[Mohamed El Marouani is the author of Abdessalam Yassine's funeral oration, who died on 13 December 2012. Sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for "conspiring against state security," El Marouani was released during the wake of the February 20 Movement. He is the founder of the Al Umma, which he hopes to transform into a political party, however, he has been barred from doing so. The following interview was orginally published in French on Salah Elayoubi's blog and translated to English by Allison L. McManus.]
Ahmed Benseddik and Salah Elayaoubi (AB and SE): We remember the eulogy that you gave at the funeral of Sheikh Yassine. Those of us who did not know you could appreciate your talents as an orator given the severe charges you delivered against those whom you described as “normalizers and collaborators in tyranny and corruption.” Who are you, Mohamed El Marouani?
Mohamed El Marouani (ME): Licensed in economic science, with a focus in econometrics, and with a diploma in superior studies (Études Supérieures DES) in management, I am a researcher of questions regarding political Islamic thought. I am actually preparing a doctoral dissertation on “the theory of the legitimacy of political power in Islam.”
Married and the father of three children, I am the senior manager and director of studies at Maroc Telecom and previously held a position at the National Institute of Post and Telecommunications' management cycle.
President and founder of the Movement for the Oumma from 1998 to 2011, I am the national coordinator for the party of the same name. Ex-activist and union official, I have also founded numerous civic associations, and coordinated and participated in actions in the defense of human rights (debates or demonstrations in protest or in solidarity with political prisoners or prisoners of conscience.)
Ex-political detainee, I was condemned to twenty-five years in prison, reduced to ten years on appeal, before being liberated on 14 April 2011 in the wake of the protests of the February 20 movement.
I am the author of several publications that address different themes including constitution and democracy, teaching, economy, and others, more notably a work on the political power of Islamic political thought--historically and contemporaneously.
AB and SE: What is your relationship with Sheikh Yassine and al Adl wal Ihsane?
ME: Sheikh Yassine was one of the few leaders in this country who continuously and relentlessly demonstrated an unrivaled courage against despotism and corruption. His inquiries and addresses are both testaments to the grandeur of his personage. Despite incarceration, house arrest, persecution, and psychiatric confinement, he never wavered.
Moreover, the man was an intellectual; he carried a project of society, was gifted with the incontestable qualities that are necessary for leadership, as well as the charisma that goes with it. These were necessary to accompany and to advance al Adl Wal Ihsane to the important place it occupies today in the field of Moroccan politics.
The relationship that was woven, with him as much as with his organization, was based on mutual respect, cooperation and solidarity.
AB and SE: You were condemned to twenty five years in prison before having been pardoned by the king? What were the circumstances of your arrest and condemnation?
ME: Since 2006, the makhzen (network of Morocco's political and business elite) has been putting into place a political security plan to restructure, or rather reformat, the political scene in Morocco, of which the major guidelines are:
- Dismantling (forcible or consensual) of the administrative parties to rework a political context that is adequate to the needs of the makhzen.
- Repression of independent media.
- Weakening of the electoral mission of the PJD (according to the political plan, the PJD no longer represents any threat to the makhzeni political regime).
- Undertaking of a security surveillance operation against al Adl Wal Ihsane in an attempt to contain them, as was well indicated by P. Vermeren in his work The Unfinished Transition.
It is in this political context that our arrest and condemnation unfolded. The makhzen has developed the habit of authorizing only the parties that conformed to its political vision. They were not able to civically authorize a political party that would retain its liberty and autonomy, illustrating the makhzen’s despotic nature. Having failed to subjugate the party and to convince its leaders, they decided to muzzle us and began an inequitable court process where the presumption of innocence was knowingly violated by the Minister of the Interior at the time, Chakib Benmoussa. The judgment fit--unequalled mediocrity.
AB and SE: How were you so severely condemned one day, and just a little while later, purely and simply liberated? Was this not another proof of the same methods of manipulation and dissuasion that are applied by the makhzen? And is that not a confession of your innocence, and maybe that of others who have been condemned as well?
ME: No doubt about this! The makhzen was persuaded that conditions were ripe to install its hegemony in the political field. It would not depart from the same Keynesian approach that all despotic regimes have: “In the long run, we are all dead.” The project, always the same, is to break down all contestation of, or the tentative struggle against, despotism, and corruption.
But it did not count on the February 20 movement, which, in the wake of what has been called “the Arab Spring,” to counteract its plans and essentially become our liberation. It was a justified response for those who attempted to undermine our most basic rights and tarnish our reputation, and to cut us at the base and alienate us from the public.
But if our liberation was a reversal for the makhzen that had always privileged the option of security over development strategy, I must say, there is a damper on this victory: other Islamist detainees continue to languish in prison-- a sort of currency exchange to contain the ongoing change in our political decisions. This is completely wasted, for our determination to fight peacefully for the establishment of a true rule of law where Moroccans might enjoy a decent life and where wealth is distributed in an equitable fashion rests intact.
AB and SE: The court of appeals has refused the constitution of the political party “Al Oumma” that you have put forth since its creation. It is without a doubt a sign that you are still under watch, despite the grace that you have received. Is the refusal justified?
ME: To our great misfortune, the judicial branch is not independent and suffers profound structural problems. An example: the Administrative Tribunal declared it was opposed to the constitution of the Al Oumma party, even though the royal delegate for the Defense of Rights and Law, a neutral party, had handed down a favorable judgment. It was a scandalous verdict, especially knowing that the judgment had been based on issues regarding the registration of electoral rolls, a ministerial decision, and in flagrant violation of the law.
In reality, the refusal to authorize the party’s constitution was purely political and cannot be disassociated with the general context--that context involving the repression of liberties, fabricated processes against the activists of the February 20 movement, and political imprisonment under inhumane conditions.
AB and SE: Many amongst the February 20 protesters seemed convinced that a deal – by all means informal – had been tacitly agreed to between the PJD and Al Adl Wal Ihsane, as well as other Islamist movements, to give Benkirane and his government a chance to experiment with their political program. Some of them suspect that this was an accord under the auspices of makhzeni instigation. They are suggesting treason. What do you think of this?
ME: I can not permit myself to respond in their place. You could always ask them this question. As for what concerns us, our positions remain unchanged as long as the actual context remains the same. We are still on the side of the oppressed, opposed to despotism, tyranny, and corruption. The retreat of al Adl Wal Ihsane, with whom we share a good number of viewpoints, was an internal political decision on their part. We must respect it. Moreover, if they have left the demonstrations, they have not left the scene, but rather affirmed their own political line. Finally, it is necessary to underline that nobody ever suspects al Adl Wal Ihsane of having pursued power.
AB and SE: In Tunisia and Egypt, the Islamists’ first reaction in the aftermath of the revolution seemed to be one of doing battle with the secular movements, of searching for their own constitutional installation, while using sharia as a menace without ever putting forth democratic solutions. Where is the place for democracy in your mind?
ME: First of all, it is necessary for us to add some nuance to this topic. What is happening in Tunisia and Egypt does not have anything to do with adopting democracy or not. Egypt and Tunisia are living through a period of democratic transition that we can liken to a “turbulence zone.” In such a context, we can expect two types of events; events that we can qualify as normal or natural, tied to political debate that mobilize civil society and put in place diverse political projects: nationalist, liberal, leftist, and Islamist. This diversity is taken to be a sign of the good health of a democracy and of the richness of exchanges, as the last word belongs to the people via transparent elections in the context of freedom. It is the path borrowed from every democracy. The other kinds of events are linked to remnants from the ousted regime that wish to destabilize the democratic process.
Every democratic transition has known moments of tension that have passed as soon as a political and constitutional framework has been put in place.
As for democracy, it remains the best system humanity has ever attempted in order to organize civil society and to manage strategic decision making. Recall that the state in Islamic thought is a civil state that can take any form possible in accordance with the consent of members of society. Our political project is articulated around two axes: the people as the source of power, and the sovereignty of the law. Nevertheless, it is necessary to distinguish between the source of power and the source of law. We can draw the conclusion that everything depends on the will of the people and this is the principal rule of democracy: the respect of the majority without compromising the rights of minorities and the political opposition.
AB and SE: You have not failed to address the political messages of the PJD. What assessment can you make following this government's first year in power?
ME: I believe the government is the product of the political context and cannot act beyond its political and constitutional limits. It is the reason why we have not witnessed a fundamental change in the strategic choices of Benkirane’s government. A simple example: the regime continues to oppose our right to expression and organization.
Three conditions need to be met to be able judge whether or not the government is efficient: broad popular support, a sound and open political context and a democratic constitutional framework. On the side of political support, polls do not pass the figure of twenty-seven percent. The political climate is marked by political imprisonments, the repression of the right to expression and organization. The constitutional framework is marked by the hegemony of the royal institution. Moreover, the following figures illustrate the worsening state of affairs:
- Democray Index: Morocco went from number 116 in 2010 and 119 in 2011, anchoring Morocco in the sphere of totalitarian countries, while Tunisia went from 144 to ninety-four in the same period, permitting it to leave this sphere and to earn a place as a hybrid regime in the course of installing democracy.
- Corruption Index: Morocco went from number eighty in 2011 to eighty-eight in 2012 according to a report by Transparency International.
- Concerning freedoms, Morocco experienced a fall in freedom of the press from the 135 place in 2010 to the 138 in 2011, according to the Reporters Without Borders' report on freedom of the press in 2012.
The constitution leaves no freedom for political development in exercising power or applying programs. With the monarchy as executive, they are servants of power despite their good democratic spirit.
It is thus not an exaggeration to say that the government has actually succeeded in playing the role of the regime’s devoted stooge. In running into the arms of the makhzen, they have returned us to the era of lead. We can see that the camp of despotism is dominating.
AB and SE: Wikileaks, as well as the book The Predator King evoke the implication that the king and his entourage are party to abuses of power, extreme corruption, and multiple scandals, including acts of economic predation. The palace has never denied these two sources. Why in your opinion?
ME: The royal institution has a spokesperson whose responsibility is to reply to these accusations. His deafening silence signifies assent.
AB and SE: How do you grapple with the political situation in Morocco and its future?
ME: The makhzen persists in its guilty ignorance of the popular discontent expressed in the street. It refuses to honor its own assurances for a democratic transition and its social and economic promises. The law and fundamental liberties continue to be trampled in a political field that has been extinguished. Many conditions make me think that the ingredients for a new wave of revolt are now coming together.