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Egypt Media Roundup (November 9)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.] 

Political Rights

Prosecution freezes assets of Al-Masry Al-Youm co-founder Salah Diab Egypt's prosecution ordered the freezing of owner and co-founder of Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper Salah Diab's assets, alleging that he appropriated state lands

Al-Masry Al-Youm owner Salah Diab arrested Co-founder and owner of privately owned Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper Salah Diab was arrested along with his son on Sunday morning on charges of corruption, the state-owned Al-Ahram reported.

Hossam Bahgat's lawyers awaiting decision of Military Prosecution Prosecution charged Bahgat with publishing false news that harms national interests and disseminating information that disturbs public peace, according to lawyers.

Egyptian investigative reporter Hossam Bahgat summoned by Military prosecution Bahgat has written a number of investigative reports for Mada Masr, including an expose involving military officers.

Sisi criticizes media for coverage of floods in Alexandria during televised speech In a lengthy televised address on Sunday, Sisi criticized media coverage of the deadly floods in Alexandria and observed a minute’s silence for the victims of Saturday’s Russian plane crash in Sinai.

Egypt's Journalists union defends media's right to criticism following Sisi's complaints Egypt's Journalists Syndicate defended on Monday the right of media workers to express views critical of authorities in the wake of President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi's accusation that media criticism of his performance was uncalled for and unprofessional.

New plans to regulate digital media The draft press and media law may end up stifling the nascent electronic media scene under the pretext of organizing it.

Novelist and editor accused of publishing sexual content to go to court on November 14 The case against novelist Ahmed Naji and Tarek al-Taher, editor-in-chief of Akhbar al-Adab, will go to court on 14 November, Naji's lawyer confirmed to Mada Masr on Tuesday.

HRW: Dozens of Egyptians illegally banned from travel Egyptian authorities have illegally prevented dozens of people from leaving the country over the past year, according to a report released Sunday by the New York-based Human Rights Watch (HRW).

Award-winning detainee highlights deteriorating prison conditions Detained human rights lawyer Mahienour al-Massry told family members of deteriorating conditions in Damanhour Prison during their visit with her on Saturday. 

Esraa al-Taweel begs for medical care as judge extends her detention by 45 days Detainee Esraa al-Taweel sobbed as a judge renewed her pre-trial detention for another forty-five days on Monday. She begged the court to let her go home and receive critically needed medical treatment, her lawyer told Mada Masr.

Interior Ministry: Esraa al-Taweel has been receiving medical treatment Assistant to the Interior Minister General Abu Bakr Abdel Rahim alleged that detained student Esraa al-Taweel has been receiving medical treatment, contradicting statements from both Taweel’s family and the Doctors Syndicate.

Rights groups launch week-long campaign against forced disappearances A group of rights organizations and movements have announced the launch of a campaign against forced disappearances, a practice that has become increasingly prevalent in Egypt over the past year.

Activists launch campaign against forced disappearance, state denies involvement Egyptian activists and lawyers started a week-long solidarity campaign against alleged forced disappearance by the government, while the government denies holding anyone without charges.

Brotherhood supreme guide Badie granted retrial after appealing life in prison Egypt's Court of Cassation overturned Sunday the life sentences of the Muslim Brotherhood's Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie and eight others, who will face a retrial for accusations of murder and inciting violence. 

Egyptian court overturns convictions of 77 Morsi-supporters on violence-related charges The court ordered a retrial for the seventy-seven defendants who were originally sentenced to five to ten years in prison.

Prosecution unauthorized to list Brotherhood leaders as terrorists: Egypt Cassation Court The Cassation Court issued a decision in September to reject an appeal by MB leaders to be removed from the “terrorism list” after they were listed on it by a prosecution decision.

Egypt court reduces jail terms for Brotherhood leaders Beltagy and Hegazy in torture case The appeals court reduced the sentences from twenty to ten years in prison on charges of torturing two policemen in 2013.

Death sentences handed to Egypt’s Islamists merely preliminary, Sisi tells BBC Despite criticism in the UK against what some claim to be government repression, Britain is welcoming Sisi, who assured that Egypt is committed to democracy and is doing what is necessary within the law to combat terrorism.

Egyptian man sentenced to life in prison for torching church in 2013 The man is charged with arson attack against church in Kerdasa district in Giza governorate in August 2013.

Egypt court postpones Mubarak's final murder retrial Egypt's highest appeals court adjourned until 21 January the final trial of former president Hosni Mubarak over involvement in the killing of demonstrators during the 2011 uprising that ended his thirty-year rule.

Al-Azhar head 'rejects efforts' to convert Egyptian youth to Shiism"We have seen huge funds being paid to convert Sunni youth to the Shia sect, and that is what we reject," El-Tayeb said during his weekly address on Friday, which is broadcast on a state TV channel.

Brotherhood, 6 of April & Revolutionary Socialists banned from Egypt student union elections The Egyptian Ministry of Higher Education will start accepting candidacy applications on Monday for student union elections after announcing the exclusion of students belonging to the banned Muslim Brotherhood, the 6th of April Youth Movement, and the Revolutionary Socialists.

Lawyers' Syndicate elections kick off, annulment looming The Lawyers' Syndicate's elections are kicking off Sunday, with uncertainty surrounding the judicially-supervised process, due to several challenges to its legality.

Student nurses arrested for protesting lack of state recognition and jobs Police forces dispersed a protest in Kasr al-Aini Street by a few hundred student nurses from a private institute who were demanding government employment on Sunday.

Foreign Policy

Amnesty calls on British PM to raise human rights concerns with Sisi Amnesty International urged British Prime Minister David Cameron to raise “key human rights concerns” with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who is due to visit the UK later this week.

Protests punctuate Sisi's first day in London Protesters for and against President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi gathered on London's Downing Street Thursday morning after he arrived in the UK to meet with British Prime Minister David Cameron.

Egypt quietly signs agreements with UK as talks of Sinai plane crash dominate Sisi's London trip The MOU stipulated that a training program would be developed at Cambridge University to improve Egyptian testing and admission practices as part of bilateral efforts to improve higher education. The agreement also seeks to improve security coordination, especially in terms of staunching ideological extremism and preventing undocumented migration.

Exiled Egyptian activist asks Congress to halt aid to Cairo“The current regime in Egypt has no interest in granting basic liberties to their people. Freedom for the general population does not promote the interests of the Egyptian military industrial complex,” Mohamed Salah Sultan said in his testimony Tuesday to Congress and the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission.

Construction of Ethiopian Renaissance dam moving faster than dam talks: Egyptian irrigation minister The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is going ahead at a faster pace than the talks on the dam between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, Egyptian Minister of Irrigation Hossam Moghazi said on Saturday. 

Russian Airliner Crash

Russian airliner crash kills 224 in Egypt's Sinai; causes not yet determined A Russian airliner crashed in Egypt's central Sinai Saturday, killing all 217 passengers and seven crew members.

Egypt asserts airports are safe after UK suspends flights Civil Aviation Minister spoke out on Thursday against the UK's decision to halt flights to Sharm el-Sheikh after a Russian plane crashed in Sinai in unknown circumstances.

Egypt plays defense as investigations into Sinai plane crash continue Five days after a Russian plane crashed in the Sinai desert, killing all 224 people aboard, the Egyptian government has focused on defending its security standards and discrediting theories suggesting a terrorist attack was behind the tragedy.

US satellite recorded heat flash over Sinai at time of Russian plane crash Experts believe the flash may have been the result of a fuel tank or engine explosion, though they have not ruled out the possibility of an on-board bomb.

Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis insists it downed Russian plane, but refuses to provide evidence The group says that it downed the plane on its anniversary of pledging allegiance to the leader of ISIS.

Obama says bomb may have caused Egypt plane crash Reports indicate that authorities intercepted militant communications suggesting the incident was a terrorist attack, although officials say it is too early to be sure.

Britain, U.S. intercepted 'chatter' supporting theory bomb took down Russian jet over Sinai British and U.S. spies intercepted "chatter" from suspected militants and at least one other government suggesting that a bomb, possibly hidden in luggage in the hold, downed a Russian airliner on Saturday, killing all 224 people on board, Western intelligence sources said.

Black boxes point to bomb behind Russian plane crash over Egypt's Sinai: Source An analysis of black boxes from the Russian airliner that crashed in Egypt on Saturday point to a bomb attack, sources close to the probe said Friday, as Moscow halted flights to the country.

Too early to reach conclusion on Russian plane downed in Sinai - Egypt investigator It is still too soon to determine what caused the crash of a Russian airliner in Sinai last week, the Egyptian head of the committee investigating the crash said at a news conference in Cairo on Saturday afternoon.

CNN: Black boxes show bomb brought down Russian jet CNN Aviation Analyst Richard Quest said there would have been different data on the black boxes if there was a catastrophic failure than if there was an explosion. The key is what happened just before the data suddenly stops, he said.

Bomb by Islamic State likely caused Russian plane crash: security sources Evidence now suggests that a bomb planted by the Islamic State militant group is the likely cause of last weekend's crash of a Russian airliner over Egypt's Sinai peninsula, US and European security sources said on Wednesday.

US official: '99.9% certain' Russian plane was felled by bomb Several senior administration officials in the intelligence, military and national security community told CNN the United States is almost positive a Russian passenger jet was brought down by a bomb.

Investigators '90% sure' that bomb went off on Russian flight: member of investigation team Investigators of the Russian plane crash in Egypt are "Ninety percent sure" the noise heard in the final second of a cockpit recording was an explosion caused by a bomb, a member of the investigation team told Reuters on Sunday.

Sharm el-Sheikh airport officials reveal porous security The airport at Egypt's resort of Sharm el-Sheikh has long seen gaps in security, including a key baggage scanning device that often is not functioning and lax searches at an entry gate for food and fuel for the planes, security officials at the airport told The Associated Press.

Elections

Independents, For the Love of Egypt dominate elections runoff The High Elections Council released the official results for the runoffs of the first stage of parliamentary elections on Saturday, revealing that independents and candidates from the For the Love of Egypt list won the majority of seats.

Coalition cabinet is best for Egypt: Free Egyptians Party official The formation of a coalition cabinet is the most appropriate for Egypt as no political party gained an absolute majority in the first round of parliamentary elections, said Assistant Secretary General of the Free Egyptians Party Ayman Aboul Ela on Monday.

Head of electoral list: None of the candidates qualify for speaker Sameh Seif al-Yazal, the general coordinator of For the Love of Egypt list, speculated in an interview with Al-Arabiya that the upcoming parliament’s speaker will be one of the MPs appointed by the president.

Free Egyptians Party to support Adly Mansour as Parliament speaker Emad Gad of the Free Egyptians Party said in a press statement on Tuesday that the party would support former Interim President Adly Mansour if he is appointed Parliament speaker.

For the Love of Egypt seeks alliances to secure parliament majority An electoral list that scored a landslide victory during the first round of elections for the 568-seat House of Representatives will seek alliances with fellow member parties and independents to secure a parliamentary majority.

Leftists field 19 candidates in 2nd round of elections Egypt’s four leftist political parties are fielding nineteen candidates in the second round of parliamentary elections slated for 22 November, hoping to make up for a zero-gain in the first round.

Domestic Security

6 killed in Arish car bombing, Province of Sinai claims responsibility A car bomb targeting a police club in Arish on Wednesday killed six people and injured ten, Reuters reported.

11 dead in Beheira as flood waters rise in several areas nationwide Eleven people died in the northern governorate of Beheira as a result of bad weather and flooding, which also hit Alexandria and Sinai.

Economy

Budget deficit 11.5% in 2014/15, failing to meet Sisi's 10% target Egypt’s budget deficit for fiscal year 2014/15 amounted to 11.5 percent of GDP, the Finance Ministry announced.

State takes stopgap measures to combat rising food prices Egypt’s Supply Ministry distributed food to 4,000 outlets, to be sold at twenty percent below market value, in order to artificially combat rising food prices, the state-owned Al-Ahram newspaper reported on Tuesday.

From Jadaliyya Egypt

Egypt: What Elections? Jonathan Rashad presents a photoessay highlighting the indifference of Egyptians toward the ongoing legislative elections. 


Early Spring in Jordan: The Revolt of the Military Veterans

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The Jordanian Hirak grassroots movement of 2011–2013 is increasingly being recognized as a social and political protest movement born out of discontent in East Bank hinterlands long thought to be home to unflagging supporters of Jordan’s autocratic regime. The movement’s foundations were laid in the spring of 2010 by a revolt of Jordanian military veterans that combined an East Bank nationalism critical of the government’s approach to the Palestine question with an opposition to neoliberal economic reforms that had come to dominate policymaking under King Abdullah II.

Taken together, the two strands reflected a rising tide of political contention in Hashemite Jordan that had built up steadily over the preceding two decades. Starting with riots triggered by subsidy cuts imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1989, tribal Transjordanians—rather than the largely urban Jordanians of Palestinian origin who had been the mainstay of opposition in the 1950s and 1960s—protested against economic liberalization, the monarchy’s US-aligned foreign policy, and Jordan’s attempt to normalize relations with Israel.

The rise in East Bank discontent since 1989 sits uneasily with traditional views of Hashemite Jordan as a modernist monarchy protected by an army of East Bank tribesmen in uniform, whose loyalty was culturally ordained or politically inevitable. Nonetheless, recent upheavals reflect a mounting tide of East Bank protest against the erosion of the social compact underpinning Hashemite rule. This was based on a militarized welfare regime that provided the East Bank population with secure employment and social provision, ensuring the loyalty of the security establishment and cohesion of the Jordanian state.1 

Even after the IMF-enforced cutbacks during the last decade of King Hussein’s 1952–1999 rule, the military for all intents and purposes remained an “unflinching protector of the existing order,” in the words of Asher Susser of Tel Aviv University. But a militarized liberalization of the Jordanian state beginning in 1989 started to shift entitlements away from the East Bank population at large toward a strengthened military.

After King Abdullah II ascended the throne in 1999, more extensive neoliberal reforms were pursued. Driven by Abdullah’s conciliation of a largely Palestinian business elite, an ongoing struggle emerged within the upper levels of the monarchical regime. This coalition shuffling pitted the traditionally dominant and largely Transjordanian military-bureaucratic elite against an upstart coterie of younger, more entrepreneurial digitals—urban-based, globalized rivals with ties to capital networks in the Gulf.

The global financial crisis and commodity price spikes of 2007–2008 overlapped with rising discontent among public sector workers who hailed from the East Bank hinterlands. By spring 2010, military veterans politicized by the government’s plans to restructure the armed forces and rationalize military spending had been drawn into the protest movement. The National Committee for Retired Servicemen (NCRS), egged on by dissident East Bank elites invested in Jordanian nationalism, joined protesting dockworkers and teachers unhappy with accelerating privatization schemes and educational reforms. The social movement launched by these protests morphed into the East Bank Hirak after a so-called jasmine wave of uprisings swept across the Arab world in 2011.

The Jordanian regime was able to ride out an essentially reformist protest movement by playing on communal fragmentation and by offering makrumat (royal dispensations in the form of material favors) funded by Gulf aid. These tactics ensured the loyalty of the veterans’ movement while also blunting the challenge posed by the loose coalition of East Bank nationalists that coalesced around the NCRS.

As the Gulf-led counterrevolution against the Arab uprisings gathered pace from 2011 onward, the regime put on hold promises to move toward a constitutional monarchy. Instead, the government made largely cosmetic political and constitutional reforms that served to isolate and contain both the NCRS and the Hirak. This culminated in a decisive victory for the autocratic elements of the regime after the success of its supporters in the January 2013 parliamentary election.

Rentier Politics and the Jordanian Military

Jordan’s militarized welfare regime was a child of the Cold War and of the rapid expansion of the Arab Legion established under British colonial rule from a corps d’elite to a mass army in the decade after Jordan’s formal independence in 1946. Buttressed by US support after the departure of the British in 1957, and rationalized in the course of state building in the early 1960s, this sociopolitical pact allowed the Jordanian monarchy to survive the high tide of Arab radicalism and the rise of Palestinian nationalism after the loss of the West Bank to Israel in the Six-Day War of June 1967.

The expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Jordan after the country’s 1970–1971 civil war coincided with the end of the 1954–1971 Arab Cold War and ushered in a new regional order built on tharwa (wealth) rather than thawra (revolution). Coupled with increased aid payments allocated to Jordan at the 1974 Rabat and 1978 Baghdad Arab League summits, King Hussein was able to consolidate a new ruling bargain in Amman that gave military and bureaucratic privileges to East Bankers while allowing the Palestinian domination of the private sector. Hussein’s new coalition brought together Transjordanian peasant investors enriched by land sales, a newly educated rural middle class, and the traditionally dominant mercantile and military bureaucratic elite. As a result, the king was able to exert virtually unchallenged authority over Jordanian affairs.

Despite the veneer of prosperity brought by the inflow of new rents, martial law—imposed in 1967—remained in effect, and the power of the General Intelligence Department (GID), or Mukhabarat, was unchecked. Former heads of the GID held the premiership for most of the decade after 1976, overseeing the expansion and Transjordanization of the state apparatus, with the Mukhabarat in effect becoming the executive arm of a sultanistic palace. Mukhabarat allies came to dominate cabinet positions and the security forces, holding most of the crucial posts in a burgeoning bureaucracy.

A broad divide emerged between a public sector that catered to the interests of East Bankers and a private one largely under Palestinian control. Paradoxically, this communal division of labor went hand in hand with a pattern of uneven development in which the rural hinterlands lagged behind the urban areas, and in which the overwhelmingly Transjordanian south and east of the country were plagued by a higher incidence of poverty than the largely Palestinian cities.

By the early 1990s, the army and civil service employed some forty-seven percent of Jordanians of working age. Defense budgets supported hundreds of thousands of military pensioners and funded a widening array of ancillary services ranging from advanced medical treatment in the King Hussein Medical Center to university placement under a royal dispensation that ensured preferential admission for the children of military personnel. Special shops sold goods to soldiers’ families at subsidized prices, blunting the impact of inflation and stretching the purchasing power of military pay packets.2 

In the two decades after the 1970–1971 civil war, the efficacy of Jordan’s militarized welfare regime was eroded by the uneven development of the East Bank and the rising expectations brought about by urbanization and migration to the Gulf. By the time King Hussein ended Amman’s legal and administrative (although, importantly, not its constitutional) ties with the West Bank in July 1988, dependence on government-disbursed entitlements and more affluent lifestyles modeled on Gulf living standards had raised the fiscal burden of the military welfare regime to levels that Jordan could not sustain.

By 1989, the demands of a bloated public sector, combined with the drain of the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War and arms imports of dubious necessity, had pushed Jordan into economic crisis and forced the government’s resort to IMF-directed economic retrenchment.3 

Once Jordan’s economy came under IMF tutelage in the spring of 1989, high external debt levels ensured that government-disbursed entitlements would be in effect curtailed by the devaluation of the Jordanian dinar and donor-imposed structural adjustment policies. The anti-austerity riots that broke out in response to the cutbacks were concentrated in the Transjordanian hinterlands. Socioeconomic dependence on the state determined the geography of protest: over 90 percent of the employed labor force in the southern governorates of Maan, al-Karak, and Tafilah worked in the public sector, in contrast to only fifty to sixty percent in the populous and more prosperous urban centers of Amman, al-Zarqa, and Irbid.

Troubles in the East Bank Hinterlands

Faced with upheaval in areas long considered bastions of loyalty to the Hashemite monarchy, the regime resorted to parliamentary representation to defuse popular anger and redirect state patronage toward the East Bank hinterlands. Legislative elections, which had been suspended after the June 1967 war, were held regularly again as of 1989, but electoral districts were gerrymandered to over-represent East Bankers—and, in particular, the southern heartlands that had sparked the 1989 riots.

But the restoration of parliamentary life failed to compensate for decades of developmental bias toward the towns with mixed Palestinian-Transjordanian populations. As a result, the troubles in the East Bank hinterlands continued with bread riots in al-Karak in 1996 and demonstrations in support of the then Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in Maan in 1998.

Although East Bank discontent was a thorn in the monarchy’s side, it posed a minimal threat due to its parochial origins and limited political aims. The signal revolts that this discontent generated were aimed at attracting the attention of the king and were easily contained by royal visits or GID manipulation of patronage-based politics in the parliament. Bereft of elite support, contentious politics in the East Bank hinterlands failed to generate organized political parties or cohesive social movements, degenerating instead into largely asocial corruption and noncompliance.

By 2009, mafias, smuggling, and protection rackets had created a slew of security black spots, which were often concentrated in tribal centers such as al-Lubban and al-Shunah or in East Bank urban quarters like Hayy al-Tafaylah in Central Amman. This went hand in hand with a quiet encroachment by Jordanians of tribal origins who sought positions on the lower rungs of the state bureaucracy and laid claim to public spaces they looked upon as clan property.

Once King Hussein signed the Wadi Arabah peace treaty with Israel in 1994, East Bankers became vocal critics because the accord failed to expedite the return of Palestinian refugees from the kingdom. Hitherto loyal and eminently tribal members of the elite—most notably Ahmad Obeidat, a former prime minister and GID director between 1973 and 1984—cooperated with leftists and the Islamic Action Front, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, to resist rapid normalization with Israel.

The more radical East Bank nationalists raised the specter of an alternative Palestinian homeland being established in Jordan. They argued that the monarchy’s backpedaling on the issue of refugee returns and its failure to complete disengagement from the West Bank kept open the possibility of a future federal or confederal relationship with the Palestinian National Authority that had emerged in the West Bank after the 1993 Oslo Accord between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

The party political opposition that appeared after 1989, along with the coalition of activists that gathered around organizations such as the Association for Combating Zionism after the Wadi Arabah treaty, failed to tap into East Bank discontent. The Islamic Action Front—the only political party of any real sociopolitical weight and, with its parent body the Muslim Brotherhood, the most significant component of the antinormalization campaign—had always rejected Hussein’s 1988 disengagement from the West Bank and retained strong ties with the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas.

Together with other Islamist currents active in Jordan, the Brotherhood made little attempt to expand its support beyond the refugee camps of eastern Amman, al-Zarqa, and Irbid. Islamic Action Front politics—oriented toward political reformists and the pious middle class—focused increasingly on supporting Hamas’s strategy in Palestine. This brought the movement into conflict with the Palestinian National Authority and its beneficiaries among the East Bank business elite, but posed little threat to Hussein.

Politics and Economics Under Abdullah’s Fourth Kingdom

The overall thrust of King Abdullah II’s governance was to reconfigure the social bases of Hashemite support while maintaining the monarchy’s ties to the military. This seemed necessary “to secure [the] regime [after] the eruption of the second Intifada and the American invasion of Iraq,” to quote Columbia University’s Joseph Massad, and because Abdullah faced a potential succession challenge from his younger half-brother Crown Prince Hamzah.

In response, Abdullah appointed former generals to such posts as prime minister and chief of the Royal Court, and he took special care to reward the upper echelons of the officer corps and the elite Special Operations Command, which was also assigned control of the palace guard. The new king consolidated his hold on the GID as well: in 2003, a televised trial on corruption charges ended the career of Samih al-Battikhi, the Mukhabarat kingpin who had overseen the succession process.

Abdullah also sought to shore up his internal base by launching a Jordan First campaign in October 2002 that had an explicitly East Bank orientation.4 These moves unfolded, however, against a backdrop of economic retrenchment that went hand in hand with a new liberal bargain and a greater role for the largely Palestinian private sector in Jordan’s economy. Despite his military background and previous military service, as well as his tenure as head of the Special Operations Command, Abdullah’s closest associates were in fact neoliberal technocrats or like-minded entrepreneurs recruited from a newly formed Economic Consultative Council.

The pace of neoliberal reform quickened under the influence of Bassem Awadallah, the most prominent adviser to the palace. Doubling as the regime’s chief economic planner and its main interlocutor with the U.S. Agency for International Development and the IMF, Awadallah oversaw the dismembering of publicly owned mining, energy, and telecom firms. These sectors had been dominated by large public enterprises whose entitlements had formed one of the main pillars of Mukhabarat patronage, binding the large class of educated East Bankers that had emerged in the oil era to the monarchy.

Awadallah and his associates also oversaw the sale of fixed military assets. Army-owned real estate was placed under the aegis of a palace-controlled semipublic enterprise called Mawared, which then sold the new army headquarters and army lands that were needed for the massive Abdali urban development project. There were also plans for the divestment of the King Hussein Medical Center in 2008, but protest by East Bank tribal leaders managed to put the project on hold.

Many East Bankers viewed these neoliberal policies and proposals as empowering Palestinian-Jordanians at their own expense. While Awadallah was the politician most associated with Palestinian-Jordanians, the lightning rod for resentment was Queen Rania, herself a Palestinian-Jordanian raised in Kuwait. For many East Bankers, her rise (and the specter of her son Hussein II’s eventual coronation) seemed to confirm the transformation of Hashemite Jordan from a regime based on a Transjordanian assabiyyah (group feeling) into an alternative Palestinian homeland.

The Reconfiguration of Military Politics Under Abdullah

Given King Abdullah II’s inheritance of a hefty 450 million dollars annual defense budget and large foreign debt levels totaling eight billion dollars, cuts to the armed forces and their welfare regime were to be expected.5 Amid these fiscal circumstances, Abdullah adopted a strategy of militarized neoliberalism that called for restructuring the Jordanian army, reducing its dependence on heavy armor and artillery, and cutting down on the social services provided to military personnel. For the younger cohorts, austerity budgets precipitated plans for a merger of military pensions with the civilian benefits system administered by the Social Security Corporation. As these trends deepened, they affected the orientation of the members of the officially established Organization of Military Retirees and, more importantly, catalyzed the emergence of a new National Committee of Retired Servicemen (NCRS) that would play a key role in the Hirak.

Plans for a smaller, leaner military used mainly for commercial security services, peacekeeping, and asymmetric warfare had been in the air under King Hussein.6 Indeed, some army veterans argued that secret clauses of the Wadi Arabah treaty allowed for drawing down the Jordanian military’s deterrence capacity along the border with Israel. These trends seem to have accelerated under Abdullah, however, on some accounts leading to the de facto emergence of a two-tier military: a privileged tier comprising the uppermost levels of the officer corps and such units as the Special Operations Command; and a residual group comprising artillery, armor, and the bulk of the rank and file.

Particular attention was given to a new gendarmerie (al-Darak), a 30,000-strong constabulary distinct from the Public Security Directorate, the body historically responsible for the police and law enforcement agencies. The establishment of the gendarmerie marked a shift in the regime’s ethnic security map on a scale that paralleled the changes that followed the 1970–1971 civil war. According to one of its longest-serving ex-officers, the gendarmerie’s composition was supposed to be only one-third Transjordanian, with Palestinians and recruits from tribes that straddled Jordan’s borders with Syria supplying the remainder. Abdullah clearly conceived the Darak as the regime’s main internal strike force—the cutting edge of a muscular neoliberalism that could deal effectively with internal dissent.

Plans for a major Palestinian component in the Darak foundered because of the East Bank’s parochial social networks, the source of enduring ties to the military institution still used to maintain Transjordanian access to employment. Anecdotal evidence indicates that Palestinian-Jordanians formed no more than 15 percent of the force in 2011. However, two trends were altering the profile of the military welfare regime as a whole: One was the steady shrinking of Jordan’s active service personnel as a proportion of a young and growing population. The other was the extension of royal dispensations—university scholarships and student aid schemes that were once the preserve of the monarchy’s military and the tribal base—to the Palestinian refugee camps.

The result was to galvanize the politics of military veterans and, in the process, upend the Organization of Military Retirees, which was formally charged with aiding Jordan’s 170,000-plus military pensioners. The NCRS emerged from the network of 80–100 cooperatives run by the organization, according to figures provided by Salim al-Ifat, the committee’s secretary general. A few years into King Abdullah II’s reign, the committee won royal endorsement for a more active role in development and national security. The NCRS’s leading activist, Ali al-Habashnah, marketed the veterans’ movement to the palace as a royalist phalanx that could help safeguard Hashemite rule. However, the NCRS proved peculiarly resistant to external manipulation due to its complex voting and decisionmaking procedures, which privileged the regular army over the security services and restricted retirees ranked at or above major general to an advisory role.

By the time the global commodity spike in 2008–2009 had begun impacting the real incomes of Jordanians, an organized, overwhelmingly Transjordanian pressure group had emerged from within the central power structures of the regime. The group’s base was drawn from those most affected by neoliberal economic restructuring and the Wadi Arabah accord. Moreover, this occurred at a time when the inflationary boom that followed the U.S. invasion of Iraq was eroding the real income of Jordanians earning fixed salaries, and as regime initiatives to improve the financial lot of military pensioners were aligning the economic interests of army veterans more closely with the civilian mainstream.

The Revolt of Jordan’s Military Veterans

A fierce crackdown on Maan in 2002 deterred discontent in the East Bank hinterlands throughout the first decade of King Abdullah II’s reign, restricting popular protest to largely symbolic demonstrations in Amman during Israel’s assaults on the West Bank city of Jenin, Lebanon, and Gaza between 2002 and 2009. Public protest was largely confined to the capital, while East Bank dissent was expressed mostly through chants hostile to Queen Rania during football matches between the Wehdat and Faisaly clubs, commonly viewed as Palestinian and Transjordanian respectively.7 

For its part, the political mainstream was shackled by Abdullah’s shelving of the change agenda. Political reconfiguration was reduced to a game of musical chairs among elite factions, resulting in a series of short-lived cabinets. Intra-elite struggles reached their apogee in 2007 amid allegations—particularly strident on the part of the Islamists—of rigged parliamentary elections under the first government of retired general and former ambassador to Israel Maruf al-Bakhit.

Shifting political allegiances within the military went largely unnoticed by most oppositionists. By the end of Abdullah’s first decade in power in 2009, the impasse of oppositional Transjordanian politics was such that veteran activists of both the Left and East Bank nationalist camps were effectively withdrawing from active politics. This trend was abruptly reversed as labor agitation in Aqaba and among public sector teachers took an unexpected turn after the intervention of the NCRS in alliance with dissident members of the Jordanian elite. Over the next six months, the NCRS collaborated with a widening social movement that took on a distinctly East Bank nationalist coloring, playing a crucial role in precipitating Jordan’s version of the Arab Spring uprisings that began in 2010.

The process was sparked by the stymieing in early 2010 of the Darak’s assault on Aqaba port workers who were protesting the planned sale of the port to investors from the United Arab Emirates and the elimination of employee housing that was sure to follow. The army commander in Aqaba, who intervened directly to protect workers who had taken refuge in the nearby military hospital, played a crucial role in thwarting the repressive imposition of neoliberal directives supported by the palace. As a result, a corner was turned: Jordanian laborers had proved themselves able to challenge neoliberal policies, and workers of East Bank origin realized that the support of kinsmen and sympathizers in the military mainstream could be used effectively to confront the regime.

The success of the Aqaba protests encouraged other dissidents, not least government day workers who had been agitating for more stable livelihoods for some time. Activists among Jordan’s 105,000 public school teachers, who called for the reinstatement of the teachers’ union, which had been banned in the 1950s, also escalated their protests. Their demand to reestablish public control of education policy directly challenged the palace and led former prime minister Samir Al-Rifai to reject offers of mediation. Together with the continuing neglect of popular movements by the Islamic Action Front, this pushed the teachers toward greater reliance on agitation in the street.

Thanks to the efforts of the Alarab Alyawm newspaper columnist Nahid Hattar, the NCRS began to take an active interest in the public sector workers’ struggles in late April 2010. By then, the East Bank hinterlands were in turmoil as students joined their striking teachers and walked out of their schools in al-Karak, Ajlun, and al-Salt. Influenced by Hattar and like-minded Transjordanian radicals, the sloganeering of the teachers’ committees in al-Karak and al-Salt took on an increasingly nationalistic coloring. Activists now combined protest over socioeconomic grievances with nationalistic rhetoric about the alternative Palestinian homeland.

The NCRS’s statement of May 1, 2010, amounted to a political manifesto. Written in collaboration with radical East Bank nationalists and almost certainly in consultation with dissident elements within the Jordanian elite, it warned of a “Zionist scheme for liquidating the Palestinian Question at the expense of the Jordanian People” and published what it claimed were official figures that demonstrated a steady flow of Palestinians resident in the West Bank and Gaza across the Jordan River.

The document described this process as a soft transfer of Palestinians that was made all the more dangerous because a “narrow and unrepresentative coterie” had “monopolized cabinet formation and decision making, while preventing the Jordanian people from determining their fate and defending Jordan’s national interests.” Although the statement was careful to express loyalty to King Abdullah II, it closed with an unprecedented attack on Queen Rania, asserting that “the Jordanian constitution grants legal powers to His Majesty the King, alone and that these powers are shared by no other party regardless of kinship or title.”

The NCRS took care to argue that Palestinian-Jordanians resident in the East Bank before the 1988 disengagement were a basic component of Jordan’s national makeup; and its leaders participated enthusiastically in Palestinian-centered events commemorating the 1948 exodus or highlighting the refugees’ right of return. However, by combining a call for complete disengagement from the West Bank with a critique of the regime’s neoliberal policies, the NCRS antagonized much of Amman’s political elite.

A formidable—if ad hoc—alliance emerged that joined Palestinian-Jordanian businessmen with East Bank notables; antinormalization activists and opposition parliamentarians with defenders of the Wadi Arabah peace treaty; and the left wing of the political opposition with the Islamic Action Front. This disparate coalition circulated a widely disseminated electronic petition in direct response to the veterans’ manifesto, in effect recycling an article by Obeidat that asserted the inevitability of unity between Jordan and Palestine, reaffirmed the special and exceptional relationship that bound their peoples, and, in a clear echo of palace rhetoric, warned against untoward steps that threatened national unity.

Clashes between the NCRS and this new Pan-Jordanian coalition highlighted deep-seated disagreements over the boundaries of Jordan’s political community as well as differences over the resolution of the Palestinian question and the refugees’ right of return. Yet the popular agitation precipitated by the May 1 manifesto ensured that political momentum shifted toward various strands of radical Transjordanian nationalists. As a result, Obeidat and his allies—soon to be organized in a National Salvation Front—gained little purchase on East Bank opinion. Instead, their intervention served to move the terms of the political opposition’s agenda in a more radical direction. By fall 2010, the idea of reestablishing Jordan’s 1952 constitution and enacting a constitutional monarchy had crept into mainstream political discourse.

Jordan’s Spring in Winter

The publication of the May 1 manifesto galvanized a militant strand of East Bank radicalism that coalesced around the NCRS, demanding that entitlements be awarded as rights rather than dispensations; that citizenship no longer be granted to Palestinian residents of the West Bank or to refugees from Gaza; and that a legal framework be created to govern disengagement from the West Bank.

Beyond vague apprehensions about the alternative Palestinian homeland, most East Bank demands focused on socioeconomic issues, to which the NCRS responded with two further memorandums. First, the NCRS’s economic memorandum detailed the buildup of public debt under King Abdullah II, arguing that a more transparent process of public sector divestment—one that ensured that the full proceeds of privatization went to the public purse—would have kept public debt in check. Second, a defense manifesto, which was privately circulated for reasons of national security, documented the waste and inefficiencies of defense procurement and called for the rebuilding of credible deterrence against Israel.

With the palace and its neoliberal proponents on the defensive, the military veterans seized the political high ground. The NCRS endorsed the Muslim Brotherhood’s boycott of the November 2010 parliamentary election, effectively stripping the incumbent Rifai government of any prospect of electoral legitimacy. While a cabinet reshuffle and the onset of electioneering slowed the momentum of popular mobilization during the fall months, the committee embarked on wide-ranging talks with diverse activists and tribal groupings aimed at convening a sixth Jordanian National Congress. The NCRS and its radical allies viewed this as a means of broadening Jordan’s national identity to include the Pan-Arab politics of the pre-independence Congress movement, which existed from 1928 to 1933. However, this agenda was inevitably viewed—if somewhat unfairly—as exclusively Transjordanian by its opponents.

East Bank popular activism grew in the wake of the November 2010 election, against the backdrop of surging tribal violence in Maan, al-Karak, and al-Salt sparked by widespread perceptions of electoral fraud. The more radical members of the military veterans’ movement and the leaders of the al-Salt and al-Karak teachers’ committees joined with Hattar and other East Bank activists to launch the Progressive Jordanian Tendency. In effect, this formalized the grouping that had coordinated and publicized the popular upsurge accompanying the May 1 manifesto.

During the last quarter of 2010, the Progressive Jordanian Tendency spearheaded a new cycle of activism, with its younger members forging an effective alliance—eventually formalized as Jayyin (the ones who are coming) with young leftists, often of Palestinian origin, who were active in the Social Left nongovernmental organization, and with Islamist Transjordanians from the youth wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Irbid.

In contrast to earlier upheavals in the East Bank hinterlands, popular protest in 2010 bore rapid fruit as the military veterans added their organizational weight to the youth movement and the Islamic Action Front began to provide limited support. A demonstration in front of the Jordanian parliament in December forced the new deputies to distance themselves from the recently elected speaker of parliament and former prime minister Faysal al-Fayiz, who opposed a teachers’ union.

In the first week of January 2011, a series of demonstrations broke out in various cities and towns, bringing Jayyin together with teachers, government workers, and army veterans. On January 14, a Day of Rage saw both the veterans’ movement and the Islamists throw their full weight behind a major demonstration in Amman.

By now, the Arab Spring was in full swing. With the regime of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak tottering and the shadow of Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution spreading eastward, King Abdullah II capitulated and unceremoniously sacked the then prime minister Samir Al-Rifai. He was replaced by Maruf al-Bakhit, a former general who had been in dialogue with the NCRS and its allies for some months. Bakhit formed a new cabinet stacked with figures sympathetic to the East Bank nationalists.

From Jordanian Spring to East Bank Hirak

The Bakhit government moved quickly to promise a teachers’ union, an all-out assault on corruption, and genuine political reform. It also distanced itself from neoliberalism, advocating a third way based on a social market economy. King Abdullah II himself appeared to endorse Bakhit’s pledges in a letter of appointment urging the new cabinet to combat corruption and reform economic governance.

In the months that followed, the palace endorsed a National Dialogue Committee headed by the Palestinian-Jordanian speaker of the Senate and former prime minister Tahir al-Masri. The committee was tasked with reforming Jordan’s electoral system. A second committee was established to review constitutional amendments—in some cases stretching back to the first decade of King Hussein’s reign in the 1950s—that had over the years greatly expanded the power of the executive at the expense of the parliament and the judiciary.

At first, these reforms seemed to have little impact on East Bank opinion. A February 5, 2011, statement issued by some three dozen notables from prominent East Bank clans was more radical than the May 1 manifesto. It accused the queen and her family of financial improprieties, and warned once again of externally orchestrated campaigns aimed at naturalizing Palestinians and creating an alternative homeland for them in Jordan. It then gave notice that the compact between Jordanians and the Hashemite dynasty, once based on mutual partnership, was being violated.

The committee of 36 went on to criticize the regime’s neoliberal economic outlook, castigating the World Bank as the author of a program for Zionist-imperialist globalization and, in effect, linking Abdullah’s chosen economic reform model with Israel. The group’s statement concluded by affirming the need for liberty, equality, and democracy as the only way to deal with what it described as a revolutionary deluge that would reach Jordan sooner or later.

Despite the ratcheting up of radical Transjordanian rhetoric, both the teachers and the NCRS had taken a backseat in street mobilization efforts. Now that the new cabinet agreed to establish a union, the teachers’ committees were keen to maintain cordial relations with the government. Habashnah was inducted into the National Dialogue Committee, and King Abdullah II was careful to hold a series of high-profile meetings with a wide spectrum of retired servicemen, during which activists were allowed to express popular grievances with unusual candor.

By early 2011, the veterans’ movement had been reduced to a 30-strong rump (down from an original 70 members) due to defections and co-optation. The movement was beset by differences over strategy as well as rivalries between the NCRS and a coterie of retired major generals. However, Islamists had largely supplanted the retired servicemen and their East Bank allies in mass demonstrations in Amman. East Bank protest was largely confined to smaller outbursts in the East Bank hinterlands that came be known as the Jordanian Hirak.

More than 8,000 protests, marches, and strikes occurred between January 2011 and August 2013. But the largely Transjordanian Hirak failed to generate a unified leadership or agree on a national program, taking its direction instead from local coordination committees bound together by loose networks of mostly young activists using social media. At times, they were able to stir up spectacular anti-regime outbursts—including an assault on King Abdullah II’s motorcade in Tafilah in summer 2012 and during the vast outpouring of popular anger after IMF-imposed fuel hikes in November of the same year—but these eventually petered out.

Jordan’s communally divided political field, King Abdullah II’s and the security forces’ tact in handling demonstrations, and the practical difficulties of organizing large protests in a sprawling city such as Amman spared the kingdom from revolutionary upheaval. Abdullah was left free to undertake both coercive measures that weakened the Hirak and largely cosmetic reforms that defused popular discontent.

Abdullah Rides Out the Jasmine Wave

Bolstered by external support, the militarized welfare regime that still sustained most East Bankers continued to function at levels that made loyalty appear preferable to rebellion, and ensured that the prospect of revolutionary change seemed like a dangerous leap into the unknown. Nonetheless, King Abdullah II himself appeared in June 2011 to dangle the promise of an eventual transition to constitutional kingship.

However, the drive for reform soon came into conflict with his desire for more gradual change and the limitations this placed on the National Dialogue Committee and the Royal Committee for the Revision of the Constitution. The latter’s recommendations, which were adopted by parliamentary vote rather than popular referendum in August 2011, created a constitutional court and an independent electoral commission but otherwise kept the basic structures of Abdullah’s autocracy intact. Despite increasing the quota for female members of parliament and earmarking more seats for deputies elected on nationwide lists, the mixed electoral system advocated by the National Dialogue Committee was rejected in favor of an electoral law that fell far short of the reformers’ expectations.

The escalating influx of grants and other external aid encouraged King Abdullah II to backtrack on his reform pledges. This included sizable grants from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, continued annual US economic and military assistance, and billion-dollar grants and soft loans from the European Union and IMF. Thanks to these renewed levels of strategic aid, the per capita levels of rent disbursed by the regime remained much higher than those available in Tunisia or Egypt (although lower than those in the Gulf Cooperation Council states). This allowed the government to paper over Jordan’s yawning budget deficit and to finance ad hoc salary increases for government pensioners and employees. This policy of royal dispensations—including a large pension increase for military retirees in March 2012—helped co-opt the rank and file of the military veterans’ movement and isolate the more radical members of the NCRS.

With parliamentary elections pending, Abdullah was nonetheless careful to reach out to the military veterans, the Hirak leadership, allied East Bank nationalists, and the non-Islamist party political opposition. In the wake of major popular protests in November 2012, East Bank notables such as Rajai al-Muashir arranged face-to-face meetings between the king and his East Bank critics. During these meetings, Abdullah reportedly listened patiently to unusually frank denunciations of regime policies, while offering vague promises of case-by-case reform in exchange for his pledges to publicly endorse the electoral process and to participate in the January 2013 poll.

The January 2013 parliamentary election was a triumph for the regime and an unmitigated disaster for the East Bank opposition that had emerged since 2010. For the regime’s foreign supporters, the result of the vote—a parliament of tribal loyalists and wealthy businessmen invested in the stability of the regime—appeared to confirm the wisdom of Jordan’s gradualist approach to democratic reform. Few of the leading military veterans or their allies took the risk of standing in the election, and those who did lacked the financial resources to support a nationwide parliamentary campaign or the social power to mount an effective bid for a local seat.

For the radical rump of the NCRS, matters were compounded by the fact that Habashnah allowed himself to be placed second on an electoral list headed by a tribal candidate; the latter abandoned the veterans’ movement once his parliamentary seat was secured. With his internal support assured, Abdullah moved to enact additional constitutional amendments that effectively placed the military and GID under permanent monarchical control, and beyond the purview of the parliament.

Conclusion

By June 2015, the democratic promise of Jordan’s early spring was a distant memory. When the red banner of the Hashemites was flown on Army Day on June 10, replacing the national flag that Jordan had inherited from Faysalite Syria, this appeared to advertise King Abdullah II’s adherence to a dynastic nationalism very much at odds with the radical Transjordanian nationalism that had taken center stage in 2011–2013.

Despite the radicalism of its members, the Jordanian Hirak had failed to develop the organizational permanence or institutional capacity that would allow it to project its demands beyond the Transjordanian hinterlands where it was born. For its part, the military veterans’ revolt was as much about struggles within the Jordanian state as about the politics of protest in the street. The entanglement of the NCRS in intra-elite intrigues, coupled with the abiding dependence of its followers on royal dispensations, prevented the committee from developing into a full-scale systemic challenge to the status quo.

Yet a focus solely on the Hirak’s shortcomings, or on the military revolt’s limited aims, would underestimate the new vistas opened up by the popular protests witnessed between 2010 and 2013. The NCRS May 1 manifesto politicized the intercommunal rivalry on which the monarchy had depended for so long, while shattering the glass ceiling that had long protected the monarchy from popular censure. The effects on Jordanian politics promise to be long-term and far-reaching. As Habashnah aptly put it, “For Jordanians, the monarchy used to be a sacred issue, but now it is the issue. If there is no real political reform and no economic change, I think the people will explode one day.”

Given Jordan’s unresolved social and economic issues and the embedded fiscal dysfunctions that have steadily eroded the country’s militarized welfare regime, there is every prospect of further unrest on the East Bank. But it remains to be seen whether Jordan’s fragmented political field will allow for mass mobilization, and whether Habashneh and his fellow oppositionists can find the political means—both material and symbolic—needed to project popular discontent onto a still-fractured national stage.


[This article was originally published by the Carnegie Middle East Center. It was prepared as part of the 2014–2015 Renegotiating Civil-Military Relations in Arab States: Political and Economic Governance in Transition Project run by the Carnegie Middle East Center.This regional insight was prepared as part of the 2014–2015 Renegotiating Civil-Military Relations in Arab States: Political and Economic Governance in Transition Project run by the Carnegie Middle East Center.]

Notes

1 The argument on the centrality of a militarized sociopolitical contract in Jordan has been made in Ghassan Salameh, Al-Mujtama wa al-Dawlah fi al-Mashriq al-Arabi [Society and State in the Arab Levant] (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1999), 157. A similar theme is taken up for more recent years in Anne Marie Baylouny, “Militarizing Welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian Policy,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 62, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 277–303, http://faculty.nps.edu/ambaylou/Baylouny military welfare.pdf.

2 NCRS members gave a figure of 700,000 military pensioners and their dependents (information received via the author’s personal communication with Salim al-Ifat, the secretary general of the NCRS). The quality of the services provided to military personnel is illustrated by the fact that over 600 open heart operations a year were being performed in the King Hussein Medical Center by the early 1980s. See Adil Awwad Ziyadat, Al-Khadamat al-Sihiyyah fi al-Mamlakah al-Urdunniyyah al-Hashimiyyah (Irbid: Yarmuk University, 1994), 185.

3 Baylouny, “Militarizing Welfare,” points out that the linkage between arms imports and growing public debt was made in the World Bank’s post mortems on the 1989 crisis. By then, apparently well-informed pamphleteers who penned various versions of a Black Dossier (al-Malaff al-Aswad) on corruption in high places had long since identified a number of palace favorites as key intermediaries of the various deals. Something of the scale of the sums involved was revealed by the contretemps that followed the UK’s cancellation of the sale of Tornado jet fighters to Jordan in 1989. According to one source from the Observer newspaper quoted by Mark Phythian in The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), “The basic price for a Tornado [was] around £22 million, the Jordanian price [was] in excess of £35 million” with the difference paid in “hidden commissions to middlemen and politicians.”

4 It is worth noting that the Jordan First campaign failed to please both of Jordan’s communal groups and was “viewed by some Palestinian Jordanians as meaning ‘Palestinians, last,’ and by some Transjordanians as ‘Jordanians, last,’” in the words of Joseph Massad, “Producing the Palestinian as Other: Jordan and the Palestinians,” in Temps et espaces en Palestine : Flux et résistances identitaires, edited by Roger Heacock (Beirut: Presses de l’Ifpo, 2008), 273–292, http://books.openedition.org/ifpo/499?lang=en.

5 Roland Dallas, King Hussein: A Life on the Edge (London: Profile Books, 1999), 260.

6 The logic of moving to a more compact security establishment by downsizing the army by one-third is set out in Alexander Bligh, “The Jordanian Army: Between Domestic and External Challenges,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 13–20, http://www.rubincenter.org/meria/2001/06/bligh.pdf. For details of Jordan’s participation in peacekeeping operations and asymmetric warfare, see Anthony Cordesman, Arab-Israeli Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006), 225–230, http://csis.org/publication/arab-israeli-military-forces-era-asymmetric-wars.

7 The pattern of the chants captures nicely the dilemma of monarchist Transjordanians: Wehdat fans sang “Umm Husayn jibi awlad, khalina nuhkam hal-bilad,” to which the only possible response by Faysaly supporters was “Talligha wa min jawzak ithnatayn minna.”

Last Week on Jadaliyya (November 2-8)

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This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya last week. It also includes a list of the most read articles and roundups. Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our "Last Week on Jadaliyya" series.
  

 

Rights Groups Outraged by Hossam Bahgat’s Detention, Demand his Immediate Release

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Rights groups in Egypt and abroad have condemned the detention of Mada Masr contributor Hossam Bahgat in a series of statements released after military prosecutors took him into custody Sunday. They declared their solidarity with the imprisoned journalist and called on the Egyptian authorities to release him immediately.

Bahgat has been charged with broadcasting false information that disturbs public security, and is currently being held under a four-day detention order issued by military prosecutors. His current whereabouts remain unknown.

United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon expressed concern about Bahgat’s detention on Monday, describing him as a “human rights defender” and noting that Bahgat is a member of the United Nations Development Program’s Global Civil Society Advisory Council.

“This is just the latest in a series of detentions of human rights defenders and others that are profoundly worrying,” said Ban’s spokesperson in New York.  “Pluralism and vibrant civil society are key for achieving long-term stability in the country, including the guarantee that all peaceful voices are heard and represented."

Also on Monday, sixteen local NGOs released a statement demanding that the authorities drop all charges against Bahgat, and calling for a moratorium on the sections of the Penal Code that he is charged with violating.

The groups include the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) — which Bahgat founded in 2002 and lead as executive director until 2013 — as well as the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, the Habi Center for Environmental Rights and the Egyptian Center for Public Policy Studies.

EIPR has called for a protest in solidarity with Bahgat on Tuesday at 5 pm on the steps of the Journalists Syndicate in downtown Cairo.

The International Network for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR-net) also sent Egyptian authorities a letter demanding Bahgat’s immediate and unconditional release. Bahgat serves as chair of the network’s board, having been elected to the post by the coalition’s 220 member organizations.

ESCR-net says it “condemns the arbitrary arrest of Mr. Bahgat and the serious violation of his human rights.” The group adds that “this arrest is reflective of an ongoing practice of harassment, arrest and incarceration of journalists and human rights defenders.” 

In a separate statement released Monday, the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information condemned Bahgat’s interrogation and detention as a “serious and alarming violation of freedom of the press as well as the right to information.” The organization said his prosecution at the hands of military authorities violated of Article 204 of the Constitution, which prohibits the trials of civilians before the military court, except for crimes that constitute a direct assault against military facilities or camps of the Armed Forces, or their equivalents.

International groups have also called on the government to free Bahgat and drop charges against him.

“The arrest of Hossam Bahgat today is yet another nail in the coffin for freedom of expression in Egypt. He is being detained and questioned by the military prosecutor for peacefully exercising his right to freedom of expression and must be immediately and unconditionally released. Any charges brought against him must be dropped,” said Philip Luther, director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at Amnesty International, in a Sunday statement.

Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director for the New York-based Human Rights Watch, described Bahgat’s detention as a “bellwether moment” for Egypt. “Continuing to hold Hossam Bahgat or putting him on trial would be a definitive signal that President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and his government have no interest in rolling back the repression of the past two years,” she said in a Monday statement.

“If the government of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi were interested in protecting and advancing the rights of Egyptians, it would bring in Hossam Bahgat to provide advice, not prosecute him,” Whitson said. “The specter of Bahgat joining thousands of other civilians unlawfully charged in military courts starkly demonstrates how Egyptian authorities under Sisi believe that the only place for critics is behind bars.” 

The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders — a joint program of the International Federation for Human Rights which represents 178 global NGOs — and the World Organization Against Torture — a coalition of more than 311 global NGOs — also released a statement Monday calling on Egyptian authorities to release Bahgat. “The Observatory expresses its concern regarding the arbitrary detention of Mr. Hossam Bahgat in an unknown location, which seems to aim only at preventing him from exercising his right to freedom of expression,” the group said.

The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) also called for Bahgat’s immediate release. "The Egyptian military has already indicated its contempt for the role of an independent media with a series of arrests of journalists. This latest detention is a clear attempt to stifle reporting," CPJ Middle East and North Africa Program Coordinator Sherif Mansour said. "The Egyptian authorities should release Hossam Bahgat immediately. The fact that he was questioned for so long without his lawyers present only heightens the outrage."

Geneva-based human rights workers organized a solidarity stand for Bahgat inside the United Nations Human Rights Council, where a representative of Egypt was scheduled to take the floor today. Individual members of Civicus, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, the International Federation for Human Rights and the Coalition for Reproductive Rights entered the meeting room wearing shirts calling for Bahgat’s release. They were quickly escorted out and had to surrender their badges, meaning they could not reenter.

Bahgat’s supporters have also organized campaigns online. A Facebook page calling for his release, Free Hossam Bahgat, had more than 5,000 likes as of Monday evening, and the hashtag #FreeHossamBahgat is one of the top Twitter trends in Egypt.

 

This story originally appeared onMada Masr.

Revisiting Dalieh: Open Ideas Competition Results & Updates

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Last June 2015, The Civil Campaign to Preserve the Dalieh of Beirut announced its open ideas competition results at the Lebanese Ministry of Environment. The Civil Campaign is a coalition of individuals invested in safeguarding Beirut’s livability, advocating for the protection of the city’s seafront as a shared space, open access zone. The Campaign had launched its open ideas competition on 24 March 2015, under the patronage of the Lebanese Ministry of Environment, the American University of Beirut’s Asfari Institute for Civil Society and the Nature Conservation Center. The competition called for participants “to articulate creative, sensitive, and environmentally sustainable design proposals for the conservation and future development of Dalieh.”

On 30 June 2015, the competition jury composed of architects, landscape architects, an economist, and a lawyer met and shortlisted seven entries out of the twenty submissions. The jury then selected three winning entries, featured below.

Jadaliyya Cities Page Editors have endorsed The Civil Campaign to Preserve the Dalieh of Beirut since its launch, and continue to do so. We have published on Cities in December 2014 the Campaign’s Open Letter to Mr. Rem Koolhas, to which Mr. Koolhas responded in the comments section—a response that was later disseminated on social media, and in other e-zines. We hope the results of this open idea competition will inform Mr. Koolhas and other designers who may become involved in plans to develop the Dalieh of Beirut into a commercial venture to reconsider their commitments, and take a firm position against any real-estate developments on this remarkable site that do not respect and conserve its ecology.

By publishing the winning entries of the Dalieh’s open ideas competition on Jadaliyya, we are disseminating to a wide public the range of alternative possibilities to develop the Dalieh of Beirut in environmentally sustainable ways that respect the site’s urban history, socio-spatial practices, and ecology. We hope this information will mobilize more urban activists to rally the cause of the Civil Campaign. The statement by the minister of Environment to declare Dalieh a natural reserve demonstrates the range of impact such mobilization can have on the built and natural environments. The recent inclusion of Dalieh on the World Monuments Watch 2016 list is an additional testimony. We also hope the case of Dalieh will mobilize the political consciousness of urban dwellers of Beirut, and other Lebanese cities, against the increasing impunity of real-estate development across Lebanon which are robbing us all of shared spaces, and instigate waves of collective action to reclaim rights to the commons. The recent protests in Beirut, associated to the garbage crisis, have incorporated such actions, as urban activists removed forcefully the fence that was installed around Dalieh earlier this year, and appropriated the open areas of Zaitunah Bay.

In this bundle, we feature the the Campaign’s press release about the competition, the competition jury’s report, the Campaign’s background report on Dalieh, as well as the three winning entries’ presentation texts and maps.

  • Dalieh’s Civil Campaign’s Open Competition Press Release
  • Dalieh’s Civil Campaign’s Open Competition Jury’s Report
  • Dalieh Civil Campaign’s Open Competition Background Report
  • Dalieh Civil Campaign’s Competition’s Three Winning Entries

Asad’s Officer Ghetto: Why the Syrian Army Remains Loyal

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The Syrian army’s officer corps has remained intact despite the immense pressure of nearly four years of civil and military conflict, a fact that has prevented the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad’s regime. The military housing system is a crucial aspect of this cohesion: it reveals the world Syrian officers inhabit, their relations with the regime and wider Syrian society, and the reasons why so few have defected so far. 

While there have been defections in the infantry, no major fighting unit has broken away en masse, as defection on this scale would have required the participation of middle- to high-ranking officers. Indeed, the core of the officer corps continues to stand by the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. The fact that a majority of officers are drawn from Syria’s Alawite community has often been noted as the primary, even singular, factor in the army’s cohesion since 2011. But this explanation overstates the role of sectarian affiliation. 

Army officers have access to a benefits system that links nearly every aspect of their professional and personal lives to the regime, and this places them in an antagonistic relationship with the rest of society. Dahiet al-Asad, or “the suburb of Asad” northeast of Damascus and the site of the country’s largest military housing complex, reveals how this system works. Known colloquially as Dahia, the housing complex provides officers with the opportunity of owning property in Damascus. As many army officers come from impoverished rural backgrounds, home ownership in the capital would have been beyond their financial reach. Military housing has offered them an opportunity for social advancement, but the community that officers and their families inhabit within Dahia also fosters a distinct identity that segregates them from the rest of Syrian society, leaving them dependent on the regime.

The benefits Dahia provides come at a steep cost. With the move into military housing, officers effectively complete their buy-in, linking their personal and familial fortunes to the survival of the regime. All the trappings of an officer’s life, and the social respectability it provides, are thus granted by and dependent on the regime. In 2000, when then president Hafez al-Asad died, many officers in Dahiet al-Asad sent their families back to their home villages to wait out the succession outcome. The families only returned once Hafez’s son Bashar was confirmed as the new president. Officers had understood that their life in Damascus was contingent on the Asad regime’s survival, rather than on their status as state employees or military personnel.

Syria’s military housing programs were greatly expanded during the 1980s, but in the decades since, they have not fostered a sense of solidarity among officers from different sects, especially Alawites and Sunnis. Nonetheless, military housing benefits had the de facto effect of drawing officers together to protect their common financial interests after the start of the 2011 uprising. 

Dahia’s haphazard development suggests that its role in cementing regime loyalty was not a deliberate choice but rather an inadvertent outcome of years of mismanagement and nepotism. The regime has thus been able to capitalize on the suburb’s internal corruption and isolation from wider Syrian society to strengthen its ties with the officers living there and secure their unyielding loyalty. As the uprising descended into full-scale civil war, the ghettoization of the officer corps has played out in the regime’s favor and prompted many officers to regard the revolution as a personal threat to their assets and livelihood. 

Protecting a beneficial system, rather than adhering to strict ideological loyalty, is what has kept the Syrian officer corps largely intact. While there have been individual defections among officers living outside of the military housing system, as of mid-2015 there has been only one recorded instance of an officer leaving Dahiet al-Asad to join the opposition—and he was already retired.1 The neighborhood has morphed from a residential area into something more akin to a fortified military base—one that officers perceive as defending them collectively, and by extension the entire army and Syrian regime.

Dahiet al-Asad: The President’s Gift

Two systems of military housing exist in Syria. The first provides officers and their families with accommodations in army compounds during active service—such as the Qatana housing area in Damascus, Rayan in Homs, and Saida in Daraa—without conferring ownership. The second system is a state-subsidized home purchase program that enables officers to purchase homes at discount prices in designated housing areas run by the Syrian army. In theory, any officer could apply for military housing, but the success of an application depends largely on securing favors from those with the de facto power to bestow or withhold property. 

Dahiet al-Asad is by far Syria’s largest example of the state-subsidized home purchase program. Others are located in Deir Ezzor, Aleppo, and Tartus.2 In 2003, the army ended the program through which new officers could apply for home ownership in military housing complexes, replacing it in 2005 with a loan program that allocates officers 1 million Syrian pounds (nearly $20,000 at the time) that is paid off monthly via salary deductions. This restricted the supply of housing in Dahia and in areas under the same military housing system, making existing homes all the more coveted and valuable. 

It is unlikely that Dahiet al-Asad was originally part of the regime’s long-term plan to preserve officer cohesion. Initially, it simply provided homes to army officers, and later it became the target of commercial property investment and speculation. That the officer corps would be steadfast in its support of the regime was not a foregone conclusion when the uprising began in 2011, but the regime built on decades of mismanagement, corruption, and patronage to ensure its loyalty and to turn Dahia into a bastion of military and ideological support. 

Haphazard Development 

Dahiet al-Asad was first established in 1982 after Hafez al-Asad issued an executive order to establish housing for officers and their families.3 The archway at the suburb’s main entrance still declares it “the gift of President Hafez al-Asad to the officers in the Syrian Arab Army and their families.” 

Dahia’s construction began under the auspices of the Military Housing Establishment (Sharikat Iskan al-Askari), but the Institution for the Implementation of Military Construction (Moassat tenfez al-inshaat al-askaria) assumed responsibility for the project in the late 1980s. The Military Housing Establishment, under the purview of the Defense Ministry, is the overarching institution responsible for military housing in Syria. While it does not carry out actual construction, it is the lead contractor for military housing, and it is ultimately responsible for all work undertaken in Dahia. The Institution for the Implementation of Military Construction is effectively a real estate firm and general contractor that manages many public and private sector projects. 

Construction was meant to take place through a series of multiyear development plans that involved coordinating with various government institutions in order to bring in necessary services. Then defense minister Mustafa Tlass laid the first stone of the housing complex in 1985, and officers began moving in by the early 1990s. As of March 2011, it covered some 250 hectares and housed more than 100,000 residents.4  

Contrary to popular belief, Dahia is not a luxury residential area nor is it home to high-ranking officers. Despite its growing population, most areas of Dahia lack key public service provisions. The supply and quality of services have often lagged far behind other neighborhoods in the Syrian capital, due to the lack of coordination between military housing institutions and the civilian government that dispenses services.5 The streets need repair, and water and electricity cut out frequently. While there is much unused land, the neighborhood lacks public spaces or a large park. Public transportation to and from Dahia is also insufficient given its population size and location. The first government bakery in Dahia only opened in 2014, and until 2009, a large garbage dump servicing the neighboring town of al-Tal had only operated near the suburb’s entrance. Burning trash was common in Dahia, and the suburb’s dump site often attracted packs of wild dogs.6 

The Civilianization of Military Housing

Economic reforms during the 2000s spurred rapid real estate price inflation and an investment rush into Dahia, which exacerbated the suburb’s chaotic infrastructural development. This process was also facilitated by Dahiet al-Asad’s unique status. Contrary to the rest of Syria, real estate in Dahia is not registered with the Ministry of Local Administration. Rather, the Institution for the Implementation of Military Construction owns the land where the suburb sprang up and thus holds full decisionmaking authority for new construction projects and property sales. Thanks to this special status, the institution has broad leeway in contracting new construction projects for civilian housing and for private firms, with most of the latter being owned by regime members and their affiliates. During the 2000s, the institution became flush with cash following the Dahia construction boom, in turn drawing in a new wave of regime-affiliated personnel and the corruption that came with them.

Thanks to the institution, Dahiet al-Asad also received a large influx of civilian residents during the 2000s. Although there are no official statistics available, interviews with residents suggested that in 2011, roughly sixty percent of the suburb’s residents were officers—including active and retired officers, secret service members, and other security personnel—and forty percent were civilians. Subsequent interviews with both civilian and military residents confirmed a notable change in the neighborhood’s composition during the run-up to the 2011 uprising. Dahia had become more civilian and had ceased to be, in the view of its residents, a place for officers and their families alone. 

This civilian influx made the officer corps more business savvy as the Dahia property boom in the 2000s had increased the value of homes there. Officers began viewing their homes as financial assets. In Dahia’s more wealthy areas of Jowiyyeh or Amjad, for example, home prices reached as high as thirty million Syrian pounds (roughly $600,000 before the uprising began) or more, even though most salaried officers could not afford an apartment worth more than two million Syrian pounds ($40,000) after even thirty years of service. 

Nonmilitary families moving into Dahia, especially during the five years before the uprising, made many Damascenes believe the area had become a residential suburb of Damascus like any other. One former civilian resident noted: “By 2007, we could no longer say that it was military housing.”7 But the uprising-turned-civil-war showed how Dahia’s new civilian feel was merely a veneer for what was in effect a military neighborhood.

The Officers’ Ghetto 

The Benefits System 

The army has traditionally framed the purchase of a home in Dahia as a lifelong commitment to the regime. Upon graduating as a second lieutenant—the starting officer rank in the military—cadets would begin a ten-to-fifteen-year waiting period, during which five to seven percent of their salary was withheld as an eventual down payment on a home. During this time, military personnel and their families often stayed in practically cost-free temporary military housing. Officers invariably need influential connections to eventually purchase a unit in Dahiet al-Asad, and that acquisition normally takes another twenty years to pay off via monthly salary deductions. 

Dahia almost entirely hosts only middle-ranking officers. The vast majority of the officer corps there is ranked between major and major general, with less than a dozen of the latter living in the suburb. Higher-ranking officers live in elite areas inside Damascus.

For many officers, military housing has given them a unique opportunity for rapid social ascent. The typical army officer living in Dahiet al-Asad is lower-middle class—regardless of his sect—and hails from the countryside or from coastal areas where economic prospects are dim. Alawite officers mostly come from the coastal areas of Jableh, Latakia, and Tartus, whereas Sunni officers tend to come from the rural outskirts of large urban centers such as Aleppo, Daraa, and Raqqa. Yet both Alawite and Sunni officers share a similar socioeconomic upbringing and thus similar aspirations of upward mobility. The military is one of the few avenues open for these young men that offers them a degree of status, a decent wage, and the prospect of home ownership (in the capital, no less, which many view as the pinnacle of personal success). A home in Dahia was also seen as a place where officers can live while serving out their career, and later as a home to retire in. 

Moving into Damascus also improves the social lot of an officer’s entire family. Housing in Dahia provides an officer’s children with the opportunity to grow up and study in the capital. One retired brigadier general, who had lived in Dahia for thirty-five years, at first in temporary army housing but later in his own home, talked about the benefit of living in the suburb had for his four children. “After I took possession of the apartment, our life became more stable and we had [better] hope for the future of our children. As we lived in the capital, our children would study at Damascus University,” he said. The officer mentioned other benefits such as free access to army hospitals anywhere in the country for his entire family—including Tishreen Hospital, Syria’s most advanced, which is also located in the suburb.  

There are other perks that living in Dahia provides, and these can be seen upon entering the homes of officers. Army-issued soap and blankets, bread procured from special military offices, and gasoline coupons are all given to officers at discount prices or free of charge. Officers also receive free subscriptions to all three official government newspapers (Thawra, Tishreen, and al-Baath). And each officer receives a certificate of completion of military training signed personally by the Syrian president, along with a photograph taken with the president that is typically hung on the living-room wall. 

These may not sound like the sorts of luxuries a resident of a rich central Damascus district would covet, but the officers value these perks because they come largely from lower-middle class and rural backgrounds.

A Sort of Solidarity 

Besides the material benefits, the military housing system is central to cultivating a shared identity among middle-ranking officers, as living in Dahia is a comprehensive, all-encompassing lifestyle. Living together with people who are all adapting to city life helps build a sense of solidarity. Dahia is also the space where officers can showcase their social achievements—which many then jealously guard. 

But living in Dahia causes officers and their families to be caught between two worlds: the city on the outskirts of which they live and the villages from where they come. In the capital, they are considered to be from the countryside, and in their ancestral towns and villages, they are considered urbanites. This liminal identity strengthens their attachment to Dahia and all that it represents. This hybrid identity is felt most strongly among the officers’ children, who grow up in the suburb and have their identity anchored in it.

Segregation From and by the Wider Society 

The benefits officers have access to, along with the shared identity nurtured in Dahia, effectively “ghettoizes” officers within the suburb’s perimeter. Dahiet al-Asad has few official or unofficial relationships with its neighboring areas. In the 1980s, there was little interaction between Dahia and the adjacent suburbs of Barzeh, Douma, and Harasta. Following economic reforms in the 1990s and 2000s, some Douma and Harasta residents opened small businesses in Dahia, including supermarkets, vegetable markets, and butcher shops. But these forms of commercial or social interaction were the exception, not the norm. Dahia students would be sent to the Baath Party’s vanguard camps (muaskar lel-talai) in Douma, and, because the suburb remained administratively part of Harasta, its residents would go there to get a number of official services and paperwork completed.

The army benefits and the officers’ socialization in Dahia give them an incentive to stay where they feel welcome. The colloquial and derogatory term for Dahia residents is the “army of sandal-wearers” (jaysh abu shehata), because they are regarded as being from uneducated, rural, and lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Aware of this perception, officers tend to see few viable options for themselves outside the military in Damascus cultural life, where they expect to be treated poorly.

The divide between Dahia and non-Dahia residents has only grown since the 2011 uprising. To wider Syrian society, a person who lives in Dahia is inescapably associated with the regime. This reinforces a defensive attitude among these officers in Dahia vis-à-vis the rest of society. Whether or not officers personally support the Asad regime, their residences in Dahiet al-Asad, their places in the military, and often their sects and backgrounds all play a role in cementing a perception among the officer corps that they would be targeted by opposition supporters.

Bonds Beyond Sect

Sect plays no formal role in the Syrian army or in Dahia, as this would run counter to the regime’s secular claims. Yet military housing has not bridged the divides among officers of different sects. Division and mistrust has persisted and has even grown stronger between Alawites and non-Alawites since the uprising began. Even in each sect, there are divisions along regional and familial lines. 

The military housing system has, however, de facto aligned all officers in defending the benefits and status conferred on them by living in Dahia. Though most officers are Alawite, there seems to be little perceptible difference between them and non-Alawite officers in the way they worry about outside threats. Indeed, many officers have shed their overt sectarian affiliation in order to encourage unity among the officer corps.

For instance, one Sunni major, originally from Daraa but who now lives in Dahia, views himself as an officer first and foremost. When asked to choose between his belonging to Daraa or Dahia, the officer unequivocally said, “I’m from the Dahia community” (ana min ahel al-Dahia).9 Though he noted that the security services committed violent acts, the officer blamed the opposition for fomenting chaos. He maintained that Dahia remained safe even after 2011, but that the uprising has affected him personally because it was against the army institution broadly, to which he belongs and identifies with.

Sect and place of origin are still relevant to life in Dahia. When demonstrations began in Daraa in 2011, Sunni officers avoided grouping and socializing with each other to prevent arousing suspicion. One Sunni officer, for instance, was suspected of sedition, and he made significant efforts to prove that his loyalty to the army superseded his loyalty to his home region. The officer received a Facebook message saying that a fellow officer had accused him of insulting the president and supporting the uprising in his home province. The message frightened the officer, and he followed the chain of rumors about his disloyalty back to its original source, taking great pains to prove the accuser otherwise. He even hung a large photo of President Asad on his balcony to underscore his allegiance to the regime.10 

Sect has played a different role for Alawite officers. The uprising deepened their sense of isolation from non-Alawites, causing them to rely even more on the army for their defense. The memory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s rebellion from 1976 to 1982—during which a 1979 attack on the Aleppo artillery school left many Alawites dead—colored their views of the 2011 protests. For them, the uprising was a replay of that earlier Brotherhood rebellion, when their sect, the army, and the regime had all come under fire.11 

The 2011 uprising had the effect of driving Alawite officers even closer to the army without necessarily strengthening ties between them and Alawite civilians. One Alawite officer described the predominately Alawite Esh al-Warwar neighborhood near Dahia as follows: “Esh al-Warwar is close to Dahia, but I [have] never been there. They are street people [shabeen].” Before the uprising, the officer and his family used to say that the Alawites of Esh al-Warwar were “cattle and gypsies” (baqar wa shrashih).12  The daughter of another officer in Dahia expressed similar sentiments about Alawites from Esh al-Warwar: “The Alawite officer is closer to the Sunni officer than he is to an Alawite from Esh al-Warwar, because they say the Alawites of Esh al-Warwar are lower than them. My mother speaks badly about those people in Esh al-Warwar. The community [negatively] affects the Alawite image in the capital.”13 

The relationship between these two Alawite communities has somewhat evolved since the uprising began. Alawite officers’ sentiment in Dahia toward their neighboring Alawite community morphed to some degree from hostility to pity, in part reflecting the uptick in sectarian solidarity after the conflict erupted. After Esh al-Warwar came under attack from rebels in the neighboring area of Barzeh, Alawite officers in Dahiet al-Asad began describing people from Esh al-Warwar as “poor,” “simple,” and “deserving of pity and protection.”14 However, officers in Dahia did not rush to support the residents in their fight against the rebels, nor, as the conflict evolved, were new linkages developed between the two Alawite communities despite their shared position on a sectarian border.

The Regime’s Countermobilization Stronghold

Even though the initial opposition protests in 2011 were political in nature and were aimed specifically at altering regime policy, the isolation of Dahia residents led army officers and their families to believe that protesters posed a threat not only to the regime but also to them personally. As the uprising unfolded, officers shared the same belief—regardless of sect or political ideology—that defending themselves and their interests from wider society was a priority. 

The uprising made Dahia residents more suspicious of neighboring areas. Officers would routinely tell their children not to let taxi drivers know they were from Dahiet al-Asad or that it was their final destination. Rumors were common, including one unconfirmed story about the daughter of an officer from Dahia being kidnapped and later killed by criminals from Douma. Another unconfirmed account in Dahia describes a taxi driver kidnapping, killing, and decapitating a young man from the suburb.15  

The officers’ separation from the rest of society allowed these rumors to spread. In Saida, near Daraa, for instance, where officers also live in a military compound, Air Force Intelligence Directorate agents began reporting to residents that protesters from nearby villages were planning to attack the military housing complex in retribution for the siege of Daraa.16 In response to these rumors, the military officers and their families in Saida created defense plans and prepared for a potential ambush from would-be attackers even though the battle never materialized. Fears that “maybe the Doumanis or Barzawis [families from towns adjacent to Dahia] will do the same” were expressed frequently and openly in the suburb.17  

The 2011 uprising strengthened the perception among Dahia officers that the area’s defenses needed bolstering. Under these auspices, Dahiet al-Asad’s military identity has been fully reasserted. The suburb was turned into a military platform from which to launch attacks on neighboring pro-opposition areas. Military infrastructure that had been blended into the residential area before the uprising were suddenly put into full use.18 For instance, both a property belonging to the water resources ministry and a school for traffic police were used as artillery positions to launch shells at rebels in neighboring Harasta and Barzeh. These sorts of actions reveal the army’s dominance over Dahia and the perception among residents that the regime holds ultimate control over the area. While the militarization of neighborhoods has happened throughout Syria, the transition has been quicker and more thorough in Dahia, which as of 2015 resembles a military base.

In June 2012, as the Free Syrian Army advanced toward Dahia, regime personnel began organizing officers’ sons (mostly Alawite) into the National Defense Forces (NDF), a vigilante group tasked with the suburb’s internal security. As shelling by the rebels became routine, the NDF erected checkpoints throughout the area, and its military vehicles became omnipresent. DShK heavy machine guns were occasionally mounted on the backs of pickup trucks and tanks used to patrol the suburb. 

Insecurity and sect-based militarization compelled civilian residents (and Sunnis in particular)—who had migrated into Dahia during the economic boom of the 2000s—to leave the suburb. The reverse was true of military families: one resident remarked that, for him, the sounds of war were “pleasing” because it meant they were in the thick of the fight against the “conspiracy” aimed at the army and the country.19 

Once the conflict began, the defining criteria for belonging to Dahia became explicit association with the Asad regime and its symbols. Before the 2011 uprising, pro-regime paraphernalia was no more common in Dahia than most other parts of the capital. But walking through the streets of the suburb since then, the transformation is palpable. Syrian flags and posters of Asad are ubiquitous, with pro-regime groups delivering speeches and holding routine public rallies. Posters of martyrs killed in the fighting are also common. Discussions about the war in Dahia tend to fit with the regime’s narrative, often miming Syrian state media. It is common to hear that “everything is well in the country, there are no problems,” along with stories about how “infiltrators,” “terrorists,” and a “foreign conspiracy” are trying to destroy Syria.20 

Sons of officers have begun to prominently display pictures of the president with slogans such as “we love you” (minhabek) while patrolling Dahia and blasting pro-regime songs from their car stereo systems. These sons—many of whom did not enlist—are generally more vocal than their fathers in expressing the need to defend Dahia. That is in part a reflection of their torn identity as neither belonging to Damascus nor to their ancestral villages. This cohesion among Dahia youth has played out in various other ways, including the formation of new political organizations such as the Lions of the Asad Suburb (Asood Dahiet al-Asad) and paramilitary groups such as the NDF. 

Fighting on the side of the regime effectively became the defining criteria for belonging to Dahiet al-Asad. A civilian resident reported that military personnel who moved to the area as late as 2007 are considered to be “original residents” as of 2015, while the few civilians who have been living there since the 1990s—longer than the majority of military families—have become “outsiders.”21 This fact was driven home when the NDF began making lists of all Dahia residents in early 2014, but it would only enter the homes of nonmilitary families for head counts. Yet joining the NDF was one way for civilians to “belong” to Dahia. One Dahia resident recalled how a Syrian-Palestinian civilian, who was unable to join the army because of his dual nationality, instead joined the NDF and began to speak with a rural Alawite accent in order to prove his loyalty.22 

Surveillance 

Regime personnel had long ago infiltrated the private firms tasked with constructing and allocating homes in Dahiet al-Asad. As a result, the determining factor in allocation is rarely the official process, with personal ties to the regime being the most important factor. This allowed corruption and surveillance to thrive in Dahia, with the two reinforcing each other. 

The Institution for the Implementation of Military Construction, which is responsible for real estate and construction in Dahia, informally conducts surveillance to protect the regime’s interests. Officially, the institution operates under the Syrian state’s military and is not accountable to the country’s judiciary. Major General Riyad Salman Issa, who is also known as Riyad Shalish and is the cousin of President Bashar al-Asad, has been its director since the late 1980s. Ali Saqr, a regime figure, ran the Office of the First Assistant to the Director for years. Though Saqr is not a commissioned officer—his official military rank is warrant officer first class—he oversaw important administrative tasks in Dahia, making him both powerful and feared among the suburb’s officers.23 

Corruption has been the regime’s main tool for both co-optation and surveillance in Dahiet al-Asad. In the case of Saqr, his office was effectively the key to everything from home allocations to business and construction permits—none of which were granted without connections (wasta). Officers as high-ranking as brigadier generals would have to go through Saqr and his office to secure their home allocations. As a result, officers who officially outranked Saqr were forced to curry favor with him in order to receive what was, by all rights, their due. (Saqr was replaced in October 2007 with a civil engineer as part of the regime’s economic reform program to give the institution a more bureaucratic, rather than military, appearance.)24 

In Dahia, officers often spy on one another, informing regime personnel about pertinent information or people who criticize the regime. In part for this reason, criticizing the regime or the president in public is rare in Dahia, unlike in most other parts of the country where there is at least some tolerance for it. In one incident during the 2000s, a fifteen-year-old girl living in the suburb published a magazine detailing the government’s failure to provide services in the neighborhood. Shortly afterward, her mother received a call from the Office of the First Assistant to the Director, warning her to desist or face retribution. This is the sort of response most Syrians in Damascus would normally associate with the regime’s intelligence services. Shocked by the call, the mother asked the daughter: “What did you do in the school to have Ali Saqr call me?”25 

Corruption has become entrenched in Dahia through the military housing system. An officer knows that improving his lot in life—including his job, salary, and housing for him and his family—is based largely on his ability to befriend key regime personnel. This cronyism has helped foster an environment where officers vie for influence by snitching on each other and backstabbing their colleagues. This has created a general atmosphere of myopic self-interest in the army and regime at large.

Conclusion 

The Syrian military was not the only beneficiary of state-subsidized housing. Over several decades, public sector teachers, workers, and numerous other state employees acquired homes through similar projects. Dahiet al-Asad simply offers a window into the wider ways in which the regime provided benefits to state employees before 2011 and insight into how these benefits, whether by design or default, have kept those employees from openly resisting the regime. 

In the army, sectarian ties alone do not account fully for the loyalty of officers. Clearly, Alawites hold the most important commands, but many non-Alawite officers have not defected, which suggests that other factors have held them back.26 A close look at the workings of Dahiet al-Asad indicates that the benefits awarded to officers and their families—many of whom come from humble origins—tie them to the army and the regime, irrespective of any religious or ideological concerns. However, the diversity found within Dahia has not resulted in the erasure of sectarian identity and its replacement with a new, corporate officer identity. Conversely, it is Dahia’s networks and patronage system that have created a shared interest in compelling people of various backgrounds to remain loyal to the regime. The uneven public services and byzantine regulations governing the neighborhood suggest that it has prevented defection because it has de-professionalized officers, making them dependent on informal back channels for basic services and compensation, rather than a formal military hierarchy that could weather civil strife. 

For decades, one of the Asad regime’s strongest instruments for retaining control of the army and other state institutions has been to corrupt officers by providing them benefits on a personal, rather than institutional, basis. By awarding housing as a matter of discretion and not as an entitlement, the regime has ensured officers and their families have had little choice but to stay in the ranks and remain loyal. And because officers have acquired status and benefits as individuals, not as a corporate group, this has encouraged rivalry among them, discouraging the kind of networking and trust that would be necessary were any officers to try to lead whole units to defect. 

Most Syrian army officers have spent years trying to rise above their lower-middle-class origins and acquire the privileges Dahiet al-Asad offers them and their families. Yet in attaining these privileges, they have signed away almost all plausible options ever to leave Dahia. And it is not just the officers’ own futures that are at stake but the fortunes of their entire families. For this reason, almost all defections from the officer corps since 2011 have involved officers who were not invested in the military housing system. 

The extent and manner of the dependence of army officers—and other state employees—on the regime for their livelihood, upward mobility, and their families’ well-being reveals a crucial social component that has shaped their behavior since the uprising broke out. This same calculus will also shape their response to any political transition, should this come to Syria.


[This article was originally published by the Carnegie Middle East Center. It was prepared as part of the 2014–2015 Renegotiating Civil-Military Relations in Arab States: Political and Economic Governance in Transition Project run by the Carnegie Middle East Center.]


Notes

1 Author survey with Dahia residents, 2015. 

2 None provides housing for noncommissioned officers.

3 Directorate of Culture in Damascus Countryside, “Arab Cultural Center in Dahiet al-Asad” [in Arabic], last accessed September 14, 2015, www.doc-dc.gov.sy/center.aspx?id=39.

Author interview with an employee of Damascus Province, Damascus, May 2012.

5 “Suburb of Harasta Out of Time and Space” [in Arabic], Tishreen, March 12, 2006, www.tishreen.news.sy/tishreen/public/read/93299.

6“Suburb of Dahiet al-Asad Suffers From Poor Services” [in Arabic], Tishreen, October 19, 2006, http://tishreen.news.sy/tishreen/public/read/88809

7 Author interview with a former Dahiet al-Asad resident, Beirut, March 2014.

8 Author interview with a retired brigadier general, Damascus, Syria, June 2012. 

9 Author interview with a Syrian Arab Army officer (via Skype), July 2014.

10 Author interview with Dahia al-Asad officer (via Skype), September 2014.

11 The Aleppo artillery school was attacked early in this rebellion, with prominent Alawite civilians, such as scientists and doctors, later being targeted, which led to the sense that Alawites as a sect, rather than the army or the regime, were the true targets. The rebellion, which was centered in and around the city of Hama, ended in 1982 after the Syrian army laid siege to and destroyed large sections of the city with tanks and artillery, killing thousands of people in the process.

12 Author interview with the wife of a Dahia officer, Damascus, August 2012. 

13 Author interview with a daughter of a Dahia officer (via Skype), September 2014.

14 Author interview with Alawite officers from Dahia (via phone), November 2014.

15 Author interview with a Dahia resident (via phone), Beirut, Lebanon, June 2014. 

16 See interview with former member of the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, “Interview With Intelligence Official Afaq Mohammed Ahmad,” YouTube video, 17:15, from a segment televised by France 24 on November 18, 2012, posted by “France 24 / FRANCE 24 Arabic,” www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4RWZP-QEIk

17 Author conversation with officers’ families, Damascus, Syria, February 2012. 

18 This included military storehouses that had been discreetly spread throughout Dahiet al-Assad and held ammunition, weapons, medical supplies, blankets, and other military gear.

19 Author interview with a Dahia resident (via Skype), September 2014.

20 Author observation in Dahia, May 2011. 

21 Author interview with a civilian Dahia resident (via phone), October 2014.

22 Author interview with a Dahia resident (via Skype), October 2014.

23 Saqr’s office was also responsible for recruiting the sons of officers into the NDF, with Saqr’s own son heading the Lions of the Assad Suburb.

24 Hilal Aoun and Ahlam Islmail, “Dahiet al-Asad: Associations Bypass the Plan” [in Arabic], Thawra, June 7, 2009, http://thawra.sy/_print_veiw.asp?FileName=6715202220090705212911.

25 Author interview with a Dahiet al-Assad resident (via phone), July 2014. 

26 For estimates of the ratios of Alawite and Sunni officers, see Hicham Bou Nassif, “‘Second-Class’: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 5 (2015): 626–49.
 

New Texts Out Now: Moustafa Bayoumi, This Muslim American Life: Dispatches from the War on Terror

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Moustafa Bayoumi, This Muslim American Life: Dispatches from the War on Terror. New York: New York University Press, 2015.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Moustafa Bayoumi (MB): The War on Terror made me write This Muslim American Life. I believe that the people of the United States aren’t taking sufficient notice of how much the War on Terror is structuring contemporary life, both in this country and abroad. Muslim Americans will feel differently. We have been subjected to sweep arrests and deportations, blanket surveillance of our everyday activities, scripted sting operations that really create rather than discover terrorist suspects, and much more. Within all of this, it matters little if one is devout or a believer or even if one self-identifies as Muslim. What really matters is whether the state can locate and define you as a Muslim. By closely examining what’s happening to Muslim American life, we can witness the ever-expanding power of the national security state, something the Snowden revelations of massive covert spying by the government further exposed.

But the actions targeting Muslims are not limited to the law-enforcement wing of the national security apparatus. Muslim Americans have become the subjects of several moments of national hysteria around difference in this country. Building houses of worship is frequently met with opposition. Prominent Muslims are maligned publicly. Media representations constantly repeat the notion that Muslims are either villains or victims. Put it all together and you can see a kind of War on Terror Culture being defined, a culture that promotes the idea that Muslims as a group are inherently suspicious and must be contained or controlled.

Needless to say, this way of thinking, which has both a racial and colonial logic behind it, not only forgets the Muslim American past—Muslims have a very long and productive history in this country—but by creating a kind of community of suspicion, also threatens all of our civil liberties in the present. In short, coming to terms with the multiple dimensions of the War on Terror, and how they affect Muslim Americans specifically and American society generally, is what drove me to write This Muslim American Life.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

MB: You could say that the book begins with Walt Whitman, detours through James Baldwin, and ends in dialogue with Philip Roth. (Some of the essays in the book, in other words, refer to these writers and interact with their work in various ways.) On the way, it discusses the legal legacy of the Chinese Exclusion Acts and how they relate to policing Muslims today, recalls the history of paranoia in American politics as a precursor to today’s panic over Muslims, and briefly considers the structural similarities between Japanese internment and Guantanamo Bay. I also consider how Orientalism continues to thrive in the United States today, but now often with Muslims themselves translating the Muslim world in neo-Orientalist fashions to the general public.

One of the aims of This Muslim American Life is to consider how politics, culture, and the law all reinforce the idea of the dangerous outsider Muslim for their own ends, and how together they create this War on Terror culture that is self-reinforcing and often ends up justifying American foreign policy goals. Since an important effect of War on Terror culture is to forget the long history of both Muslims and Arabs in this country, the book also recalls that thriving community that was once called “Little Syria,” which was in lower Manhattan, almost exactly where the World Trade Center stood, and investigates the intimate relationship that many of the key jazz figures of the mid-century had to Islam as well. We have become accustomed, I think, to expecting discussions about Islam and the United States to be about the irreconcilability of two distinct, distant, and incompatible forces, but this book challenges that notion. Much can be learned by viewing the Muslim American predicament through the long lens of American history and culture.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MB: In many ways, This Muslim American Life is a companion book to my previous work How Does It Feel To Be a Problem?: Being Young and Arab in America, which focused on telling the life-stories of seven young Arab Americans from Brooklyn in the post-9/11 era. While I do relay some of my own personal stories within it, ThisMuslim American Life book is based more fundamentally on analysis than on storytelling. Both are equally important, which is why I like to the view the two books as a kind of unit.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MB: My hope is that this book will find multiple audiences, from general readers concerned or curious about the direction their country is taking in the War on Terror era to university students in advanced seminars on American studies or global politics. I have always tried to write in a way that makes the ideas accessible and interesting without requiring readers to come to the topic with highly specialized knowledge. I generally aim to reach a broad spectrum of readers in my writing. Since the issues addressed in the book are not just timely but in fact urgent, finding a broad audience for the book would be not only gratifying, but I think significant as well. 

J: How did you find ways of moving from your own personal experiences to larger issues?

MB: Perhaps the best answer I can offer to this is question is that it is necessary to read like a writer and not only like a reader. Readers read for content, complexity, and contradictions. Writers read as readers too, but they also read for craft. Essays are assembled as much as they are written, and paying close attention to how writers before you have resolved various problems of writing is how you learn how to write better. Writing is essentially a problem-solving enterprise of how you are going to translate thought and experience into words and sentences, and someone has already cracked any writing problem you face before you have encountered it. It’s also important to have a stake in what you’re writing. This is a lesson Edward Said taught me when I was a graduate student at Columbia University. After you would tell Edward what you were working on, he would often ask “so what?” This required you to detail why what you had proposed was important, not just because it would advance knowledge, but also because it would bend scholarship toward the arc of justice in this world.

Excerpt from This Muslim American Life: Dispatches from the War on Terror

Introduction

In August 2011, almost exactly ten years after the terrorist attacks of 2001, the Associated Press published an article titled “With CIA Help, NYPD Moves Covertly in Muslim Areas.” The article’s authors, Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, described how the New York Police Department was working with officials “on loan” from the CIA to develop a massive and covert surveillance program that directly targeted the entire Muslim community in and around New York City.[1] Initially, the NYPD flatly denied the reporters’ findings. “Someone has a great imagination,” NYPD spokesman Paul Browne said.[2] The AP then posted on their website a trove of leaked internal documents from the police department that proved not only the existence of the program but also that the department felt free to lie outright to its public about its actions. Veteran police reporter Len Levitt also gained access to internal documents, and on September 5 published an article (reprinted two days later by the Huffington Post) on the scope of the surveillance.[3] Levitt noted that the NYPD had placed confidential informants in seven Muslim student associations (MSAs) at local colleges and that Brooklyn College, where I teach, and Baruch College had been listed as MSAs “of concern.” Levitt wrote about one confidential police report that listed “forty-two top tier ‘persons of interest,’” which included “a lecturer at Brooklyn College.” For weeks, people assumed that this lecturer must be me.

Frankly, I wondered the same while also thinking that it would be absurd for the police to waste their resources on me. The Associated Press called me to ask me if I thought I was being surveilled, and a New York Times columnist also interviewed me about the report. Later, someone I know and trust who was shown the file told me that it had identified someone else. Of course, just because I was not the person named in the report does not mean that the NYPD has not spied on me. It just means I don’t know for sure.

Others have learned something different. Mohammad Elshinawy is a young Egyptian American from Brooklyn with a popular following among New York’s devout Muslims. I know Mohammad, who was once my student, and he and I also spent some time together when I was writing my book about Brooklyn’s Arab Muslim youth. I could tell even then that he was a rising star with religious conservatives. Always dressed in a galabeyya with a kufi on his head, a fist-length beard on his chin, and sneakers on his feet, Mohammad commanded the respect of Brooklyn’s young Muslims with his eloquence, intelligence, scholarly knowledge, and mastery of Qur’anic Arabic. It wasn’t just the young people who were attracted to Mohammad. He has also been the subject of fastidious NYPD surveillance. According to Apuzzo and Goldman, Mohammad’s popularity had initially attracted the interest of the FBI, which became concerned that he might have been recruiting young men to fight overseas. That investigation was concluded with no charges filed. Yet the NYPD decided to pursue the matter—and Mohammad—further.[4]

I wondered what it’s like to know you’ve been surveilled by the police, so I contacted Mohammad to ask him. He invited me to one of the regular classes he offers on the Qur’an at Masjid Al-Ansar, a simple storefront mosque in Bensonhurst, Brooklyn, that, as reports indicate, has also been under NYPD surveillance. After the class, we went to a quiet room in the mosque’s basement to talk. Boxes of canned foods, ready to distribute to the needy, surrounded us as we sat on the carpeted floor. I asked Mohammad what he felt after learning about the surveillance on him and its extent.

“Apprehension,” he said, after thinking a while. “To what degree is this going to affect me?” He shared that he carefully considered his actions and that he would “try to take a stand and get past this hump.” Mohammad was referring to being a plaintiff in a lawsuit filed by the ACLU (still pending as of this writing, in January 2015) against the police department. “There’s no reason why we should consider ourselves second-class citizens,” he said, speaking about Muslim Americans generally. “I’m born in this country like anybody else,” he said.

From the documents leaked to the AP, we know the character of the surveillance practiced on Mohammad and the NYPD’s views on the young man. Labeling his race as “ME,” that is, Middle Eastern, the police files describe Mohammad’s views as “hardcore Salafi ones.”[5] (Salafis are scriptural conservatives who seek a belief system based on their understanding of the early days of Islam, and the police department operates under the assumption that they are particularly prone to violence.) One report states that the “TIU [Terrorism Interdiction Unit] believes that [Mohammad] is a threat due to the fact that he is so highly regarded by so many young and impressionable individuals,”[6] as if charm were a weapon. In the same report and under the heading “Surveillance Objective” is written, “Target moves on a daily basis to many different spots. Every day of the week is beneficial….[Most beneficial would be] after 1500 (after target gets off of work),”[7] revealing essentially that Mohammad is a hardworking young man. The spying even invaded his love life and followed him around the city. The report continues, “Surveillance has revealed many things re: this target. His change of auto, the fact that he was going to get married b/c surv[eillance] observed him shopping for diamond rings w/ a female in the diamond district.”[8] I asked him about this detail. “I took my fiancée to go buy her a diamond ring, and even then I’m being tailgated,” he told me. “Many times we knew we were being tailgated,” he explained, “it’s just like, what are you going to do? Call the cops on the cops?” He laughed. “It’s quite a predicament!”

***

Looking closely at the NYPD surveillance program, we can get a larger sense of its dangerous presumptions and misguided activities. The program began in 2002, when Police Commissioner Ray Kelly hired David Cohen, a former deputy director for operations at the CIA, as his deputy commissioner of intelligence. Cohen succeeded in getting a judge to relax provisions of the Handschu Agreement, a 1985 consent decree developed in response to a lawsuit against the NYPD for spying on the constitutionally protected activity of political groups in the 1960s and 1970s. The Handschu Agreement previously allowed police surveillance only when officers had specific information a crime would be committed or was being planned. Under the new rules adopted in 2003, police no longer needed evidence to begin an investigation, just the possibility of criminal activity.

Cohen established four units in his Intelligence Division—the Demographics Unit, the Intelligence Analysis Unit, the Cyber Intelligence Unit, and the Terrorism Interdiction Unit—and hired Lawrence Sanchez, a CIA analyst, to oversee intelligence. Using data from the 2000 US census, the intelligence division proceeded to chart where the Muslims in New York lived.[9]

This mapping has precedents. It recalls a 1919 map of ethnic New York drafted by the NYPD and New York State Police that identified certain ethnic neighborhoods in an effort to root out socialists, communists, and anarchists.[10] It’s reminiscent of when the Census Bureau provided the government with information on where Japanese Americans lived to assist the War Relocation Authority in interning them during World War II.[11] And it bears a resemblance to specially tabulated statistics on Arab American populations, indicating zip-code-level breakdowns of Arab Americans by country of origin, which the Census Bureau produced for Homeland Security from August 2002 to December 2003.[12]

The NYPD did more than exploit publicly available data, however. They also sent out “rakers,” plainclothes officers who could blend in to the community, and “mosque crawlers,” informants working for the police. (Rakers were so dubbed because Cohen described their actions as akin to “raking an extinguished fire pit.”)[13]

The Intelligence Division viewed everything about ordinary Muslim life as suspicious and catalogued it all. They established sports leagues as a way to spy on Muslim youth.[14] They recorded license plate numbers from the cars of mosque visitors. They noted where Muslims got haircuts and they eavesdropped on conversations in cafés.[15] They considered it suspicious when café televisions were tuned to Al Jazeera and when they were not. (The “Egyptian Locations of Interest Report” states that in one café “the Al Jazeera news channel is prohibited inside this location because the owner feels it brings extra scrutiny from law enforcement.”)[16] They made more than seventy-five visits to thirty-four “targeted” travel agencies in South Asian communities around New York to discover that there were four principal airlines to Pakistan: Pakistan International Airlines, Emirates Airlines, Kuwait Airways, and Gulf Air.[17] They also often got facts wrong, identifying Sephardic Jews and Lebanese Christians as Syrian Muslims, Coptic Egyptians as more numerous than Muslim Egyptians in New York, and Sunni Muslims as Shi‘i Muslims.[18]

More troubling still, the NYPD designated selected mosques as “Terrorism Enterprises,” meaning any visitor to these Muslim houses of worship could be investigated and that speech, including sermons, would be monitored and recorded.[19] “It was an unprecedented moment in the history of American law enforcement,” Apuzzo and Goldman write in Enemies Within, their book about the surveillance program. “The NYPD regarded houses of worship—and everyone who prayed there—as possible criminal organizations.”[20]

All of this netted, the NYPD was later forced to admit, not a single lead on suspected terrorist activity.[21] After the facts of the program were no longer deniable and due in large part to the mobilizing efforts of New York’s Muslim communities and their allies, the department announced in April 2014 that they would disband the Demographics Unit. They did not however announce a halt to other aspects of their Muslim community surveillance, including designating mosques as “Terrorism Enterprises.”[22]

Nor has the NYPD announced an end to using informants to monitor Muslim communities without any probable cause. We now know the inner workings of informant life. One informant, Shamiur Rahman, who was a regular attendee of Mohammad’s lectures, emerged from the shadows in October 2012, revealing on his Facebook page that he had been sent by the NYPD to observe Muslims and “bait” them into saying inciting things, particularly statements containing “jihad” and “revolution.”[23] For this he was paid as much as a thousand dollars a month and given leniency on misdemeanor marijuana possession charges.[24] According to a New York Times report from May 2014, such practices are continuing.[25] The end of the Demographics Unit does not mean the end of bias-based policing of New York’s Muslims, who can still count on being treated by the NYPD as harbingers of terrorism just by going about their everyday affairs.

NOTES

[1] Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, “With CIA Help, NYPD Moves Covertly in Muslim Areas,” Associated Press, August 23, 2011.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Len Levitt, “The NYPD: Spies, Spooks and Lies,” NYPD Confidential, September 5, 2011; Len Levitt, “The NYPD: Spies, Spooks, and Lies,”. Huffington Post, September 7, 2011.

[4] Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD’s Secret Spying Unit and Bin Laden’s Final Plot Against America (New York: Touchstone, 2013), 193–94.

[5] NYPD Technical Operations Unit, “Surveillance Request: Mohammad Elshinawy,” February 2, 2009, 5.

[6] Ibid., 5.

[7] Ibid., 6.

[8] Ibid., 6.

[9] The Demographics Unit was renamed the “Zone Assessment Unit” in 2010 out of concern for how the former would sound to the public if discovered. See Apuzzo and Goldman, Enemies Within, 282. The CIA paid Sanchez’s salary from 2002 to 2004, despite the fact that the CIA is forbidden from having “any police, subpoena or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.” See the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-235, 61 Stat. 496, July 26, 1947). Sanchez remained in his post until 2010, and the NYPD paid his salary after 2004. After 2010, a former CIA clandestine officer, Lance Hamilton, replaced Sanchez until his identity became known, after which he was recalled. See ibid., 283. Working out of an office in the Brooklyn Army Terminal, the Intelligence Division divided the community into what they called “Ancestries of Interest,” twenty-eight countries mostly from the Middle East and South Asia as well as former Soviet states with large Muslim populations. They also included “American Black Muslim” on the list, as if being Muslim and black meant your ancestry belonged to another nation. See ibid., 75.

[10] Sam Harris, “Police Demographics Unit Casts Shadows from Past,” City Room: The New York Times, January 3, 2012.

[11] J. R. Minkel, “Confirmed: The U.S. Census Bureau Gave Up Names of Japanese-Americans in WW II,” Scientific American, March 30, 2007; William Seltzer and Margo Anderson, “After Pearl Harbor: The Proper Role of Population Statistics in Time of War” (paper, Population Association of America annual meeting, Los Angeles, March 2000).

[12] Lynette Clemetson, “Homeland Security Given Data on Arab-Americans,” New York Times, July 30, 2004.

[13] Apuzzo and Goldman, Enemies Within, 72.

[14] Here’s an example of the kind of hard-hitting investigative work the NYPD was involved in. The Intelligence Division produced a thirty-eight-page memo called the “Sports Venue Report,” pinpointing fifty-five locations in the five boroughs where Muslims gather to play or watch sports. The report begins by stating that “the Demographics Unit identified the sports of cricket, soccer and billiards as the primary sports within the communities,” and concludes that “there are distinct differences between the South Asian and Arab communities with regard to the sports played and the general level of sporting interest,” noting that South Asians play a lot of cricket and Arabs play pool. “Billiards serves a dual purpose in the Arab community,” the report says. “People play Billiards for the sport in it as well as the opportunity to socialize with their friends in a friendly atmosphere.” See NYPD Intelligence Division: Demographics Unit, “Sports Venues Report,” n.d., 2.

[15] Another study produced by the NYPD was the “Internet Café Report,” which used open-source research to identify Internet cafés located near “communities of concern.” The report states that “locations, public or private that only offer a wireless access point for your computer (i.e.,…Starbucks, Bryant Park etc) are not included in this report,” which naturally calls into question its usefulness, not only due to the limited technical overview of the report but also since cafés and stores change so frequently in New York. (And if you think nothing evil can happen in a Starbucks, you clearly have never used one of their restrooms.) NYPD Intelligence Division: Demographics Unit, “Internet Cafe Report,” June 15, 2007.

[16] NYPD Intelligence Division: Demographics Unit, “Egyptian Locations of Interest Report,” July 7, 2006, 14.

[17] NYPD Intelligence Division: Demographics Unit, “Pakistani Travel Agency Report,” n.d.

[18] Apuzzo and Goldman, Enemies Within, 87, 147. NYPD Intelligence Division, “Egyptian Locations of Interest Report,” 2.

[19] Apuzzo and Goldman, Enemies Within, 180.

[20] Ibid., 181.

[21] While testifying in a deposition on June 28, 2012, Assistant Chief Thomas Galati, commanding officer of the Intelligence Division, revealed that no leads had been discovered or investigations begun as a result of the Demographics Unit’s work. Galati also revealed that the NYPD was suspicious of foreign languages. The department was concerned about “Islamics [sic] radicalized towards violence,” and so it kept surveillance records on two Pakistani men who in a conversation in Urdu had complained about the mistreatment they felt Muslims received at the hands of airport security in the United States.When Galati was shown the document, he responded, “I’m seeing Urdu. I’m seeing them [the officers] identify the individuals involved in that [conversation] are Pakistani. I’m using that information for me to determine that this would be a kind of place that a terrorist would be comfortable in,” adding that “most Urdu speakers from that region would be of concern, so that’s why it’s important to me.” He says essentially the same thing about Bengali speakers later in the deposition. As the AP notes, “About 15 million Pakistanis and 60 million Indians speak Urdu. Along with English, it is one of the national languages of Pakistan.” See Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, “NYPD: Muslim Spying Led to No Leads, Terror Cases,” Associated Press, August 21, 2012. Also see Galati Deposition, June 28, 2012, 29, 85–86, 92.

[22] Noa Yachot, “NYPD Shutters Muslim Mapping Unit—But What about Other Tactics?” ACLU.org, April 15, 2014.

[23] Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, “Informant: NYPD Paid Me to ‘Bait’ Muslims,” Associated Press, October 23, 2012.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Joseph Goldstein, “New York Police Recruit Muslims to Be Informers,” New York Times, May 10, 2014.

[Excerpted from Moustafa Bayoumi, This Muslim American Life: Dispatches from the War on Terror, by permission of the author. © 2015 New York University Press. For more information, or to purchase this book, click here.] 

Jadaliyya Monthly Edition (October 2015)

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This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya during the month of October 2015. It also includes the most recent roundups, editors picks, and most read articles. Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our Monthly Edition series.

 


Syria Media Roundup (November 11)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Syria Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to syria@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

 

Inside Syria

Policeman, Rebel, Farmer – Abu Luay Has Seen it All“Working as a policeman before the uprising, Abu Luay quickly defected as the government’s crackdown on peaceful protestors grew steadily more violent. After fighting with various opposition groups for nearly a year, he put down his weapons to create a DIY-electricity project in his besieged hometown.”

ICRC Works to Avoid Massive Water Crisis in Aleppo“As water cuts in Aleppo reach an all-time high, the Red Cross and its local partner organizations are asking for help in publicizing a GPS-enabled map that gives users the ability to pinpoint themselves in relation to a network of restored water wells throughout the city.”

For All Sides, Syrian Peace Will Involve Dealing with the Devil“Assad’s stubbornness may well reflect a flaw in character, but it has been enabled and sustained by backing from Russia, China and Iran.”

The End of the Army of Conquest? Syrian Rebel Alliance Shows Cracks Jaish al-Fateh has recently announced a major new offensive, however one of its most hard-line factions, Jund al-Aqsa has publicly quit the coalition.

A History of Mass Exodus: the Uncertain Fate of Syria's Christians“Accounting for more than 25 percent of Greater Syria’s population at the beginning of last century, Christians are now believed to number no more than 5 percent of Syria’s current population.”

Strategic Implications of Assad’s Victory at Kweiris After a two year siege, in a first offensive victory against IS, Assad retook Kweiris. Analysis by Aron Lund.

When fruits are sold by the centimeter, know that you are in Douma Journalists Celine Ahmed and Al Basel Tadros met with the residents of Douma, a town in Damascus suburbs under the control of the Army of Islam and under siege by the regime for over two years. In such a context, to feed oneself becomes a struggle in itself as residents face soaring prices and deal with unscrupulous traders trying to make a profit.

An Arabic like to this article can be found here: عندماتباعالفاكهةبـ"السنتيمتر" فاعلمأنكفيدوما

Syria: No Word on Activist’s Whereabouts Syria’s authorities have yet to disclose the whereabouts of Bassel Khartabil, a software developer and defender of freedom of information, one month after his transfer to an undisclosed location, 25 organizations said on 4 November 2015.

An Arabic like to this article can be found here: سورياـلاجديدحولمكاناحتجازناشط

Why ISIS Is Killing Journalists This article by "Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently" discusses ISIS’s campaign against the media.

Russia Now Has 4,000 People in Syria — And They're Not in a Rush to Fight the Islamic State Avi Asher-Schapiro writes that the Russian presence in Syria has grown to nearly 4,000 personnel — including military and civilian support staff — a sign that Russian President Vladamir Putin is digging in long-term to prop up the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Iranian carrier ‘purchased UK plane’ to fly elite troops to Syria An Iranian airline last week bought a UK-made plane for the delivery of troops and arms to the Syrian regime, according to a report in the International Business Times, in a violation of the nuclear accord signed between the Islamic Republic and world powers in July.

Why is Russia bombing my town? Raed Fares writes: "Americans should not be so passive in the face of Putin’s farcical anti-Islamic State campaign. Kafranbel’s thriving civil society is in many ways modeled after that of the United States, and in some cases has even received U.S. funding."

Saudi Arabia's 'intensified' support to Syrian rebels is reportedly slowing regime advances Offensives by the Syrian army and its allies backed by Russian air strikes are going more slowly than expected due to increased Saudi support to rebels.

Russian soldiers geolocated by photos in multiple Syria locations, bloggers say Three serving or former Russian soldiers have been geolocated by photographs in Syria, including locations near Hama, Aleppo and Homs, Russian bloggers said on Sunday (8 Nov,2015), suggesting the Kremlin's operation stretches well beyond its air campaign.

Dramatic rescue of Syrian Jews ends in visa dispute Two of the last Jews in Syria have been spirited out of the country in a dramatic operation, but a third woman has returned to the war-torn nation after Israel rejected her visa, the rescue organiser said Tuesday (10 November 2015).

Syrian forces break 2-year ISIS siege on air base Syrian government forces broke a siege imposed by (ISIS) on Kweiras, the military air base in the northern province of Aleppo, since 2013.

  

Regional and International Perspectives  

Anti-ISIL air strikes are in need of greater guidance Two foreign coalitions take turns bombing areas under ISIS control and civilians are expected to tell the difference, Hassan Hassan reports.

Duration of Russian operation in Syria to depend on efficiency of Syrian army Kremlin: how long Russia stays in Syria depends on SAA’s “achievements” and should end in a “political settlement.”

Envoys look to gain momentum for peace in Syria As world powers seek to sustain momentum for Syria diplomacy amid divisions on the way forward, a former US diplomat urged moving for a cease-fire first before convening talks on Syria’s political future, which could take years.

ISIS in Afghanistan: School of Jihad FRONTLINE documentary, ISIS in Afghanistan — is some of the first to show the degree to which ISIS has gained a foothold in the country, introducing a new level of brutality to the conflict, beyond what has been practiced by the Taliban.

The Military Escalation in Iraq and Syria Frustrated by the resilience of ISIS, the Obama administration is taking steps to expand a military campaign that remains untethered to any coherent strategy. Instead of challenging an escalation of American military forces in the Syrian war, several prominent members of Congress are irresponsibly demanding even more hawkish approaches.

Hands of Power: The Rise of Syria's Assad Family The conflict in Syria has drawn in major global powers, some supporting and some opposing President Bashar al-Assad. The Assad family has ruled Syria for more than four decades, but how did they rise to power? That is what Dr Neil Quilliam aims to answer in this article.

Top UN official calls for helping Syria refugees make living Aid to Syria's millions of refugees must "go beyond relief" and help them make a living close to home, a top U.N. official said Sunday (8 Nov, 2015), as key international decision-makers gathered to find a new approach to the Syria refugee crisis.

Syria crisis: UK 'letting down' allies over air strikes The UK is "letting down" its allies by failing to launch air strikes against terrorist group ISIS in Syria, says Britain's top military commander

Syria's 'moderate jihadis' elated by Turkish election results The Syrian opposition wants to know what kind of support it can expect from the AKP government after the AKP won solid support in the recent election.

America’s Vital Interests in Syria John Cassidy writes that for the U.S., involvement in the refugee crisis is also about safeguarding stability in Europe.

Assad’s Lifeline The Authoritarian Stabilization Pact in Syria Steven Heydemann writes that "Syria today stands out as a case of how developed global authoritarian networks have become. It sheds important light on the growing capacity of authoritarian actors to mobilize for the collective defense of regimes that are seen as central to the stability of such networks."

 

Policy and Reports

Syria: State profits from crimes against humanity as policy of enforced disappearances drives black market The vast scale and chillingly orchestrated nature of tens of thousands of enforced disappearances by the Syrian government over the past four years is exposed in a new report by Amnesty International published on 5 November 2015.

To download the full English file of the report see this link.

Syria: 'Between prison and the grave': Enforced disappearances in Syria

An Arabic version of the report can be found here: سوريا: مابينالسجنوالقبر: حالاتالاختفاءالقسريفيسوريا

  

Economy and Agriculture

Taking Stock Of ISIS Oil: Part 1 The first installment of Matthew Reed’s greater explanation of the Islamic State’s oil business in Syria.

Taking Stock Of ISIS Oil: Part 2 The second installment of Matthew Reed’s greater explanation of the Islamic State’s oil business in Syria.

East Ghouta Residents to Brave Impending Winter Amid Firewood Shortage An increase in firewood prices has encouraged some locals to turn to raiding Ghouta’s famous fruit orchards for fuel.

North Syrian food-for-diesel trade routes invite smuggling One of the trucks transporting supplies to IS as part of the food-for-diesel agreement was found to be carrying ammunition. 

 

Documentaries, Special Reports, and Other Media

Transnationalism and the 1925 Syrian Revolt The 1925 Syrian Revolt was catalyzed by contestation over authority between local notables and the French mandate government, but it soon spread throughout the mandate as a form of anti-French protest. In this episode, Reem Bailony explores the ways in which the Great Syrian Revolt was also a transnational affair, sharing her research on the activities of the Greater Syrian diaspora in the Americas, Europe, and beyond over the course of 1925-27.

Syria Outside the Media: A Cultural Week in France The Syrian organization Syrian Freedom, in collaboration with French solidarity organizations with the Syrian opposition, exhibited poetry, and testimonies, as well as Syrian art through the first week of October 2015 in the Saint-Georges-de-Didonne cultural center.

Syrian Arab Republic: United Nations cross-border operations under UNSC resolutions 2165 and 2191 (July 2014 to October 2015) [EN/AR] This infographic covers UN cross-border operations into Syria from July 2014 to October 2015.

Refugee Crisis – Western Balkan route This map by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office shows the main migration routes of Syrians as of 05/11/2015.

جيشسورياالجديد New Western backed rebel group in Syria called "New Syrian Army" to fight ISIS.

الاعترافاتالكاملةلـ"أبيالوليدالتونسي" بعدانشقاقهعنداعش، تفاصيلخطيرةومثيرةتؤكدجرم"داعش" This video includes recorded confessions for "Abu al-Walid al-Tunisi" after defecting from ISIS.

 

Arabic Links:

بينمعتقلاتالنظاموأقفاصعلوش Mohamad Dibo writes about detention in Syria and comments on recent news in this regard.

كلمةأحدمؤسسيالرقةتذبحبصمتاماملجنةالشؤونالخارجيةفيالبرلمانالهولندي This article includes the speech of Abu Mohammed, One of the co-founders of  "Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently", for the Parliament of the Netherlands on 4 November 2015.

An English like to this article can be found here: We will bring back luster to the city of Raqqa

البنكالمركزيالسورييتدخللإنقاذالليرةمنالانخفاضأمامالدولار The Central Bank of Syria (CBS) interferes to save the value of Syrian pound exchange rate to dollars after it decreased sharply.

موسكوتحتاجإلىاستراتيجيةخروجمنورطتهاالسورية Raghida Dergham writes: "Moscow has achieved for the United States and the UN what they could never achieve despite numerous attempts, by convincing Tehran to sit at the negotiating table for the future of Syria. Riyadh agreed after initial reluctance, because Moscow has made a tradeoff between Syria and Yemen."

An English like to this article can be found here: Moscow Needs An Exit Strategy for Its Syrian Quagmire

حاملةالطائراتالفرنسية"شارلديغول" تشاركفيعملياتضدتنظيمالدولة France deploys Charles De Gaulle Aircraft Carrier to Syria and Iraq to Fight ISIS. Hollande described the move to deploy the aircraft carrier as "a rational choice" which would "allow us to be more efficient in coordination with our allies".

نقطةغيّرتمعنىالكلمة.. قطّعتأوصالهوفصلترأسهفيالرقة Ahmed Ibrahim shares personal accounts about different aspects of oppression in Al-Raqqah during one day.

ابراهيمعبدالقادرفيسطور This is a biography of Ibrahim Abdel Qader--one of the co-founder of the citizen-journalist group Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently--who was beheaded with his friend by ISIS members in Turkey.

المفكرتيزينييبكيماضيومستقبلبلاده Ammar Daioub reflects on a recent lecture by Syrian philosopher Tayyeb Tizini in Morocco.

10 أسئلةيطرحهااللاجئونالسوريونبعداجتيازالبحر.. وأغربهاعنالإنترنت This article summarizes 10 questions that Syrian refugees ask after passing the sea and arrive into Greece.

الحياة اليوميّة في دمشق: زهران علّوش «أقوى» من بوتين !  

Souhaib Enjrainy writes about daily life in Damascus as well as the economic and service challenges in the city.

عن روسيا في سوريا Thaer A. Deeb analyzes the consequences of the Russian military intervention in Syria

 ماذا لو قُسّمت سورية؟ In this article, Omar Kaddour invites Syrians to engage in the debate about Syria's partition.

طائرةإسرائيليةترسمخطالافتراقبينموسكووطهران Hazem Alamin writes about the recent political announcements and involvement of some international and regional political actors, like France and Iran, in the Syrian conflict. 

Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (November 11)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Arabian Peninsula and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Arabian Peninsula Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to ap@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.] 


Al Salman demands Lifting the 11 months ban on Freedom of Assembly & allowing the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly visit Bahrain Sheikh Maytham al-Salman has called on the Bahraini government to lift its eleven-month ban on assemblies and demonstrations. 

Blood Money: How your 401K benefits from bombing Yemen Many American and foreign institutional investors—including government pension funds—have investments in a company that manufactures bombs used by Saudi Arabia in Yemen.

Saudi Prince arrested in largest drug bust in the history of beirut's airport A member of the Saudi royal family was arrested at the Beirut airport in a drug bust that proved to be the largest in the airport’s history.

Extreme heatwaves could push Gulf climate beyond endurance, study shows A new study argues that the Gulf region could be rendered uninhabitable by global warming.

Airstrikes hit Medecins Sans Frontieres hospital in Yemen A hospital operated by Doctors Without Borders has been damaged by a Saudi Airstrike in Yemen.

Saudi Foreign Minister says Russia and Iran must agree on Assad exit plan The Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia said that Russia and Iran must be included in any agreement for a Syrian transfer of power.

Saudi prince al-Waleed bin Talal: In case of outbreak of Palestinian uprising I'll side with Israel, Saudi Arabia reached a political maturity to constitute durable alliance with Jewish nation Prince al-Waleed bin Talal of Saudi Arabia has argued that Saudi Arabia should support Israel in the event of a Palestinian uprising.

Saudi Arabia has decided to sell debt in the first sign the oil giant is running out of cash Saudi Arabia has decided to raise cash through debt offerings in a sign that it has been affected by lower oil prices.

Saudi Arabia Hopes Oil Supply Outside Of Opec Declines In 2016 According to Gary Bouregault, Saudi Arabia is hoping that non-OPEC oil prices decline in 2016, raising their market share.

Banned baby names in Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia has banned a number of baby names including Linda and Binyamin. 

Kuwait to stop public healthcare for expats Kuwait has announced plans to end providing free health care to expatriates residing in the country.

BBC protects UK's close ally Saudi Arabia with incredibly dishonest and biased editing According to the Intercept, the BBC has edited articles to protect Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the UK.

Hundreds of women prosecuted for extramarital sex in UAE, finds BBC A recent BBC report found that hundreds of women in the UAE have been prosecuted for having sex outside of marriage.

David Cameron launches secret diplomatic offensive with Saudi Arabia after row British Prime Minister David Cameron is attempting to improve relations with Saudi Arabia after a recent diplomatic row.

Saudi Arabia is set to crucify pro-democracy teenage protester A teenager named Ali al-Nimr is facing execution by beheading and crucifixion for participating in a pro-democracy protest.

Qatar Minister: Urgent need to rethink subsidies or consider new taxes A Qatari minister says that the country may need to reduce subsidies or raise taxes due to its financial difficulties.

Bahrain: On her birthday, Zainab Al-Khawaja sentenced to one-year in prison on appeal, other cases postponed Bahraini human rights defender Zeinab al-Khawaja was sentenced to a year in prison by a Bahraini court, though she remains free on appeal. 

Dubai Airshow: Security fears 'to boost arms sales' Aircraft manufacturers are using the Dubai airshow as a way of marketing fighter jets to the Gulf States.

UK builds first permanent Middle East base for 40 years The United Kingdom has opened a base in Bahrain, it’s first permanent Gulf presence since its withdrawal from the region in 1971. 

Palestine Media Roundup (Nov 5 - 11)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Palestine and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Palestine Page Co-Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each roundup to Palestine@jadaliyya.com.]


The Occupation Forces

Israeli Forces Shoot Dead Seventy Two Years Old Palestinian Woman Thawarat Ashrawi was killed while filling her car with gasoline. Israeli forces claim she was intending to run them over.

The Law is Not Enough to Protect Palestinian Children While Israeli law dictates that children under the age of 12 are unable to be arrested, Palestinian children as young as six have been detained by Israeli forces.

B’Tselem: Hebron District Residents Undergoing ‘draconian’ Measures B’Tselem accuses Israeli forces in Hebron as “immoral” and “awful” as Israel continues to operate on a “principle of separation.”

Prisoners Tortured in Etzion, Face Difficult Situations in Ashkelon Prisoners in Etzion and Ashkelon jails face regular torture by Israeli forces.

Ministry of Health: 78 Palestinians Killed Since Oct. 1 Since the beginning of October, 78 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces and an additional 2,500 people were shot. Of the 78 killed, 17 were children.

Crimes Against Humanity: Arrested Palestinian Children Imprisoned, Tortured In October, over 800 Palestinian children arrested by Israeli forces were subject to torture and unlawful imprisonment. Since 2000, over 10,000 children have been unlawfully arrested.

Israel Closes Schools, Announces Closed Military Zones in Jerusalem Israeli army announced Ras Al-Jabal area in Jerusalem a closed military zone, positioning snippers on rooftops and settlements.

Israel Attacks Journalists to Hide Reality Palestinians Face More incidents of Israeli soldiers abusing Palestinians journalists are being documented. According to MADA there has been an increase of 154 per cent in such assaults.

Israeli Soldiers Kill Father of three-week-old Baby Israeli forces shot and kill Fadi Hassan al-Froukh, 27 years old Palestinian man. He was hit with approximately 10 bullets for alleged stabbing attempt.

‘It Has Become A Prison’: The Ghettoization of Hebron Israeli Forces declares Tel Rumedia in Hebron's Old City a closed military zone assigning each resident a number. Only those on the list can go in and out.
 

Domestic Politics

“Centrist” Politician’s Plan for Total Separation from Palestinians Yair Lapid, of Yesh Atid, wants to build a bigger separation wall and keep the military inside the West Bank.

The Idea that People Living Under Violent Military Occupation Must be Instructed in Nonviolence is Problematic Those living abroad make swift claims to call for nonviolence – the situation under oppression is much more dire.

‘Netanyahu Destroyed Hope’ – Erekat PLO Secretary General Saeb Erekat was interviewed by BBC on November 4 where he claimed Netanyahu is responsible for the failings of Oslo and the peace process.

Poll: Majority of Jewish Israelis Support Executing Terror Suspects on the Spot According to a recent poll, 53% of Jewish Israelis believe that Palestinian terror suspects should be killed on the spot even after being arrested and 80% believe their homes should be demolished.

Destruction of Al-Aqsa is No Conspiracy Theory"There is nothing ludicrous or unimaginable in assuming that a zealot Zionist will one day carry out such plans" Ilan Pappe on the destruction of Al-Aqsa mosque to replace it with a "Third Temple".

A Palestinian Call for ‘Unarmed Warfare’ Jonathan Cook writes about the different calls for non-violent resistance and why most Palestinians lost faith in such resistance.

A “Blue and White Kristallnacht: Only a Matter of Time MK Haneen Zoabi has been facing death threats, police investigations and racist attacks for standing up to the racist right-wing regime in Israel.
 

Foreign Policy 

Netanyahu’s Arrogance; Our Stupidity For the past two decades, Netanyahu has openly defied American presidents with no consequence, yet will be soon negotiating extending, renewing and expanding Israel’s foreign aid contract with the U.S.

Hilary Clinton Promises to Invite Netanyahu to White House in her First Month As a part of her campaign, Hilary Clinton has appealed to “reinvigorating” the relationship with PM Benjamin Netanyahu while neglecting the occupation forces’ violence against the Palestinians.

Ann Lewis and AIPAC Pressured Democratic Think Tank to Censor Writers Deemed “anti-Israel” The Center for American Progress came under fire a few years ago and pressured by AIPAC to censor what it was publishing that was critical of Israeli policy.

Obama Administration Concedes that Mideast Peace is Beyond Reach on his Watch The Obama Administration has stated that the possibility of a two-state solution is not feasible for the remainder of his presidency.

US Gala Raises $31 Million to IOF in Only One Night The Beverly Hilton Hotel in Beverly Hills held a gala for Friends of the Israeli Defense Forces – prominent celebrities and other gala-goers and raised over $31 million to be donated to the IDF.

Israel Wants More Than 5 Billion Dollars from US in Military Aid The Israeli army is asking for over $50 billion dollars over the next 10 years from the United States for military aid. Its current contract of $3 billion per year will be reassessed in 2017.


The Settlements and Settler Violence

How the Government Rewards its Most Violent Settlers Settler attacks largely go by unreported by Israeli media and many settlers act under the watchful eye of Israeli forces.

Netanyahu Flips the Bird to Obama – 2200 More Settlement Units! Israel’s civilian planning committee just revealed that it will be building over two thousand new settlement units.
  

Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions

French Court Outlaws Calls to Boycott Israeli Products BDS has been ruled as anti-Semitic and illegal by the French Supreme Court.

Amos Oz won’t Attend Events Hosted by Israeli Embassies Amos Oz, a celebrated Israeli author, will no longer attend events held by Israeli embassies, as he is against Israel’s growing extremist policies.

NY Senate Ponders Anti-BDS Movement Legislation NY State Senate Michael Gianaris (D) has announced the introduction of legislation that would “require states to cut ties” with companies involved in the BDS movement.

Leading US Anthropologist Signs on to BDS Despite Qualms James Ferguson, Stanford anthropologist, has signed on to BDS due to Israel’s “illegal and immoral” conduct.

BDS has To Be Taken More Seriously Than Boris Johnson Boris Johnson has chosen to go down the same path of other British MPs before him who supported oppressive regimes.
 

Economy and Development

As Tensions Run High, Arab Workers Pay the Price Since the Gaza War and recent spike in violence, the rights of Arab workers are being violated on a constant basis.

Egypt’s Destruction of Gaza Tunnels Leading to Economic and Environmental Disaster Environmental experts warn of the long term effects of flooding water on the Palestinian borders.
  

قوات الاحتلال

استشهاد فلسطيني برصاص الاحتلال جنوبي الضفة الغربية
استشهاد الشاب الفلسطيني، مالك طلال الشريف، من مدينة الخليل، برصاص الاحتلال الإسرائيلي، قرب مفترق مستوطنة "غوش عتسيون" المقامة على أراضي الفلسطينيين، جنوب مدينة بيت لحم جنوب الضفة الغربية المحتلة. 

اعتقال فتاة بعد اقتحام منزلها في قرية الطور
استهدفت قوات الاحتلال أهالي الطور اليوم بالقنابل الصوتية والانتشار في شوارع القرية بصورة استفزازية وقامت باعتقال الفتاة تمارا معمر أبو لبن، بعد اقتحام منزلها في قرية الطور.

اصابات في مواجهات وسط الخليل
اصابة شابان بالرصاص المطاطي، فيما اصيب عدد آخر من المواطنين بحالات اختناق جراء استنشاقهم للغاز المسيل للدموع، خلال في منطقة باب الزاوية وسط مدينة الخليل.

76 شهيدا منذ بدء الهبة
أفادت وزارة الصحة الفلسطينية بارتفاع حصيلة الشهداء منذ الثالث من أكتوبر/ تشرين الأول وحتى مساء الخامس من نوفمبر/ تشرين الثاني إلى 75 شهيداً، من بينهم 17 طفلاً وسيدتين.

شهيدة ومائة إصابة في مواجهات الضفة الغربية
استشهاد مسنة فلسطينية، وأصابة نحو مائة فلسطيني، يوم الجمعة، خلال مواجهات عنيفة اندلعت بين شبان فلسطينيين وقوات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي، في الضفة الغربية المحتلة. 

اصابة جنديين برصاص قناص قرب الحرم الابراهيمي بالخليل
أصيب جنديان إٍسرائيليان- أحدهما بجراح حرجة- برصاص قناص فلسطيني قرب الحرم الإبراهيمي في الخليل وذكرت صحيفة "يديعوت أحرونوت" العبرية أن فلسطينيًا مسلحًا تمكن من إصابة الجنديين على حاجز عسكري، وانسحب من المكان.

استشهاد شاب برصاص الاحتلال شرقي خانيونس
استشهاد الشاب فلسطيني سلامة موسى أبو جامع (23 عامًا)  برصاص جيش الاحتلال الإسرائيلي شرقي خانيونس جنوبي قطاع غزة أثناء مواجهات مع الاحتلال في حي الفراحين.

جيش الاحتلال ينفذ عمليات دهم في الخليل غداة هجمات

جيش الاحتلال الإسرائيلي ينفذ عمليات دهم وتفتيش في الخليل بالضفة الغربية المحتلة غداة اصابة ثلاثة إسرائيليين بالرصاص في هذه المدينة التي تركزت فيها المواجهات مع قوات الاحتلال في الاسابيع الاخيرة.

اسرائيل : نموذج لعسكرة المجتمع والدولة
يحاول المقال توضيح كيفية عسكرة الدولة والمجتمع في إسرائيل، وما هي الآليات التي لجأت إليها دولة الاحتلال لتعزيز هذه العسكرة كي تكون قادرة على البقاء، وكيف امتدت هذه العسكرة من الاقتصاد إلى الحياة إلى البرامج التعليمية؟

أطفال الانتفاضة في سجون الاحتلال... ضحايا الانتقام الإسرائيلي
يشتكي أهالي الأطفال الفلسطينيين المعتقلين في سجن "جيفعون" من سوء الأوضاع والظروف التي يُحتجز فيها أبناؤهم منذ شهر أكتوبر/تشرين الأوّل الماضي.

إصابة 136 فلسطينيًا بمواجهات ضد الاحتلال شمالي الضفة الغربية
أدت المواجهات التي اندلعت، اليوم الإثنين، واستمرت حتى ساعات المساء، بين شبان فلسطينيين وقوات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي في مدينتي طولكرم وقلقيلية شمالي الضفة الغربية، إلى إصابة 136 فلسطينيًا.

فلسطين: 80 شهيدا في الهبة وألفا معتقل في سجون الاحتلال
أعدمت قوات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي، الاثنين، فتاة عشرينية فلسطينية بعدما أطلقت عليها نيران عدوانها وتركتها تنزف بدون مساعدة طبية حدّ الاستشهاد، ليرتفع بذلك عدد الشهداء، منذ بداية الشهر الماضي، إلى 80 شهيداً، منهم 17 طفلاً، بالإضافة إلى مئات الجرحى وأكثر من ألفي معتقل.

مش_متذكر.. تضامن إنساني ضد التعذيب النفسي للطفل مناصرة (تقرير)
"بعرفش، مش متذكر، مشان الله صدقني"، بهذه الكلمات فقط أجاب أحمد مناصرة وهو يُضرب رأسه تحت تأثير إصابته السابقة، خلال صراخ المحققين الصهاينة عليه لدفعه للاعتراف بطعن جنود في مقطع فيديو مسرب. 

الاحتلال يهدم آبارًا زراعية بجنين ويهدد المزارعين

هدمت قوات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي في سهل مرج ابن عامر وفي أراضي بلدة تعنك غرب جنين ثلاثة آبار ارتوازية تستخدم للزراعة وهددت المزارعين في حال حفروا آبار جديدة.


السياسة الداخلية 

فتح تتهم حماس بعرقلة إحياء ذكرى “عرفات” في غزة
قالت حركة التحرير الوطني الفلسطيني (فتح)، إنّ حركة المقاومة الإسلامية (حماس)، تتذرع بما وصفته بـ”أسباب واهية” لمنع إحياء الذكرى الـ”11″ لوفاة الزعيم الفلسطيني الراحل ياسر عرفات في قطاع غزة.

تسليم منزل الرئيس عرفات بغزة
سلمت حركة حماس منزل الرئيس الراحل ياسر عرفات في غزة بعد الاستيلاء عليه منذ عام 2007، وجرى تسليم المنزل لقيادة حركة فتح ومؤسسة الشهيد ياسر عرفات بحضور قيادات من الفصائل الفلسطينية.

حماس: أمن السلطة يعتقل 4 من عناصرنا بالضفة
قالت حركة المقاومة الإسلامية "حماس" إن أجهزة أمن السلطة الفلسطينية اعتقلت في الضفة الغربية أربعة من عناصرها على خلفية انتمائهم السياسي، بينهم شقيقان، فيما استدعت آخر للتحقيق.

غزة : تظاهرة تطالب بالكشف عن قتلة عرفات
نظمت الفصائل في قطاع غزة تظاهرة أمام مقر الامم المتحدة غرب غزة للمطالبة بالكشف عن قتلة الرئيس الراحل ياسر عرفات

دحلان وعباس على مائدة السيسي للمصالحة
أفادت تقارير إعلامية مصرية بوصول النائب في المجلس التشريعي عن حركة "فتح" محمد دحلان إلى القاهرة بالتزامن مع تواجد الرئيس محمود عباس فيها، في اطار الجهود المصرية للمصالحة الفلسطينية الداخلية بين قيادات فتح.


السياسة الخارجية

الخندق يهدّد رفح
يعيش سكان مدينة رفح جنوب قطاع غزة، المحاذية للحدود الفلسطينية - المصرية في خوف متواصل وقلق مما قد يصيبهم أو يصيب منازلهم من المشروع المصري الجديد القاضي بإنشاء خندق مائي على طول الحدود مع رفح

السيسي يربط بين فتح معبر رفح وعودة سلطة محمود عباس إلى غزة
ربط الرئيس المصري عبد الفتاح السيسي بين فتح معبر رفح بشكل دائم وبين عودته لسيطرة السلطة الفلسطينية برئاسة محمود عباس، جاء ذلك، في بيان للرئاسة المصرية، حول لقاء جمع السيسي ونظيره الفلسطيني محمود عباس بقصر الاتحادية شرقي القاهرة.

اليسار اليهودي غير الصهيوني للفلسطينيين: لا تعوّلوا على كلينتون
أثارت المواقف الأخيرة التي عبّرت عنها المرشحة الديمقراطية للرئاسة الأميركية هيلاري كلينتون بشأن الصراع الفلسطيني الإسرائيلي، والتي دلت على تماهيها مع مواقف حكومة اليمين المتطرف في تل أبيب، سخط وحفيظة أوساط اليسار اليهودي غير الصهيوني.

نتنياهو لأوباما: يمكن التفكير بطريقة مختلفة بشأن مستقبل الجولان

ألمح رئيس الحكومة الإسرائيلية، بنيامين نتنياهو،خلال لقائه مع الرئيس الأميركي، باراك أوباما، إلى مطامع إسرائيل باستغلال الأوضاع في سورية بهدف ضم الجولان لإسرائيل والحصول على اعتراف دولي بذلك.

أوباما "يغازل" نتنياهو باستثنائية العلاقات ويدين الفلسطينيين
جدد الرئيس الأميركي باراك أوباما تأكيده لرئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي بنيامين نتنياهو، أنّ العلاقات بين بلده وإسرائيل تعتبر "استثنائية"،  كما أكد التزامه بالحفاظ على الأمن الإسرائيلي وذلك في أول لقاء يجمع المسؤولين اليوم الاثنين في البيت الأبيض، بعد توقيع الولايات المتحدة الأميركية للاتفاق النووي الإيراني.
 

عنف المستوطنين

مستوطنو كريات اربع يهاجمون منازل المواطنين
العشرات من مستوطني 'كريات أربع' المقامة على أراضي المواطنين شرق مدينة الخليل، بحماية جنود الاحتلال الإسرائيلي هاجموا منازل الفلسطينيون في وادي الحصين، وحارة جابر، ووادي النصارى، ورشقوها بالحجارة، ووجهوا الشتائم العنصرية لسكانها.


قانون 

الاحتلال يفرض الحبس المنزلي والكفالة على طفلة مقدسية
قررت محكمة الاحتلال الافراج عن الطفلة تمارة ابو لبن "15 عاما' بكفالة مالية وحبس منزلي، وكانت شرطة الاحتلال قد اعتقلت الطفلة ابو لبن بعد اقتحام منزلها على خلفية نشرها كلمة "سامحوني" على صفحتها في موقع "فيسبوك".


الاقتصاد والتنمية 

دراسة اقتصادية توضح دور الدعم الدولي الى فلسطين في تمويل الاحتلال
دراسة اقتصادية نشرت من قبل مبادرة متابعة الدعم الدولي الفلسطينية تشير الى أن ما يقدر بنحو 72% من أموال الدعم الدولي إلى فلسطين تصب في نهاية المطاف في الاقتصاد الإسرائيلي.

اسرائيل تفتح حاجز الأغوار لاستقبال المنتجات الزراعية الفلسطينية
تعتزم اسرائيل فتح حاجز الاغوار تمهيدا لتصدير المنتوجات الزراعية الفلسطينية الى اسرائيل، حيث افادت الادارة المدنية الاسرائيلية انه وفي إطار الاستعدادات الجارية لبداية فصل الزراعة في منطقة غور الاْردن افتتح هذا الاسبوع حاجز الاغوار من اجل تصدير المنتوجات الزراعية.

 
 الحركة العالمية لمقاطعة إسرائيل وسحب الإستثمارات منها وفرض العقوبات عليها

غضب إسرائيلي من تمييز أوروبا لمنتجات المستوطنات
أثار قرار الممثلية الأوروبية بترميز منتجات المستوطنات الإسرائيلية لتمييزها عن باقي منتجاتها ردود أفعال إسرائيلية غاضبة، في خطوة وصفت بـ"الخطيرة" ووصف مصدر سياسي إسرائيلي القرار بـ"الفضيحة وبالمقاطعة الصريحة للبضائع الإسرائيلية"، متهماً متخذي القرار بدعم ما اسماه "الإرهاب".

ترحيب فلسطيني بوضع ملصق على منتجات المستوطنات مع اعتباره غير كاف

رحب الفلسطينيون باعلان المفوضية الاوروبية انها ستطلب من الدول الاعضاء وضع ملصقات تدل على منشأ منتجات المستوطنات الاسرائيلية في الاراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة منذ العام 1967، واعتبروه ايجابيا ولكن غير كاف.

نشطاء أجانب يرفعون لافتات بساحة البراق تدعو لمقاطعة إسرائيل
رفع نشطاء أجانب  لافتات باللغة الإنجليزية في ساحة حائط البراق في الجدار الغربي للمسجد الأقصى المبارك تدعو إلى مقاطعة إسرائيل.

القتلى في المداهمات الأمنية: قوة مفرطة أم دفاع عن النفس؟

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في العاشر من الشهر الحالي، داهمت قوة أمنية بلدة صمّا في إربد للقبض على شخص بتهمة تكسير شهود القبور فيها. تعرضت القوة لرد عنيف من المطلوب وأشقائه استخدموا فيه العيارات النارية والحجارة والأدوات الحادة، بحسب البيان الأمني، فأصيب خمسة من أفراد الأمن، وتوفي شقيق المطلوب بعيار ناري «غير محدد المصدر» بحسب الأمن الذي فتح تحقيقًا للوقوف على التفاصيل. يقول فراس التل، وهو أحد أقرباء العائلة، إن أهل البلدة «استفزهم» الاقتحام، خاصة بعد أن أطلق أحد رجال الأمن رصاصة بالهواء، ليردوا بالرصاص مصيبين خمسة من عناصر القوة، قبل أن يتلاسن شبيب المقابلة – وهو عنصر في القوات المسلحة شقيق المطلوب عوض مع رجال الأمن ويطلق أحدهم النار عليه، بحسب ما يروي التل. وأكد محافظ إربد لحبر سعد شهاب فتح تحقيق بالحادث. تلك واحدة من بين 27 وفاة حدثت خلال مداهمات أمنية منذ بداية عام 2013 حتى الآن، سواء من المطلوبين أو أشخاص آخرين، فيما استشهد سبعة من مرتبات الأمن العام في المداهمات نفسها، بحسب رصد أجراه حبر للأخبار الصادرة من الأمن أو المنشورة في الصحف والمواقع الرسمية عن مصدر أمني. هذا الرقم يشمل كل الوفيات التي حدثت خلال مداهمة أمنية، سواء برصاص الأمن مباشرة، أو في ظروف تضاربت فيها رواية الأمن العام مع رواية أهل المطلوب، أو التي قال الأمن أن التحقيق حول ملابساتها لا يزال جاريًا. هذه المداهمات -التي تركزت النسبة الأكبر منها في معان- أثارت وما تزال تثيرًا جدلًا بين واجب الأمن العام في القبض على المطلوبين والدفاع عن أنفسهم وحماية أمن المجتمع، وحق المطلوبين في الحياة والإجراءات العادلة في الاعتقال والتحقيق والمحاكمة. كما تثير المداهمات السؤال حول مدى محاسبة رجال الأمن إن أخطأوا وآلية تلك المحاسبة، خاصة بما ينعكس ذلك على ثقة أهالي المطلوبين بتطبيق القانون وحثّهم على تسليم أنفسهم، دون الخوف من خرق الإجراءات.

بعد محاولات عدة لأخذ ردّ من المكتب الإعلامي في الأمن العام أو محافظ معان حول تنفيذ المداهمات واتهامات الأهالي ومدى محاسبة عناصر الأمن، لم تعلق تلك الجهات على تساؤلات حبر. فيما نفى مصدر منتدب من وزارة الداخلية، أي من أشكال الاستخدام المفرط للقوة، مؤكدًا إحالة كل من يخالف القانون للجهات المختصة. المداهمات بين القانون والتطبيق قبل أشهر، أشادت الداخلية في بيان لها بالمداهمات التي ينفذها رجال الأمن والدرك بين الحين والآخر معتبرة أنها تهدف لفرض هيبة الدولة وتحقيق الأمن والأمان للمواطنين. تعلق النائب وعضو مجلس أمناء المركز الوطني لحقوق الإنسان وفاء بني مصطفى على عدد الوفيات في رصد حبر بأنه «رقم عالٍ ومؤسف، حتى وإن كانوا مجرمين أو مطلوبين يجب أن يكون هناك طريقة أخرى أكثر سلمية لمحاولة اعتقالهم» داعية إلى «مراجعة الإجراءات التي يتم من خلالها فرض القانون وإلى إخضاع كافة القوى الأمنية المشاركة في المداهمات إلى التدريب». وتسأل المحامية في المركز الوطني لحقوق الإنسان نسرين زريقات عن التزام الجهات الأمنية بالمبادئ المنصوص عليها في القانون الدولي لحقوق الإنسان حول توفير معايير التناسبية والضرر، «أي أن يكون عدد الوحدات الأمنية المشاركة في المهمة  يتناسب مع عدد الأشخاص المنوي القبض عليهم، وأن يتم تقييم الضرر الصادر من المطلوب». وتأخذ زريقات على الأمن عدم إعلانه لتفاصيل المداهمات التي ينتج عنها وفيات تحديدًا للرأي العام. وكان المركز الوطني لحقوق الإنسان أشار في تقريره حول حالة الحريات في الأردن لعام 2014 إلى تلقيه 18 إخبارًا تفيد باقتحام المنازل لإلقاء القبض على مطلوبين، رافق بعضها استخدام القوة وترويع النساء والأطفال، مقدمًا توصيته عدم اللجوء لاقتحام المنازل الا بحالات الضرورة وعدم استخدام المفرط للقوة. يوضح المنسق الحكومي في رئاسة الوزراء باسل الطراونة لحبر، أن الاستعمال المفرط للقوة «محظور ومجرّم قانونيًا»، بالاستناد إلى المادة 9 من قانون الأمن العام الذي يوضح الحالات التي يلجأ لها لأمن لاستخدامالقوة، مؤكدًا إحالة كل من يثبت بحقه استخدام مفرط للقوة في الواجبات الرسمية للمحاسبة. المادة (9) من قانون الأمن العام: لأفراد الأمن العام اللجوء إلى استعمال القوة بالقدر اللازم لأداء واجباتهم بشرط أن يكون استعمالها هو الوسيلة الوحيدة لذلك  (…) ويراعى في جميع الأحوال السابقة أن يكون إطلاق النار هو الوسيلة الوحيدة لتحقيق الأغراض السابقة، ويبدأ رجل الأمن بالإنذار إلى أنه سيطلق النار، ثم يلجأ بعد ذلك إلى إطلاق النار، ويجري الإنذار نفخًا بالبوق أو الصفارة أو بأية وسيلة أخرى من هذا النوع أو بإطلاق مسدس تنبعث منه إشارة ضوئية. إلا أن الطراونة يلفت لحصول بعض الأخطاء الفردية التي تحال للمسائلة مباشرة، دون أن تعتبر تلك الأخطاء «منهجية» في التعامل. تروي عائلة محمود أبو دية الفناطسة (أبو سليمان) في معان قصتها في المداهمات الأمنية لمنزلهم دون أن يكون أحدٌ من أبنائها مطلوبًا للجهات الأمنية، إلا أن قرابتهم لمطلوبين من العائلة نفسها كانت مبررًا كافيًا للجهات الأمنية للمداهمة للبحث عن المطلوبين، ما نتج عنها هدم جزء من جدار المنزل. يروي أبو سليمان -وهو ابن عمّ لمطلوبين- ليلة دخول القوة الأمنية لمنزله: «هدّوا الحيط، وهينا حطينا حرامات عشان ما نكون مكشوفين، ودخلوا من ورا الدار وطلعوا الجميع برا، بعدين دخلوني أنا لحالي ع البيت قدامهم وحاطين علي سلاح، يعني استخدموني درع بشري، وفتشوا البيت، والله لو نطت بسّة قدامي ونقزت كانوا طخوني ومتت».

 

 
[ابو سليمان يقف قرب منزله أمام حائط هدم أثناء المداهمة. تصوير دانة جبريل]


يميز أبو سليمان بين مداهمات حصلت لمنازلهم قبل سنوات وبين ما حدث مؤخرًا. «ع الأقل، زمان كانوا يجوا معهم أمر وقبل ما يطلعوا يعطونا ورقة نوقع عليها بعد ما نتفقد البيت. هسه ما في منه هاد الحكي». في الوقت الذي وجه فيه أبو سليمان هذا الاتهام للأمن، اتهمت وزارة الداخلية المطلوبين في معان في تلك المداهمات «باستخدامهم للنساء والأطفال كدروع بشرية لحمايتهم من القوة الأمنية ما اضطر القوة للتراجع حرصًا على سلامة النساء والأطفال وعدم تعريضهم للخطر». ما يلفت له أبو سليمان منصوص عليه في قانون أصول المحاكمات الجزائية الذي يمنح في مادته 82 الادعاء العام الحق في تفتيش الأمكنة التي يحتمل فيها وجود ما يساعد على ظهور الحقيقة، بينما توضح المادة 85 شروط تفتيش منازل لأشخاص غير مشتكى عليهم. من جانبه يؤكد الطراونة بأن الأمن العام «لا يفتش أي منزل إلا بموافقة خطية من المدعي العام، وأن تفتيش المنازل لا يتم إلا في حالات محدودة نظراً لجسامة الفعل المرتكب أو نوع الطلب على الشخص المراد ضبطه أو تفتيش منزله»، مشيراً الى وجود «فرق خاصة مدربة تعمل بحرفية ومهنية عالية يؤهلها تدريبها لعدم المساس بالأبرياء». الحق في الحياة مقابل الأمن المجتمعي استطاع حبر الاطلاع على بعض قضايا التي لوحق على إثرها مطلوبون قتلوا في المداهمات، منها قضايا سرقة، أو تجارة مخدرات، أو قطع طرق، أو شروع بالقتل، أو هتك عرض. إلا أنه ما بين حقوق المطلوبين قضائيًا وأمنيًا بالمحاكمات العادلة، وحق رجل الأمن في الدفاع عن نفسه، وحق المجتمع بالسلم والأمن، مساحة لجدل واسع. «ضياع فرد مدني أهم من القبض على 100 مطلوب بالنسبة لي»، تقول النائب وفاء بني مصطفى. يقابل ذلك ما يقوله المحامي المعروف بمرافعاته عن أفراد الأمن في محكمة الشرطة أحمد النجداوي «أن أمن وسلامة المجتمع يفوق بالأهمية أحيانًا أمن مخلّين بالقانون». من جهته، يؤكد الباحث المختص في قسم الشرق الأوسط في منظمة هيومن رايتس ووتش آدم كوغل لحبر على ضرورة رفع جاهزية الجهات الرسمية بحيث تضمن عدم وقوع أي وفيات خلال المداهمات الأمنية. تشدد بني مصطفى في الوقت نفسه على حق رجل الأمن بالدفاع عن نفسه، في حال شعر بالخطر على حياته. تطالب زريقات بدورها الأمن بتوضيح هذه الجزئية للرأي العام في كل مرة يقتل فيها مطلوب. «يجب أن يوضح الأمن ماذا حصل بالتحديد كي نعرف دواعي استعمال القوة». حاول حبر الحصول على إجابات حول المعايير التي تتبعها لجان التحقيق المختصة في محكمة الشرطة عند النظر في حالات الاستخدام المفرط للقوة والدفاع عن النفس، لكن المكتب الإعلامي في مديرية الأمن العام رفض التصريح. مع عدم وجود تصريحات واضحة من الجهات المختصة حول تفاصيل المداهمات، يعتمد حبر على رصد لما نشر عن بيانات الأمن ومصادر أمنية في وسائل الإعلام. وبحسب هذا الرصد فقد قُتل ستة أشخاص في مداهمات الأشهر الستة الأولى من عام 2013 جميعهم في معان، و12 في مداهمات عام 2014 فقط، وتسعة منذ بداية العالم الحالي للآن.


الطراونة يشير إلى أن «عدد الوفيات خلال المداهمات الأمنية إذا ما قورن مع عدد المداهمات المنفذة في المملكة لنفس الرقم يظهر ضآلة نسبة الوفيات»، مع تأكيد «حرص الحكومة على عدم إزهاق أي روح مهما كان الجرم المرتكب من قبل صاحبها».  «محاكمات ميدانية» أم رد بالمثل؟ يكتفي الأمن في التصريحات الصادرة عنه حول المداهمات التي ينتج عنها وفيات بالحديث عن وجود مقاومة «شديدة» من قبل المطلوب وأعوانه في بعض الأحيان، ما يضطر القوة للرد بالمثل، وهو ما يدل عليه استشهاد سبعة من مرتبات الأجهزة الأمنية المختلفة منذ بداية 2013 خلال «قيامهم بالواجب في القبض على المطلوبين في المداهمات أو المطاردات»، حسب رصد حبر. إلا أن أهالي المطلوبين يشككون في بعض الروايات الأمنية. عائلة أحمد الربابعة الذي قتل في جديتا بمحافظة إربد بداية العام الحالي -وكان مطلوبًا على خلفية 49 قيدًا أمنيًا بحسب الأمن- اتهمت الأمن بوجود نية قتل عمد للمطلوب، فيما اتهم شقيق المتوفي في حديثه مع حبر الأمن «بالإعدام الميداني» لشقيقه، الذي يؤكد أنه كان مطلوبًا للأمن منذ سنوات عدة. يقول عبد المنعم الربابعة إن الأجهزة الأمنية لم تسعف شقيقه أحمد لأربع ساعات من الإصابة ما أدى لوفاته. ويشير تقرير الطب الشرعي الذي اطّلع عليه حبر إلى أن سبب الوفاة هو النزيف. من جهته قرر النائب العام في مديرية الأمن العام «منع المحاكمة وحفظ أوراق القضية». بحسب محامي العائلة عبدالله الكيلاني. يوضح الكيلاني «أن تحقيقًا أجري من قبل مدعي عام شرطة غرب إربد لمعرفة حيثيات القضية كاملة، إلاّ أنه توصل لمنع المحاكمة لتعذر معرفة الفاعل»، وقدّم الكيلاني طلبًا لرئيس النيابات العامة لتمييز القضية، «لكن ملف القضية الأصلي لم يصل للنيابات العامة من مديرية الأمن العام منذ ثلاثة أشهر». تلك الاتهامات تكررت خلال حديثنا مع بعض الأهالي في معان. تقول أم سليمان أبو دية ابنة عم أربعة مطلوبين قتلوا خلال السنة والنصف الأخيرة: «هذول مطلوبين. ليش ما يتحاكموا؟ بدهم يقنعوني إنه دولة ما قدرت تمسك ولد [عمره] 18 سنة؟». المصدر سابق الذكر في وزارة الداخلية، استهجن بشدة اتهامات الأهالي بتقصد القتل، مؤكدًا أن ذلك «من الاستحالة أن يكون ضمن السياسات الأمنية الأردنية». من جهته، لا يرى النائب عن محافظة معان وعضو «اللجنة النيابية لمتابعة أحداث معان» أمجد آل خطّاب أن هناك «نوايا قصدية أو تصفيات» في المداهمات التي ينتج عنها وفيات، ويعتقد أنها دومًا تؤشر لضعف الاحترافية ونقص التدريب خلال العملية الأمنية. كثافة الوفيات في معان تأتي محافظة معان في الموقع الأول في الوفيات خلال المداهمات من كلا الطرفين، المطلوبين والأمن. أكدت جهات رسمية في السابق على عدم استهدافها للمدينة ومحاولتها فقط القبض على المطلوبين، لكن ذلك لم يمنع تصاعد الاتهامات النيابية بالتعامل الأمني الخاطئ الذي أدى لـ«معاقبة المدينة جماعيًا»، مع الاستهجان «لعدم مقدرة الدولة القبض على المطلوبين».



رئيس لجنة متابعة قضايا معان محمد أبو صالح، قال في حديث لحبر العديد من المطلوبين في معان «تمت تبرئتهم في العديد من القضايا لعدم وجود دليل، لكن تمت معاملتهم بطريقة سيئة في التحقيق (..) بالإضافة إلى نظرة المجتمع السيئة لهم، [ووضع] أسماءهم كمتهمين في أي قضية سرقة تحصل لاحقًا، ليصبحوا مطلوبين مرة أخرى». يضرب أبو صالح مثلًا ببدر أبو دية، أحد المطلوبين المقتولين في مداهمة أمنية في معان: «بدر لما توفّى كان مش مكمل 21 سنة، وكان عليه 158 قيد. يعني من لما كان عمره 10 سنين برتكب جريمة أسبوعيًا؟». في معان، تساءل عدد من المواطنين عن الغياب الأمني في السنوات السابقة، الذي وصفوه سببًا في تنامي المطلوبين، بحسب حديثهم لحبر.


أربعة قتلى من عائلة وحدة، وخامسٌ أصيب بالشلل، وسادس سلّم نفسه في آيار عام 2013، قُتل عيسى أبو دية الفناطسة في مطاردة أمنية. ظهر بعدها تسجيل فيديو -سرعان ما حذف- يظهر ما أسمته العائلة تنكيلاً بابنها، طالبة فتح تحقيق بالحادث. بعد عام ذلك، قُتل شقيقه بدر (20 عامًا) في «كمين أمني» بحسب العائلة، بينما أوضح  وزير الداخلية السابق حسين هزاع المجالي بأن بدر أطلق النار على القوة الأمنية، وكان بحقه حينها «55 طلبًا أمنيًا و19 أمر جلب و79 أسبقية جرمية». رفضت عائلة أبو دية دفن ابنها حتى تعرف حيثيات مقتله، بالأخص مع عدم ورود أي إبلاغ أو توضيح رسمي للعائلة. «ما إجا علينا حد يوضح لنا شو صار. أنا عرفت من النساوين اللي أجوا ع الدار والتلفونات والفزيع»، تقول الوالدة. بقي بدر في ثلاجة مستشفى البشير سنة وأربعة أشهر، أصيب خلالها شقيقه فرج برصاصة من الأمن سببت له الشلل، ليعالج بمكرمة ملكية في المدينة الطبية، فيما بات شقيقاه أحمد وقاسم بعدها خارجين عن القانون. «يعني أحمد صار يطخطخ ويولع عجال ويسكر طرق، بده يعرف مين اللي قتل أخوه»، تقول والدته. 

 

[.شعارات على جدران منزل عائلة الفناطسة تنعى ابنها بدر. تصوير دانة جبريل]

[شقيق بدر، فرج المشلول إثر إصابته خلال مداهمة يستلقي في منزل العائلة تصوير دانة جبريل ]


قتل أحمد وقاسم لاحقًا، في أولى المداهمات الأمنية خلال عهد وزير الداخلية الحالي سلامة حمّاد بعد إقالة المجالي. وأكدت وزارة الداخلية حينها مقاومة القوة الأمنية المرسلة للقبض على المطلوبين بالألغام الأرضية والعيارات النارية. دفن أحمد وقاسم وشقيقهما بدر في يوم واحد. «سألوني بدك تدفني ولادك ولا تخلي هاد عند هذاك؟ حكيت لهم لا بكفي شو العيلة بدها تلحق بعضها واحد ورا واحد؟ خلص بكفي!»، تقول والدة المطلوبين. وبقي فرج مصابًا بشلل كامل بالأطراف دون الحصول على كامل علاجه بعدما خرج من المدينة الطبية. «الدولة اتكفلت بعلاجي وما حدا متعرف عليّ هسّا»، يقول لحبر. لاحقا، سلّم الشقيق السادس فوّاز نفسه لوزير الداخلية عندما زار الأخير معان للوقوف على مطالب المواطنين واحتياجاتهم، فيما اعتبرته لجنة متابعة قضايا معان بأنه مبادرة لإعادة جسور الثقة بين المواطن والدولة. لماذا لم يسلموا أنفسهم؟ تمثل إشكالية عدم تسليم المطلوبين لأنفسهم إلى الأمن، ومن بينهم أبناء عائلة أبو دية، مجمل الأزمة في المحافظة، والتي «يفتقد أبنائها الثقة بوجود ضمانات محاكمات عادلة وعلى رأسها ظروف التحقيق الملائمة»، بحسب أبو صالح. تستذكر والدة الأشقاء المطلوبين حديثًا دار بينها وبين ابنها الأكبر أحمد قبل وفاته، عندما حثّته على تسليم نفسه. «والله أقنعته وما كان يرضى، يحكيلي غير يعذبوني ويبعتوا شريط للناس تتفرج علي». إلا أن الوالدة تحمل عتبها على ابنها بدر بعد وفاته. «كان عليه قضايا سرقات مسكوه وحطوه بدار الأحداث مرتين وشرد. ومرة منهم أنا وأخته حشرناه وأخوه سلمه للشرطة ورجع شرد. حجمه كان صغير ويفرّ، وبس كبر بطلنا نقدر نسيطر عليه». وتقول متمنيةً لو أن ابنها قضى محكوميته كاملة: «لو كان عليه تشديد مزبوط مزبوط بدار الأحداث ما هرب العيل من الشبابيك، أنا والله كنت أصيح وألطم على راسي يوم يشرد». يلفت أبو صالح إلى ضرورة أن يشعر المطلوبون وأهاليهم بأن القانون يطبق على الجميع بالتساوي. «هل يحاسب رجال الأمن الذين تجاوزوا القانون في معان؟»، يسأل أبو صالح. «عندما أقنع مطلوبًا بأن يسلم نفسه علي أن أحفظ حقوقه أيضًا. هل تمت محاسبة من أخطأ بحقه؟». هل يحاسب الأمن إن أخطأ؟ يشدد المحامي النجداوي على حزم محكمة الشرطة في محاسبة مرتبات الأمن الذين يمثلون أمامها، نظرًا «لأهمية وظيفتهم وضرورة التزامهم بالقانون». بحسب المواد 81 – 85 من قانون الأمن العام، فإن لجان تحقيق تُشكل من عدد من الضباط يختارهم مدير الأمن العام أو من ينوب عنه  للنظر في الشكاوي على أفراد الأمن، لتقدَّم نتائج التحقيقات جميعها للمدعي العام ليتابعها أو يغلق ملف القضية حسب طبيعتها. وفي عام 2013 حكمت محكمة الشرطة على مرتب برتبة نقيب في إدارة مكافحة المخدرات بطرده من الخدمة والحكم
عليه 15 عامًا مع الأشغال الشاقه بعدما وجهت له تهمة القتل القصد خلال مداهمة أمنية قام بها عام 2010 مع زملائه في أم السماق، قتل خلالها أحد المطلوبين بعد أن تهجم على رجال الأمن بالضرب. بالرغم من ذلك، تأخذ النائب بني مصطفى على آلية محاسبة من يتجاوز القانون من الجهاز الأمني أنها تتم أمام جهة أمنية فقط دون إشراك للجهات المستقلة في التحقيق أو المساءلة». الخصم والحكم واحد. كيف يجوز ذلك؟ يجب ألا تكون لجنة التحقيق حكومية بالكامل، بل لا بد من إشراك جهات مستقلة فيها لكسب الثقة». إلاّ أن الطراونة ينوّه إلى أن العديد من الشكاوي المقدمة بسبب الاستخدام المفرط للقوة غالبًا ما تتضمن هدفًا آخر يتعلق بمحاولات المطلوبين للتهرب من الملاحقات القانونية، حيث «أثبتت التحقيقات في مجموعة ادعاءات أن استخدام القوة كان ضمن الإطار القانوني للمقاومة الشديدة لأمر القبض أو الإجراءات القانونية الأخرى»، بحسب قوله. يشير النجداوي إلى لجوء العديد من المتهمين من رجال الأمن للضغط على عائلة المتوفي لإسقاط حقه الشخصي في القضايا التي يثبت فيها استخدام الأمن للقوة المفرطة في المداهمات الأمنية، ما يقلل من الحكم، الأمر الذي يستنكره رئيس لجنة قضايا معان، محمد أبو صالح. «تستطيع الدولة دفع التعويضات، لكنها هل تعوّض الوطن عن حجم التشويه الذي أصاب صورة رجل الأمن في عين المواطن؟». ولم يتمكن حبر من الوصول للقضايا المنظورة أمام محكمة الشرطة، لعدم منحه التصريح اللازم لذلك من مديرية الأمن العام.

[تم إعداد هذا التقرير بالتعاون مع منظمة صحفيون من أجل حقوق الإنسان (JHR).]

[صورة المقال بعدسة صلاح ملكاوي، وكالة أنباء الأناضول، عمّان، 13-07-2012.]

[المقال تصميم حسام دعنة. يعاد نشر المقال ضمن اتفاقية شراكة بين "جدلية" ومجلة "حبر"] 

Maghreb Media Roundup (November 13)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Maghreb and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Maghreb Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to maghreb@jadaliyya.com by Tuesday night of every week]

Algeria

Bouteflika in full control of running Algeria: premier Al Arabiya reports on Algeria’s assurance of the president’s political capabilities.

Algeria unwavering in support of Western Sahara independence“Algerian Ambassador to Namibia Sid Ali Abdelbari has reiterated Algeria’s support for the independence of Western Sahara.”

الشاب عبدو… الرّاي على إيقاع المدّاحات Nafha Magazine discusses the contemporary rai musician Cheb Abdou and his role in continuing rai culture.

Projet de Loi de finances 2016 : Un budget conséquent pour l’Education Algeria increased its educational budget by over two percent, and now represents almost ten percent of the state budget.  

Libya

Libya's Black Market Foreign Currency Exchange: From Healthcare To What's On The Table, When The Exchange Rate Dictates Every Area Of Your Life An analysis of Libya’s volatile foreign policy black market, currently “the only available source of foreign currency for most Libyans.”

هل كان مبعوث الأمم المتحدة إلى ليبيا وسيطا محايدا؟ UN Envoy for Libya, Bernardino Leon, resigns from the United Nations and takes on a new position as Director General of the Abu Dhabi Diplomatic Academy.

Libya: Back to Square One?“A leaked email written by Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Bernardino Leon on 31 December 2014 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan badly compromises Leon’s credibility as a neutral mediator, that of the negotiation process, and most importantly that of the entire United Nations as an independent actor.”

اغنية جديدة للقريتلي Popular song on social media denouncing the dire state of the economy.

Mauritania

شكوي للرئيس محمد ولد عبد العزيز من ادارة بير أم آكرين A Mauritanian citizen demands reforms in governmental corruption and corrupt management, addressing the president directly.

فضائيات موريتانية حرة تنقل العرض العسكري في الشامي من داخل سيارات الجيش Mauritania’s army holds a public parade in the Shami region of the country for the military’s fifty-fifth anniversary.

CGTM: عمال اسنيم بالزويرات تعرضوا لعنف لا يمكن تفسيره The General Confederation of Mineworkers has complained of violent oppression by security forces against any form of public assembly in Zouerate.

ولد عبد العزيز في زراية للسعودية Taqadoumy reports on President Aziz’s visit to Saudi Arabia for the Arab Summit.

La Mauritanie doit libérer deux prisonniers d’opinion détenus depuis un an Amnesty International calls on the Mauritanian government to release the jailed anti-slavery activists Biram Dah Abeid and Brahim Bilal Ramadane, imprisoned since November of last year.

Morocco

Maroc, une réforme territoriale bâtie contre l’identité régionale OrientXXI analyzes the territorial reform plan behind the official discourse of a better inclusion of ethnic identities.   

Le Desk A new investigative magazine has launched in Morocco and will be available for free from 10 November to 20 November.

La bombe à retardement sociale du Maroc Medias24 paints a dark picture of educated youth unemployment and the worsening of their situation over the last few years.

الحبس لقياديين ف العدل والاحسان بمكناس وها علاش Leaders from the Justice and Spirituality movement have been arrested under the charges of assembly and disobedience.

Sahara : comment le Maroc entend creuser son sillon Le Point reviews Morocco’s policy on Western Sahara following the fortieth anniversary of the Green March.

Tunisia

تونس..32 نائبا يستقيلون من كتلة "نداء تونس" والنهضة تهيمن على البرلمان Thirty-two members of Parliament have resigned over a rift with President Essebsi’s son. The members denounce the attempt to create another dynasty in the country, a situation against the ideals of the 2010 Revolution.

La Tunisie et l'Union Européenne signent un accord pour soutenir la réforme et la modernisation du secteur sécuritaire A new security agreement has been signed between Tunisia and the European Union, seeking to reform the security sector.

Tunisia: Musicians confronted with censorship and repression Freemuse criticizes the status quo, which continues to target young musicians and infringes upon their freedom of expression.

JAWHAR SOUDANI ALIAS VA-JO, LE COLORISTE DE GABÈS A report on street artist and visual artist Va-Jo.

Western Sahara

The Unending Quest for Self-Determination in the Western Sahara Jake Silverman traces the history of Western Saharan self-determination, and US and UN policy towards the territory.

Western Sahara: President Abdelaziz Hails Ben Ki-Moon's Call for "True Negotiations"“The Polisario Front has reaffirmed its willingness to enter into true negotiations without preconditions, advocated by the Secretary General of the UN to reach a solution that guarantees the right of the Saharawi people to self-determination and independence…”

Quarante ans de conflit au Sahara occidental OrientXXI discusses security issues in the Western Sahara, and provides a number of references concerning the region.

Vast underground river system discovered in once-vibrant Western Sahara Scientists discover a once vibrant river system in the Western Sahara region. 

Recent Jadaliyya Articles on the Maghreb

Kabylia: Between Colonial Myths and Algerian Realities A translated excerpt from Yassine Temlali's book, La genèse de la Kabylie. Aux origines de l’affirmation berbère en Algérie (1830-1962).

Libya: The Forgotten War of the Tebu and Tuareg Valérie Stocker sheds light on the violence marring southern Libya.

Social Dialogue Under The Gun in Tunisia Ian M. Hartshorn contextualizes the developments with regard to negotiations in Tunisia, looking at the various actors and processes that have led up to the present day.

De-dramatizing Algerian Politics Brahim Rouabah writes on the recent changes in Algeria's political sphere, dispelling dominant notions in media.

Tunisia: The Counter Demographic Transition Khadija Mohsen-Finan interviews researcher Youssef Courbage on the increasing birth rates in Tunisia.

The Ongoing, Steady Gains of Morocco's Islamist Party Dörthe Engelcke examines the mounting successes of Morocco's leading Islamist party, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD). 

A Statement of Solidarity with Moroccan Historian, Maâti Monjib Activists mobilize in solidarity with Moroccan historian Maâti Monjib, who is wanted for "undermining state security" and has been prevented from leaving the country.

عن العمارة ونهاياتها

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”قد تدوم أساسات مبنى لألف عام، بينما يستوجب تغيير هيكل السطح بعد ألف شهر. وقد تدوم التمديدات الصحية لألف أسبوع، والدهان الخارجي لألف يوم، واللمبة لألف ساعة. يجب أن تُفهم المباني من خلال مقاييس زمنية مختلفة تتغير أثناءها“.1

لطالما كانت العمارة أداة فعالة في تشكيل حقائق على أرض الواقع، وفي مساعدة مختلف البرامج السياسية والإيديولوجية على تخطي حيز الأفكار النظرية والمجردة، لتصبح بذلك واقعاً ملموساً يحيط بالأفراد ويتداخل مع حياتهم الآنية ورؤيتهم للمستقبل. وبالمقابل، فعند فشل تلك الإيديولوجيات والبرامج، تصبح تلك العمارة تجسيداً مادياً وملموساً لذلك الفشل من خلال مبانٍ أقرب ما تكون إلى صروحٍ لأفكار منتهية الصلاحية أو نموذج لما يجب تجنب فعله، على أحسن تقدير.  

منذ نهاية السبعينيات، لم يعد بالإمكان فهم نتاج العمارة ودور المعماري بمعزل عن المنظومة الرأسمالية العالمية والديناميكيات الناظمة لها. إذ أصبحت قيمة المباني مرتبطة بشكل أساسي باعتبارات الموقع، والمساحة، والعائد المالي المحتمل لبيعها، حيث يكفي ألا يعاني المبنى من خلل تقني فادح حتى تصبح جودة التصميم المعماري (الفراغية، والجمالية، والوظيفية) ثانوية في تحديد قيمته، تتخطاها قدرته على تحقيق الربح.2وبذلك، باتت المشاريع العمرانية والبناء الشامل أو البناء واسع النطاق (Mass Construction) أحد أهم المحركات الأساسية لعجلة الاقتصاد، في معادلة تتحول فيها المباني إلى سلعة، وتستقل فيها القيمة التبادلية عن القيمة الاستعمالية، ولا تأتي عملية البناء فيها كاستجابة للنمو السكاني العالمي وإنما كنتيجة لتجاذبات العرض والطلب في الأسواق العقارية. ورغم أن انتشار البناء واسع النطاق ليس مرتبطاً بشكل حصري بالرأسمالية العالمية، حيث يمكن تعقبه في فترات سابقة، ابتداء من الثورة الصناعية ومرورا بالحربين العالميتين، وضمن برامج سياسية مختلفة سعت إلى توفير أبنية سكنية سريعة البناء ومنخفضة التكلفة،إلا أن حاجة الرأسمالية العالمية، في العقود الأخيرة، إلى خلق أسواق جديدة من خلال التوسع المناطقي وهاجس التجديد المستمر أصبح الناظم الأساسي لديناميكيات البناء والهدم، والذي يروج له دائما في إطار التقدم والازدهار.

تتطرق هذه المقالة إلى ديناميكيات رأس المال وأثره في الانتاج المعماري في القرنين العشرين والواحد والعشرين. نستعرض فيها ظاهرة هجران المباني المتزايدة في العالم وخصوصيتها عن فترات سبقتها. ونحاول فهم هذه  الظاهرة  من خلال تتبع الفكر الذي يحصر التفكير في المستقبل بالتقدم وانعكاسه على النظرة الكلاسيكية للخط الزمني لحياة المباني وعملية التصميم المعماري. كما تبحث المقالة في أجزائها اللاحقة في آليات احتواء منظومة الرأسمالية العالمية لطروحات معمارية مختلفة كالعمارة البيئية، وإعادة الاستخدام التكيفي للمباني، ومشاريع إعادة الإعمار، وعمارة اللجوء المؤقتة في سبيل تحقيق الأرباح المادية.

وأخيرا، نستعرض إمكانيات مختلفة للتفكير في دورة حياة المبنى منذ إقرار بنائه، والتي تتخطى مفهوم التقدم الخطي وثنائية النقاش الذي يضع العمارة الحديثة والمعاصرة مقابل العمارة التاريخية في محاولة لتفضيل أحدهما على الآخر. وعليه، يكمن التحدي في كيفية تصميم حيوات متعددة للمبنى الواحد، مناسبة لمجتمع النمو والتراجع الدوري كوسيلة للتعامل مستقبلا مع إرث البشرية المبني. إذ بات من الضروري الآن الحديث عن عمارة تأخذ في الحسبان إمكانية فشل البرنامج الذي بنيت من أجله لتخدم الحاجات المتغيرة للمجتمع في جميع مراحله (مراحل التراجع إضافة إلى مراحل التقدم)، مختلفة بذلك عن تلك الرؤية الطوباوية التي قدمها لنا مشروع الحداثة الذي لم ير في المستقبل سوى التقدم والتطور. إن التسليم بحتمية هجر عمران بأكمله عند انتهاء البرنامج الإيديولوجي الذي بني من أجله، أصبح ترفاً وعبئاً بيئيا ووجودياً لمجتمعات دائمة التغير وكوكب محدود الموارد. 

أطلال الرأسمالية   

صدر في العام 2014 كتاب بعنوان ”على المباني أن تموت“ لستيفن كيرنز وجاين م جاكوبز3، والذي يبحث في مفهوم موت المبنى، ويطرح نقاشاً يبدو ضرورياً وملحاً أكثر من أي وقت مضى حول التفكير في النهايات المحتملة للمباني، وما يترتب عليها من إعادة تفكير في عملية البناء بحد ذاتها، نظراً للكمّ غير المسبوق من الإنتاج المعماري. فبعدما كانت الطبيعة صاحبة الدور الأجلّ في فناء العمارة وتحولها إلى أطلال، باتت المباني المهجورة في عصرنا تتحول إلى مخلفات.4

يجول اليوم الباحثون والمصورون لتوثيق مئاتٍ من مباني القرن العشرين المهجورة في أنحاء العالم؛ ابتداءً من محطات الطاقة، وأماكن السكن العامة، والأسواق التجارية، ووصولاً إلى مدنٍ كاملة، كديترويت مثلاً، للبحث في السبب وراء هجرها، أو احتفاءً بها، أو أملاً في إيجاد طرق لإعادة استخدامها. وقد نقف قريبا أمام أطلال ”المدن ما بعد الصناعية“ المعتمدة على اقتصادٍ خدماتي متمثل بالزحف العمراني منخفض الكثافة - من أسواق تجارية، ومجمعات سكنية، ومجتمعات مسوّرة، ومقرات شركات – لتختفي كالسحر فاسحة المجال لغيرها، أو تُرمى كالسلعة عديمة الفائدة.

أتاحت التكنولوجيا إمكانية فصل الإنتاج المعماري عن سياقه الجغرافي، متيحة بذلك المجال أمام المعماريين التغاضي عن المحددات البيئية المحيطة. وهو ما ساعد على خلق ذلك الفراغ الذي يطلق عليه ريم كوولهاس ”الفراغ الميت“ (Junkspace)، أي ذلك الفراغ الزائد عن الحاجة، صنيع الحداثة، والذي ينتج الكثير منه في سبيل الرخاء والمتعة، ويعتاش على أي اختراع يسمح له بالتمدد. هذا الفراغ هو فراغ تراكمي، متعدد الطبقات، ”خفيف الوزن“، لايمكن تذكره لأنه من الصعب فهمه أو استيعابه:

”الفضاء الميّت هو مجموع إنجازاتنا؛ ما قمنا ببنائه هو أكثر مما عمّرت كل الأجيال السابقة مجتمعة، وإن اختلفت المقاييس، فنحن لا نخلف أهرامات. وفقا لإنجيل القباحة الجديد، هناك بالفعل فضاء ميّت قيد الإنشاء في القرن الحادي والعشرين أكثر من ذلك المتبقي من القرن العشرين [...] الاستمرارية هي جوهر الفضاء الميت، فهو يستغل أي اختراع يمكّنه من التوسع، ومن تواصل فراغي سلس: المصعد، ومكيف الهواء، ورشاش الماء، والأبواب المقاومة للنار، وستارة الهواء الساخن ... وهو دائماً داخلي وممتد، ونادراً ما تستطيع تصور حدوده. وهو يروج التوهان بأي وسيلة (مرآة، مواد تلميع، صدى) ... الفضاء الميت محكم الإغلاق ومترابط، ليس من خلال هيكلٍ ما، وإنما من خلال قشرةٍ  كالفقاعة.

[...] نصف البشرية تلوث لتنتج، ويلوث النصف الآخر ليستهلك. إن مجموع التلوث لدول العالم الثالث مما تنتجه عوادم السيارات، والدراجات النارية، والشاحنات، والحافلات، والمصانع المستغلة للعمال تتضاءل أهميته إذا ما قورن بالحرارة المتولدة من الفضاء الميت [...] الفضاء الميت هو فضاء سياسي: إذ يعتمد أساساً على الإزالة الجذرية  للقدرة على النقد باسم الراحة والمتعة. فالراحة الآن هي العدالة الجديدة، حيث باتت دول مصغرة بأكملها تعتمد الآن على الفضاء الميت كبرنامجٍ سياسي، وتؤسس لأنظمة من الارتباك المُهندَس، وتحرّض على سياسة الفوضى الممنهجة.”5

عن تصميم التراجع

حتى وقتٍ قريب، استطاع المعماري رسم خطٍ زمنيٍ لمبناه، بدءاً من إنتاج المخططات الأولية للمبنى. إذ يبدأ عمر المبنى الافتراضي بالتناقص منذ لحظة تشييده إلى أن يُهجر ويتهالك نتيجة توقف صيانته، ومن ثم  يُهدم لتشييد بناءٍ آخر مكانه. وفي بعض الحالات، قد ينجو المبنى من الهدم، وقد ترتفع قيمته التاريخية أو الثقافية، وقد تتزايد معها قيمته العقارية، وقد يصبح في نهاية المطاف معلماً على لائحة المباني الواجب الحفاظ عليها.

أضعف هذا التفكير ضمن أطر التقدم والنمو الخطي من قدرة العمارة على تخيل سيناريوهاتٍ مستقبلية واتخاذ إجراءاتٍ استباقيةٍ لها، كما حَصَر دورها في التحضير لواقع أكثر تقدماً والأمل في تحقيقه. وفي ظل التفكير المبني على مفهوم التقدم كغايةٍ بحد ذاتها، يصبح وضع الخطط التحسبية للسيناريوهات الأكثر تشاؤماً متنافياً مع الإيمان المطلق بالإيديولوجيا أو البرنامج الذي يتم البناء من أجله. وينعكس ذلك على عدم قدرة المعماريين على تخيل هذه النهايات ضمن مراحل الإنتاج المعماري. فمن الوارد عند إعداد مخططات معمارية لمبنى ما، أن تضم الرسومات، بالإضافة إلى مخططات المبنى الذي سيتم بناؤه في المستقبل القريب، مخططاتٍ للتوسع، بصفة ذلك السيناريو المستقبلي المرجّح. ما ليس وارداً هنا هو وجود مخططات لتقليص حجم المبنى أو تفكيكه لاعتبار ذلك شكلاً من أشكال سوء الطالع، رغم رجوح احتماليتها في العديد من الحالات. ولربما ينبع ذلك من حلم ٍ داخل الكثير من المعماريين بأن يصمد إنتاجهم المعماري أمام الزمن تماماً كما صمموه، ليصبح مثالاً حياً ومساهمةً شخصيةً لحقبةٍ تاريخيةٍ معينة بتمثيلاتها المختلفة، وذلك على افتراض أن المعماري هو المتحكم الأساس بمصير مبانيه.

إن تاريخ الاقتصاد الرأسمالي قائم بجوهره على فكرة النمو الخطي، وبأن ما تحتاجه البشرية الآن هو نمو اقتصادي لامحدود إلى أن يُشبع الكل بالثروة  دون التشكيك في عواقب هذا الطرح وجدواه.6وقد تلخص عبارة المعماري والمفكر سيدريك برايس (1934 - 2003) الشهيرة "التكنولوجيا هي الحل، ولكن ماذا كانت المشكلة؟"7موقف العديد من دور العمارة في خدمة هذا النمو، ومن تسخير التكنولوجيا لإنتاجٍ نهم من المباني ذات التصميم الثابت بدلا من تسخيره لإيجاد حلولٍ لمشاكل قائمة وإنتاج مبانٍ قابلةٍ للتكيف وإعادة التنظيم الذاتية. 

ظهرت في النصف الثاني من القرن العشرين حركات معمارية دعت إلى طرح رؤية لعمارةٍ "وقتيّة" تتغير مع مرورالزمن، وتتيح للمستخدمين حرية إجراء تغييراتٍ وتعديلات تتناسب مع كيفية استخدامهم للمبنى عوضاً عن مبانٍ ثابتة نجهد في إعادة تكييفها لحيواتنا المستقبلية. فمثلاً ينتقد برايس، أحد المنتمين إلى هذا الفكر، الميل اللامتناهي لإدراج المباني على قوائم الحفظ في المملكة المتحدة. ليس في هذا تقليل من شأن المباني التاريخية كمبان حيوية يمكن تطويعها لحياة معاصرة بدلا من إحلال عمارة أخرى مكانها، بل هي رغبة في التفكيرفي قابلية ملايين المباني المشيدة في القرنين الأخيرين على استضافة وظائف ومستخدمين جدد في ظروف اقتصادية واجتماعية مغايرة. فالحقيقة بأن ما يُشيّد من المباني الآن هو لخدمة حقبة زمنية معينة لتختفي بعدها كما اختفت غيرها على مدى التاريخ، ولكن هذه المرة كسلعة في إطار عملية إنتاجية استهلاكية لا محدودة وتوسعٍ عمراني مطرد.

في العام 2009 نشرت النيويورك تايمز مقالة تنعى فيها مبنى ”فرع البنك“ أحد البرامج المعمارية التي أنتجها التضخم الأخير في الصناعة المالية. وكما منازل الماكمانشينز(McMansions) التي هُجر العديد منها بسبب عجز مالكيها عن تسديد ثمنها، انتشرت فروع البنوك في كل زاوية في مدن وضواحي الولايات المتحدة لخدمة حمى قروض الإسكان والنظام الائتماني المُسبب للأزمة المالية العام 2008. وبعد وقوع الأزمة، ونتيجة رقمنة الخدمات المصرفية عبر الإنترنت ظهرت التساؤلات حول جدوى الحاجة إلى هذا العدد الهائل من فروع البنوك بعد الآن. وفي عام 2010 نشر الطالب كريستوفر تورو جوينون مشروعاً بعنوان ”عمارة منأجل التراجع“ والتي يقترح فيها جوينون نموذجا تصميميا لمصرف يمكنه التحول بقليل من التدخل ليخدم الحاجات المتغيرة لمجتمع ”ما بعد النمو“ وأبعد.8إذ تتحول خطط الطوارئ المصممة للبنك إلى إجراءات تشغيلية عند أحداث أو تحولات أساسية في الاقتصاد المحلي.

ترتكز فكرة جونيون على توفير تصميم قادر على الاستجابة لاحتياجات المصرف المختلفة التي تتغير بتغير النظام الاقتصادي. فالنسخة الأولى من التصميم تضم برنامجاً وظيفياً يشمل بشكل أساسي قاعات لإجراء معاملات بنكية، صرافات آلية، خزائن إيداعات، استشارات مالية ومكاتب. أما النسخة الثانية لنفس التصميم المقترح فتضم قاعة للمزاد العلني، وسوقاً للمقايضة، ومخازن للسلع، وهو برنامج أكثر ملائمة في حالة الاقتصاد المتراجع. أما بخصوص المبنى نفسه، فهو قادر على تطويع نفسه للانتقال من البرنامج الأول إلى الثاني: فعلى سبيل المثال، يمكن إزالة الوحدات الخشبية المكونة لقاعة المعاملات البنكية عندما لا يعود هناك حاجة لها واستخدامها في بناء وحدات سكنية، كما يمكن إزالة صفائح النحاس التي تغطي المبنى واستخدام عائد بيعها في دعم البرنامج الجديد، حيث أن قيمة النحاس تعد أكثر ثباتاً من قيمة العملات المصرفية المتأرجحة باستمرار وفقاً لاعتبارات الأسواق المالية. فنرى هنا أن تقليص فراغات المبنى لم يتم عن طريق الهدم، وإنما عن طريق عملية تفكيك مبنية على زيادة كفاءة استخدام الموارد إلى حدها الأقصى.            

”ليس السؤال هو ما نوع المبنى الذي نحتاجه، بل إذا ما كنا فعلا نحتاج إلى مبنى“؟9

يعبر سؤال برايس الشهير عن أزمة التفكير المعماري في السياق الرأسمالي لاعتبار أن حاجتنا لإنتاج المباني هو أمر مسلّم به. وهنا تصبح المفاهيم المتعددة حول ديمومة المباني او انتهائها إشكالية خصوصا عندما يصبح  بالإمكان تحقيق عائد مادي كبير من مجرد امتلاك مقدّرات مادية (سواء كانت على شكل أسهم أو عقارات)، ويتخطى بذلك الربح الذي يمكن تحقيقه عن طريق التملك ذلك الذي يمكن تحقيقه عن طريق العمل. تشكل هذه الحقيقة أحد أهم التناقضات الكامنة في نموذج السوق الحر الاقتصادي الذي تم التسويق له كطريقة لتحقيق الفرص المتكافئة والخلاص من القيود الطبقية. فقد باتت المباني أحد أهم أشكال رأس المال الثابت الذي ترى انعكاساته في مدن كثيرة عبر العالم وفي المنطقة أيضا كما يحدث في بيروت مثلاً التي باتت تعاني من نقص في الإسكانات لذوي الدخل المتوسط والمحدود، في مقابل مئات الشقق باهظة الثمن غير المستخدمة لملاك أثرياء من اللبنانيين والعرب.

أسهمت السياسات الاقتصادية النيولبرالية التي رسخها رونالد ريغان ومارغريت تاتشر في نهاية السبعينات في تعزيز فكرة المبنى كشكل من أشكال رأس المال عن طريق خصخصة الملكيات العامة ورفع شعار ”حق الشراء“. وقد أدت المناداة بـ”حق الشراء“ إلى إخضاع قطاع الإسكان لسيطرة القطاع الخاص في معادلة لا يرتبط فيها تملك المنزل بالضرورة بحاجة السكن، وإنما بكونه استثماراً جذاباً.10

أتاحت السوق الحرة المجال لتدفق رأس المال بشكل مستمر نحو الأماكن التي تحقق أعلى ربح ممكن. ونتيجة تخطي قيمة المبنى الشرائية قيمته الوظيفية، أصبحت حاجة الرأسمالية للتوسع وخلق أسواق جديدة والاستثمار في التغيير هي المولّد الأساسي للبناء والهدم وفرض الهجران. ”فالحقيقة بأن كل ما تبنيه المجتمعات البرجوازية يبنى من أجل الهدم، ليتم تدويره أو استبداله في عملية مستمرة قد تدوم للأبد بأشكال أكثر ربحية من أي وقت مضى.“11لذا فبالنسبة لديفيد هارفي فإن ”التدمير المستمر هو عملية مركزية بالنسبة للرأسمالية، وفهم هذه الحقيقة هو خطوة أولى مهمة نحو تشكيل سلوك بيئي صارم اتجاه العمارة.“12

ومن جهة أخرى، لم تسلم الأحياء التاريخية ومجتمعاتها في مدن عدة حول العالم من حي سولوكولي في اسطنبول إلى بروكلين في نيويورك من تحكم القطاع الخاص في الأسعارالعقارية لمبانيها. حيث يسعى المستثمرون إلى إعادة الاستخدام التكيفي للمباني التاريخية المتداعية ورفع سعرها في السوق العقاري مسببة بذلك ترحيل سكانها من ذوي الدخل المحدود لعدم قدرتهم على تحمل تكاليف ارتفاع المعيشة والإيجارات واستبدالهم بسكان من الطبقات المتوسطة والعليا فيما يعرف بعملية "الاستبدال الطبقي" أو ”الاستطباق“ (Gentrification). يصبح المحرك الأساسي لهذه العملية هو انحدار قيمة المباني العقارية والاجتماعية إلى أدنى مستوى ممكن حتى تمر في مرحلة تحسين لاحقة ترفع عنها "الوصمة الاجتماعية" وترفع من قيمتها العقارية. 13

إن ما يميز المنظومة الرأسمالية، في المثال السابق والأمثلة اللاحقة، هي قدرتها العالية على تطويع نفسها لاستيعاب متغيرات جديدة، بما فيها تلك التي وجدت لتخطيها أو محاربتها. فقد استطاعت المنظومة الرأسمالية احتواء العديد من طروحات العمارة البيئية، وإعادة الاستخدام التكيفي للمباني التاريخية، وإعادة الإعمار، والعمارة المؤقتة في محاولة لتحويل مضامينها من حلول فعلية وطارئة إلى أفكار رمزية ذات أجندة ربحية. 

الرأسمالية الخضراء

حظي مفهوم العمارة الخضراء مؤخراً باهتمام متزايد في تعليم العمارة وممارستها. وعلى الرغم من وجود عدد من التجارب التي استطاعت استحداث برامج متكاملة غير مقتصرة على تقنيات وعناصر معمارية، وإنما على رؤية فكرية ونمط حياة بديل لمستخدميها، إلا أن العمارة الخضراء لا تزال إحدى المجالات المعرّضة باستمرار لإعادة الانخراط في نفس المنظومة التي تقوم بمقاومتها، حيث تهيمن مفردات ”توفير الطاقة“، و”إعادة الاستخدام“، و”المواد العضوية والمحلية“ وغيرها على التعريف السائد للمبانى الخضراء. وتستضيف الكثيرمن المباني الخضراء المعاصرة، المزودة بأسقف خضراء، وأنظمة لتكرير المياه الرمادية، أنماط حياة وإنتاج شبيهة بمثيلاتها من المباني غير الخضراء، في إطار الفهم الخطي للنمو الذي يفرضه التفكير الرأسمالي، ويعطي الختم الأخضر شرعية لبناء مدن كاملة، ويمنحها حصانة من أية مساءلة حول حاجة مجتمعاتها لها. 

يرتكز الهوس المعاصر بالتوعية البيئية -حسب المفكر السلوفيني سلافوي جيجيك- على استعدادنا التام للشعور بالذنب والمسؤولية اتجاه مصير الكوكب. حيث أن شعورنا بالذنب، وإن كان مزعجاً، يبعث على التفاؤل، فهو يوهمنا بأننا نمسك بزمام الأمور، وأنه بوسعنا حصر الضرر الذي قمنا بإحداثه عن طريق تغيير سلوكنا. وبالفعل، فإن العديد من الشركات الرأسمالية سارعت إلى استحداث ما يسمى بـ”الاستهلاك الواعي“، بحيث توفر سلعاً صديقة للبيئة مع إمكانية دفع مبلغ إضافي بسيط مقابل شراء الرضا عن الذات والتخلص اللحظي من الذنب مع مواصلة الأنماط الاستهلاكية نفسها. 14 

كما تقدم نعومي كلاين شرحاً مغايراً للفرضية التي تدعي أن التدهور البيئي الناتج عن سوء استخدام المصادر الطبيعية وتدميرها سببه الطبيعة البشرية اللامبالية والأنانية، والتي تُركت على سجيتها للتصرف دون إدراك العواقب، مؤدية إلى إخفاق جماعي، فتقول: ”نحن عالقون لأن الإجراءات التي من شأنها تجنيبنا الكارثة المُحتّمة، هي مُهدِّدة لمصالح أقليّة نخبويّة تحكم قبضتها على اقتصادنا، وقراراتنا السياسية، ومعظم وسائل إعلامنا الرئيسية“.15أو بعبارة أخرى، تصف كلاين الأزمة البيئية بصراع ما بين رأس المال والكوكب، حيث أن الانبعاثات الكربونية في القرن الواحد والعشرين-على سبيل المثال- تنشأ بمعظمها من جمهورية الصين، إلا أن المسبب الحقيقي لتلك الانبعاثات هو ليس النمو السكاني في الصين أو الاستنزاف غير المسؤول للموارد الطبيعية من قبل الصينيين، وإنما هو نتيجة لتركيز رأس المال الأجنبي واستغلاله للعمالة المحلية غير المكلفة. وبالتالي، فإن إلقاء اللوم على البشرية كمسبب للضرر البيئي الحالي يساهم في تشتيت الانتباه عن المسبب الحقيقي لها (رأس المال والاقتصاد النيولبرالي) ويضعف من إمكانية إيجاد حلول فعالة ومؤثرة لسبب المشكلة وليس أعراضها، أو كما يقول أندريا مالم في مقالته ”أسطورةالأنثروبوسين“: "إلقاء اللوم على الجميع هو شكل آخر لعدم إلقاء اللوم على أحد".16

وعليه، فإن النظر إلى الكوارث البيئية كنتيجة لمنظومة اقتصادية مهيمنة يستدعي بالضرورة أن يقوم الفكر المعماري البيئي في إعادة النظر في  المسببات الحقيقية  للضرر البيئي وإيجاد حلول جذرية لتخطيها.

الهدم الخلاّق وعمارة ما بعد الحرب

كما تحدثنا سابقا، لم تعد معايير، كتداعي المباني وانتهاء عمرها الوظيفي، العامل الوحيد للهجران والهدم. فالإفلاس، وأزمة الرهن والقروض، وإغلاق المصانع والشركات، وتراجع شعبية مناطق معينة، باتت عوامل هامة في تحديد حياة المباني وقيمتها العقارية، وفي هجران البيئات المبنية بشكل عام. وهذا بحد ذاته دافع أساسي لانتقال رأس المال إلى جغرافيات أخرى، لإنتاجٍ معماريّ آخر، في عملية غير مستدامة من البناء والهجران، لإثراء فئات معينة، وفي فهم ملتوٍ لعملية الهدم الخلاق (Creative Destruction)، التي استخدمها الاقتصادي شومبيتير، في خمسينيات القرن العشرين، لوصف النمو الاقتصادي، القائم على عملية تراكمية مستمرة من تطوير التكنولوجيا، واستبدالها بما هو أكثر تطوراً، فهو هدم يعقبه بناء، ومن هنا تم وصفه بالخلاّق.17

وفي هذا السياق يتغير أيضاً مفهوم إعادة الإعمار بعد التدمير واسع النطاق أثناء الحروب والكوارث الطبيعية. فبعد الحرب العالمية الثانية، اعتُبرت إعادة الإعمار طريقة لإنعاش الاقتصاد، وتلبية حاجات مجتمات ما بعد الحرب، برعاية من الدولة. أما الآن فقد تحوّلت مشاريع إعادة الإعمار في الجنوب العالمي إلى مجال ربحي للشركات العالمية غير الخاضعة لسيطرة أو رقابة الدولة كما في لبنان والعراق وأفغانستان والبلقان وغيرها.

فمثلاً، بدأ التخطيط لإعادة إعمار العراق بعد ستة أشهر من بدء الغزو الأمريكي العام 2003. وبلغت حصيلة ما أنفقته الولاياتالمتحدة(حكومة وقطاعاً خاصاً) حتى شهر حزيران 2012 ما قيمته 60 بليون دولاراً أمريكياً، جاعلة منه أكبر مشروع إعادة إعمار تقوم به الولايات المتحدة خارج أراضيها، منذ مخطط مارشال الذي نفذته في أوروبا في أعقاب الحرب العالمية الثانية.18توزعت مشاريع إعادة الإعمار في العراق ما بين البنية التحتية، والأجهزة الأمنية، والهيكلية الاقتصادية والسياسية، والمؤسسات القانونية، والمساعدات الإنسانية. وشملت البنية التحتية، ومحطات توليد الماء والكهرباء، إضافة إلى المدارس، والشوارع، والمشاريع السكنية. وبعد مرور أكثر من عشر سنوات على بدء المشاريع، تبدو إشكالياتها واضحة أكثر من أي وقت مضى. 

وبغض النظر عن الفشل الذريع لتلك المشاريع في تحقيق أهدافها المعلنة، والكم الهائل من الأموال المهدورة (حوالي 8 بلايين دولار أمريكي)، فإن الغاية هنا هي الإشارة إلى التناقضات الكامنة وراء ظاهرة إعادة الإعمار من قبل دول قامت هي نفسها بالتدمير، وتوضيح الأبعاد التي تأخذها فكرة الهدم في هذا السياق. وقد ساهمت سيطرة شركات القطاع الخاص على هذه المشاريع في تمكين الشركات الأجنبية من السيطرة على موارد العراق الاقتصادية، وجعلت من إمكانية التطوير المحلي فكرة بعيدة المنال.  

ومن جهة أخرى، لم يعد ارتباط المنظومة الرأسمالية بالحروب والكوارث الطبيعية مقتصراً على قطاع شركات السلاح والنفط، وشركات إعادة الإعمار فحسب، بل بات يشمل أيضا شركات تصنيع سكن اللجوء للمجتمعات المنكوبة. مثلاً، اختارت المفوضية العليا للأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين في العام 2013 شركة سويدية لتصنيع وحدات سكنيةمؤقتة للاجئين تعمل بالطاقة الشمسيّة من مواد مُصنعّة وتقنيات حديثة صالحة لثلاث سنوات. يتم إنتاج هذه الوحدات ضمن عملية تصنيع معقدة داخل منظومة التجارة العالمية، حيث يُصمّم النموذج السويدي في أوروبا، ومن ثم يتم تصنيعه في إحدى دول آسيا، ومن ثم شحنه إلى الدول المستضيفة للاجئين، دون الأخذ بعين الاعتبار مصير تلك الوحدات عند انتهاء صلاحيتها، وأثر مخلفاتها على البيئة. وفي محاولة عولمة سكن اللجوء هذه، يبدو من الصعب استكشاف سبل أخرى لسكن معتمد على مواد وعمالة محلية. كما أن هذا النموذج لا يعطي الفرصة بمساهمة حقيقية للاجئين في بناء مسكنهم والتي تتطلب الكثير من الحراك والمشاركة المجتمعية، وتسهم في التخفيف من المعاناة التي سببتها الكارثة. 

عن عمارة تَحسبيّة (استباقية)

ولكن ماذا لو توفرت نهايات أخرى للمباني؟ ماذا لو ابتدع المعماري أثناء التصميم تصورات مستقبلية أخرى للمبنى؛ تلبي احتياجات زمن ذي سياق اجتماعي واقتصادي مختلف يتداعى فيه البرنامج الذي بني من خلاله، وتصورات تسمح للمجتمع -مستقبلا- بتغيير تكوين المبنى تبعاً لحاجاته المتغيرة، فلا يكون مجرد وعاء للبرنامج؟ وكيف يختلف هذا عن ذلك المجال المتنامي في تكييف المباني وخصوصا التاريخية منها، لاستخدامات ووظائف غير التي صممت من أجلها؟

يكمن الجواب في هذا النقاش المتزايد حول أهمية دور المعماري في إنتاج عمارة "تحسبيّة" مصممة لتتغير باستمرار خارج ذلك الخط الزمني الحتمي لحياتها، في سبيل عمارة تتيح الفرص وتمكّن من التغيير في عالم متغير، يصبح فيه الدور الأساسي للمستخدم وليس للمعماري.

ظهر مصطلح العمارة التحسبيّة (Anticipatory Architecture) في أوروبا عقب انتهاء الحرب العالمية الثانية، عندما اندمج التطور التكنولوجي للثورة الصناعية بفكر الحداثة المهتم بمفاهيم"التقدم"و"المستقبلية" لبناء مجتمعات ما بعد الحرب في أوروبا.19حيث سعى معماريو الحداثة إلى استغلال التطور التكنولوجي من أجل إنتاج عمارة تستبق التغيير، وتكيّف المبنى حسب الاحتياجات والبرامج المتغيرة لمستخدميه، والظروف البيئية من حوله، حيث تهتم عملية التصميم باستيفاء المبنى لاحتياجاته التكنولوجية أكثر من الاهتمام بمضامين معمارية تاريخية سابقة. 

ورغم طوباوية الطروحات المعمارية في تلك الفترة، التي رأت مستقبلاً واحداً وهوتقدم البشرية من خلال التقدم التكنولوجي، والدمج بين الآلة والعمارة لبناء مجتمعات صناعية منتجة في دولة الرفاه، إلا أنه من المهم التمعن في مفهوم العمارة المتغيرة آنذاك. ففي العمارة الحديثة، استُخدم بدايةً المسقط الأفقي الحر في المواقع الصناعية، لاحتواء التغير السريع لأنماط وخطوط الإنتاج، والتي انعكست أيضا عند لوكوربوزييه في رؤيته للوحدة السكنية كامتداد لروح العمل الصناعي والمنطق المستمر للتغير المكاني. وبذلك يصبح الفراغ غير المتخصص والمحايد وسيلة الرأسمالية في احتواء أية أوضاع غير متوقعة، حيث أن "الصفة العامة التي يمتاز بها هذا الفراغ من قابلية للتطويع، وعدم التخصصية المرتبطة ارتباطاً وثيقاً بصفة مميّزة للنوع البشري؛ وهي انعدام الحدس التخصصي الذي ينتج عنه صعوبة التنبؤ بأفعال وردّات أفعال الإنسان. وكلما اعتمد رأس المال على هذا الجانب من الطبيعة البشرية لاستغلال القوى العاملة، كلما استدعت الحاجة إلى أن يكون الفراغ محايداً لاحتواء مختلف الأوضاع التي لا يمكن التنبؤ بها." 20 

أما في سياق مجتمعات ما بعد الصناعية، فيقصد بالعمارة التحسبيّة تلك العمارة ذاتية التوازن، وذاتية التعديل، والتي لا تنتهج عملية تصميم لإنتاج مبانٍ ثابتة لتخدم وظيفة معينة، لفئة مستخدمين محددة، ولفترة زمنية محددة. وهنا تختلف النظرة إلى المستقبل عما كانت عليه في مشروع الحداثة بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية، فمفهوم العمارة التحسبية الآن يتوقع تراجعاً للمشروع أو الفكر الذي بُنيت من خلاله، ويوفر سيناريوهات مختلفة لتهالكها كالتقليص وتغيير الاستخدام، بدلاً من الهجر والهدم والإحلال. وبذلك تعتمد العمارة التحسبيّة على استخدام تكنولوجيا العصر لهذا الغرض. 

على المبانى أن تموت، ولكن كيف؟ 

في النهاية، فإن قدرة الرأسمالية على احتواء الطروحات المذكورة سابقاً، يمكن ردّه إلى كون هذه الطروحات تتعامل مع أعراض الرأسمالية وليس مع فكرها. وقد تكون الخطوة الأولى نحو تغييرٍ جذري، بطرح مغاير لمبدأ التقدم الخطي، ونظرة بديلة لسير الزمن من خلال نموذج النمو والتراجع الدوري. فوفقاً لنظرية هوارد وإليزابيث أودم21عن أنظمة المجتمعات البشرية، فإن المبادئ التي تحكم الأنظمة الطبيعية والبيولوجية تحكم المجتمعات البشرية كذلك، من خلال تكرار دورة النمو والتراجع. ومن هنا، فإن النمو الخطي غير المحدود، بغض النظر عن مدى التقدم التكنولوجي، يتنافى مع ديناميكية أنظمة المجتمعات.

يعرض الثنائي أودم دورة حياة للأنظمة بصفة عامة، مكونة من أربع مراحل، تعمل كل منها وفق استراتيجية مختلفة: الأولى هي مرحلة النمو، والتي يقوم فيها النظام باستهلاك الموارد المتاحة إلى أن يصل إلى أقصى درجاته تعقيداً. تتبعها مرحلة الذروة، وهي مرحلة انتقالية، يقف عندها النمو لعدم توفر المصادر اللازمة لاستمراره، ويعمل فيها النظام بكفاءة تكفيه لأن يستمر بالعمل مع استهلاك الحد الأدنى من المصادر، حيث يقوم بتجميع وتخزين المعلومات تحضيراً للمرحلة الثالثة وهي مرحلة التراجع. خلال هذه المرحلة، يصغر حجم النظام تدريجياً وتزداد عمليات إعادة التدوير الداخلية، حيث تقوم بعض الأنظمة بتطوير وسائل لتخزين معلومات عن نفسها لتساعدها في عملية النمو عندما تكرر الدورة نفسها. أما المرحلة النهائية فهي إعادة الإحياء، وتبدأ عندما يتخطى إنتاج النظام المصغر للموارد استهلاكه لها، ويصبح هناك تراكماً كافياً للموارد، فتبدأ مرحلة النمو من جديد. ويمكن ملاحظة هذا النمط في عدة أنظمة ابتداءً من دورة حياة النباتات ووصولاً إلى تعاقب القوى السياسية العالمية. 22

تمتاز العمارة التحسبيّة أيضا بالتراكمية. حيث أن دوريّة حياة المبنى تتضمن مرحلة تخزينه لمعلومات عن نفسه في نهاية كل دورة، تحضيراً لتلك التي تليها. ومع استمرارية الدورات المتعاقبة، يحدث تراكمٌ معرفيٌّ، مرتبطٌ باستجابة المبنى الفراغية لتغيرات محيطه خلال المراحل المختلفة، مما يُعزّز ويُغني عمليات الإنتاج الفراغي اللاحقة. فبالإضافة لاستجابته للتغيرات الاجتماعية، والسياسية، والاقتصادية، يصبح المبنى جزءاً مشاركاً في إحداثها.       

يمكن الاستدلال مما سبق على أن نموذج التقدم الخطي يتقبل مبدأ التراجع الجزئي في سبيل تحقيق التقدم الكلي في المحصلة، وأنه ينظر إلى التراجع كمرحلة لا بد منها لتحقيق التقدم في النهاية. في حين أن النظر إلى حياة الأنظمة كدورات متكررة هو خطوة أولى للتفكير في المبنى ككائن عضوي متغير كما المجتمعات، وقادر على التكيف مع مختلف مراحل النمو والتراجع، وعلى تخزين معلومات ذاتية في كل مرحلة، لتحقق تراكمية هي أساس دورات حياته اللاحقة. مما يستدعي التفكير في الأدوار المترابطة بين المعماري والمستخدم، لإيجاد عمارة تتفاعل مع هذه الدورية وتستفيد من الإمكانيات التي تتيحها.    

تهدف عملية هدم المباني، ضمن السياق الرأسمالي، إلى توفير أرضية مستوية نظيفة مستعدة لاستقبال المخططات التطويرية اللاحقة، حيث يتم الترويج لكل من البناء والهدم كوسائل لإتاحة فرص التقدم. إن رؤيتنا لكل من البناء والهدم كأدوات للتشكيل الفراغي ستختلف عند الإدراك بأن العمارة هي وسيلة لحجب الاحتمالات بمقدار كونها أداةً لإتاحتها. فقرارات "عدم البناء" أو "تفكيك البناء" هي أيضا أدوات للتشكيل الفراغي، وترتبط بشكل وثيق بالاحتياجات المتغيرة والموارد المتاحة. 

الهوامش:

الكهرباء في الحقبة الأولى للاستقلال في لبنان

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[هذا الجزء الثاني من مقابلة أجراها المركز اللبناني للدراسات مع محرر جدلية والباحثزياد أبو الريش، وهي  تركّز على قطاع الكهرباء ومسائل تتعلق بمؤسسات الدولة في بداية عهد الجمهوريّة اللبنانيّة. وتجدر الإشارة إلى أنه تم إجراء هذه المقابلة قبل انطلاق الحراك الكبير في بيروت في شهر أيلول 2015. أما الجزء الأول فناقش خلاله تاريخ مؤسسات الدولة في بدايات الاستقلال في لبنان وبعض الموروثات التي خلفتها. يمكن قراءة الجزء الأول هنا]

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تحدث المركز اللبناني للدراسات مؤخّرًا مع الدكتور زياد أبو الريش لمناقشة تاريخ مؤسّسات الدولة خلال المراحل الأولى للاستقلال في لبنان، واستقاء المعلومات والاستفادة منها في التحاليل والنقاشات الحاليّة المتّصلة بالخدمات التي تقدمها الدولة في لبنان. ويُذكر أنّ الدكتور أبو الريش هو بروفسور مساعد في تاريخ الشرق الأوسط في جامعة أوهايو وهو في صدد إعداد كتاب بعنوان: Making the Economy, Producing the State: Conflict and Institution Building in Lebanon, 1946-1955 (صنع الإقتصاد، إنتاج الدولة: النزاع وبناء المؤسسات في لبنان، 1946 – 1955). الدكتور أبو ريش حائز على شهادة الدكتوراه من جامعة كاليفورنيا، لوس أنجلس، حيث قدّم أطروحة حول الموضوع نفسه. وقد نشر العام الماضي قسمًا من بحثه حول الكهرباء في بيروت في مقالة نُشرتها المجلّة الإلكترونيّة "جدليّة" الّتي يعمل فيها كرئيس تحرير مساعد.

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شكّل قطاع الكهرباء في لبنان محطّ اهتمام في السنوات الأخيرة، بصفته مرفقًا عامًّا ومشغّلاً في الوقت عينه. جُلّ ما قيل حول هذا الموضوع لناحية عرقلة توليد الطاقة الكهربائيّة وتوزيعها بالشكل الملائم، قضى بالقاء الملامة على الحرب الأهليّة اللبنانيّة (1975 – 1990). فكيف تقيّم هذا الزعم استنادًا إلى بحثك حول الإقتصاد السياسي في فترة الاستقلال في مراحله الأولى؟ وكيف يمكننا أن نصف تغيّر طبيعة قطاع الكهرباء بين السنوات الأولى للاستقلال وعشيّة الحرب الأهليّة؟ 

لا شكّ أنّ مرحلة الحرب الأهليّة، بما فيها الغارات الجويّة الإسرائيليّة وما رافقها من اجتياحات واحتلالات، قد انطوت على تدمير (إن لم نقل استهداف صريح) للبنية التحتيّة للكهرباء في لبنان. ولكن ما من شكّ أيضًا أن التسوية (أو التسويات) السياسيّة التي تلت الحرب ومختلف جهود إعادة الإعمار قد فشلت في معالجة هذا الدمار ونتائجه على إنتاج الكهرباء واستهلاكها بشكل ملائم.

وبعد، لا يصحُّ تاريخيًّا الزعم بأنّ قطاع الكهرباء كان يلبّي حاجات المواطنين اللبنانيّين كما يلزم قبل الحرب، أو أنّه كان بمنأىً عن الإنتقادات العامّة، والمصالح الخاصّة المتنافسة، والإختلالات البنيويّة. ومن الجدير أن نذكر هنا أنّ توليد الكهرباء وتوزيعها على الأراضي الّتي تتشكّل منها الجمهوريّة اللبنانيّة قد انطلق في أواخر القرن التاسع عشر ومطلع القرن العشرين. ففي ذلك الوقت، منحت السلطات العثمانية، ومن ثمّ المفوّض السامي الفرنسي ولاحقاً الحكومة اللبنانيّة، بالتعاون مع السلطات البلديّة المحليّة، عددًا من الإمتيازات المحدّدة لتوليد الكهرباء و/أو نقلها و/أو توزيعها في بيروت وغيرها من المدن. فالدولة اللبنانيّة لم تُنشئ مؤسّسة كهرباء لبنان إلاّ في العام 1964، فأرست بذلك احتكار الدولة لقطاع الكهرباء في البلاد.

لم يُكتب ما يكفي حول هذه المرحلة التاريخيّة (أي الإمتيازات الفرديّة، وتعزيزها تحت مظلّة احتكار الدولة، وما جرى بعد ذلك). غير أنّ عددًا محدّدًا من العلماء ألقوا الضوء على جوانب مختلفة من هذه المرحلة لاتّصالها بمسائل أوسع نطاقًا تتعلّق بالحوكمة والأعمال التجاريّة والتخطيط. فتمّ التركيز بشكل خاص على مرحلة أواخر الحكم العثماني، والإنتداب الفرنسي، وأواخر حقبة الاستقلال. أمّا بحثي فيركّز على ديناميّات الكهرباء كمرفق عام في بيروت خلال مطلع مرحلة الاستقلال.

في البداية، تمثّل الهدف الأساسي من إنتاج الكهرباء في بيروت في تغذية خدمات الترامواي بالطاقة، فيما كانت الإضاءة مؤمّنة بموجب إمتياز الغاز. أمّا امتياز الكهرباء الأساسي، فقد امتلكته شركة الترامواي والتنوير العثمانيّة المغفلة في بيروت (المنشأة عام 1906) والّتي باشرت بإدارة نظام الترامواي عام 1909. وأدّت التطوّرات الإقتصاديّة والسياسيّة خلال العقدين اللاحقين -الّتي أتناولها في قسم آخر من البحث والمتمحورة حول الحرب العالميّة الأولى- إلى نقل الحقوق والأصول التابعة للشركة الأصليّة إلى أخرى جديدة سُميّت بشركة الترامواي والإنارة في بيروت. وكان التغيير في تكنولوجيا الإنارة من الغاز إلى الكهرباء أبرز ما ميّز هذه النقلة في ذلك الوقت، إذ تسلّمت الشركة الجديدة أيضًا امتياز التنوير الأساسي بالغاز. وبشكل عام، عُرفت الشركة في حقبة الإنتداب بشركة كهرباء بيروت، ما يدلّ على أنّ الكهرباء أصبحت بحدّ ذاتها مرفق لتوفير الخدمة العامّة الأساسيّة الى مجموعة متشعّبة من المستهلكين المنزليين والتجاريين والصناعيّين.

ويتضّح جليًّا عند قراءة مقالات الصحف والدراسات الفنيّة وحتّى تقارير التنمية العامّة المنشورة في الأربعينيّات والخمسينيّات من القرن العشرين أنّ مسائل ملكيّة المرفق وجودة الخدمة وأسعار الاستهلاك المتّصلة بالكهرباء خلال الحقبة الأولى للاستقلال شكّلت عنصرًا هامًا من النقاش العام حول الاستقلال السياسي، والتنمية الاقتصاديّة، والمرافق العامّة، والفساد. وعُلّقت أهميّة كبيرة أيضًا على أسعار الكهرباء. وتردّدت في ذلك الوقت اثنان من الشكاوى الفنيّة تتصلان بعدم استقرار التيّار الكهربائي والانقطاع المتكرّر للكهرباء. وكان للمستهلكين، والسياسيّين الناشطين في مجال الإصلاح السياسي ، ورجال الأعمال المتنافسين مصالح مختلفة وإنّما متداخلة لجهة الإضاءة على هذه المسائل والضغط باتّجاه التدخّل الحكومي، الّذي غاب غيابًا شبه كلّي في مجال الكهرباء منذ الاستقلال.

وبالتالي، لا يصحّ بكلّ بساطةٍ الزعم بأنّ كلّ شيء كان على ما يرام في قطاع الكهرباء قبل الحرب الأهليّة، أو حتّى بأنّ قطاع الكهرباء لم يتحوّل إلى مسألة جدليّة إلاّ بعد موجات النزوح الكبرى من الريف إلى المُدُن. فتاريخيًّا، لطالما شكّل هذا القطاع محورًا جدليًّا ونزاعيًّا وتعبويًّا، إن عند إنشائه، أو لجهة عدم المساواة في توزيع شبكة الكهرباء والوصول إليها، أو ملكيّة الكهرباء وجودتها، وأسعارها. دون ان ننسى طبعًا المركز المحوري الّذي احتلتّه الكهرباء في التطلّعات المتضاربة الّتي قولبت الأفكار الأولى وراء مشروع نهر الليطاني والجدليّات المحيطة به، وهو أهمّ مشاريع التنمية الحكوميّة في بداية حقبة الإستقلال، وقد تمّ الترويج للمشروع بعد ذلك على أنّه الحلّ لجميع مشاكل الكهرباء في لبنان.

على الرغم من المشاكل المستفحلة المتّصلة بتوليد الكهرباء وتوزيعها في لبنان، فإنّ عمّال الكهرباء لا مستهلكيها هم من قاموا بتنظّيم العدد الأكبر من التظاهرات الإحتجاجيّة والحملات المطلبيّة في قطاع الكهرباء. فهل تُعتبر هذه المسألة العماليّة حديثة نسبيًّا في تاريخ لبنان، وهل لطالما اكتفى المستهلكون بلعب هذا الدور المُذعن إن جاز القول؟ 

هذا السؤال يسلّط الضوء على عدد من المسائل. فتاريخيًّا، لطالما كان عمّال قطاع الكهرباء ناشطون في مسألة الحقوق العماليّة، وفي أحداثٍ معيّنة شكّلت اتّحاداتهم قوى إجتماعيّة فاعلة سياسيًّا. لكن لا بدّ من الإشارة إلى أنّ مطالب عمّال الكهرباء وأشكال التعبئة قد تغيّرت مع الوقت. واتّسمت هذه المطالب بديناميّة مختلفة في مرحلة ما بعد الحرب لجملة من الأمور، من بينها مسألة الخصخصة الفعليّة لشركة كهرباء لبنان، والتغيّر في الخطاب والممارسة لجهة التوزيع الطائفي.

وإذا كانت تحرّكات العمّال متماسكة في كلّ مراحل تاريخ قطاع الكهرباء، فالأمر لا ينطبق على المستهلكين. قبل الحرب الأهليّة، شكّل مستهلكو الكهرباء (المنزليّون منهم، والتجّار، والصناعيّون) عاملاً أساسيّا في التعبئة المنظّمة. تلك كانت الحال على الأقلّ في أواخر الحقبة العثمانيّة، وخلال فترة الإنتداب الفرنسي وأولى مراحل الإستقلال. وفي حين كانت الإحتجاجات في آخر الحقبة العثمانيّة  لأغراض محددة، شهدت حقبة الإنتداب الفرنسي وحدها ثلاث حملات مقاطعة كبرى للمستهلكين في الأعوام 1922 و1931 و1935. تميّزت هذه الأحداث بإنشاء لجان مقاطعة في محاولة للضغط على الشركة لخفض الأسعار وتحسين جودة الخدمات. وبما أنّ الشركة نفسها كانت توفّر خدمتي الكهرباء والترامواي في بيروت، فقد توجّهت الإحتجاجات في معظم الحالات ضدّهما معًا، في محاولة للاستعانة بكلّ الوسائل الممكنة للضغط ماليًّا على الشركة. وفي مطلع الخمسينيّات، قامت مجموعة من مستهلكي الطبقة الوسطى وحاملي لواء الإصلاح السياسي بتنظيم حملة إحتجاجيّة كبرى دامت ثمانية أشهر تقريبًا، ولم تنتهِ إلاّ بعد تدخّل الحكومة لفرض خفض رسوم الكهرباء، وهو ما شكّل المطلب الأساسي (وإن لم يكن الوحيد) للمحتجّين ومنظّمي الحملة. فحتّى السياسيّون ورجال الأعمال قاموا بالمبادرات في مجال الكهرباء لتحسين موقعهم السياسي أو لتوسيع مصالحهم الإقتصاديّة. ومن الأمثلة على ذلك قيام كميل شمعون بتأميم شركة كهرباء بيروت فعليًّا في 1953-54، كوسيلة لتعزيز رصيده القومي والإصلاحي. ونذكر مثالاً آخر سعى مستثمرو القطاع الخاص إلى الحصول على امتيازات لتوليد الكهرباء وبيعها للشركة لدعم مستويات الإنتاج المتدنية وغير القادرة على تلبية الطلب على الطاقة، مع تقديم هامش ربح في الوقت عينه. وما محطّتا نهر ابراهيم ونهر البارد سوى نتيجة لهذه الجهود ودلالة على بعض مخلّفاتها.

غالبًا ما يتوازى الجدل حول قطاع الكهرباء مع نقاش حول الخصخصة، وفاعليّة السوق، وقدرة الدولة. فمن أيّ نواحٍ يشكّل ذلك استمرارًا للجدالات التاريخية حول قطاع الكهرباء أو يضع حدًّا لها؟

في بداية حقبة الاستقلال، تمثّلت المشكلة بأنّ تأمين الكهرباء كان مرهونًا بمصالح خاصّة، ما يستدعي بالتالي تأميم القطاع إذ كان يُنظر الى الدولة على أنّها الكافل الوحيد الفعلي للصالح العام. غير أنّ هذا المطلب بحدّ ذاته كان مرتكزًا إلى مجموعة مختلفة جدًّا من الأطر المعياريّة والنظريّة، في زمنِ أوليت فيه قيمة كبيرة لدور الدُوَل في إدارة التنمية الإقتصاديّة وحماية المصالح العامّة. وبالتالي، وفي حين أنّ الدعوة لخصخصة شركة كهرباء لبنان في التسعينيّات والعقد الأوّل من القرن الواحد والعشرين تنبع من مفاهيم محدّدة لقدرات الدولة اللبنانيّة، من الأهميّة بمكان أيضًا الإقرار بأنّ التنمية الإقتصادية السائدة قد تغّيّرت بشكل كبير منذ الخمسينيّات والستينيّات، وباتت تولي القيمة الأكبر للأسواق لا للدول.

وعليه، فأنا لا أعتقد بالضرورة أنّ هذا النقاش مثمر جدًّا، سيّما على ضوء العلاقات غير الرسمية بمعظمها بين مسؤولي الدولة ورجال الأعمال في لبنان. فالمسألة التي تهمّني شخصيًّا تكمن في كيفيّة استخدام الخطاب حول غياب الدولة في لبنان (أي "وين الدولة") لدعم حجّة نيوليبراليّة وإنّما غير جديدة حول فاعليّة الأسواق. إلى ذلك، فالنقاش حول الملكيّة العامّة أو الخاصّة يضع المستهلك في صفّ الجمهور الصامت ويجعل منه ضحيةً لهذا الجدل ونتائجه. فالكهرباء في لبنان تجارة، وهي تجارة بارزة سياسيًّا. بالتالي، قد يكون من الأجدى التفكير بطرق لتعبئة  المستهلكين، إمّا ضدّ الدولة أو القطاع الخاص، للمطالبة بأسعار وخدمات أفضل للكهرباء، ودعم هذه الدعوة بعمل جماعي يضع الإصبع على الجرح، فيهدّد الحكومة بإسقاطها والشركات بإيراداتها.


قصائد مُختارة للشَّاعر الإيطالي إيوْجِنيو مونتالِه

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قصائد مُختارة للشَّاعر الإيطالي إيوْجِنيو مونتالِه Eugenio Montale  (1896-1981)

اختارها وترجمها وقدَّم لها: أمارجي


تقديم


لا غُلواءَ إنْ قلنا: القصيدةُ، هنا، تنكيلٌ بالزَّمن، نهشٌ بالمغاليق-، 

     (نصٌّ مخلبٌ) 

     (نصٌّ نصْلٌ) 

ههنا، الزَّمنُ ثالثٌ، موَّارٌ بِشكِّه ولا يستوثِقُ إلا الذي فيه؛ زمنٌ مختمِرٌ في صَدَفةِ الكمَدِ الوجوديِّ، يتفلَّعُ ويعلو في خمائره مثل شجرةٍ تمتاحُ ماءَ نفسِها، ثمَّ تحترقُ وتهوي بغتةً في رمادِ نفسِها؛ زمنٌ شغلُه الفتلُ والتَّحويلُ والتَّمزيق، تهييجُ "هلاساتٍ تَورِياتيَّة" تحت الجلالِ الهُدهُديِّ للنِّسيان، حين اللازمنيُّ تناصٌّ مع الزَّمنيِّ، تحريشٌ به. الهدهدُ نفسُه رمزٌ لصنيعِ مونتالِه الشِّعريِّ، إنَّه بهلوانُ الزَّمنيَّة المونتاليَّة الذي يجمِّدُ ويحرِّكُ في آنٍ معاً، مُقنبَرَاً بعَوْفِه الكونيِّ. ولا يُشْكِلَنْ علينا هذا اللَّيَاحُ الزَّمنيُّ المبهِر، هذا العماءُ الأصلُ المستعادُ عبرَ انتفالِ اللغةِ مِن سَقطةِ المواقيت، وانتفالِ المواقيتِ مِن سَقطةِ اللغة؛ لا يَنطَلِيَنْ علينا انتحالُ العدَمِ أسرَّةَ اليقين: الزَّمنُ المشاكِلُ للَّازمنِ والمشكِلُ به هو، ببساطةٍ، الزَّمنُ المنكِّلُ، هو المعتصِرُ بهاءاتِ الأمسِ في مِهرازِ الرَّاهن. لا لبسَ، إذَّاكَ، أنَّ الزَّمنين الآخرين المنكَّل بهما، المقطَّعَين بِحَزازِ ساعاتٍ مسترخيةٍ في عزلةٍ من الأبديَّةِ والأفولِ على حدٍّ سَواء، ليسا إلا الزَّمنَ الوضعيَّ اليقينيَّ، الموصَدَ بين قبلٍ وبعد، والزَّمنَ الشِّعريَّ الغيبيَّ، المفتوحَ بين أزلٍ وأبد؛ فالزَّمنُ القيُّومُ على النَّصِّ لا تستقيم قيُّوميَّتُه إلا بجرشِ ذينك الزَّمنين في بعضهما، عَجناً لهما مِن ثَمَّ في نَتْنِ العَصر. هكذا، يبدو الزَّمن عند مونتالِه تجسيداً لرعبِ اللحظةِ الحاضرة، اللحظةِ المتورِّمة بذاكرةٍ مُدَلَّاةٍ، كسيفِ ديموقليس، على رأس الواقع، فيما الواقعُ إيَّاه يتوسَّلُ الرَّمزَ مِرفعَاً له مِن طينِ نفسِه. 


*   *   *

     (نصٌّ مخلبٌ يهرِّئُ)

     (نصٌّ نصلٌ يَقْشُرُ) 

لكن، ما المغاليقُ المنهَّشة، وما المغاليق المتِمَّةُ - في النَّصِّ المونتاليِّ - ثمرةَ الرؤيا؟ ذلك مأزقٌ آخر يقتضي من القارئ قفزةَ اجتناء؛ لأنَّه كما في جدليَّة الزَّمن، كذلك في جدليَّةِ الاستغلاق الشِّعريِّ، يفتح الشَّاعرُ هُوَّاتٍ أكيدة بين الحضورات ووعيها، يبتئرُ الحضوراتِ بفأسِ الغيب، مُفلِتاً الصُّورَ تتوهَّسُ الغيابات. بهذا المعنى، يتشكَّلُ المؤدَّى النِّهائيُّ للنَّصِّ أوَّلاً مِن دَهْمِ إبهاماتٍ بعينِها،- الإبهاماتِ الهِيْمِ المنفصلة المرتَجَة، ببعدِها البرناسيِّ المصْمَتِ على نفسِه-، والتَّفجيرِ فيها؛ وثانياً مِن تدسيمِ إبهاماتٍ رؤيويَّةٍ، وإيثاقها بالواقع المرمَّز، ببعدِها الإلاحيِّ المفتوح على الممكِن الإنسانيِّ. إنَّه فضاءٌ شعريٌّ مغاليقه إيماءٌ إلى مفاتيحه، لا طمسٌ لها؛ فضاءُ ابتناءٍ على التَّخريب، ورقشٍ على التَّمْحية، ووصْلٍ على المصارَمة. وفي هذا الفضاء ليس همُّ الشَّاعر إعلاءَ المستغلَقِ وتوطيدَه، بل حملَه كما هو وتقريبَه ومناجاته. وإذا كان كلُّ شاعرٍ سارقَ نارٍ، أمكنَ القولُ إنَّ نارَ مونتالِه هي هذا الزَّيغ الازدواجيُّ: زَيغُ التَّعمية نحوَ برَّانيَّةٍ حسِّيَّة، وزَيغُ الحسِّيِّ نحوَ إبطانٍ اذِّكاري. 


*   *   *

تلك مُحاجَّةٌ تخاشِنُ النَّصَّ في أناه. تَبْهَتُ الأنا في السُّؤالِ عن أناها؛ تَخبُلُها بالمرايا. المرآة انتقامُ الآخَر من نَرجِسَةِ الشِّعر؛ تَشَفِّي المنقصةِ من المثال. كلُّ مرآةٍ أمام نصٍّ هي، قطعاً، فِعلُ خلخلةٍ وهتكٍ، افتضاحٌ للآخرِ في الأنا، وللأنا في الآخَر. التَّفتُّحُ أو التَّشظِّي نُهْيَة ذلك؛ فإمَّا المرآة وإمَّا النَّصُّ. هنا، ثمَّة تراجعٌ في الشِّمراخِ الأنَويِّ، أو تقلقلٌ له في تربةِ اللانهائيِّ: باكْتِناتٍ خجول. العثكالُ الهائلُ، عثكالُ الأنا الشِّعريَّة، أنا الفتوحاتِ والنِّهاياتِ، العزلاتِ والمجابهات، يوهمنا أنَّه متمَّمُ العُقر حيالَ مادَّةِ إخصابِ الكونيِّ الذي تزعمه الأنا بَعلاً أبديَّاً لها، ولكن ما يفعلُه بحقٍّ هو أنَّه يطرحُ، إفاضةً، بُسُرَ الكلِّيَّات عِبرَ أسديةِ المجزوءات، استيلاداً بعدئذٍ للجوهريِّ من الزَّائل، والثَّابتِ من الآنيِّ، وتثبيتاً للمولِّدات والمتولِّدات في بعضهما. لكأنَّ الأقنومَ المتعبِّدَ لذاتِه، أقنومَ الأنا، لا يكتملُ إلَّا بلُحمتِه بالآخَر وانصهارِه فيه وانتصارِه له. الأنا المُحيقةُ بالآخر وبالكون هي، في هذا الشِّعر، مَحِيقةٌ بهما، ولا تتنفَّسُ إلا برئاتِهما. رئاتٌ كلماتٌ تتدبَّرُ انصبابَها، دون زلَلٍ، في هذا الزَّيغ، واستدادَها في هذا الالتواء. 


*   *   *

(نصٌّ مخلبٌ) يهرِّئ المطلَق؛ 

(نصٌّ نصلٌ) يقشرُ الأبديَّةَ عن حجرِ اللحظة؛ 

يجتعفُ عروقَه مثلَ حجَّارٍ، 

ثمَّ، مثلَ مثَّالٍ ينحتُه. 



النُّصوص:


أيُّها الهُدهُد، يا طائر الغبطةِ المُتَّهَم


أيُّها الهُدهُد، يا طائر الغبطة الذي تقوَّلَ عليه 

الشُّعراء، يا مَن تدوِّرُ عُرفَكَ 

فوق العمود الهوائيِّ لقنِّ الدَّجاج، 

وكمثلِ ديكٍ اصطناعيٍّ تدورُ مع الرِّياح؛ 

رسولٌ ربيعيٌّ أنتَ، يا هُدهُد، كأنَّما 

الزَّمن يتجمَّدُ عبرَك، 

وشباطُ لا يموتُ [بحضورِك]، 

كأنَّ كلَّ شيءٍ في الخارجِ يتحرَّكُ 

وفقاً لحركةِ رأسِك، 

أيُّها المجنَّحُ الغريب، وأنتَ تتجاهلُه. 



الشُّرفة


مُعابثةً بسيطةً بدا لي 

تحوُّلُ الفضاءِ المفتوحِ [كلِّيَّاً] عليَّ 

إلى عدم، ونارِكِ الأكيدة 

إلى ضجرٍ غامضٍ مُزعزَع. 


بذلك الخواء وحَّدْتُ الآنَ 

كلَّ رغبةٍ مِن رغباتي البطيئة؛ 

فوقَ العدمِ الشَّاقِّ ينبثق 

قلقُ البقاءِ حيَّاً في انتظارِك. 


حياةٌ تهَبُ وميضاً 

هي وحدُها الحياة التي تُبصِرين. 

نحوَها تخرُجين  

مِن هذه النَّافذة التي لا تضيء.  



مجدُ ظهيرةٍ مسترخية


فلتتمجَّد هذه الظَّهيرة المسترخية 

حين الأشجارُ لا تصنعُ ظلَّاً، 

وهيئاتٌ صُفْرُ مُحمرَّة تتكشَّفُ حولي 

أكثر فأكثر، عبرَ ضياءٍ مُفرِطٍ. 


الشَّمسُ، عالياً-، ومجرىً نَشِفٌ. 

نهاري لم ينقضِ بعد: 

السَّاعة الأبهى تقبعُ خلف الجدار 

الموصَدِ على أفولٍ مُمتقِع. 


القيظُ في الأنحاء؛ طائرُ رفرافٍ 

يحومُ فوق رُفاتِ حياةٍ. 

فيما وراءَ الكَرْبِ ثمَّةَ المطر، 

لكنَّ فرحاً أكثر اكتمالاً يترصَّد. 


أرسِنْيو1


هي ذي زوبعاتٌ يرفعْنَ الغبارَ،  

في دُوَّاماتٍ، على الأسقُف، والمفازاتِ 

المقفِرة، حيث الجيادُ المقلْنَسَة 

تتشمَّمُ الأرضَ، واقفةً حيالَ البلَّورِ، 

بلَّورِ الخاناتِ الثُّلاجيِّ البرَّاق؛ 

فيما تتحدَّرُ أنتَ على الدَّربِ، مواجهاً البحرَ، 

في هذا النَّهارِ المنذِرِ

بالمطرِ حيناً والمتَّقدِ2حيناً، كترديدِ نواقيرٍ 

يريدُ تشويشَ العقدةِ الملتحمةِ 

لساعاتٍ 

كلُّ واحدةٍ منها طِباقُ الأخرى. 


ها إلماعةٌ مِن لَدُنْ مدارٍ آخر: اتبعها. 

اهبطْ نحوَ الأفق المعتلَى 

مِن قِبلِ شاهقةِ ماءٍ3رصاصيَّةٍ عاليةٍ على اللُّجَج 

وأعتى منها تدويماً: هالةٌ أجاجٌ ملَولَبةٌ، 

ينفخها العنصرُ الثَّائرُ4 

نحوَ السَّحاب؛ دع عبورَكَ 

يخشخش الحصباءَ مِن تحته وتعثَّرْ 

بتشبُّكِ الطَّحالب: علَّ تلك البرهة، 

المشتهاةِ مِن زمنٍ بعيدٍ، تُنجِّيكَ 

مِن اختتامِ طَوافِك، مِن حلقاتِ هذي 

السِّلسلة، مِن ترحُّلٍ بلا حراكٍ، 

آهِ أرْسِنيو، يا هذيان الثُّبوت 

الجليَّ تمامَ الجلاء... 


أصغِ بين النَّخل إلى رشقاتِ الكمنجاتِ 

الرَّاعشة، يخمدُها تدحرُجُ الرَّعدِ 

مختلجاً كمثل صفيحٍ معدنيٍّ طُرِقَ 

للتَّوِّ؛ عذبةٌ هي الأنواءُ عندما ينبلجُ 

نجمُ الشَّعرى اليمانيَّة ببياضِه 

في أفقٍ أزرق، فيبدو بعيدَ المنال إذَّاكَ

المساءُ الموشِكُ: مساءٌ إذا ما شقَّقَه البرقُ 

تفرَّعَ مثلَ شجرةٍ جليلة 

في قلب ضياءٍ ينقلبُ الآنَ ورديَّاً: الدَّفُّ 

الغجريُّ قرْعٌ أبكمُ.


انزل سُدَفَ الظَّلام الذي يهوي 

ويُحيلُ الظَّهيرةَ ليلاً طافحاً 

بأجرامٍ وقَّادةٍ تتهزهزُ على الشَّاطئ،- 

وفي البعيد، حيث ظلٌّ مفرَدٌ 

يشغَلُ البحرَ والسَّماء معاً، تنبضُ مِن مراكب مبعثرة 

سُرُجُ الأسِتيلين5- إلى أن تتقطَّرَ السَّماءُ 

مرتعدةً، وينفثَ التُّرابُ الذي يرتوي أبخرتَه، 

بَينا كلُّ ما حولِك يُختَضُّ فيك، والمظلَّاتُ الرَّخوةُ 

تخبطُ خبطَ عشواء، وحفيفٌ هائلٌ 

يسوِّي الأرضَ، والمشكاواتُ الورقُ في الأسفل 

تترهَّلُ، مزمهرةً، على الطُّرقات. 


هكذا، تائهاً وسطَ الأماليدِ 

والحُصُرِ المتهاوية، أيُّها الأسَلُ المجرجِرُ معه 

جذورَه الدَّبقة، المحالُ انتزاعُها، 

ترجفُ إزاءَ الحياة وتندفعُ صوبَ 

فراغٍ يتصادى بنُوَاحاتٍ 

مخنوقة، يبتلعُك ثانيةً امتدادُ 

موجة الماضي الذي يطويك؛ ومرَّةً أخرى 

كلُّ ما يتملَّكُك، الطَّريقُ، سُدَّةُ الباب، 

الأسوارُ، المرايا، يغرزُكَ من جديدٍ 

في الزُّمرةِ المجمَّدة، زُمرةِ الموتى،

فإذا ما مسَّتكَ حركةٌ ما، أو وقعت بقربكَ 

كلمةٌ، فتلك، يا أرسِنيو، 

في السَّاعةِ التي تنحلُّ، إيماءةُ حياةٍ مخنوقةٍ 

تنهضُ فيكَ، وعمَّا قليلٍ 

تبدِّدُها الرِّيحُ مع رمادِ الكواكب.


التَّاريخ 


التَّاريخُ لا يُفَكُّ 

كما تُفَكُّ سلسلةٌ

موثَقةُ الحلقات. 

في كلِّ حالٍ 

ثمَّة حلقاتٌ لا تُستَوثَق. 

التَّاريخُ لا يتضمَّنُ 

الماقبل والمابعد، 

ولا شيء فيه يتشكَّى 

على نارٍ خافتة. 

التَّاريخ لا يصنعُه 

مَن يفكِّر فيه ولا مَن 

يتجاهلُه. التَّاريخ 

لا يفتح طريقاً، بل يعانِد، 

وينفُرُ قليلاً قليلاً، لا يتقدَّمُ 

ولا يرتدُّ، يصيرُ سكَّةً 

وجهتُها ليست 

في جدولِ المواقيت. 

التَّاريخ لا يبرِّرُ 

ولا يُعزِّرُ، 

التَّاريخ ليس ذاتيَّاً 

لأنَّه [أصلاً] خارج الأشياء. 

التَّاريخ لا يمنحُ ملاطفاتٍ ولا ضرباتِ مِقرَعة. 

وليس التَّاريخ الملقِّنَ 

لأيِّ شيءٍ يتَّصلُ بنا. فَهمُ التَّاريخ لا ينفعُ 

في جعله أكثر صدقاً وأكثر عدلاً. 

التَّاريخ، مِن ثَمَّ، ليس 

المحراثَ المخرِّبَ كما يزعمون. 

إنَّه يترك وراءَه أنفاقاً ومغاورَ وحُفَرَاً 

وكمائن؛ فيها منجىً لحياةٍ ما. 

التَّاريخ رقيق الحاشيةِ كذلك: لا يدمِّرُ  

إلا بقدرِ ما يستطيع: لو أنَّه غالى، 

لكانَ أفضل، ولكنَّ التَّاريخ تُعوِزُه الأنباء، 

وهو لا يُكملُ انتقاماتِه أبداً. 

التَّاريخ يحُكُّ القاع 

كشبكةِ صيدٍ مهترئة، 

تتملَّصُ منها سمكةٌ أو أكثر. 

أحياناً يلامسُ الغشاءَ البلازميِّ 

لإحدى النَّاجيات فلا تبدو مغتبطةً بذلك. 

تجهلُ أنَّها صارت خارجاً، الكلُّ يجهل. 

الأخريات، داخلَ الجِراب، يحسبن 

أنَّهنَّ أكثر حرِّيَّةً منها. 



الليمون 


أصغِ إليَّ، الشُّعراءُ المتوَّجون بالغار 

يتنقَّلون فقط بين النَّباتات ذاتِ الأسماء 

النَّادرةِ التَّداول: بَقسٌ لِيغُستُرُومٌ أو أقَنْتة. 

أمَّا أنا فأحبُّ الشَّوارع التي تشبه وِهاداً 

مُعشَوشِبة حيث يقبضُ الصِّبية، 

في مستنقعاتٍ نصف مجفَّفة، على 

سمكةِ أنقليسٍ هزيلة: 

الزُّنَيقاتُ التي تقفو حوافَّ المنحدَر، 

تتحدَّرُ وسطَ لِمامِ القصب 

وتحطُّ في الحقول، بين أشجار الليمون. 


ليتَ ضوضاءَاتِ الطُّيور 

تنطفئ مبلوعةً بالزُّرقة: 

لَكانَ همسُ الغصونِ الرَّفيقة 

أشدَّ اتِّضاحاً في هواءٍ بالكادِ يتحرَّك، 

وكذا قوَّةُ هذا العبق 

الذي لا يحسنُ الانسلاخَ عن الأرض، 

ولَأمطرتْ في الصُّدور عذوبةً قلِقة. 

هنا حيثُ تنشرحُ الشَّهوات 

تخرَسُ الحربُ، كما لو بفعلِ مُعجزة، 

هنا، نحن الفقراء أيضاً لنا نصيبنا من الثَّراء، 

لنا عبقُ الليمون. 


انظرْ، في هذه السُّكونات- التي فيها 

تذعِنُ الأشياء وتبدو قريبةً 

مِن نقضِ سرِّها الأخير، 

نرتقبُ آنذاك 

أن نكشفَ خطأ الطَّبيعة، 

مُنتهى الكون، الحلقةَ التي لا تمتسِك، 

خيطَ الخلاصِ الذي يضعنا أخيراً 

في صُلبِ الحقيقةِ، 

ها العينُ تنقِّبُ في الأنحاء، 

ها العقلُ يتحرَّى يوائمُ ويفرِّقُ 

في العطرِ الذي يتفشَّى 

كلَّما خفتَ النَّهارُ أكثر. 

إنَّها السُّكوناتُ التي عندَها 

تُرى في كلِّ ظلٍّ بشريٍّ يُنائي 

ألوهةٌ متكدِّرة. 


ولكنَّ الوهمَ مُخِلٌّ [بمواثيقه]، والزَّمنُ يحملُنا 

نحوَ مدنٍ صاخِبةٍ حيث الزُّرقةُ لا تَبِينُ 

إلا مُشظَّاةً، عالياً، بين التِّيجان الحجريَّة. 

المطرُ يرهقُ الأرضَ، فوقَ ذلك؛ 

والضَّجرُ الشِّتائيُّ يتكاثفُ فوق البيوت، 

الضَّوء يشِحُّ- والنَّفْسُ تكْمَدُ. 

كذا الأمرُ، عندما ذاتَ نهارٍ، عبرَ بابٍ مواربٍ 

بين أشجار أحدِ الأفنية 

تتجلَّى لنا صُفراتُ الليمون؛ 

فينحلُّ جليدُ القلب، 

وفي الصَّدرِ تُمطِرُنا 

بأغانيها- دَفقاً

أبواقُ العزلةِ الذَّهبيَّة. 


قصيدة حُبٍّ 


متأبِّطاً ذراعكِ، هبطتُ على الأقلِّ ملايين الأدراج، 

ولكنَّ غيابكِ الآنَ يُعلِن الخواءَ دَرْجةً دَرجة. 

كذلك، أيضاً، قصيرةً كانت رحلتُنا الطَّويلة. 

رحلتي أنا لم تنتهِ بعد، ولم يعدْ لزاماً عليَّ 

ضبطُ المواقيت، ولا الحجزُ المُسَبَّق، 

لا التَّحايلُ، ولا احتمال مذلَّةٍ ممَّن يحسبُ 

أنَّ لا حقيقة إلا ما يُرى. 


هبطتُ ملايين الأدراج متأبِّطاً ذراعكِ، 

ليس لأنَّ المرء بأربع عيونٍ قادرٌ على الرُّؤية أكثر. 

معكِ هبطتُها لأنَّني كنتُ أعلمُ أنَّ

بؤبؤيكِ أنتِ هما وحدهما الحقيقيَّان لي ولكِ، 

مهما يكن إعتامُهما. 


حياتي 


ها حياتي، لست أطالبُكِ بخطوطٍ  

محدَّدة، ولا بوجوهٍ مُقنِعة، ولا بأملاك. 

في دورانكِ المضطرب سيَّان الآنَ 

مذاقُ العسلِ والإسفنط6


القلبُ الذي كلُّ حركةٍ منه تعويلٌ 

على ما قلَّ أو حقُرَ مزعزَعٌ الآنَ بالرَّجفات. 

على المنوالِ نفسِه تصدحُ بين حينٍ وآخَر  

في صمتِ الحقول طلقةُ بندقيَّة. 



الزَّوبعة 


الزَّوبعة التي تتصبَّب على أوراق الماغنوليا 

القاسية، الرُّعود الآذاريَّةُ المديدة، 

وحبَّاتُ البَرَدِ الدَّافقة، 

(الأصوات الكريستاليَّة التي تباغتُ

عشَّكِ الليليَّ، أصواتٌ ذهبيَّة 

تخمدُ على خشب الماهوغوني، على الكتبِ 

المعاد تجليدُها، فيما يضطرمُ 

مكعَّبُ سكَّرٍ في قوقعةِ جفنيكِ) 

البرقُ الذي يبيِّضُ 

الشَّجَرَ والأسوارَ ويصعقها في أبديَّةِ 

هذه اللحظة  – مرمرٌ تِبنٌ 

وخرائب- الرَّقشُ الذي تحملينه داخلَكِ

بالإكراه، أنتِ التي تتوحَّدين بي 

أقوى من الحبِّ نفسِه، أيَّتها الأختُ الغريبة-، 

وبعدُ، كمَدٌ طاغٍ، سِيسْتْرُوماتٌ7، ارتعادُ 

الدُّفوفِ عندَ المرْمَسِ السَّارقِ، 

وطءُ رقصة الفوندانغو، وفي الأعلى 

حركةٌ ما تومئ... 

على مثالِكِ أنتِ عندما 

التفتِّ إليَّ، وبيدٍ- جبينُكِ آنذاك 

مجلوٌّ مِن غمامةِ الشَّعر- 

لوَّحتِ لي، لِتَلِجي في العتمة. 



عندَ البحر (أو تقريباً)8


الجُدْجُدُ الأخيرُ يصطرِخُ 

على الشَّكير الأصفرِ للأوكاليبتوس 

الأطفالُ يجمعون بذور الصَّنوبر 

التي لا بدَّ منها لطبق الجالانتين9 

كلبٌ حارسٌ ينبحُ مِن وراءِ مُشَرِّبيَّةِ دارةٍ 

خاويةٍ على عروشِها 

الدَّاراتُ شيَّدَها الآباءُ مِن قبلُ 

وأبناءُ اليومِ نبذوها 

ثمَّة ههنا متَّسَعٌ لمائة ألفِ منكوبٍ بالزَّلازل 

حتَّى أنَّ الشَّاطئ لا يُرى مِن هنا 

إذا جازَ أن تُسَمَّى كذلك تلك الثَّمانون بالمِائة 

المُعطاة لخفرِ السَّواحل 

حيث مِن فَرْطِ الأمورِ التَّطلُّعُ 

إلى سلامٍ ذهبيٍّ هناك 

البحرُ من جهةٍ أخرى قد كَمُلَ اجتياحُه 

فيما النُّفاياتُ تشكِّلُ معاً 

رُبْواتٍ مُتماوجةٍ من اللدائن 

الحظائرُ مُخلاةٌ عن آخِرِها 

سوى مِن سُلالاتِ الصَّدأ العذبة 

وطيورِ الصَّعْوِ أو الرُّيَيْتِيَّة10 

كما يطيبُ للشُّعراء تسميتُها. ثمَّة أيضاً بِضعةُ

براعمِ ماغنوليا وبطاقةُ طبيبِ أطفال 

لكنَّ الأطفال هنا يحلِّقون بدرَّاجاتهم الهوائيَّة 

ولا حاجة بهم إلى رعايتِه 

مَن يودُّ أن يتنشَّقَ بموجة نَتْنٍ مفاجئة 

شِعرَ هذا العصرِ المزعزَع 

يمكنه المرور من هنا بلا عجَلٍ 

إنَّما الطَّعنةُ الضَّعيفة هي ما يصنعُ الخوفَ 

لا الزَّوالُ أو نفثاتُ العدمِ العذبة 

فامكثوا هنا إن أحببتم ذلك حُبَّاً وإلَّم يكنْ جمَّاً 

ذلك أنَّ الخِيارَ الأفضل شبيهٌ جدَّاً 

بالموت (وهذا لا يحبُّه إلا الحِدْثان11). 


وجعُ الحياة


لطالما رأيتُ وجعَ الحياةِ قُبُلاً: 

[رأيتُه] في الجدولِ المخنوقِ الذي يقرقر، 

في تجعُّدِ الورقةِ إذ يبَّسَها 

العطش، في الحصانِ المطروحِ أرضاً. 


لم أعرف منجىً آخَرَ خارجَ المعجزةِ 

التي تُفَتِّحُ الحيادَ الإلهيَّ12

إنَّه13النُّصبُ المرفوعُ في وسنِ 

الظَّهيرة، إنَّه الغيمةُ، والبازُ المحلِّقُ عالياً. 


الحواشي (كما وضعها المترجِم):

City Talks: Timothy Mitchell on the Materialities of Political Economy and Histories

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[City Talks provides a platform for conversations around the social, political, economic, cultural, and environmental transformations that define the historical and contemporary geographies of the Middle East, and beyond. Bringing together voices from critical scholars, activists, and artists, it seeks to explore the ways racialized, gendered, and class-based social orders come into being, materialize, and are resisted through the fabric of bodies, space, and time.] 

In this first installment of City Talks, Omar Jabary Salamanca and Nasser Abourahme discuss with Timothy Mitchell his latest work and his ongoing thinking around questions of urban political economy and political theory. More specifically, we learn about his use of the term capitalization and what it might mean for thinking about the built environment. Mitchell also reflects on the role of public space during the Arab uprisings, issues of urban and rural informality, as well as the ways the ‘material turn’ and close attention to the technical help us see colonialism in different ways. 

Timothy Mitchell is a political theorist and historian. His areas of research include the place of colonialism in the making of modernity, the material and technical politics of the Middle East, and the role of economics and other forms of expert knowledge in the government of collective life. Much of his current work is concerned with ways of thinking about politics that allow material and technical things more weight than they are given in conventional political theory.  Educated at Queens' College, Cambridge, where he received a first-class honours degree in History, Mitchell completed his Ph.D. in Politics and Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University in 1984. He joined Columbia University in 2008 after teaching for twenty-five years at New York University, where he served as Director of the Center for Near Eastern Studies. At Columbia, he teaches courses on the history and politics of the Middle East, colonialism, and the politics of technical things. 
 


City Talks: Timothy Mitchell on the Materialities of Political Economy and Histories


Theme and Time Markers: 

00:00:07 | Representation, colonialism and the city
00:01:54 | Political economy, capitalization and the city
00:14:35 | Capitalization vs. renterism or rent economies
00:21:14 | Provincializing materiality
00:26:09 | The “material turn” and colonialism
00:32:47 | Methodological encounters with the archive
00:39:43 | Reading the archive in non-representational ways
00:43:15 | Arab Uprisings and public space
00:50:26 | Urban (and rural) informality 

 

 

 



 

 

Egypt Media Roundup (November 16)

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 [This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.] 

Political Rights

Hossam Bahgat has been released, unclear if charges still pending Hossam Bahgat was released from military intelligence at midday on Tuesday after he signed a document stating, “I, Hossam Bahgat, journalist at Mada Masr, declare that I will abide by legal and security procedures when publishing material pertaining to the Armed Forces."

Egyptian journalist Hossam Bahgat calls for end to military trial of civilians after 2-day detention Egyptian investigative journalist and human rights activist Hossam Bahgat was released from the custody of military prosecution on Tuesday, two days after his detention on charges of "publishing false news aimed at harming national security."

Al-Masry Al-Youm owner Salah Diab and son released on bail The owner of Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper Salah Diab and his son were released from jail Wednesday afternoon on bail, pending investigations into charges of illegal arms possession.

Plain-clothed agents kidnap groom from his wedding It was not clear whether Badr al-Gamal had a past of political activism, but Egyptian rights advocates have decried a months-old wave of enforced disappearances of political activists where targets are taken to unknown destinations.

Egypt court to rule on Wael Ghonim's nationality suit in January Egypt's administrative court Sunday set a January 17 verdict date for a law suit demanding that activist Wael Ghonim be stripped of his Egyptian nationality on accusations of being an agent.

State TV anchor suspended for criticizing Sisi State TV anchor Azza al-Hennawy was suspended this week and referred to internal disciplinary investigation for criticizing President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

Reem Maged says banned from any Egyptian channel Outspoken TV presenter Reem Maged said she is banned from appearing on any Egyptian channel, adding that this decision makes her feel “paralyzed”.

Presenter censures Swedish ambassador over journalist’s arrest remarks TV host Ahmed Moussa criticized Sweden’s ambassador to Cairo for allegedly defending an Egyptian journalist who was briefly detained and interrogated by military prosecutors.

Journalists' Syndicate head files claim against Tahrir newspaper The Journalists' Syndicate Chairman Yehia Qalash filed a claim against Tahrir newspaper management, holding it responsible for the lives of journalists who are on hunger strike at the newspaper's headquarters for the fourth consecutive day.

Egyptian writer Ahmed Naji stands trial over sexually explicit text A writer and a newspaper editor both faced trial on Saturday on charges of public indecency for publishing what prosecutors describe as a "sexually flagrant article" in the state-owned cultural newspaper Akhbar Al-Adab last year.

Thousands demand release of teenager arrested 2 years ago for wearing anti-torture shirt Almost 145,000 people from around the world have signed an Amnesty International petition demanding the release of nineteen-year-old Mahmoud Mohamed Hussein, who has been held without charge in Cairo’s Tora Prison for almost two years.

Blog: In court again Lina Attalah reports from the Police Academy on Alaa Abd El Fattah's birthday.

Cairo University expels 27 students, political activism suspected Cairo University expelled twenty-seven students this week without prior notice, news reports have said, indicating that their past political activism could have been a factor.

Seven defendants sentenced to death in Second Rafah Massacre The Giza Criminal Court, headed by judge Motaz Khafagy, has sentenced Adel Habbara and six others to death for killing soldiers in Rafah city, North Sinai, in the case publicly known as the "Second Rafah Massacre".

Giza court sentences one to death, refers three to Grand Mufti The man is accused of storming a police station and killing eleven policemen in the town of Kerdasa.

Interior Ministry says it killed top Province of Sinai leader in Cairo Interior Ministry forces have killed a top Province of Sinai leader who they allege was behind several terrorist operations targeting the Armed Forces, diplomatic missions and civilians, the ministry said in a statement released Monday.

12 NGOs dissolved over suspected Brotherhood ties Egypt’s Social Solidarity Ministry dissolved Thursday twelve non-governmental organizations, claiming they have ties with the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.

Student union elections: Is politics dying in Egypt's universities? As students prepare for elections, almost no one is talking politics, Mada Masr reports.

Angered doctors demand healthcare reform after colleague dies from meningitis After a doctor died from meningitis that she contracted on the job, the Doctors Syndicate continued to lash out at the Health Ministry this week for failing to uphold basic health and safety standards at Egypt’s public hospitals.

Lawyers protest alleged security assault on colleagues Several lawyers staged a protest condemning police assault on their colleagues on Saturday in Banha, Qalyubiya outside the city’s prosecution and courtroom complex.

court ruled Thursday, despite a previous conviction on protest-related charges.

Egypt's prosecution investigates Alexandria sewage system corruption case The investigations revealed a corruption scandal following the heavy rains that flooded West Alexandria.

Elections

Next parliament can be bought with money: Nour Party The composition of Egypt’s forthcoming parliament will reflect the influence financial bribes had on voters, said the Salafi-led Nour Party, continuing to voice anger over its electoral failure in the first phase of elections.

Elections Snapshot: low turnout expected in Egypt's beleaguered North SinaiAswat Masriya reports.

Court upholds pardoned activist Yara Sallam's right to vote Human rights lawyer Yara Sallam will not lose her constitutional right to vote, an administrative

Economy

Pound rises against the dollar, Central Bank governor steps down Central Bank of Egypt Governor Hesham Ramez, who submitted his resignation last month, has stepped down and appointed the bank’s deputy governor, Gamal Negm, as caretaker, state-owned Ahram reported.

Sisi pledges to keep tourism afloat during surprise visit to Sharm Arriving from the Saudi Arabian capital Riyadh on Wednesday, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi made a surprise visit to the Red Sea resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh and pledged to keep the tourism industry in business.

Negotiations on $3 bn World Bank loan move to Washington Minister of International Cooperation Sahar Nasr visited Washington Tuesday for negotiations between the government and the World Bank for a loan worth three billion USD.

Egyptian unemployment edges up to 12.8% in Q3: CAPMAS Egypt's unemployment rate edged up to 12.8 percent in the third quarter of 2015 from 12.7 percent the previous quarter, but was lower than the 13.1 percent rate in the same period of last year, the statistics agency (CAPMAS) said on Sunday.

Alexandria textile workers escalate protests over salary Textile workers at several companies in Alexandria escalated their protests on Sunday over delayed salaries and forced leaves.

Luxor, Aswan tourism workers complain of state neglect Tourism sector workers in Luxor and Aswan have called on the government to rescue cultural tourism in the two cities, as both have become threatened following the Russian passenger plane crash in Sinai. 

Russian plane crash

Russian jet crash puts Sharm resort staff on 'unpaid leave' The Russian plane crash in Egypt has forced Sharm el-Sheikh hotels to send dozens of staff on "unpaid leave" as tourist numbers dwindle, with tens of thousands of jobs at risk within months.

Egypt to send Russian plane recording abroad for analysis A recording from Russian Airbus A321 which caught a sound before the plane disintegrated in midair will be sent abroad for analysis, Egypt's civil aviation minister was quoted as saying Friday.

Russia bans incoming EgyptAir flights starting Saturday: Russian state media Russian aviation authorities have banned all EgyptAir flights to Russia starting Saturday, November 14, the state news agency Sputnik reported Friday.

The terrorist theory in the Russian plane crash Western governments jumped the gun by insisting that a terrorist act brought down the Russian plane in Sinai, writes Ahmed Eleiba.

Foreign Policy

US military aid for Egypt seen continuing despite rights concerns The US Congress looks set to approve another 1.3 billion USD in military aid to Egypt despite concerns expressed by some lawmakers over its crackdown on dissent while fighting religious militants.

We are keen on strengthening cooperation with F-16 aircraft manufacturer: Sisi President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi met Thursday with Marillyn Hewson, the chairman and chief executive officer of Lockheed Martin, the US manufacturer of the F-16 aircraft.

Foreign Ministry slams UN condemnation of Hossam Bahgat's arrest Egypt's Foreign Ministry criticized a statement on Tuesday by United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon on the arrest of Mada Masr contributor Hossam Bahgat.

From Jadaliyya Egypt

New Texts Out Now: Moustafa Bayoumi, This Muslim American Life: Dispatches from the War on Terror Moustafa Bayoumi discusses his new book This Muslim American Life: Dispatches from the War on Terror.

Last Week on Jadaliyya (November 9-15)

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This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya last week. It also includes a list of the most read articles and roundups. Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our "Last Week on Jadaliyya" series.


 

Terreur partout, humanité nulle part

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Il serait sans doute plus raisonnable d'attendre quelques semaines afin de laisser passer l'émotion. C'est ce que la décence et la raison demandent. Je suis parisien de cœur, et je préférerais me taire. Malheureusement, les faucons et les fascistes, les loups et les va-t-en-guerre, les chacals et les ministres ne s'embarrassent pas de scrupules. Ils n'ont pas attendu que les corps soient en terre, et que les larmes soient sèches, pour commencer leurs vociférations. Ils appellent à la riposte musclée, à la fermeture des frontières, à la montée d'un cran dans le délire sécuritaire. Nous sommes cernés.

Il n'est pas possible de rendre compte en un article de la multiplicité des dynamiques à l'œuvre dans cette escalade du terrorisme de masse, qui a frappé en un rien de temps le Liban et la France. Mais il est nécessaire de répéter les mêmes évidences, encore et encore, dans l'espoir qu'un jour les cyniques et les médiocres qui nous gouvernent trouvent le courage de rompre le cercle vicieux.

Terreur pour tout le monde

Contre certains experts hallucinés, il faut rappeler que les attaques ne visent pas l'Occident ou la France pour « ce qu'ils sont », comme le veut la formule de Daniel Pipes. L'idée a été reprise au lendemain des attaques de vendredi par nombre d'éditorialistes de pacotilles, mais aussi par des universitaires respectables, à l'image de Jean-Pierre Filiu. Elle permet aux thuriféraires de la démocratie libérale, du capitalisme compétiteur et de l'auto-satisfaction occidentale de se réfugier dans le confort de l'essentialisme niais. C'est entendu : nous sommes tellement heureux, libres et puissants qu'ils nous envient et nous détestent à la fois, ce qui les conduits à rejouer la partition surannée du choc des civilisations. Le fait de semer régulièrement la mort à coup de bombardement et de frappes de drones imprécises aux quatre coins du monde n'a rien à voir avec cette rancœur.

Au-delà de l'inexistence politique de l'Occident et des exactions de nombreux gouvernements, cette idée nie un autre fait : le cycle infernal du terrorisme et de l'antiterrorisme s'est répandu bien au-delà de la pseudo-confrontation Occident-Orient. Les Nigérians de Boko Haram, qui enlèvent, massacrent et se font exploser, peuvent bien prétendre s'attaquer à l'éducation occidentale, ils n'en répondent pas moins à un ensemble de logique économiques et politiques locales. Ils n'en tuent pas moins d'autres Nigérians dont le mode de vie a beaucoup moins à voir avec le mien, que celui d'un bourgeois de Doha.

Le Monde trouve néanmoins un réconfort indécent en s'imaginant une France ayant le privilège de la haine des djihadistes. Nous -gaulois laïcs- ferions des victimes différentes de la quarantaine de morts dans un quartier chiite au Liban, des deux cents russes en égypte, ou de la centaine de militants de gauche en Turquie. Pourtant, nos « démocraties libérales » ne sont pas le cœur de cible des djihadistes. La généalogie de Da'ech, depuis l'insurrection irakienne jusqu'à la rupture avec Al-Qaïda, démontre que l'extrémisme anti-chiite est au fondement de l'idéologie de l'organisation. Avant cela, le triste bilan des takfiris, du Pakistan à l'Algérie, prouve que ce type de violence a d'abord touché tout ceux qui ont eu le malheur d'être considérés comme des apostats. Combien de fois faudra-t-il répéter que la grande majorité de ces attaques visent des musulmans pour que cesse enfin cette ritournelle de la haine anti-occidentale ?

Nos monstres, notre responsabilité

C'est d'autant plus insupportable que l'Occident que l'on place si haut sur l'échelle des civilisations est dans le même temps censé incarner le genre humain. Et c'est dans le sang que la France retrouve enfin son rang de parangon de l'universalisme sans frontière. À Washington, Barack Obama fait des attaques de vendredi soir un défi à l'humanité dans son ensemble.  À Paris, le président du Parlement Claude Bartolone cite Jefferson et twitte que « tout homme a deux pays : le sien et la France ». Je ne reviendrais pas sur l'ironie qu'il y a à voir le gouvernement français danser ce tango amoureux avec Washington quand on sait la responsabilité écrasante du second dans le chaos qui a engloutit une partie du Moyen-Orient et menace désormais l'Europe. Mais que dire aux Kurdes et aux Tunisiens que l'ont peut apparemment tuer sans heurter l'humanité ? Quelle humanité est-ce donc là, qui s'émeut toujours pour les mêmes ?

On le sait, cet universalisme humaniste se double mécaniquement d'une forme d'exclusion. Il protège aussi de ce que l'on ne veut pas voir chez nous. L'humanité est une invocation bien commode pour oublier que ce sont nos états et leurs complices pakistanais, arabes ou africains qui ont semé la haine qui endeuille aujourd'hui Paris et Beyrouth, hier Nairobi et Bombay. Ces monstres qui entrent dans une salle de concert et abattent des jeunes gens sans défense, ils les ont produits. Nous les avons produits. Ces monstres, qui réalisent leur rêve en se faisant découper en deux par une explosion qu'ils ont déclenché, n'ont pas d'ailes ni de crocs. Ils sont français et belges. Ils sont nés et ont grandi dans notre Occident rêvé. Bien sûr, ils sont coupables individuellement d'un carnage qui révèle la perte de toute forme d'empathie. Pour cela, l'absence d'au-delà après le suicide est une punition définitive. Mais ce sont les états français et belges qui sont responsables d'avoir créé les conditions structurelles de cette transformation.

Quand à nous qui fermons les yeux sur la violence de la ségrégation spatiale et raciale, qui courbons l'échine sous le joug de l'ordolibéralisme froid, qui célébrons la vente d'armes propice à la compétitivité de l'économie nationale, nous avons notre part de responsabilité. L'opposition entre la barbarie qui nous assaille et la civilisation que nous incarnons ne sert qu'à mystifier. C'est un discours qui nie les causes structurelles et cache l'absence de réponse adaptée. 

Gagner la guerre ? Comment ?

Car il est toujours bon de venir plastronner sur les plateaux de télévision, d'étaler son incompétence et son incapacité à produire des idées, le premier ministre Manuel Vals n'a pas manqué de venir se répandre sur TF1. Nous répliquerons « coup pour coup » à « l'armée terroriste jihadiste » de Da'ech, a-t-il déclaré. Devant tant de bellicisme et de coups de menton dans le vide, l'humble citoyen que je suis est confondu.

Cela fait quinze ans que la guerre contre la terreur a débuté, sans autre résultat qu'une interminable fuite en avant. Jacques Chirac, homme politique réactionnaire et malhonnête mais ne manquant pas d'intelligence, avait eu le bon sens de condamner l'agression anglo-américaine en Irak. Plus de dix ans plus tard, les technocrates sur-diplômés usurpant le titre de socialiste n'ont que la guerre et la répression pour répondre au meurtre de 130 de leurs concitoyens. Durant cette décennie, Saddam a été pendu, Al-Zarqaoui éparpillé, Ben Laden fusillé et escamoté. Durant cette décennie, Obama a validé tranquillement des milliers d'exécution extra-judiciaires, sans d'ailleurs qu'on ne remette en cause son humanité. Durant cette décennie, le péril terroriste n'a pas diminué, et s'est au contraire couplé avec la guerre civile syrienne pour pousser des centaines de milliers d'individus à l'exil.

Bien sûr, une fois trouvé un accord sur les bases de la transition politique en Syrie, une action énergique des puissances globales et régionales est en mesure de défaire rapidement Da'esh, en tant que structure étatique territorialisée. Mais cela n'implique nullement la fin des nébuleuses terroristes et des attentats. Il est tout bonnement improbable qu'un monde où cohabitent l'injustice, la tyrannie et la kalachnikov à 2,000 euros se trouve pacifié par la grâce d'une intervention militaire, d'un tapis de bombe et d'une opération de reconstruction permettant l'enrichissement de géants du BTP. Cette formule n'est pas magique, elle est parfaitement stupide.

Quand à la fameuse technique de la citadelle assiégée lançant continuellement des frappes préventives défendue par des génies tels que Benyamin Netanyahou, l'état de psychose dans laquelle est plongé la société israélienne depuis plus de dix ans démontre non seulement son inutilité, mais aussi sa nocivité à long terme.

Fliquer sans protéger

Le gouvernement français peut bien multiplier les perquisitions sans mandat a posteriori, cela ne change rien à un constat frappant : les services de sécurité n'ont pas la capacité d'empêcher les attaques. Ils ne l'auront jamais, à moins d'accepter une orientation complètement totalitaire de la société couplée à un flicage numérique global. Les milliards de conversations qu'ils écoutent déjà, les mails et les adressent IP qu'ils enregistrent, ne leur permettent pas de repérer une clique de petits repris de justice radicalisés en train de coordonner leurs attaques sur Paris via leur Playstation 4. Ils peuvent mettre des flics à tous les coins de rues, cela n'empêchera pas non plus certains de profiter des immanquables failles sécuritaires.

Mais alors, pourquoi les gouvernants ne cessent-ils d'aller vers plus de contrôle, dès lors qu'ils savent bien qu'ils ne seront jamais en mesure de sécuriser les bouts de territoire dont ils ont la charge ? Bien sûr, on peut envisager qu'il s'agisse là d'une tentation autoritaire inhérente à tout organisme de police et de gouvernement. Mais la réponse réside sans doute bien plus dans l'irresponsabilité qui caractérise, selon Arendt, tout type de bureaucratie. Voulant sans cesse échapper aux reproches, services et ministres se couvrent au dépens de notre liberté, sans rien changer au risque terroriste que leur guerre contre la terreur alimente. L'esprit du terrorisme ne peut perdurer sans cet esprit bureaucratique, et l'effroi n'est jamais mieux complété que par la banalité du mal. Aux esprits sains, il reste le deuil et l'impuissance.

Cela devait donc se passer ainsi : deux jours après les attentats qui ont touché la jeunesse parisienne, François Hollande n'a guère plus à proposer qu'une rhétorique guerrière et un renforcement des pouvoirs exceptionnels des autorités. Incapable de prendre ses responsabilités, soumis à la pression des faucons qui crient à l'invasion sarrasine, fidèle à une faiblesse confondante de par sa constance, le Président français offre plus de guerre contre la terreur pour lutter contre « le terrorisme de guerre ». Je ne suis même pas surpris.

J'aurais voulu conclure en écrivant que ces attentats nous donneront une occasion de comprendre la tragédie qui touchent le Moyen-Orient depuis 2003, qu'ils nous permettront de prendre la mesure de ce qui cause la fuite de millions de Syriens, d'Afghans et d'Irakiens, sans parler des autres. J'aurais voulu écrire qu'il y a peut-être en effet une place pour une forme d'humanité après ce qui s'est passé ces dernières semaines. Tout dans l'attitude de nos gouvernants, en France et ailleurs, démontre le contraire.

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