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Understanding Gender Politics in Modern Iran

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By Alex Shams

The 1979 Iranian Revolution dramatically changed how Iranians thought about their lives and country in every single way. Never before in modern history had a popular revolution led to the establishment of an Islamic Republic, and for the most part neither Iranians nor foreigners had any idea what to expect as the self-proclaimed Islamic order came to power.

Nowhere were the dramatic transformations brought by the revolution more pronounced than in the realm of gender relations. The secular Pahlavi regime had represented itself as the harbinger of Western modernity in Iran, while the Islamic Revolution declared its struggle to be the end of Westernization and the formulation of a distinct Islamic modernity. Just as they had been under the Pahlavi regime, Iranian women’s bodies were hyper-visible symbols of the success or failure of the Iranian state’s projects after 1979. Gender relations more broadly remained a critical part of how the state sought to remake Iranian society.

The Pahlavi regime emphatically projected an image of the family and society that neatly mirrored the European bourgeois ideal: a heterosexual nuclear family consisting of a husband in business attire, an unveiled and devoted wife, and two neatly dressed children living in a stand-alone house with an American-made car. This image of gender relations not only structured the family, but also provided a blueprint for society more broadly.

To this end, the Pahlavi regime stressed fashion’s importance for defining Iranian modernity. Women were widely discouraged from wearing hijab, for example, through a mixture of coercive means like its outright ban in the 1930s to more subtle means, such as compulsory school uniforms of short skirts. Men, meanwhile, were expected to wear a tie and trim their facial hair.

Many of these transformations, however, were focused on the aesthetic, and their ramifications were felt primarily in the more secular middle and upper classes. The working and lower-class realities of most Iranians, meanwhile, had little or nothing to do with the Pahlavi image. In the early 1970s, most Iranians lived in rural areas and had between 6 or 7 kids. The isolated nuclear family of Pahlavi lore was for most a myth, as men and women tended to socialize separately and spent most of their time with relatives or neighbors, while the extended family network was an active part of daily life.

The Iranian Revolution sought to subvert and reverse the narrative of the westernized nuclear family propagated by the Pahlavis, and resulted in an entirely new and modern gender politics that appears little like either of the two social models outlined above. Today, most Iranians live in urban areas and the average woman has between one and two children in her lifetime. More than 65% of college students are women and around 2.5 million women attend university today, up from around 25,000 before the revolution. 87% of Iranian women were literate in 2005, compared to 29% in 1976, and by the late 2000s, over 30% of women were wage-earners, according to the International Labor Organization, a dramatic increase over an estimated 12% before the revolution (more information on these figures below).

The state, meanwhile, promotes homosociality in the public sphere, meaning that men and women are encouraged to interact among their own genders, and bands of morality police wander the streets to regulate public displays of heterosexuality. Some form of hijab is compulsory for women in public as well as the covering of arms and legs, while men are for the most part expected to wear shirts and pants (shorts are banned for both genders). As family sizes decreased dramatically in the last two decades due to a highly successful state-run family planning campaign, the importance of the extended family in daily life has lessened and, ironically, Iranian family sizes are increasingly approximating the Pahlavi nuclear ideal.

The gender politics of the Islamic Republic, in short, look nothing like those of the Pahlavi regime, and they look nothing like what most outside observers or Iranians would have predicted back in 1979.

How did all this happen? How much of this transformation was the result of state policy and planning, and how much of the transformation occurred by chance or through the concerted actions of individuals and civil society?

Below is a list of key books to help answer those questions, tackling the issue of gender politics in the Islamic Republic from a variety of angles that get at the questions of gender, sex, and sexuality so central to understanding modern Iran. For a broad overview of the topics and themes covered in the books below, read my earlier article, Misreading Feminism & Women’s Rights in Tehran: Beyond Chadors, Ninjabis, & Secular Fantasies.

Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran, Ziba Mir-Hosseini

Islam and Gender emerges as an insider exploration of the debates surrounding Islamic and Islamist feminisms as they are understood in contemporary Iran. An Iranian-born legal anthropologist and the director of the groundbreaking film,Divorce, Iranian Style, Mir-Hosseini takes us through a series of thought-provoking interviews with clerics and activists across Iran as they outline their conceptions of gender in the Islamic Republic, focusing strongly on religious interpretation and theory.

Mir-Hosseini argues that certain aspects of secular feminist writings and works of religious clergy have begun to converge since the Iranian revolution, as the emergence of an Islamic Republic has opened up space for different kinds of debates about the meaning of gender and feminism in an Islamic society. This has happened primarily as a result of the displacement of secular feminism from its hegemonic position with feminist discourse.

Islamist and Islamic feminists have formulated responses to secular feminist arguments from within a religious idiom that carries weight in many sectors of Iranian society. On the other hand, secular feminists have refined and indigenized feminist theories in response as they have been forced to reckon with newly hegemonic Islamist feminisms. As a result, the 1979 revolution forced both sides to engage with the other in order to formulate meaningful positions within a public sphere defined by Islam.

Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Politics of Patriarchy in Iran, Minoo Moallem

Minoo Moallem’s book is an in-depth investigation of the gender and sexuality politics of the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War. She argues that prior to the revolution, Westernization did not challenge patriarchy but merely modernized it; this process generally left patriarchal control over women’s bodies in families intact while subjecting women to an ideal of secular patriarchy in the public sphere. The hijab ban of the 1930s, when headscarves were ripped off women’s heads in public and thousands emigrated, is a clear example of this.

While laws were introduced guaranteeing various rights for women in the 1960s and 1970s, these were for the most part rarely applied outside of the middle and upper classes. As a result, most women did not experience these changes, restricted as they were to the private sphere. After 1979, however, this all changed.

Revolution created the conditions of Iranian women’s entrance into the public sphere under the model of oppositional Islamic femininity. Because of the popular nature of the revolution and the Islamic nature of the State that followed, traditional cultural and social barriers to women’s participation were rapidly dismantled and their presence became both legitimate and normal. The interpretations of Islam championed by the revolution gave religious legitimization to women’s active involvement in politics, education, work, and the public sphere more broadly. As a result, traditional patriarchal opposition to women’s involvement in public life, previously expressed through an Islamic idiom in opposition to the secular government, became more difficult to justify following the revolution. In other words, if Imam Khomeini says that young women have a divine right to go to university, who are her parents to forbid it?

Families, meanwhile, could not quite oppose these activities, given their religious sanction. But this entrance, of course, destabilized the clear-cut lines of who participates and for what purpose, and women’s active participation in the revolution and the Iran-Iraq War led to a wider transformation of their roles in society.

Veiled Employment: Islamism and the Political Economy of Women’s Employment in Iran, edited by Roksana Bahramitash and Hadi Salehi Esfahani

Veiled Employment examines the gendered effects of economic development in Iran since 1979. The book works from within an analytical framework that does not merely focus on Islamism as a political ideology but instead examines structural economic shifts more broadly.

One of the book’s most fascinating contributions is breaking down the stereotype that the percentage of Iranian women employed before the revolution was higher than it was after the revolution. One contributor points out that pre-revolution figures counted child carpet-weavers in statistics, for example, and so early declines in female labor rates after the revolution actually reflected to some extent increased availability of schooling for Iranian girls.

The authors assert that in fact statistically few women who stayed in Iran experienced a foreclosure of economic opportunity as a direct result of the revolution, but instead experienced increasing opportunities for education amidst a widespread, general economic crisis followed by stagnation that affected all. The war period of 1980-88, however, led to a major increase in the rate of volunteerism among women, encouraging many women who had never previously worked to contribute to the national cause and creating new norms of women’s involvement in society that persisted even after the war had ended.

The book makes clear that even while employment can be important and meaningful for many women, high labor force participation of women does not necessarily reflect a romanticized notion of women’s equality, as often this work can be exploitative or a result of economic necessity and is thus not experienced as emancipatory. Additionally, meaningful changes come from social transformations, like high rates of volunteerism, that don’t show up in labor statistics.

Women, Power and Politics in 21st Century Iran, Edited by Tara Povey and Elaheh Rostami-Povey

This book is a collection of articles by prominent Iranian academics and activists delving into issues of women’s participation in the Iranian public sphere. Among the contributors are Massoumeh Ebtekar, Iran’s first female vice-president, and Jamileh Kadivar, a former member of Parliament.

As Editor Tara Povey argues early on, women’s active involvement in the public sphere during and following the Revolution led to a process of rethinking and critique as the limits of the new found freedoms became increasingly clear. By the late 1980s, young religious women initially empowered by the Revolution were beginning to see the patriarchal and autocratic tendencies of the new system and began struggling to reform the system they had helped bring about. Once secular feminism was no longer hegemonic and Islamism was no longer oppositional, Islamic feminists were able to re-evaluate each.

The book’s articles go on to outline women’s roles in various fields in Iranian public life, including their work in journalism, education, Parliament, the judiciary, and the executive branch. Many of the articles presented are insider accounts, written by women active in the fields they discuss.

Rethinking Global Sisterhood: Western Feminism and Iran, by Nima Naghibi

Naghibi’s book focuses on the largely-neglected study of Western women’s involvement in Iran in the 19th and 20th centuries. She begins by examining turn of the century discussions of the “abject” state of Iranian women and the need for Western colonialism to “save brown women from brown men” (to use Gayatri Spivak’s astute expression), exploring how feminist concerns were used to justify foreign intervention in Persia. She then moves onto the hijab ban, exploring how Iranian women had to accept the unenviable position of “acquiescing to the rhetoric of emancipation, or of being cast as an archaic figure responsible for retarding the modernizing impulses of the nation.” As she argues, patriarchal nationalist discourse and secular feminist discourses merged in their desires to control women’s identities.

Naghibi goes on to explore Pahlavi state feminism in the second half of the 20th century, looking at how state-funded feminist organizations applauded the government’s economic policies even as they had disastrous implications for poor women. At the same time, these groups petitioned for increased legal rights whose effects were largely limited to the urban middle and upper classes. As a result, feminism became increasingly identified by large swathes of the Iranian population as a bourgeois social project that prioritized legal change while ignoring the socioeconomic realities of most women.

Finally, Naghibi discusses the involvement of Western feminists in supporting feminist movements in Iran during the 1979 revolution, explaining how in many cases these efforts backfired terribly for Iranian women. As she argues, “the predicament of anti-imperialist feminists in 1979 arose out of the historical associations of feminism with ‘Westernization’ as exemplified by the state-controlled Women’s Organization of Iran,  as well as the association of the Pahlavi regime with Westernization.”

Women with Moustaches Men without Beards, by Afsaneh Najmabadi

Afsaneh Najmabadi’s book offers an analysis of sex and sexuality politics in Iran of the late 19th and early 20th centuries which demonstrates how notions of sexuality (and gender identity more broadly) transformed dramatically amidst the increasing influence of European powers in Iran. This book is the only text on this list that does not actually engage with the post-1979 period, but it’s an extremely important book because it reminds us that the assumption of heterosexuality and nuclear family structures as the norm, the way we understand them today, is an extraordinarily modern phenomenon.

Najmabadi investigates how ideals of beauty transformed during this period, as young men – previously idealized in art and literature – were increasingly sidelined in favor of women, according to contemporary European norms which insisted upon strict rules of same generational heterosexuality. Importantly, she also examines the consequences that interactions with Europeans had on Persian society more broadly. While traditionally men and women had tended to occupy separate spheres (a phenomenon known as homosociality), in European society this social arrangement – and the widespread permissibility of homosexual desire that accompanied it – was condemned as backwards and immoral.

Her book thus creates an extremely important backdrop for understanding how and why the modernizing Pahlavi regime insisted upon the heterosexual nuclear family as the only proper arrangement. Additionally, the text helps us understand the Islamic Republic’s insistence upon homosociality in the public sphere and its condemnation of public displays of heterosexuality in a historical context.

Reconstructed Lives: Women and Iran’s Islamic Revolution, by Haleh Esfandiari

Esfandiari’s book describes the lives of a number of women who were educated professionals before the revolution. She focuses on the impact the political changes had on their lives. She analyzes the very negative repercussions the revolution and the following period had on their lives and some of the positives, as recalled in interviews. She then proceeds to discuss how these women have “reconstructed” their lives since this period, and how they changed and in some ways improved their lives under the new regime.

The book is useful for understanding how one of the classes of people most targeted negatively by the revolution – secular upper and middle class women – understood these changes. Interviewing women who remained in Iran after the revolution as well as those who left, Esfandiari successfully chronicles the experiences of women who managed to advance and create professional lives under the Pahlavi regime.

Voices from Iran: the Changing Lives of Iranian Women, by Mahnaz Kousha

This book follows the experiences of 15 women from various walks of life in the 1990s, focusing on their relationships with mothers, fathers, as well as husband and children, where applicable. Interestingly, even as Kousha’s work reveals the speed with which cultural norms shifted (even within families between the older and younger children), her interviews reveal that these shifts occurred extremely unevenly.

The book is rare for works on Iranian women as it is narrated in such a way that it is not always clear what the political context was for the transformations discussed, and instead women’s lives appear as narratives apart from chronological political history. The book thus offers an in depth analysis of familial relationships and how women’s domestic lives changed dramatically as the state’s conception of social relationships more broadly changed.

Islam, Gender, and Development: Rural-Urban Migration of Women in Iran, by Masoumeh Velayati

This book focuses on experiences of poor, rural migrant women in Tabriz. Because of the economic dynamics of internal migration, female migrants tend to be more-often employed than the general population. Because of a tendency towards circular migration patterns, these women also transmit urban values into the rural areas they originally come from and encourage shifts in norms and values among women in their villages.

Velayati suggests that the enforcement of hijab and gender segregation by universities and the police has brought the public sphere more closely in line with the values of migrants, so that second-generation migrant women as well as rural women who commute from villages are increasingly facing less stiff challenges to their educational aspirations. One rural migrant to Tabriz explained she was “ashamed” when her male and female children taunted her for sending them to carpet weaving instead of school, and that she feels she didn’t do her “motherly obligation” because she cut their education short due to financial needs.

These kinds of intimate anecdotes offer a refreshingly original, and yet oft forgotten look into the lives of Iranian rural migrant women, which constituted a huge segment of the Iranian population due to the mass urbanization of the last three decades.

The books above are by no means an exhaustive study of modern gender politics in Iran. They do, however, offer a sense of how varied and diverse gendered experiences have been in the country both before and after the 1979 revolution.

There is a tendency to reduce women’s experiences, in particular, of the last 35 years to their relationship to the Iranian government and its laws. This tendency, however, flattens women’s experiences, obscuring the complex lived realities that Iranians experience on a daily basis. The nine books presented above counter these simplistic, reductionist narratives of the oppressed Iranian woman and instead base their stories in the complex lived realities of Iranian women over the last few decades.

In order to understand gender politics in modern Iran, it is crucial to pay attention to positionality and to recognize that Iranians’ experiences have been structured not only by their gender, but also by their class, religiosity, ethnic background, and a multitude of other factors. As the books make clear, religion, religiosity, and spirituality have had wildly varying effects on the lives and experiences of Iranians.

These books show that there is no single Iranian experience, and enrich our understandings of gender in Iran. "Understanding Gender Politics in Modern Iran" was originally published on Ajam Media Collective as part of the Ajam Reads series.

Ajam Reads is a series presented by Ajam Media Collective that offers the reader essential reading and book summaries on topics of interest. This article, introducing nine important books for understanding gender politics in modern Iran, is the first in that series.


New Texts Out Now: Claire Beaugrand, Amélie Le Renard, Roman Stadnicki, Villes et dynamiques urbaines en péninsule Arabique / Cities and Urban Dynamics in the Arabian Peninsula

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Claire Beaugrand, Amélie Le Renard, and Roman Stadnicki (eds.), "Villes et dynamiques urbaines en péninsule Arabique / Cities and Urban Dynamics in the Arabian Peninsula." Special issue of Arabian Humanities 2 (2013).

Jadaliyya (J): Can you first tell us about Arabian Humanities, and why you chose to publish this collection of essays in this particular journal?

Claire Beaugrand, Amélie Le Renard, and Roman Stadnicki (CB, ALR, and RS):Arabian Humanities is a newly launched, peer-reviewed online magazine covering academic research on the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, in all disciplines of social sciences ranging from archaeology to contemporary studies. It builds on the legacy of the Yemeni Chronicles, the journal of the French Center for Archaeology and Social Sciences in Sanaa (CEFAS), but seeks to widen its readership to an intrnational audience. Published in English, French, and Arabic, it releases two thematic issues per year and is in open access.

The launching of Arabian Humanities created a new publishing dynamic by adding a France-based publication dedicated to this fast-changing region to the existing publishing landscape. We wanted to both take part in this momentum and to support it.

(J): Why did you decide to put this special thematic issue together? How did you select the contributing authors?

(CB, ALR, and RS): This issue resulted from an intellectually fruitful encounter between the three of us at a crucial moment in our research, with each of us coming from a different academic background (geography, sociology, and political science) in France and the United Kingdom. Roman Stadnicki was coming from the field of urban studies with in-depth experience on Yemen. Amélie Le Renard worked on the transformation of gender, class, and nationality hierarchies in Riyadh through women's access to public spaces. Claire Beaugrand looked at political dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in Kuwait through the lens of the bidun [stateless persons]. Noticing that no special issue on cities had been published in a while, we decided to share our perspectives in order to open bridges between different academia and disciplines, and edit an issue about cities through a multi-faceted angle.

The authors’ selection was rigorous.  We first launched a call for papers and selected the most promising abstracts based on their original contribution and anchorage in the field. In addition to the three editors, two external reviewers also assessed the quality of the final papers.  “Boom Cities”, a conference that the editors organized in December 2012 along with NYU-Abu Dhabi's Pascal Ménoret, was crucial to the selection process.  Some of the contributors to the special issue of Arabian Humanities presented their draft papers at the conference, sharing their findings with other scholars in the field as well as getting feedback from the audience. Another collection of articles, drawn from presentations at the conference, will be published in a forthcoming special issue of City, edited by Pascal Ménoret, in 2014.

(J): What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the issue address?

(CB, ALR, and RS): The issue, titled "Cities and Urban Dynamics in the Arabian Peninsula" aims at comprehensively approaching urban dynamics and shows the diversity and complexity of these phenomena. It distances itself from binary conceptions such as modernity versus tradition, or rich nationals versus poor immigrants, in order to concentrate on processes. Three processes emerge prominently. First, the demiurgic notion of a boundless urban sprawl in an uninhabited desert environment does not hold true in the region. On the contrary, cities in the Arabian Peninsula are affected by global slowdowns, economic changes, and relocations. As a result, over the past half-century or so, one sees the hierarchy between cities in this region fluctuating and evolving, with past prominent cities declining and new regional centers developing rapidly. Moving beyond the booming Gulf cities of international standing so often in the academic spotlight, the issue also calls attention to the so‐called “declining” cities like Unayza in the heartland of Saudi Arabia (al-Qasim), and emerging mid‐sized cities like Salalah in Oman and Ras al-Khayma in the United Arab Emirates. Second, urban policies have also shifted away from mega-projects toward environment-, heritage-, and culture-driven projects, albeit without drastically changing the ways in which regimes in the peninsula differentiate treat their inhabitants based on class and nationality. Finally, the different categories of city dwellers all contribute to shaping these cities in ways that elude urban policies through their complex belongings, experiences, and social relations.

(J): How do the contributions to this special issue connect to and/or depart from the existing literature on Gulf and Arabian cities? 

(CB, ALR, and RS): The special issue builds on the fast-growing and fascinating field of urban studies on the Arabian Peninsula more than it departs from it. It is indebted to the field’s pioneers – whether in the discipline of history—namely Nelida Fuccaro and Ulrike Freitag, and contemporary studies, or those who have used innovative methodologies focusing on the puzzling case of Dubai, like Yasser Elsheshtawy[1] (who mixed architecture with social sciences), and Ahmed Kanna. It also owes a great deal to the recent anthropological works that have contributed to highlighting social hierarchies and differentiated appropriations of fragmented spaces.  It thus clearly connects to the works of Andrew Gardner on Manama and Doha and Neha Vora and Pardis Mahdavi on Dubai, to mention only a few.

While most of the literature tends to focus on a single case study, our special issue brings together a plurality of contexts, and confronts conclusions reached in the cases of capital cities with the lesser-known situation in the periphery. This confrontation of several case studies on scarcely studied cities gives a unique regional perspective.

(J): Who do you hope will read this issue, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

(CB, ALR, and RS): We are aiming at two kinds of impact. First, within the field of Middle Eastern studies, the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula are only recently emerging as places of interest, so we wanted to fully integrate this region to the broader, better-researched areas. We found that the dynamic at work in this cash-rich part of the world has a lot to offer in renewing the studies of cities in the Middle East, particularly as their urban models, but also their short-term or long-term inhabitants, circulate in the region. Moreover, the widely mixed population of the cities and the way this demographic variety is conceived, regulated, and experienced seems of particular interest to a wide audience interested in global cities.

Second, we hope that open access to all articles will help reach a broader academic and professional audience interested in cities in the Arabian Peninsula. It is a great opportunity for us to feature it on Jadaliyya, as the portal hosting Arabian Humanities,revues.org, is mostly known in French-speaking academic contexts. We hope that translating the introduction in both languages and mixing articles in English and French will allow for greater accessibility so that readers can form their own idea about the issue. 

(J): How do you see this book contributing to the field of urban studies in the Arab world and beyond?

(CB, ALR, and RS): Until recently, scholars have often studied cities of the Arabian Peninsula as exceptional cases in the Arab and wider world. They have emphasized their eccentricity and, in polemic fashion, they have  demonized and doomed them to failure. In reality, many of the phenomena at work in the region—whether land speculation, increasing inequality within and between cities, social marginalization, and urban fragmentation—are rather comparable to what is happening in other global cities, cities that, by virtue of international competition and mimicry, they end up resembling. Our intention was to reinsert the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf in particular into the wider field of urban studies and to stop falling into the trap of too idiosyncratic an analysis that was partially constructed by national governments for marketing purposes. However big the hype, the uniqueness of Gulf cities needs to be qualified.

(J): The articles are either in French or in English, and the authors stem from various nationalities. Do you see different “national” schools of thinking and studying Gulf and Arab cities, and if so, how do they complement each other?

(CB, ALR, and RS): Though growing, the field of urban studies in the Arabian Peninsula is not yet big enough to talk about clearly defined emerging “schools of thought.” Yet, what interested us was to pool together various resources, ranging from the heirs of Paul Bonnefant’s work in French academia to the well-established German scholarship led by Fred Scholz, to a new generation of promising researchers working not only in European and North American universities but also in the region itself. The latter are united in their ability and will to experience these cities' transformations and to stay very close to their subjects of study. 

(J): What other projects are you working on now?

ALR: I have begun new research on multinational professional worlds in Riyadh, Dubai, and Abu Dhabi, and I am mainly interested in hierarchies of gender, class, and nationality in private firms there, interviewing lots of expatriates self-defined as "Westerners." I have an article that will be published in French on competing masculinities in a multinational firm in Riyadh. At the same time, I am currently finishing work on my monograph (Femmes et espaces publics en Arabie Saoudite, Paris, Dalloz, 2011) in English, focused on gender and urban transformations in Riyadh and entitled, A Society of Young Women: Opportunities of Place, Power, and Reform in Saudi Arabia (Stanford University Press, forthcoming).

CB: I am in the process of publishing my research on the bidun in Kuwait titled, Stateless in the Gulf: Migration, Nationality, and Society in Kuwait (I. B. Tauris, forthcoming). This initial work is substantially complemented with a reflection on new “acts of citizenship,” understood as a mode of belonging to alternative forms of making politics that transcend top-down political rights, acts that contributed to redefining relations between nationals and stateless in the aftermath of the 2011 political turmoil in Kuwait. Theses findings will be published in an article in the Middle East Law and Governance journal. Finally I am embarking on new research, very much in its infancy, looking at the role of Gulf investments and policies in the perpetuation of the political landscape in Palestine.

RS: Being based in Cairo, I now look at the overhaul of urban policy encompassing bottom-up proposals in urban planning that emanate from civil society organizations, in the context of revolutionary Egypt. I am also editing two journals’ special issues on urban studies: one with Built Environment, co-edited with Leïla Vignal and Pierre-Arnaud Barthel, entitled “Arab Cities after the ‘Spring’.” The second, in Egypte-Monde Arabe, is dedicated to “Urbanism and Revolution in Egypt: Decision-Makers, Urban Planners, and City-Dwellers after January 25th.”

Excerpts from Cities and Urban Dynamics in the Arabian Peninsula

From “Beyond the Skyline: Cities in Transformation in the Arabian Peninsula,” by Claire Beaugrand, Amélie Le Renard, and Roman Stadnicki.

Slowdowns, decline, loss of status and reclassification are thus also part of urban dynamics in the Peninsula which are too often seen only through the only prism of "growth." Sebastian Maisel’s contribution highlights the case of a medium sized town in Central Arabia, ‛Unayza, which is struggling for survival in this era of global cities. Despite the plethora of state services, the city exhibits a profound urban monotony and looks to its past to maintain its identity; the case of ‛Unayza is certainly not an isolated one: the same conclusions could apply to other cities of the Saudi Interior marginalised by new trade routes, such as Abhā or other cities in Oman, like Nizwā or Jahrā in Kuwait. Maisel points out that “although the population has grown, the city [of ‛Unayza] has remained on the sidelines of economic growth and failed to become a strategic location in the country’s development.” Thus, what seemed to be unbridled urban growth instead follows different trajectories

[. . .]

The limits of urban development go beyond hierarchies and the shifting relationships between cities. They also appear in the details of the neighbourhoods, the urban fabric and in the daytoday experience of their inhabitants. Thus, in ‛Unayza, just as in Bahrain and Kuwait, inhabitants complain about the delay in accessing statesubsidised housing. Sebastian Maisel notes that according to the Saudi “National Housing Strategy Plan,” the central region of Qāsim would require 50,000 housing units. This is in line with the work of ‛Umar al-Shihābī in his analysis of the social tensions between nationals and nonnationals seen through the specific prism of the development of housing projects intended for foreigners who, in addition to having access to real estate, obtain longterm resident permits.[2] Aside from housing capacity, the infrastructure and services of cities are being put to the test by demographic pressure, such as the water supply to Riyadh, the electricity supply in Kuwait and issues of traffic jams in Medina. In Bahrain, where population density is amongst the highest in the world, with urban settlement concentrated on the north coast even though it requires land reclamation, awareness of limited resources, such as the lack of public access to the seafront, contributes to political tension centred on issues of redistribution.[3] Indeed, in the fastgrowing suburbs of sprawling conurbations, some neighbourhoods give the impression of relative or even deliberate neglect: the areas of buyūt sha‘biyya (popular housing) housing the bidūns ("paperless") in Jahrâ in Kuwait, or the Shiite "villages" in northeastern Bahrain, which, in spite of the name, form part of the continuous urban fabric, are thus also prey to urban degradation. It is in these marginalized zones that the bidūns rose up in February 2011 and continue to do so. It is also in such areas that, in Bahrain, the youth, claiming an affiliation to the "villages" where they are from (shabāb Bilād al-Qadīm, taḥāluf shabāb Sitra, Ḥarakat shabāb Sanābīs—“the Youth of Bilād al-Qadīm,” “the Alliance of the Youth of Sitra,” “Youth Movement of Sanābīs”), have been clashing with police forces almost daily since the clearing of the Pearl Roundabout in the city center pushed the protest movement into the "suburbs."

[. . .]

Three main strategies emerged from the urban policies currently advocated in the region: the development of an environmental approach to urbanism (Masdar City in Abu Dhabi) as Gulf cities are often singled out because of their high energy consumption; the invention of an urban heritage based on a reconstruction, often ex nihilo, of parts of the ‘traditional’ Arab-Islamic city (creation of the "Heritage Villages" in Doha, Dubai etc.); and finally, the multiplication of urban projects with significant cultural emphasis, like the “Saadiyat island museum” project in Abu Dhabi. Elizabeth Harrington shows that the search for growth opportunities through sophisticated activities has guided the Emir of Abu Dhabi towards choosing culture. But more than a simple architectural challenge, the author reveals that the government is looking to create swiftly a new urban identity, as well as a reputation aimed at foreigners, based on a cosmopolitan outlook and access to international culture.

[. . .]

Governments thus demonstrate the need to fashion a new urban model for the region. Nonetheless, this change of direction in urbanism in no way hinders the mechanisms of social and spatial division that are at work in the towns of the Arabian Peninsula, contrary to what would suggest the urban marketing developed by the municipalities and chambers of commerce and industry, in charge of the international promotion of each city at the local level. In other words, although new urban concepts are appearing, the ways in which urban spaces are treated seem unchanged. Thus, the regeneration of the center of Doha, Nadine Scharfenort tells us, is happening through the expropriation and relocation without compensation of its nonnational inhabitants who had been living in this cosmopolitan neighbourhood for two generations. Similarly, Elizabeth Harrington explains that apart from the principle of select access to the island of Sa‛diyāt excluding lower social classes, its development introduces another principle of segregation between various categories of visitors whose paths are not meant to cross. Steffen Wippel shows that the realisation of the first stages of the new development plan for Ṣalālah (new neighbourhoods and extensive transport infrastructure) contributed to the fragmentation of the second town of the Sultanate of Oman. It created new sociospatial differentiations at the heart of a territory, characterised by its relative homogeneity in the Dhofar regional setting and by the fact that the city has not been at the centre of modernisation policies.

[. . .]

Going beyond centralised approaches to urban policies, some studies show how the different categories of inhabitants contribute to shaping these cities, through their lifestyles, their experiences and their social relations. Whether through anthropology, sociology or geography, these studies demolish the idea that the Peninsula cities are mirages or tricks. Several important pointers emerge from these studies.

Firstly, the ideology of transience does not prevent the emergence of forms of belonging. Although the Gulf States are founded on the exclusion of the majority of immigrants, to ignore all the forms of attachment and anchoring that have emerged over the decades would be to reproduce and reinforce their discourse. In this regard, the work of Neha Vora, devoted to the Indian diaspora in Dubai,[3] opens some interesting avenues by describing types of "urban citizenship" (consumerist, or in terms of belonging to a diaspora group, amongst others) despite the impossibility of obtaining citizenship. Laure Assaf’s analysis, in her article on the corniche of Abu Dhabi, would seem to concur. She describes families of Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian origin who, by picnicking on the corniche, recreate their own intimate space within the public space, thereby appropriating it. In this way, these families, whose presence in the Emirates often dates back twenty or thirty years, demonstrate their belonging both to the city—to an urban community much larger than that of the nationals—and to a particular group of its inhabitants, the ahl al-Shām (people from Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories). The article also addresses the stimulating but littlestudied question of the memory of places that are in a state of constant transformation. The article by Amin Moghadam looks at another dimension in terms of living in these cities, by describing the transnational spaces through which the "Iranians of Dubai" reinvent an imaginary Iran. The history of migrations and exchanges between the two shores of the Gulf predates by far the beginning of the petrol boom, contrary to a widespread idea that the "cosmopolitanism" of these towns is something recent.

Secondly, urban society in the Gulf and in some cities of the Arabian Peninsula cannot be described simply in terms of conflicts between ultra-rich nationals and extremely poor immigrants, contrary to the caricature. The articles in this issue explore in detail some of the models of interaction between class and nationality based on the use of different types of space. On the one hand, within each national group there are diverse and complex situations, as Andrew Gardner has shown in the case of the Indian community in Bahrain, which is divided between the proletariat and entrepreneurs.[5] Thus the status of "Iranian from Dubai" can apply equally to someone who is a national of one of the Emirates or who has European or American nationality, as to someone who has arrived directly from Iran (Amin Moghadam). Recent studies have highlighted the emergence of middle classes composed of nonnational residents,[6] on the one hand, and shown that class relationships also structure the urban society of the "nationals"[7], be they passport holders or stateless, on the other hand.[8] The people who enjoy privileged access to urban space, such as being able to drive around or enter leisure areas, are not only "nationals" but also the "Western" expatriates (Laure Assaf). Studying urban spaces through the uses that shape them makes it possible to determine the way in which large projects are recomposing hierarchies. Thus, whilst being part of urban transformations in terms of privatisation and security, the shopping malls of Riyadh are some of the few spaces accessible to women in the city, all the while continuing to accentuate consumerist norms and contributing to the reinforcement of class hierarchy.[9] The corniche of Abu Dhabi, a public space frequented by very varied categories of inhabitants, is marked by the contrast between its two ends, the Mīnā (port) where labourers from the Indian subcontinent live, and the Marina, with its luxury hotels and shopping malls. These groups cross each others’ ways, but do not develop the same activities and do not socialise together; the poorest are, implicitly or explicitly, excluded from certain spaces: migrant workers, for example are forbidden to enter public beaches in Abu Dhabi (Laure Assaf).

NOTES

[1] See, for instance and among others, Yasser Elsheshatwy, Dubai: Behind an Urban Spectacle (London: Routledge, 2010).

[2] Al-Shihābī, Iqtilā‘ al-Juzūr: al-Mashārī‘ al-‘Aqāriyyah wa Tafāqum al-Khallal al-Sakānī fī Majlis al-Ta‘āwun li-Duwal al-Khalīj al-‘Arabiyyah [Pulling Up the Roots: Real Estate Projects and Understanding the Population Anomaly in the GCC] (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyyah, 2012).

[3] John Burt, "The Environmental Costs of Coastal Urbanization in the Gulf," paper presented at the Boom Cities Conference, New York University Abu Dhabi, December 2012; Fuad Al Ansar, Public Open Space on the Transforming Urban Waterfronts of Bahrain: The Case of Manama City, (PhD Thesis: Newcastle University, 2008).

[4] Neha Vora, Impossible Citizens: Dubai's Indian Diaspora, Durham (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013).

[5] Andrew Gadner, City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain, (Ithaca: Cornell/ILR Press, 2010).

[6] Hélène Thiollet, « Nationalisme d'État et nationalisme ordinaire en Arabie Saoudite: la nation saoudienne et ses immigrés», Raisons politiques 37 (2010), 89-101; Neha  Vora, Impossible Citizens: Dubai's Indian Diaspora (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013); Brigitte  Dumortier (ed.), «Changement démographique et changement social dans les États du golfe Arabo-persique», special issue of Espaces, populations, sociétés2 (2012).

[7] Pascal Ménoret, Racailles et dévots: la politisation de la jeunesse saoudienne 1965-2007, (PhD Thesis in History: Université Paris 1 Pathéon-Sorbonne, 2008); Pascal Ménoret, Joyriding in Riyadh: Oil, Urbanism, and Road Revolt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Amélie Le Renard, Femmes et espaces publics en Arabie Saoudite (Paris: Dalloz, 2011); Amélie Le Renard, A Society of Young Women: Opportunities of Place, Power and Reform in Saudi Arabia (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014).

[8] Claire Beaugrand., Statelessness and Transnationalism in Northern Arabia: Biduns and State Building in Kuwait, 1959-2009 (PhD Thesis: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011); Claire  Beaugrand, Stateless in the Gulf: Migration, Nationality and Society in Kuwait (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014).

[9] Amélie Le Renard, Femmes et espaces publics en Arabie Saoudite, (Paris: Dalloz, 2011).

New Texts Out Now: Jacobin Magazine, Special Section on the Gulf Cooperation Council

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Special Section on the Gulf Cooperation Council (edited by Max Ajl), Jacobin 13 (January 2014).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you put together this special section on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)?

Jacobin (JAC): Over the past several years, it has become impossible to ignore the role of the Gulf Cooperation Council in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. References to petrodollars, petro-power, and Gulf-peddled sectarianism are constant, yet somehow simultaneously elusive. It is increasingly common knowledge that the GCC and the United States work in lockstep, but the mechanisms for that cooperation can be unclear, and that lack of clarity can be extremely damaging. So one rationale for this section was to address that lacuna in the wider left literature on the region, particularly as the weight of the GCC in global capitalism becomes heavier and heavier.

Paralleling that gap in knowledge of how power operates is a gap in knowledge about ongoing labor and political struggles within the GCC. Of course, strikes by oil workers and others have been constant since the inception of the oil era, pace the claims of rentier state theory. Indeed, explicitly revolutionary struggle has been immensely strong in the peripheral regions of the Gulf. An exclusive emphasis on an excessively amorphous Gulf power masks both the details of that power, on the one hand, and the depth and history of resistance to it on the other.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the issue address?

JAC:
The issue addresses two main topics. Omar alShehabi’s article is on Bahrain: how sectarianism has weakened social revolt, both there and regionally. He shows how this happened through the fascinating life story of a political activist named Ibrahim Sharif. Sharif used to be linked to the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), and went on to play a leading role in the protests that began in 2011. Through Sharif’s story, alShehabi explains how the Bahraini regime has been able to turn sectarian affiliation into corrosive sectarianism, keeping people fragmented, and thus unable to present a common front against the major center of power: the Bahraini state. Though Bahrain is one of the lesser-discussed of the larger revolts of the “Arab Spring,” what has happened there shows how breaking through sectarian divisions is crucial to any regional social transformation. Through his very detailed account, alShehabi highlights the salience of the sectarian divide and how it has erupted in the region, cleaving through the regional social fabric. The piece also implicitly addresses the rise and fall of Arab nationalism and Arab leftism as the banners of regional anti-systemic movements, by showing how sect has frequently replaced nation or class as a point of unity.

Adam Hanieh’s article focuses on the GCC’s development into a major center of capital accumulation. He also shows how its capital circuits have increasingly enveloped corporations and states in the wider region, with massive foreign direct investment in Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and elsewhere. What that means is that challenges to domestic economic power within any regional state are also challenges to the Gulf circuits, which extend to those domestic political economies. For that reason, there has been extensive Gulf involvement in regional repression. For example, the GCC states have been central to ensuring that an elite transition contained the Egyptian revolt and maintained the basic structures of ownership and accumulation intact.

Hanieh’s article also touches on the incredibly important and long-standing issue of migrant workers and the creation of the regional labor pool. Of course, this is not new. Egyptian and Palestinian migration to the Gulf have been longstanding, and indeed contributed to the Palestinian capital accumulation which supported the national project at certain points. But the movement of laborers within the region has become increasingly intense lately, given increased labor needs within the GCC states and also elsewhere. Hanieh also shows how regional downturns in overall economic activity affect those flows. For example, he discusses how the class power condensed within the GCC resolves social contradictions on the back of an increasingly international pool of expendable migrant labor, running from Yemen to South Asia. In that way, he makes transparent the immanent ways in which labor unrest immediately becomes a transnational phenomenon, both within the region as well as in a belt running from North Africa all the way to the Filipino archipelago.

Another crucial issue is how the Gulf states have melded seamlessly into US capital circuits. This occurs through petrodollar recycling and arms sales. This phenomenon is also visible on the political plane, where shared interests dictate conjoint policies. In that way, he makes visible the manner in which the United States has offloaded its regional foreign policy onto the Gulf states, which have happily taken it up. Through this regional framework, he shows how simply using the nation-state as the unit of analysis eliminates the possibility of understanding contemporary regional political economy.

Both articles also bring into sharp relief the importance of the state, its role as the guarantor of the regional order, and its centrality to organizing both regional oppression and accumulation in the region. For that reason, struggles like the one in Bahrain acquire incredible importance, and so face enormous repression. And that repression assumes regional form at rapid velocity, as shown by the Saudi buttress to the Bahraini regime’s 2011 crackdown.

J: How does this work connect to and/or depart from the previous work of the editors and contributors?

JAC:
Jacobin’s previous publications on the region have been overwhelmingly focused on Palestine and the Special Relationship. With this issue, we are starting a process of broadening our scope to offer our readers a regional perspective. Speaking generally, we have been trying to publish work on the MENA region that uses a political economy approach or is otherwise radical in its critique of law, or its treatment of leftist currents in the region. Although there has been a massive turn towards political economy, and especially materialist analyses of the region, amongst newly-minted doctoral students, much of that work is only slowly starting to percolate to area specialists, and has yet to make its way to a general readership. One index of this is that since the so-called “Arab Spring,” there have been only a small handful of stand-alone books that use a materialist approach to analyze the region, and Hanieh has written one of them! So this is a small effort, and also a down payment on what we plan to run in the future—that is, a more structural perspective on regional developments and regional struggles.

J: Who do you hope will read this issue, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

JAC: We hope that these essays will benefit specialists concerned with Gulf issues, as well as the MENA region more broadly, along with activists as well as general-interest readers. We agree with Hanieh’s call for more, and more targeted, solidarity. We feel that often, with the exception of Palestine-related politics, solidarity can become gestural, lacking real means for engagement. But there are very substantive campaigns to be built in support of political prisoners in Bahrain and elsewhere. Such work is not needed solely in support of those resisting state repression on the political level. Labor struggle in the region is practically invisible in the Anglophone press, with the exception of Al Akhbar and Gulf News. So it would be great if this issue provokes a wider interest in concrete work to both support and make visible the constant and ongoing struggles in the Gulf.

Excerpted from Jacobin’s Special Section on the Gulf Cooperation Council

From Omar alShehabi, “Bahrain’s Fate

Sharif’s grandfather was a mulla, but his father was influenced by the rising tides of Arab nationalism and anti-colonialism then dominating the wider Arab world. Bahrain had been a British protectorate since the mid-nineteenth century, with the pax Britannica both dictating the island’s international politics and economics and heavily influencing local political affairs. A tense but dependent relationship with the Al Khalifa, the local ruling family who have controlled the island since 1783, prevailed. Previously unstable and vulnerable to threats from the Persians and the Wahhabi movement in the Arabian Peninsula, the British cemented the rule of Al Khalifa, gradually rearranging the institutional governance structure, though occasionally reorganizing local rulers within the same family when their interests so required.

By the mid-1950s, Bahrain was pulsing with anti-colonial sentiment. Living minutes away from the British Royal Air Force base, Sharif’s political awakening was in Muharraq. His first political idol was Gamal Abdul Nasser, then by far the most popular leader in the Arab world, one who was held in strong affection by the local people, who still remember his stopover in the island in 1955, on his way to the Bandung conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, when, much to the British’s annoyance, he was given a rapturous welcome.

As a primary school student, Sharif participated in the March 1965 uprising—a series of strikes and demonstration which began in Bapco, the local oil company where his father used to work, and which was still under British management. A strike protesting the layoff of hundreds of local workers quickly escalated into protests and riots. They continued for weeks before the local authorities and the British jointly put them down—part of the intermittent peninsular labor unrest that has been erased from court histories of the region and rentier state theories alike.

Amid this atmosphere, Sharif finished high school, where he had exceled, and moved to Lebanon to continue his studies in the mid-1970s. Bahrain had achieved independence in 1971, after the withdrawal of the British from their posts east of the Suez. A new constitution was inaugurated in 1973, followed by parliamentary elections in the same year, which were supposed to herald the advent of democratic politics on the island. But emboldened by rising oil revenues and frustrated by parliament’s lack of cooperation, the local rulers terminated constitutional rule, declaring a state of emergency that lasted twenty-five years. Colonialism had officially ended, but despotism was coursing through the Bahraini political system.

At the American University of Beirut, Sharif found himself in the epicenter of progressive politics in the Arab world. There, he formally entered political activism. Initially approached by the Muslim Brotherhood, he rejected their overtures due to their poor reputation in Bahrain at that time, where they were seen as politically weak and unsupportive of anti-colonial and democratic movements. Instead, he decided to join the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), an organization with roots in the Arab Nationalist Movement, a pan-Arab revolutionary organization with chapters around the Arab world, which took an ideological turn towards Marxist-Leninism twinned with a tactical turn to armed struggle.

Sharif also became active in student union organizations—when he moved to Texas after the civil war broke out in Lebanon in 1975, he established there a chapter of the Bahrain student union. It was also during his time in North America that he met his future wife, Farida Ghulam, a political activist and a student at Concordia University in Montreal. Although Farida was Shi’i, this posed no problem for Sharif, and they would eventually marry in Bahrain.

But he could not finish his studies in North America. On his way back from a student union event in Canada in 1980, he was stopped by the authorities for carrying flyers and donations in support of Palestinian and Dhofari revolutionaries. He was handed over to the Americans. They interrogated him, expelled him on charges of terrorism—a familiar incantation—and remanded him to Bahrain. There he spent two weeks in prison, where the government detained him for belonging to the PFLOAG, then, along with the communists, the main threat to the dynasty.

[…]

From Adam Hanieh, “A Petrodollar and a Dream

This perspective reveals a stark characteristic of the contemporary Arab world: the ever-widening unevenness in the regional political economy, expressed most sharply in the polarization of power and wealth between the Gulf and the rest of the Arab world. Despite the initial puncturing of real estate bubbles in cities such as Dubai, the Gulf states emerged relatively unscathed from the global crisis of 2008-2009, and since that time have continued to accumulate growing pools of surplus capital alongside the renewed rise in hydrocarbon prices from 2010 onwards.

On the other side, the ongoing stagnation of global markets—particularly in the case of the region’s most important trading partner, the European Union—and the political and social crises that wrack states such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria, have further entrenched the hierarchies of the region. These different trajectories remind us that crises are never felt uniformly, and absent political challenge are often a boon for those in positions of power.

There are many statistical indications of this growing divergence. According to a recent report from the Institute of International Finance (IIF), a “peak body” of the world’s largest banks and financial institutions, the net foreign assets (gross foreign assets minus external debt) of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries rose from $879 billion in 2006 to $1.79 trillion by end-2012. By the end of 2013, this figure is predicted to reach over $2 trillion, a figure equivalent to more than one hundred and twenty percent of the Gulf’s GDP. At the same time, the net foreign assets of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco, have fallen from a surplus of $20.4 billion to a deficit of $24.3 billion.

The same divergences are also seen in current account balances. In 2012, the six states of the GCC were estimated to have a total current account surplus of just over $400 billion, more than double their annual average over 2006-2010 (and, revealingly, also more than twice that of China in 2012). While the Gulf’s surpluses have reached these record levels, the rest of the Arab world has seen its balance sheets face parlous decline. The total current account balance of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco reached an estimated total deficit of $35 billion in 2012, more than triple the average deficit over 2006-2010.

Contrary to popular misconceptions, the enormous pools of capital in the Gulf are not simply held by state institutions or Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). The Financial Times reported in mid-2013 that the levels of wealth held by GCC banks, private companies and the wealthiest individuals and families reached $3 trillion, a figure that does not include wealth held by SWFs. Privately-held wealth in the Gulf grew by seven percent over the last year, and is now at a level ten percent higher than 2007—the peak of the boom years that preceded the global downturn. One remarkable indication of this is the Gulf’s proportion of “millionaire households.” According to a recent report by the Boston Consulting Group, countries from the GCC occupy five out of the top eleven spots for the proportion of millionaire households at a global level, with tiny Qatar ranked number one in the world (14.3 percent of households).

Of course, this wealth is not spread evenly throughout the GCC and, most significantly, these figures ignore the presence of millions of low-paid, temporary migrant laborers that make up the vast majority of the Gulf’s workforce. Indeed, one of the key reasons underlying the polarization of wealth in the Arab world is found in the presence of these workers in the Gulf. Faced with the crisis of 2008-2009 and the collapse of the property boom in Dubai and elsewhere, the Gulf states were able to utilize their heavy reliance on temporary migrant labor—equivalent to at least half of the labor force in all of the GCC states—to offload the worst effects of the crisis onto those neighboring countries that provide the region with its easily deportable and highly exploitable workforce.

[Excerpted from a special section of Jacobin, Issue 13, by permission of the editors. © 2014 Jacobin Press. For more information, or to read the full text of the special section, click here.]

Syria Media Roundup (January 22)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Syria Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to syria@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

International and Regional Perspectives

The Arab world into the unknown In this crucial piece, Peter Harling and Sarah Birke offer a comprehensive overview of the transformations in the region.

What Iran Wants in 2014 A conciliatory piece by Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani

Iran and the Arab world: a change in foreign policy Maged Mandour argues that “Iran has lost a significant component of its soft power in the Middle East.”

From ISIS to Majed: The Deals of Death Sami Kleib asks if the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s “status being deliberately exaggerated ahead of Geneva II?”

Syrian refugee girl to marry to pay the rent A report by Aljazeera English’s Zeina Khodr, about Hanifa, a 14-year old who “has agreed to marry a 44-year-old Lebanese landlord. Her family can not afford to pay their monthly rent, so the owner of the house has demanded Hanifa become his second wife.”

Lebanon: Bekaa Valley Coupon Racket Scams Syrian Refugees“The coupon, which claims to be under the authority of the Saudi government in memory of a deceased Saudi national, promises the holder $120 worth of goods in exchange for only 2,000 Lebanese lira ($1.33). As it turns out, it is a promise too good to be true,” explains Yazan al-Saadi.

New ISIS Leaks Reveal Particulars of al-Qaida Strategy Matthew Barber, writing on Joshua Landis’ blog, examines the @wikibaghdadi Twitter account adding that “though not highly detailed, the leaks do present us with some interesting insights into the structure of al-Qaida in Iraq, including protective strategies used to insulate key leadership figures, as well as al-Qaida’s readiness to embrace thievery and extortion to fund their own operations.”

The Syrian Conflict and Sunni Radicalism in Lebanon Alexander Corbeil examines “two disturbing trends: the growing radicalization of underprivileged Sunni Muslims and the entry of al-Qaeda’s two Syrian factions into Lebanon.”

 Syria in the context of the Arab Uprisings“The conference is organised by groups and individuals who recognise the need to oppose Western imperialist threats to attack Syria while also continuing to defend Syria’s popular revolution against the Assad dictatorship and its allies” and includes the following speakers: “Yasser Munif, Razan Ghazzawi, Gilbert Achcar, Ewa Jasiewicz, Joseph Daher, Miriyam Aouragh, Iman Murphy, Bushra Al, Rouba Mhaissen, Jamie Allinson, John McDonnell MP”

How Syria’s War Is Dividing the Egyptian Jihadi Movement Jerome Drevon argues that the “Syrian war is reshaping the radical Salafi-jihadi landscape of the Middle East.”

Geneva II

Syria crisis: UN withdraws Iran invitation to Geneva talks

Syrie. L’approche de « Genève 2″ exacerbe les divergences au sein de la Coalition nationale Ignace Leverrier explains how the various participants in Geneva II remain divided.

Préparation de Genève II: «Tous les amis de la Syrie sont responsables» de la situation actuelle Juliette Rengeval interviews Salam Kawakibi.

GENEVE II : « Conférence de paix » pourquoi et pour qui ? Solidarites posts a statement (in French) that reads (rough translation): “We want to remind people that the issue at stake in Geneva II cannot be an unacceptable power redistribution between the regime factions and its affiliates and its opposition.”

To achieve peace in Syria, better start in Aleppo not Geneva, argues Jean-Pierre Filiu

Time to be bold and make peace in Syria Jimmy Carter and Robert A Pastor say that “It is time to change the agenda, the preconditions and the strategy on Syria—and end the war.”

Other

Beyond a self-fulfilling prophesy: religion and conflict in the Middle East Katerina Delacoura revisits the issue whereby primordialism has been used as a lens to analyze conflicts in the Middle East.

Syrian women demand to take part in the peace talks in Geneva Madeline Rees explains how “the international women's movement, (and here is one!) has not let this pass, and there has been an ongoing process of connection, support and networking to bring women into the narrative for almost two years.”

On western military interventionism Patrice de Beer writes that “if negotiations must always be preferred to war, or have to be tried first, there sometimes comes a point where it can become a face saving excuse for doing nothing and letting innocents die. Like in Syria.”

Why the US should join forces with the Baathist regime in Syria Afshin Shahi says “the Baathist regime is indeed guilty of great war crimes, but the human cost of a failed state would be a greater catastrophe. Washington should have learnt this lesson from Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq.”

Turkey shifts toward Iran on Syria Ali Hashem explains how “Turkey is resetting its relations with Iran, including over Syria.”

Despite Walkout, Syria National Coallition Decides to Attend Geneva Alex Simon reports: “The final vote count Saturday in Istanbul was 58 in favor of attending and 14 opposed, with two abstentions and one blank ballot. This tally, however, did not include the votes of 44 members who walked out of the Coalition’s meeting.  Thus, while the 58 ‘Yes’ votes comprised a majority of the 73 votes cast, they represented less than half of the Coalition’s total membership of 119.”

European Spies Reach Out to Syria Maria Abi-Habib reports that “European intelligence agencies secretly met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's delegates to share information on European extremists operating in Syria, Western and Middle Eastern officials said, the first known encounters since withdrawing their ambassadors.”

Exclusive: Russia steps up military lifeline to Syria's Assad - sources Jonathan Saul reports that “In recent weeks Russia has stepped up supplies of military gear to Syria, including armored vehicles, drones and guided bombs, boosting President Bashar al-Assad just as rebel infighting has weakened the insurgency against him, sources with knowledge of the deliveries say.”

Syria: Army of the Mujahideen Challenges ISIS Gains Suhaib Anjarini on the emergence of this new group, which capitalized upon ISIS’ retreat in some areas.

Asylum seekers' perilous path to Sweden Yermi Brenner recounts the long and hazardous journey of a Syrian man to Sweden.

Syrian Narratives

Yarmouk

Yarmouk – A Palestinian Responsibility Ibrahim Al-Amin writes a rather controversial piece that reads: “as a matter of fact, Yarmouk is not Sabra and Shatila. Syria is not Lebanon. The Syrian army is neither the Israeli occupying forces nor the racist Lebanese gangs. The armed groups in the camp are not the pioneers of the Palestinian revolution. The Salafi Palestinian movement is not the Palestine Liberation Organization. And the road to Palestine doesn’t pass through Damascus.”

Yarmouk Camp – A Responsibility to Protect Nour Samaha writes: “whatever we may think of either side in the Syrian war, we must not wash our hands of the thousands of civilians left behind.”

 Yarmouk Camp – Resistance Camp Needs to Reflect Amal Saad-Ghorayeb responds to Al-Amin, and writes: “His thesis, that the Palestinians are personally and collectively responsible for the tragedy that has befallen the Palestinian refugees in Yarmouk, is at once intellectually flawed, morally indefensible and politically damaging. Although Amin’s position is one not shared either publicly or privately by Hezbollah, his commentary warrants a response if only because it reflects the rise of a new and troubling discourse within our ranks which fails to distinguish between ordinary Palestinians and the treachery of their leadership.”

Cornell SJP responds to the situation in Syria’s Yarmouk refugee campWe ask that the government coordinate with the United Nations or other capable and non-compromised agencies to ensure that the people of Yarmouk can eat. We demand that the armed groups respect its neutrality and leave the camp immediately.”

While you were neutral about YarmoukTalal Alyan responds to SJP Cornell’s statement saying “the statement from SJP Cornell is a disaster, not only for the Palestinian solidarity movement but also more generally for the continuation of the Palestinian cause. We cannot ask that the world stand with us against our oppressor while we whitewash, or deflect, the crimes of someone else’s.”

Other

Syrie : Les ennemis de la révolution populaire, le régime dictatorial et les forces de la contre-révolution réactionnairesSyria Freedom Forever writes: “we condemn the false and dangerous political position of certain structures of the soft liberal opposition linked to some countries of the region that consider the elimination of Da3ech, in addition to the Democratic Union of Kurdistan, as the elimination of all counter-revolutionaries forces, in their eyes.”

The Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 1: Structure and SupportAron Lund takes a closer look at the alliance formed at the end of November.

The Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 2: An Umbrella Organization Lund focuses here on the group’s ideology and organization.

 The Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 3: Negotiations Lund here looks at the group’s various stances.

The Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 4: The State Lund on the group’s conception of a future state.

The Baath Battalions Move Into Damascus Aron Lund provides an update on this military development whereby “a new military faction has started to show up at government checkpoints and roadblocks in Damascus, according to Syrian media. The so-called Baath Battalions, a militia controlled by the ruling Baath Arab Socialist Party, was first formed in Aleppo in 2012.”

En Syrie, l’autorité des oulémas mise en cause par la révolution In this pertinent piece, Thomas Pierret examines the return of religion actors who had long been excluded from the political scene under the Assad regime and how this new reality is carving a new power balance.

Who's who: Bahjat Sulaiman, The New Old Guard The Syrian Observe offers this profile of this “Syrian ambassador to Jordan has a history in intelligence operations”

Inside Syria

“Observations of a Homsi living in Tartous,” by Aboud Dandachi

Aleppo between the Cold Winter and Fuel Shortage Oliver Holmes reports that “aid workers in Syria have accused authorities of hampering deliveries to opposition-controlled areas and threatening groups with expulsion if they try to avoid bureaucratic obstacles to help the tens of thousands trapped in an almost three-year civil war. Syria blames rebel attacks for aid delays.”

 Electricity Rations Plunge Damascus into DarknessSalam al-Saadi meets with a man who claims that power cuts in his Damascus suburb are now in place 16 hours per day.

Syrians Facing “Coldest” Winter Yet With No DieselLina al-Hakim reports from Aleppo, writing that “procuring fuel has become a main preoccupation in Aleppo. The demand for gasoline to generate electricity grew because of the recurring power cuts that sometimes last for days. In the absence of coal, the price of wood increased to 60 Syrian liras (about 40 cents) per kilogram, up from between 15 and 25 liras last winter.”

Displacement Crisis Worsens in Jaramana “There are now about 900,000 displaced persons in Jaramana, according to a relief worker. They are scattered between houses, schools, and half-finished buildings which alone house around 200 families.”

 Used Clothing Stores Are Destinations for Both Rich and Poor“The outrageous inflation of prices in Syria has driven the poorest and richest members of Syrian society to shop at second-hand stores. Each has their own reasons for resorting to used clothes: the poor are searching for affordable prices while the rich are on the lookout for brand names,” reports a journalist from the Damascus Bureau.

Syrian government introduces Kurdish in universities Andrea Glioti reports on this latest development.

 The Story of Two Armenians Arrested by ISISSuhaib Anjarini tells the story of “ Wanis and Minas Livonian, two Syrian-Armenians from the north Syrian city of Aleppo”, who were killed by ISIS after being accused of faking to convert to Islam.

Syria: Military Checkpoints Hate, Love and ArrestRuba al Khaier on this new reality faced by people across Syria.

Arts and Social Media

Syria: A Literature of Resistance Farouk Mardam Bey reports on Khalid Khalifa’s winning of the Naguib Mahfouz prize and encourages readers to explore the Syrian literature of the past decades.

New Texts Out Now: Rebecca Joubin, The Politics of Love: Sexuality, Gender, and Marriage in Syrian Television Drama “In The Politics of Love: Sexuality, Gender, and Marriage in Syrian Television Drama, I contend that Syria’s television industry provides insight into the political and cultural climate of Syria prior to and following the uprising. During my preliminary fieldwork in 2000 and 2001, my extended residence in Damascus from 2002 through 2008, and fieldwork there during the summers of 2010 and 2011, I was privileged to have known leading Syrian drama creators who were dedicating their lives to transforming society and politics from within.”

Syria: Aleppo Defeats Death With Theater Suhaib Anjarini reports on this “eight-day theater festival to celebrate life in a time of war.”

The Medieval Scheme - Poetry - Omar Imady

The Fragility Of Syria In One Heartbreaking PhotoBassam Khabieh captures images in the aftermath of a government airstrike in Douma.

The Controversial Death of a Teenage Stringer David Kenner on the Reuters the 18-year old freelance photographer Molhem Barakat.

Haunting images of Syria's abandoned homes The pictures were taken by Italian photographer Matteo Rovella last June.

Policy and Reports

Evidence of 'industrial-scale killing' by Syria spurs call for war crimes charges Ian Black examines a report that explains how “Syrian government officials could face war crimes charges in the light of a huge cache of evidence smuggled out of the country showing the "systematic killing" of about 11,000 detainees, according to three eminent international lawyers.”

Syria's refugees: international effort needed Sherif ElSayed-Ali reports on an Amnesty International report that has highlighted the huge gap between the Syrian refugee crisis and the global response. Fortress Europe needs to discover an ethos of hospitality

New analysis of rocket used in Syria chemical attack undercuts U.S. claims Matthew Schofield reports on the latest development in the chemical attack file, explaining how “a series of revelations about the rocket believed to have delivered poison sarin gas to a Damascus suburb last summer are challenging American intelligence assumptions about that attack and suggest that the case U.S. officials initially made for retaliatory military action was flawed.”

Possible Implications of Faulty Intelligence In the Damascus Nerve Agent Attack of August 21, 2013 The report that challenges the US claims.

U.N.: $2.4bn pledged at Syria donor conference

U.N. abandons aid delivery after Syria insists on dangerous route

 Economy and Agriculture

Report-Back from LCPS Panel Discussion on Impact of Syrian Conflict on Lebanese Economy “[The following summary was produced by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) on a panel discussion held on 6 December 2013 on the impact of the Syrian conflict on the Lebanese economy.] “

Syria’s War Economy Samer Abboud explains how “there are always profits to be made during civil conflicts, where entrepreneurial networks often emerge to reap the benefits of chaos and conflict, and the Syrian case is no different.”

Syria: dozens die of starvation in Damascus after being 'denied food'

Green bread from animal feed is Syrians’ food in besieged areas Souad Khibiyeh reports for the Syrian Observer. 

Arabic

المعركةالسوريةالكبرىعلىأبوابجنيف٢
Basel al-Awdat on the divisions and disputes among the different factions of the Syrian opposition concerning Geneva 2. 

إعادةإحياءالبنىالأهليّـــةفيسوريا
Monther Khaddam on the importance of popular non-violent resistance and the ways in which the regime sought to quell it from the start of the popular uprisings.

جماعةسوريةمعارضةفيالداخلترفضمحادثاتجنيف 2
Reuters report that members of the Syrian National Coordination Body inside Syria refuse to attend the Geneva 2 conference due to the outcomes of the talks between Russia and America, and the request that the SNCB attends the meeting as part of the Syrian National Coalition.  

العيطة:جنيف2 لنيكونسوىمهرجانخطابي، وسورياالتينعرفهالمتعدموجودة
Samir al-Aita views that Geneva 2 will not be fruitful and that there are many obstacles facing the conference.  

رُبَّ لحنٍ ألم
Haytham Mannaa explains to the people the latest developments that have led him and members of the SNCB to go against attending Geneva 2, which is set to be held on the 22nd of January.  

أمهاتاليرموكيسقينأطفالهنماءالأعشاب
A report on the dire situation in the Palestinian al-Yarmouk refugee camp in Syria, which the Assad regime is effectively holding under siege.

الازمةالسوريةوالتساؤلاتحولنموالاقتصادستكونعلىجدولاعمالمنتدىدافوس
On the 44th annual Wold Economic Forum, set to take place in Davos-Klosters, Switzerland from the 22nd until the 25th of January, which coincides with the date of the Geneva 2 conference. The Syrian struggle and the discussions about the future of the country’s economic development are included in the agenda of the forum.  

نظرةتحليليةلجنيفوظروفه
Walid al-Bunni analyzes Geneva 2 and the context in which it will be held.

حولقرارالإئتلافبالموافقةعلىحضورمؤتمرجنيف: الدكتورهيثممناع
Haytham Mannaa comments on RT about the decision of the Syrian National Coalition to attend Geneva 2. 

تقريرأممي: النازحونالسوريونفيلبنانتجاوزوا 880 ألف
UN reports that the number of Syrian refugees inside Lebanon has reached over 880 thousand.

بينالمتديّنالمحترموالطائفيالزبالة
Hisham Naffaa criticizes the way religious fundamentalism has been exerted in the Syrian struggle. 

«الأولويات... عقدةالمنشارفي«جنيف 2
Tarek Ajib on the priorities in Geneva 2. 

داعش» فيسوريا: لانزالغرباء»
Ziad Ghusn on ISIS.

سوريا: 2014 ثورةعلىالأسدوداعش
Fadi adDahouk on the protests of Syrians, and in Kafranbel in particular, against Assad and ISIS. 

DARS Media Roundup (January 22)

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[This is a bi-weekly roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Resistance and Subversion in the Arab world and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the DARS Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each bi-weekly roundup to DARS@jadaliyya.comby Sunday night of every second week.] 

News & Commentary

Sale of Tear Gas to Bahrain Blocked Over Concerns Raised by Rights Group, by Robert Mackey and Choe Sang-Hun
In response to concerns raised by rights groups about the misuse of tear gas by the riot police in Bahrain, South Korea’s government has decided to block the export of millions of canisters of the gas to the kingdom. The Lede that proposed shipments to Bahrain from two defense contractors had been stopped. The decision was made in response to political instability in Bahrain, where people are reportedly killed and injured there because of tear gas.

I’m No Traitor, Says Wael Ghonim as Egypt Regime Targets Secular Activists, by Patrick Kingsley
One of the figureheads of Egypt's 2011 uprising says he is staying away from the country "as Egypt no longer welcomes those who are like me." Wael Ghonim's statement comes amid claims by fellow activists that Egypt's government has returned to the authoritarianism of the pre-2011 era. Ghonim is the latest 2011 figurehead to be targeted in recent months, as a crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood supporters of ex-president Mohamed Morsi spread even to those secular activists who called for Morsi's overthrow last July.

Egypt’s Top Satirist Gets Ready to Return after Ban, by Nate Rawlings
Bassem Youssef, Egypt’s most popular satirist who has been called the country’s Jon Stewart, is preparing to bring back his wildly popular show two months after being tossed off the airwaves for criticizing the government. Youssef, a TIME 100 honoree last year, hosted the popular but controversial program “El-Bernameg” (Arabic for ‘The Program”), which he used as a platform to criticize those in power in Egypt.

Egypt’s Unsustainable Crackdown, by Anthony Dworkin and Helene Michou
As Egypt was preparing itself for a constitutional referendum, protests by supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood continued to sweep the country. In a new European Council on Foreign Relations policy memo - Egypt’s unsustainable crackdown - Anthony Dworkin and Hélène Michou argue that the authorities’ attempt to restore public order through repression will not succeed.

Journalists Demand Egypt Free Al-Jazeera Colleagues, by BBC
More than 40 journalists and editors have signed a statement demanding the immediate release of three Al-Jazeera colleagues accused of helping the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Senior figures from the BBC, New York Times and CNN are among the signatories. Peter Greste, Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, and Baher Mohamed were detained by Egyptian authorities on 29 December. The letter calls for an end to their "arbitrary imprisonment." 

Widespread Boycotts as Egyptian Voters Back New Constitution, by Patrick Kingsley
Participants in the first Egyptian vote of the post-Morsi era have voted overwhelmingly in favour of approving a new constitution. The referendum's integrity has been challenged by opposition members and rights campaigners, who say the poll was conducted against a backdrop of fear. Up to 35 no campaigners were arrested, claimed one opposition party that boycotted the poll in protest.

Egyptians to Vote on New Constitution Amidst Boycotts and Apathy, by Shahira Amin
Egyptians head to polling stations on Tuesday to vote on a revised constitution heralded by Egypt’s military-backed government as a” first step in the country’s democratic transition” and billed as a blueprint for the “new Egypt.” The amended document has also been hailed by analysts as one that “enshrines personal and political rights in stronger language than in previous constitutions.” Rights advocates however, have expressed fears that the enormous powers and privileges the ‘new’ charter grants the military could undermine those rights, rendering them meaningless.

Egypt: A Tale of two Constitutions, by Heather McRobie
The 2013 constitution that has been put to voters last week was explained in pro-government media in terms of its improvements on the 2012 constitution that Morsi passed under tense circumstances and from which his Presidency never recovered. The re-framing of the executive-legislative relationship in the 2013 constitution, compared to the ‘Morsi constitution’ of the previous year, also read at first sight as hopeful measures of instituting meaningful checks and balances. However, reading the 2013 constitution as a remedy to the ills of the 2012 constitution evades two main problems of legitimacy. The first is the status of the military in the 2013 constitution. The second is the primary issue of the 2013 period itself, tangled in irreconcilable narratives variously of ‘saving’ the revolution and a brutal coup in which many hundreds were murdered.

On Means and Ends, by Mahmoud Salem
On 14 January, Egypt votes on the new constitution, which aims to show the world its electoral legitimacy, and thus undermine the Muslim Brotherhood. Given that the Yes campaign is on the streets, on TV, in the newspapers, all over the social media and in targeted text messages to phones, and that the few who dare start a No campaign get arrested, it is fair to say that the Yes vote will win handily, since everyone who will go to the polls is planning to vote Yes anyway. The result will be as follows: a constitution that will get a historic turn-out and approval rating, but will not have electoral legitimacy, because, well, it’s hard to claim it is democratic if those who oppose it are getting arrested.

Strike, Protest in Tunisia Town as Social Unrest Mounts, by AFP
A general strike gripped the central Tunisian town of Kasserine on January 8th amid rising discontent over the government's failure to improve living conditions three years after the revolution. The night before, dozens of protesters attacked a police post in the nearby village of Thala, witnesses told AFP. Tunisia's powerful UGTT trade union confederation called the strike to coincide with the anniversary of the first death in the town during the January 2011 uprising that toppled veteran strongman Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

Netherlands Businesses Cutting Ties With Israel’s Occupation, by Mitchell Plitnick
The Netherlands has seen a number of its companies terminate cooperation with Israeli companies over Israel’s ongoing occupation. The latest is PGGM, the largest Dutch pension management fund. PGGM made the decision to divest all its funds from Israel’s five largest banks because all of them are involved in some way in the settlements. The amount of money is not huge, estimated at several tens of millions of euros, but Israel is concerned that other financial institutions may follow suit and that, despite its official stance, the Netherlands government is creating an atmosphere which encourages boycotts and divestment from Israel.

Academic Boycott Diverts Attention from More Effective Pressure, by Yarden Katz
Every few years, a call to boycott Israeli academic institutions gains enough momentum to make a brief wave in the media, before it enters the cycle of condemnation. After making the rounds, the boycott gets predictably denounced by major organizations, followed by widespread reiteration of support for the state of Israel. It diverts the public’s attention from the main issues of justice in Palestine, stands no chance of convincing a mainstream audience, and sets the stage for right-wing opponents. Ultimately, it is economic pressure — justified by legal and human rights violations for which there is ample evidence and strong international opposition — that can help remedy the injustices in Palestine.

British Activist Detained Entering Israel, Facing 10-Year Ban, by Dimi Reider
A high-profile member of Northern Ireland’s Alliance Party and a long-standing activist for human rights in Israel and the Occupied Territories, Gary Spedding, was detained on arrival at Ben-Gurion Airport on 9 January and told would be deported and banned from the country for ten years. Speaking from the airport, after being held for eight hours, Spedding told +972 that the interrogating officers hacked into his mobile phone, and copied email addresses and telephone numbers. He also said no reason for his impending deportation was given, except that he was a “liar” and a “security threat.”

Gaza’s Wet and Wild Nonviolence, by Nadine Bloch
Activists of nonviolent opposition to the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, came up with an action plan. Instead of trying to get goods from the outside world into Gaza, they created a way to get goods beyond the siege. The Gaza’s Ark project centers around rebuilding an old fishing boat into a cargo ship — by training and hiring locals to do the construction, as well as establishing trading partners to receive the Palestinian goods. Internationals are acting as consultants and supporters rather than as saviors. Meanwhile, this outbound trade is keeping alive shipbuilding expertise and seamanship skills, providing local jobs and helping to rebuild the Gaza Strip’s economy.

Syrian Women Demand to Take Part in the Peace Talks in Geneva, by Madeleine Rees
There are over fifty Syrian women in Geneva this week at a UN Women meeting. Supported by international women's organisations, they are demanding a ceasefire in Syria and to be part of the planned peace talks in Geneva on 22 January. Women need to be in these talks not necessarily as negotiators for a particular political settlement, but to ensure that what is said is based on the demands of civil society, that gender dimensions are taken into account, and that women’s rights are in no way compromised. 

Did Iran Just Ban Online Chatting? by Aryn Baker
Both the Jerusalem Post and the exiled opposition group People’s Mojahedin Organization have stated that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei banned online chatting between unrelated men and women. The ‘ban’ is sourced to a response the religious leader gave to a question submitted to his website by a conflicted follower. But a religious ruling does not make an official ban. So while Khamenei might discourage his followers from online chatting, people fear that it might lead to flirtation, or worse, he is not likely to order Iran’s religious police to start patrolling chat rooms and looking over texters’ shoulders.

Arrested Iranian Activists and Bloggers Accused of BBC Links, by Saeed Kamali Dehghan
Iranian judicial authorities have accused a group of recently jailed activists and bloggers of having links with the BBC and its past training courses. At least sixteen Iranian nationals, including employees of the technology website Narenji, were arrested in December in the southern province of Kerman as part of another crackdown by the intelligence forces of the elite Revolutionary Guards. Half of those arrested have since been released on bail, the Guardian has learned, but the rest, including Narenji's staff, remain in detention.

Turkish Riot Police Officer Who Gassed ‘Lady in Red’ Faces Prosecution and Possible Jail Term, by Adam Withnall
A Turkish police officer Fatih Zengin, who sprayed tear gas in the face of Ceyda Sungur, wearing a red dress at an anti-government protest faces prosecution and a possible jail term, a legal source has said. Images of the incident with “the lady in the red dress” became symbolic of the ongoing unrest throughout last summer, quickly spreading on social media and printed on stickers and posters at protest camps. 

Turkey’s Top Business Group Warns against Internet Censorship, by Hurriyet Daily News
Turkey’s top business group has warned that a government-led bill to increase control over the Internet is worrying and the planned regulations might lead to wide censorship on the Internet. The Turkish Industry and Business Association noted in a statement that “the law, which results in limiting the individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms, has also been subject to a ‘rights violation’ ruling of the European Court of Human Rights.” All individuals’ Internet records, including details about what sites they have visited, which words they have searched for on the web and what activity they have engaged in on social networking websites, will be kept for one or two years, according to the draft law.

Three Years after Revolution, Tunisians Have Cause to Celebrate, by Carol J. Williams
Marches through Tunis, the capital, evoked both the gains and setbacks of the era after the President Zine el Abidine ben Ali, with Tunisians celebrating their evolution from repression to self-determination while also lamenting the assassinations, political clashes and economic turmoil that has dogged the movement's progress. Tunisians are poised to approve a new constitution that enshrines Islam as their religion but secular democracy as their form of governance.

Campaigns

Successful Activism Campaign Cuts Off the Supply of Tear Gas to Bahrain, by Molly Hofsommer
South Korean authorities announced this week that they are suspending the export of more than 1.6 million canisters of tear gas to Bahrain in response to a global advocacy campaign. South Korea joins a growing list of countries including the United States, France, and Spain that have stopped shipping chemical irritants and crowd control weapons to Bahrain. The use of tear gas has caused dozens of deaths since demonstrations against the repressive Sunni-ruled monarchy began in 2011.

Egypt: Activists Arrested for ‘No’ Campaign, by Human Rights Watch
At least seven peaceful activists from the Strong Egypt party face criminal charges, apparently for hanging posters calling for a “no” vote in the constitutional referendum. During interrogations with prosecutors and police, questions fixated on the posters and the men’s political views. Police arrested the activists in three separate incidents after finding them in possession of posters calling for a “no” vote in the week preceding the referendum.

Art

Playing an Oud, a Bard of the Revolution, by Celine Ahmad
Maan, a Syrian musician, was one of the original protest organizers in Daraa in 2011. He was arrested while sitting for an English-language exam at Damascus University. During lulls in fighting, he began playing for the local Free Syrian Army fighters. “I insist on carrying on my professional art for the Syrian revolution, even if I have to play at a street corner to convince the world that the Syrian people are oppressed,” he says. He played his oud for wounded civilians and sang songs about the revolution at funerals or when rebels captured new areas of Daraa. He wrote a song about twelve of his friends who had volunteered with the FSA and who were all killed during a failed attack on an army checkpoint in Daraa. After that, he became known as a “bard of the revolution.”

Gezi Park and the Transformative Power of Art, by Stephen Snyder
The transformative power of creative narrative is the power to give meaning to life’s activity by keeping ahead of forces that would deny it. It is a fundamental dynamic of the resistance movement that sprang from the Gezi Park sit-ins. The movement erupted with an aesthetic intensity that surprised detractors as well as supporters, employing aesthetic creativity in a way that sets it apart from other protests in Turkey and the Arab world. On several levels, the young movement has become a form of artistic protest.

Creator of Gezi Park Protest’s Animated Film ‘Tornistan/Backward Run’ Speaks Out, by John Patlakas
On 28 May 2013, a sit-in began in Gezi Park at Istanbul’s Taksim Square as hundreds attempted to prevent the demolition of the park and the erection of a large shopping complex. The brutal eviction of the protesters resulted in massive demonstrations that broke out in all major Turkish cities, including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Bursa. “Tornistan/Backward Run” is a short animated film made by Ayce Kartal about police violence during the protest and the diminutive media coverage of the events.

50 Iranians, One Question: ‘If You Could Do Anything You Wanted, What Would You Do?’, by Golnaz Esfandiari
"If you could do anything you wanted, what would you do?" That's the question Iranian artist Ali Molavi asked fifty people in Tehran. One man answers: "I would fix our country's problems, the unemployment of youth." Another interviewee asks whether what he says will be censored. After apparently receiving an assurance that his comments won't be subjected to censorship, he touches on a sensitive subject: "I will fix [Iran's] relations with America," he says, adding that he would remove the sanctions that are in place against Iran over its nuclear program. 

Conferences & Events

She Who Tells a Story: Women Photographers from Iran and the Arab World, 27 August 2013-12 January 2014, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, USA

Creative Dissent: Arts of the Arat World Uprisings, 8 November 2013-9 February 2014, Arab American National Museum, Michigan, USA

The Third Annual Conference on the Social Sciences and Humanities, 19-20 March 2014, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Tunisia 

أدورنو والموسيقى الجماهيريّة/ الجزء الأول

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تضم هذه المقالة جزءان، نحاول أن نتاول من خلالهما موقف ثيودور أدورنو من الموسيقى "الخفيفة" أو الجماهيريّة. سنتناول في النص التالي: خلفية عن حياة أدورنو، موقف مدرسة فرانكفورت من جدليّة التنوير، "صناعة الثقافة" وأخيراً موقف أدورنو في الموسيقى الجماهيريّة بشكل خاص. ليهيّئ هذا الجزء سياق الجزء الثاني، وهو عبارة عن ترجمة دراسة لأدورنو "الموسيقى الجماهيريّة في المجتمع الرأسمالي" إلى العربيّة، والتي تسلّط الضوء على تنميط الموسيقى الجماهيريّة.

أدورنوالاحتجاجي،إلىالمحتجعليه

ولد أدورنو في مدينة فرانكفورت (1903) بألمانيا، في بيئة غنيّة لأب يهودي، تحوّل فيما بعد إلى البروتيستانتيّة، يمتلك شركة لتصدير النبيذ، ووالدة احترفت الغناء. كبر أدورنو في كنف الموسيقى "الجادّة" كما يسمّيها، وتعلم عزف البيانو منذ الصغر. أما تجربته خارج الجو العائلي المريح فكانت سيئة، خاصة في المدرسة حيث لم ينجح بالتأقلم وشعر بنفور من زملائه. وتزايد نفوره من مجتمعه مع تزايد الشعور القومي الألماني بعد الحرب العالميّة الأولى، مما كوّن لديه ذهنيّة رافضة للهويّة التي بحثها لاحقاً في كتاب شارك بكتابته "دراسات في الشخصيّة الشموليّة" (Studies of the Authoritarian Personality) والذي أصدر في الولايات المتحدة مع نهاية الحرب العالميّة الثانية سنة 1950.

"كطالب (جامعي)، كان أدورنو معروفاً كشخص مؤثّر وناقد موسيقي بروح المعاصرة الراديكاليّة. ومن وقتها دعم الملحن شنبيرغ، بعكس كثيرين. وكما كان يعزف معزوفات لحّنها هو". (1)وبعد أن أنهى دراسته في فرانكفورت، انتقل إلى فينّا التي رفض فيها الفصل بين المواضيع التي تعنيه: الفلسفة والموسيقى. حيث كان هذا أيضا توجهّه في المستقبل ليتناول الموسيقى وعلم النفس وعلم الاجتماع والفلسفة سويًا.

 [الفيديو: مقطوعة ألّفها أدورنو للبيانو (1921)]

في ذلك الوقت، وفي بداية عشرينيّاته، تبنّى أدورنو الأسلوب الذي حوّله لأحد الباحثين المرموقين بعلم اجتماع الموسيقى، والذي عمل على تطوير الأفكار التي غيّرت طريقة تناول الأجسام الأكاديميّة والعلوم الإنسانيّة للموسيقى من آليّة تعكس الواقع فحسب إلى عنصر فعّال يستطيع أن يطرح نتائج مؤثّرة. إضافة إلى تغييره لاتجاه النقاش حول الموسيقى من التعامل مع العنصر الذي يقود الموسيقى، إلى التعامل مع ما تولّده الموسيقى. (2)

في فينّا، تلقّى أدورنو دروساً على البيانو والتلحين على يد Alban Berg (طالب شنبيرغ). وعمل كمحرّر بمطبوعة Anbruch المتخصّصة بالمقالات الموسيقيّة المعاصرة والراديكاليّة. وعندما عاد إلى فرانكفورت، عزّز علاقته بمؤسّسة البحوث الاجتماعيّة، حتى مارس عمله كمحاضر فلسفة بجامعة فرانكفورت سنة 1931 حتى صعود النازيّة في 1934. حينئذٍ، بدأت رحلة المنافي أوّلاً في بريطانيا التي علّم فيها بجامعة أوكسفورد لمدة أربعة سنوات، ثم إلى أميركا، حيث تنقّل بين نيويورك ولوس أنجيليس، منجزاً عدة أبحاث، ومجرياً محاضرات إذاعيّة عن الموسيقى.

هندست تجربته الأميركيّة نظرته لتأثير التنميط كنتيجة للرأسماليّة والاحتكار على المنتج الثقافي والفنون والعلوم. مراقباً عمليّات تقليص التنميط للفروقات بين الناس، ومعايناً تأثيراتها النفسيّة على المجتمع الأميركي، كتأثيرها على إرادة الفرد في أن يكون جزءاً من الجموع والسائد، وانعدام الموقف النقدي. بالتالي، ادّعى أدورنو، وبقسوة، أنّه لا يوجد في الولايات المتّحدة من هو مسؤول عن أفعاله وطريقة استيعابه وإدراكه للعالم، وبأن الإنسان الأميركي يتصرّف بحسب الضغوطات الجماعيّة والتقاليد القائمة في الدوائر التي ينتمي إليها. منتقداً توجهات المجتمع الأميركي معتقدًا بأن "خطر الأنظمة الاستبداديّة موجود داخل المجتمع الحديث" (راجع المصدر الأول، 2009:6).  

بعد انتهاء الحرب العالميّة الثانية وانهزام النازيّة، عاد أدورنو إلى ألمانيا وجامعة فرانكفورت. مجدّداً نشاطه بمؤسسة البحوث المجتمعيّة مع زميله ماركس هوركهايمر الذي عمل معه على إنجاز أهم مخرجات "مدرسة فرانكفورت": الجدليّة السلبيّة"، ومباشراً العمل بكتاب "نظريّة الجماليّات" الذي لم يستكمله.

خلال سنواته الأخيرة، تعرّض أدورنو لإدانة الحركات الطلابيّة اليساريّة الراديكاليّة، الذين عبّروا عن خيبة أملهم فيه خلال فترة التمرّد الطلابي في أواخر الستينيّات. حيث قدّم ادّعائه في واحدة من أواخر محاضراته من خلال التأكيد على التفكير النّقدي الذي أدى به إلى رفض الاحتجاجات الطلابيّة آنذاك لادّعائه أن "العنف الذي يميّز هذه الاحتجاجات يرمز لحركة غير ديمقراطيّة ستهيّئ الطريق للفاشيّة". إثر الاحتجاجات والإدانات والضغوطات التي تعرّض لها، قرّر أدورنو قضاء فترة إجازة في السويد، حيث داهمته سكتة قلبيّة في 6 آب/ أغسطس 1969 أدّت إلى وفاته.

 [أدورنو يتحدّث في هذا المقطع عن رفضه لوظيفة الموسيقى الجماهيريّة كموسيقى احتجاجيّة (خيار الترجمة إلى العربيّة متاح)]

 جدليّةالتنوير

لم يهتم أدورنو بالموسيقى كرمز أو مرآة لواقع ما، بل كآليّة لتمرير وعي قد يكون إيجابيّاً أو سلبيّاً. وبالتالي: ليس هناك فصل بين نهجه وتفكيره حول الوعي في المجتمع الحديث وبين تناوله للفن والموسيقى. بل هي جزء من رؤيته الشاملة حول جدليّة التنوير، كما سنستعرضها تالياً.

قبضت الحداثة على، وحتّى سوّقت التنوير بالمعنى العابر للسياق التاريخي (Transhistorical)، على أنّها سيرورة هدفها التهيئة لتحرّر الإنسان من قيود الطبيعة، وإبراز الفرديّة، وتحقيق إمكانيّات الفرد في المجتمع. وتم اعتبار العقلانيّة شرطاً رئيسيّاً لتبلور الثقافة والتعليم كوسيلة للتنوّر. على أساس هذه الآيدولوجيّة، ظهرت شعارات مثل: "التعليم للجميع"، "إنهاء امتيازات النخب"، وشعار الثورة الفرنسيّة الشهير: "حريّة ومساواة وإخاء". وبنفس الفترة، تطوّرت التكنولوجيا والاقتصاد بهدف تحسين حياة الفرد بعيداً عن تعلّقه بالطبيعة.

نظرت مدرسة فرانكفورت إلى هذه الإنجازات بعين الشك. ففي كتابهما "جدليّة التنوير" (3)، يفسّر هوركهايمر وأدورنو مصطلح التنوير كتجسيد لجدليّة بين العقلانيّة الآليّة (حسب فايبر) المتزايدة من ناحية، وسيطرة عميقة لمنظومة الإنتاج الرأسمالي للفرد من الناحية الأخرى، القوّتان اللتان أنتجهما بنفسه. مستخلصان أن التنوير هو سيرورة لا تنويريّة، بل قمعيّة بطبيعتها، وتتضمّن اغتراباً ذاتيّاً واستعباداً متزايداً. وبالتالي، طرحت مدرسة فرانكفورت تساؤلات حول صحّة إنجازات التنوير، وثمن تطبيقها على المستوى الفردي والمجتمعي. إذ تساءلا: هل يتحوّل الإنسان في هذه السيرورة إلى كائن فردي بالفعل؟ وهل حسّن التنوير من أوضاع الحياة؟ وهل حقّاً أصبحت أساسيّات مثل التعليم والثقافة متاحة للجميع؟

تدّعي مدرسة فرانكفورت أن سيرورة التنوير، التي تجسّدت في الثورة الفرنسيّة، خدمت بشكل أساسي الطبقة المسيطرة، البرجوازيّة في حينها، وحسّنت من شروط حياتها. بكلمات أخرى، لم تكن المصلحة العامّة سوى وهم، إنّما كانت مصلحة تخصيصيّة محدودة. وهذا ما أثبتته الفجوة العميقة بين الإدعاءات العالميّة وبين الواقع، وبالتالي: الثورة الفرنسيّة لم تكن طبقيّة تسعى لتغيير التراتبيّة الطبقيّة، بل سياسيّة. مثال على ذلك: تطبيق شعار "التعليم للشعب" فيما يسمّى: تعليم للماكنة، أو التعليم شرطاً للعمل؛ في الفترة الصناعيّة، أصبح على الفرد معرفة القراءة والكتابة والرياضيّات ليكون قادراً على تلبية معايير التجارة المتطوّرة والعمل. أي أن تعليم الشعب اقتصر على "التعليم للماكنة" والذي تحوّل إلى شرط ضروري لخلق وإعادة إنتاج نمط الإنتاج الرأسمالي، بينما بقي التعليم بمفهومه الأوسع مقتصراً على الطبقة البرجوازيّة.  انسحبت ذات السيرورة على الثقافة، ومن ضمنها موسيقى المنصّة والحفلات، حيث لم تكن النخبة والبرجوازيّة معنيّة باستقبال الجماهير في هذه القاعات، وبالتالي: تم خلق منظومات إقصائيّة طبقيّة جديدة، ومنها: صناعة الثقافة.

من هنا، يحاجج منظّرو مدرسة فرانكفورت في أن عبوديّة الإنسان الجديد آتية من تسليمه الطبيعة ونفسه وبخياره لمنظومة السيطرة. وهذه نتيجة لتذويت الدونيّة، وقمع الحضارة. ما يؤدّي إلى إمكانية بروز أنظمة سياسيّة واجتماعيّة فاشيّة ووحشيّة ضمن إطار الحريّة والديمقراطية، وتجسّد قوّة القمع في القضاء الممنهج على المقاومة والفردانيّة عن طريق دمجها بالنظام، وبالتالي احتواؤها.

ادّعى أدورنو أنّ ماهية الإنسانيّة، كنتيجة لهذه السيرورة، اندثرت وتحوّلت إلى منظومة وظائف اجتماعيّة. كما اندثرت ماهية الفن أيضاً ولم تعد مستقلة. فبحث بما سمّاه "فشل المنطق" الذي بلغ ذروته أثناء أحداث القرن العشرين الكارثيّة. واهتم، بشكل خاص، بتغيير الوعي الذي أدّى إلى سيطرة هذه الأنظمة الفاشيّة والنّازيّة (دينارو: 2003، راجع المصدر الثاني). في حين أن مشروع "جدليّة التنوير" بدأ كإشكاليّة فلسفيّة وموضوع فلسفي، استمرّ كبحث اجتماعي- نفسي للوعي البشري. إذ رأى أدورنو أن خطورة سيرورة التنوير لا تكمن فقط في عدم إبراز الفردانيّة بالفعل، بل أيضاً في خلق منطق موحّد لدى جميع البشر، وبالتالي يصبح الوعي محافظاً. كما تستطيع هذه السيرورة احتواء المقاومة، وبالتالي منع أي ردّة فعل. بالنهاية، تُقحم سيرورة التنوير هذه على الإنسان أنماط تفكير استبداديّة تتجاوب مع أساليب معروفة سلفاً، وليس بمنطق التعامل مع مخرجات الواقع. مثلاً: بنيت الموسيقى الجماهيريّة أو "الخفيفة" (Pop Music) من أنماط معروفة مسبقاً(4). تتركّز خطورة هذا المبنى في السيرورة التي ترافقه، وهي فصل الوعي عن الواقع، حيث تستبدَل القيمة الحقيقيّة للمنتوج بقيمة التبادلات الحديثة للمنتوجات المتعلّقة بالثقافة التي بنيت حوله، وبذلك تتكوّن في وعينا قيمة جديدة للمنتوجات التي لا تطابق قيمتها في الواقع. يدّعي أدورنو أن إحدى النتائج البارزة لهذا المنطق الجديد هو العبادة العمياء للعلوم. لذلك، رأى أن وظيفة الفلسفة الحديثة هي الكشف عن هذه الفجوة بين المنطق الجديد والواقع.

الجدير بالإشارة أن أدورنو لم يبحث عن دمج الواقع والأفكار، بعكس ماركس وهيغل اللذان قدّما جدليّة إيجابيّة تسعى إلى يوتوبيا- مثاليّة معيّنة، بل اكتفى بالجدليّة السلبيّة، ساعياً لتحسين المنطق وكشف تعقيدات الواقع. وبسبب ذلك، آمن أن حل التنوير هو بالتنوير نفسه، وبعقلانيّة فقط.

 صناعةالثقافة

ادّعى أدورنو أن الفنون تتخللها حقيقة غير ملموسة بحاجة لتفسير فلسفي، وأنّها، بكلماته: "قوّة التقدّم المجتمعي"؛ فمن جهة، اعتبر أن الفنون مستقلّة وتهدف إلى رفض الواقع القمعي، ومن جهة ثانية تهدف لإيقاظ الوعي وصولاً إلى إمكانيّة إقامة واقع اجتماعي بديل. وأن الفنون تعمل بوظيفة نقد الـ"أنا"، ونقد الواقع القائم من خلال التجربة الجماليّة، حيث يدعي أدورنو أن على الفن صدم الفرد جماليّاً حتى يعيش تجربة ماهية العمل الفنّي. وعلى النقيض من ذلك، تهدف الثقافة "الانحطاطيّة" إلى المحافظة على الواقع الموجود.

ادّعى أدورنو وهوركهايمر (1947) في مقالهما "صناعة الثقافة: التنوير وخدعة الجماهير" (فصل من كتاب "جدليّة التنوير"، راجع المصدر الثالث)، أن الثقافة اليوم تتعلّق بالمجتمع الصناعي. ويحدّد هذا الربط الثقافة إلى درجة أنّها تتحوّل، بذلك، إلى ثقافة متجانسة، من حيث أن الأسعار المختلفة للمنتوجات لا تعكس اختلاف الجودة (كمثال عن الفشل في المنطق المذكور أعلاه)، بل توفّر ترتيباً هرميّاً للمنتوجات بجودات "مختلفة" تناسب أفراداً بمستويات مختلفة. أي أن المستهلكون تحوّلوا إلى مادة ثابتة يتم تقسيمهم إلى تصنيفات تحتوي على أنماط جاهزة.

استعمل أدورنو وهوركهايمر مصطلح "صناعة الثقافة" كبديل عن مصطلح "ثقافة الجماهير"، وذلك بهدف إلغاء، من الأساس، كل التفسيرات التي تدّعي أن هذه الثقافة نبتت بشكل عفوي من الجماهير، أو أنّها صيغة الموسيقى الشعبيّة الآنيّة. نبعت صناعة الثقافة من سيرورة جدليّة الحضارة التي سيطر فيها الإنسان على الطبيعة، وبما في ذلك سيطرة الإنسان على الإنسان الآخر. ورأى أدورنو أنّه لا يمكن تجسير الفجوة ما بين الفن المستقل وصناعة الثقافة. إذ مع أن الفنون كانت دوماً سلعة، إلا أنّها لم تكن يوماً سلعةً فقط. بالمقابل، صناعة الثقافة هي فقط سلعة من دون الحاجة لإثبات ذلك لأنها تعرّف ذاتها كـ"صناعة"، ما يجعلها جزءاً من الواقع، وليس فنّاً. تتجلّى ماهية صناعة الثقافة حسب أدورنو في تكرار الواقع، لتتحوّل الثقافة لـ"كيتش" الذي يعرّفه أدورنو على أنّه: نسيج ثابت يعيد ويكرر ذاته، وينذر بلاتغيير أبدي ومتواصل. ومن هنا، يقول أدورنو أن للـ"كيتش" سحراً تخديريّاً كان موجوداً طيلة الوقت، إلّا أنّ الاختلاف في صناعة الثقافة اليوم عن الماضي، أنّه في الماضي سيطرت الثقافة "العالية" التي منعت من التكرار غير الآلي للنظام، وبالتالي انفصلت عن الـ"كيتش". لذلك، يقول أدورنو أن الجماهير ليسوا معيار الحقيقة لصناعة الثقافة، بل آيدولوجيّتها، فصناعة الثقافة توهم مستهلكيها بأنها تكيّف ذاتها مع ردّة فعل الجماهير، بينما في الواقع هي التي تكوّنه وتمنح الجماهير عدّة منتوجات متشابهة تعمل على ترفيههم بدلاً من صدمهم وزعزعة الوضع الراهن. بهذا الطريقة تضعف "الأنا"، وتختفي ماهية الفن، وصولاً إلى ما سمّاه: "نزع الفن عن الفن". 

 أدورنووالموسيقى

للموسيقى، حسب أدورنو، وظيفتان معرفيّتان، الأولى: تجسيد حقيقة الفرد، وعلاقته مع البيئة والمجتمع. تذكّر هذه الوظيفة الفرد بخساراته: الأوضاع المختلفة تحت نظام مختلف، لأن الموسيقى قوّة التقدّم الاجتماعي المتواجدة بمقدّمة المجتمع. والوظيفة الثانية: تجسيد العلاقة بين التفاصيل والكلّي، وذلك من خلال وظيفة الموسيقى المجرّدة التي ترسي مثالاً تعليميّاً بديلاً لطريقة ترتيب المواد. (دينارو: 2003، راجع المصدر الثاني). لكن الموسيقى تحوّلت، كجزء من الثقافة في فترة التنوير، إلى جزء من الصناعة التي تكسر حالة عدم الخضوع، وتجبرها على الخضوع لذات المعادلة الثابتة التي تبدّل المقطوعة الموسيقيّة. يتم التعبير عن هذا الانتصار من خلال الكلّي والتفاصيل، بما أن المعادلة ترسّخ الكلّي من دون علاقته مع التفاصيل. ففي مقال "صناعة الثقافة: التنوير وخدعة الجماهير"، يتناول هوركهايمر وأدورنو الأنماط المتكرّرة بصناعة الثقافة للمعادلة الثابتة في الموسيقى (أدورنو وهوركهايمر، المصدر الثالث 1947:162): "ليس فقط أنّه يتم تكرار الأنماط غير المتغيّرة بشكل دوريّ، مثل المشاهير ومسلسلات التلفزيون، بل حتّى المحتوى المعيّن للترفيه نابع من هذه الأنماط، وتغييره ظاهريّاً فحسب. فالتفاصيل والعناصر ذات قابليّة للتبديل. فسلسلة الأبعاد القصيرة لنوتة، وقوع البطل في فخ عابر(..) جميعها كالتفاصيل الأخرى كليشيهات جاهزة سلفاً يمكن استعمالهم في كل مكان. لا تتعدّى وظيفتهم دورهم في المخطّط الكامل. فالتأكيد على المخطّط يوفّر لهم الحق في وجودهم... ففي الموسيقى الخفيفة، يمكن للأذن المتدرّبة، بعد الاستماع إلى أوّل جملة موسيقيّة لأغنية مشهورة، تخمين بقيّتها، لتشعر بالسعادة عند تحقّق توقّعاتها. تطوّرت صناعة الثقافة إلى نظام ترفيهي (..) فيها يتم تفضيل تفاصيل تقنيّة عن المقطوعة التي روّجت الفكرة، وتمت تصفيتها معه".

كما نستنتج من هذا الاقتباس، رأى أدورنو أن ثقافة صناعة الثقافة "كيتش". وأن فكرتها تتجسّد في الموسيقى من خلال التنميط - مصطلح قام أدرونو ببلورته بسياق الموسيقى الخفيفية في مقاله "الموسيقى الجماهيريّة في المجتمع الرأسماليّ"(5) والذي ترجمته "معازف" في الجزء الثاني لهذا المقال. حيث يفسّر أن التنميط في المقطوعات يتجسّد من الميزات العامّة وحتى الخاصّة جداً. ويذكر مثالاً بارزاً: وظيفة اللازمة المحدّدة بـما يقارب الـ32 خانة موسيقيّة، تتجاوب مواضيع الأغاني مع المعايير وتقسّم إلى أنواع ثابتة، كذلك تتجاوب التفاصيل الصغيرة في الموسيقى الجماهيريّة مع المعايير، فعدد العناصر معروف سلفاً. مثلاً: "النوتات "القذرة"، الأكوردات، والتناغم في بداية ونهاية الأغنية، إذ يجب أن يكون هناك تناغماً أفضل من التناغم البدائي للمعادلة النموذجيّة المنمّطة. وبهذه الطريقة، تنفصل كل الإشكاليّات الموسيقيّة في المقطوعة عن النتيجة العامّة الثابتة والمعروفة سلفاً، وبالتالي: العام ممنوح سلفاً، وتقبّل الجمهور يسبق النتيجة. وبكلمات أدورنو: معطى سلفاً، مقبول سلفاً حتى قبل خوض التجربة ذاتها.

يحاجج أدورنو في المقال بأن الجمهور يدرك الأغاني كمنتوجات جديدة ومختلفة رغم معالجتها الثابتة. وذلك بسبّب ما أسماه "عنصر الفردانيّة" للتفاصيل داخل الأغاني كنتيجة لهذا العامل، يتجاوب الجمهور مع التفاصيل بدرجة أكبر من الكلّي، وهكذا يتناول المقطوعة كأغنية جديدة. إلا أنّه يفسّر أن عنصر الفردانيّة هو، في الواقع، شبه فرداني، وذلك لأن تفاصيل الموسيقى الجماهيريّة الخفيفة لن تشكّل الكلّي أبداً. فمن الممكن تغيير أماكن التفاصيل لأنّها ليست بذي أهميّة أو وظيفة حقيقيّة، مثل: أسماء الفرق أو الأغاني، وتصميم المنصّة ومقطوعات الارتجال. إذ توفّر كل هذه الأمور للمستمع شعوراً بأن ثمّة عناصر مميّزة في الأغنية بما يمكّنه من التعلّق بها، لكنّه شعور غير واقعي، حيث أن هذه التغيّرات لا تؤثّر في المعادلة الثابتة، كما وأنها تظهر كإمكانيّات وأصنافاً موسيقيّة كثيرة ومختلفة، لكنها في الواقع تشبه بعضها. تجربة المستمع الثابتة في الموسيقى الخفيفة لا تؤدّي إلا إلى ردود فعل منمّطة تدخل المستمع إلى منظومة ردود فعل ثابتة، وهذا ما يمنع عنه التجربة الفردانيّة. وذلك خلافاً لتجربة المستمع في الموسيقى الجادّة، حيث يهتم ويتعلّق بالحبكة المعروضة ويتساءل عمّا سيحدث لاحقاً وكيف ستتبلور، في هذه الحالة لا توجد معادلات ثابتة ومخطط جاهز، بل تبني العناصر المخطّط الكلّي وبالتالي تحافظ على فردانية ردود الفعل (كيفي : 2002، راجع المصدر الرابع).

فصناعة الموسيقى لا تضر بوظيفة الموسيقى والثقافة فحسب بل أيضاً بوعي الإنسان، وردود فعله وأنماط تفكيره. وبكلمات أدورنو "الموسيقى الجماهيريّة بشكل موضوعي ليست حقيقيّة وتؤدي إلى عجز في الوعي للمكشوفين إليه" (راجع مصدر رقم 6 1976:37-8). أما نتائجها المباشرة فبتنمية بشر غير مستقلين، وبلا قدرة على الحكم واتخاذ قرارات مدروسة.

رغم كتاباته العديدة عن صناعة الثقافة والموسيقى الجماهيريّة، إلا أن أدورنو كان واعياً بأن الحدود بين الموسيقى الجديّة والجماهيريّة ليست واضحة دائماً. ولعلها في الحاضر صارت حتى أقل وضوحاً، حيث أن الفترة التي تبلورت بها نظريّة أدورنو كانت فترة مشحونةً جداً في الحرب العالميّة الثانيّة، إضافة إلى حقيقة أن أدورنو لم يعتمد هذه النظريّة وفق أبحاث تطبيقيّة. أما الآن، في وقت تتعمّق فيه الرأسماليّة بحيث لا مجال لانهيارها إلا بانهيار الحياة كما نعرفها، إضافة إلى تعمّق صناعة الثقافة التجاريّة وترسيخها كطريقة حياة وثقافة مهيمنة وتداخلها بالنشاط السياسي، يمكن لنا أن نطرح تساؤلاتنا حول صلة النظريّة بواقعنا الآن، وحول نتائجها إذا ما قورنت بواقعنا في عصرنا هذا.

[نشرت المقالة للمرة الأولى على “معازف". يعاد نشرها بالاتفاق مع المجلة]

ما هو أكثر شيء تشتاق إليه؟ أجوبة اللاجئين السوريين

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ما هو أكثر شيء تشتاق إليه؟ أجوبة اللاجئين السوريين

[تمثل الأقوال التالية جزءاً من بحث مستمر يتناول مواضيع اللاجئين السوريين. وتقوم بهذا البحث الأستاذة روشيل ديفيس مع فريق من الباحثين في جامعة جورجتاون.  انقر هنا لقراءة المقالة التي نشرتها روشيل ديفيس وآبي تايلور في صيف 2013 والتي تتناول خلفية وسياق أزمة اللاجئين السوريين في لبنان والأردن.

النص: روشيل ديفيس وآبي تايلور. الصور: أندرو فارند وآبي تايلور. ساعد في التحرير والترجمة: لؤي الهاشمي، حسام الجولاني، غريس بنتون، إيما مورفي، نيكولاس غريفين. تحية تقدير لفريق بحث اللاجئين في الأردن ولبنان وللاجئين الذين تعاونوا وعملوا معنا.]

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هُجِّر حتى الآن حوالى ٤٠% من سكان سوريا من بيوتهم، وقد عبر حدود سوريا خلال الخمسة عشر شهراً الأخيرة أكثر من مليوني سوريٍّ كلاجئين إلى تركيا والعراق والأردن ولبنان. وبينما تابع بعضهم إلى الوجهة الجديدة بلغاريا فإن أولئك الذين قصدوا مصر واجهوا صعوبات كبرى تجلت في عدم الاستقرار وتضاؤل الخيارات والفرص وكل ذلك ناتج عن الاضطرابات الداخلية التي تعاني منها مصر. في الوقت نفسه اضطر سوريون آخرون إلى أن يتكبدوا عناء أكبر في سبيل الوصول إلى بلاد أوروبية مخاطرين بحياتهم أثناء سفرهم عن طريق البحر الأبيض المتوسط. 

وعندما أجرينا هذا الصيف لقاءات مع من هُجِّروا بسبب العنف والحرب، طرحنا على عدد منهم، ممن هربوا إلى الأردن ولبنان، سؤالاً محدداً :(ما هو أكثر شئ تفتقده/تفتقدينه أو تشتاق/تشتاقين إليه؟)، وفي هذه المقالة سنعرض بعضاً من إجاباتهم. إن كلماتهم والصور الحية التي استحضروها تحثنا على تذكّر من هم هؤلاء الناس، وما الذي تعنيه سوريا بالنسبة لهم، وما الذي فعله العنف بهم وبحياتهم، وكيف هم وملايين من أمثالهم سيتحملون هذه الحرب، وكيف ستساعدهم ذكرياتهم على إعادة بناء حياتهم. إنّ كلمات المهجّرين السوريين ستساعد القراء البعيدين عن واقع العنف هذا في تكوين فكرة أفضل عن واقع تهجيرهم وتجربتهم من خلال إجاباتهم على هذا السؤال البسيط.  في هذه المقالة ألحقنا إجابات اللاجئين السوريين و(الفلسطينيين) بصور من سوريا التقطها أندرو فارند عندما كان يدرس العربية في سوريا في عام ٢٠٠٥، وصور أخرى التقطتها آبي تايلور في عام ٢٠١٠.

ما هو أكثر شىء تشتاق/ين إليه؟

. امرأةعمرها٢٧ عاماًمنحمص،  في سورياوالآنفيالأردن

”مشتاقة كتير لبلدي لأشم ريحتها. ما عندي غير أمي هوني. أخواتي معتقلونهم بسوريا ٣ أخوة شباب. ما بنعرف عنهم أي شي. مشتاقة إلى أني إرجع لبلدي (أمين). “

. رجلعمره  ٦٨ عاماًمنحماة،سورياحالياًيسكنفيالأردن

”مشتاق لكرامتي. ومشتاق لابني لأنه موجد بمفرده مع هؤلاء الوحوش المجرمين.“ 

. امرأةعمرها٤٠عاماًمنريفدمشق،سوريا،والآنفيالاردن

”أكثر شي مشتاقتلو هو الوردات يلي ع البرندة تبع بيتي بسوريا ومشتاقة لحارتنا ولبيت أهلي (بيت الطفولة يلي ربيت فيه وهدموه قوات النظام). أكثر شخص مشتاقتلو جارتي لأنو هي أكتر حدا كنت شوفو وكانت منيحة وأخلاقها عالية ودمها خفيف.  إنشاء اللّه تكون بخير ويطلع زوجها من المعتقل بالسلامة.“ 

. رجلعمره٢٥ عاماًمنركنالدين،دمشق،سورياحالياًيسكونفيإربد،الأردن

”أنا أكتر شي بشتاق إلو هو رفقاتي يلي استشهدو وما بعرف بكرا لما ننتصر بإذن اللّه ونرجع عالبلد ما بتخيل شلون رح تكون حياتي بدونهن. أصحابي يلي كنا على طول سوا نطلع ونفوت سوا نضحك سوا ونبكي سوا نطلع بالمظاهرات سوا. اللّه يرحمهن.“  

. رجل فلسطيني عمره ٤٢عاماً من مخيم اليرموك، دمشق، يسكن حالياً في مخيم برج البراجنة، لبنان

” بشتاق لأيام الجمعة في الحارة. بعد الضهر كانو الجيران يتجمعو ويحكو قصص لنص الليل. بشتاق لبيتي وشغلي. أكتر شخص بشتاقلوه هو ابني إلي استشهد... الله يحفظ روحه.  بشتاق للحكي معه وسماع صوته. بشتاق احضنه... بشتاق أمر من باب غرفته واشوفه هو واصحابه بلعبو. الآن ما ضل حدا... كلهم راحو. بحكي مع اخوي إلي ضل في المخيم لما بتوفر تلفون بنطمن على بعض... الله يحفظه هو وعيلته...“

. رجلعمره٢١ عاماًمنقريةداعلفيمحافظةدرعا،سوريا؛يسكن حالياًفيإربد،الأردن

”أنا مشتاق لوطني، ولقريتنا ولبيتنا، مشتاق لرفقاتي يلي تشاركت معهن أحلى اللحظات، ومشتاق لشجر الزيتون وحقول القمح. مشتاق بالدرجة الأولى لحبيبتي يلي كان المفروض تكون خطيبتي لولا هالحرب يلي أعلنها النظام عالشعب.“

. امرأةعمرها١٩ عاماًمنإدلب،سوريا،والآنفيإربد،الأردن

”أكتر شخص مشتاقتلو هو بابا حبيبي يلي دفناه بسوريا (اللّه ينتقم من يلي قتلو).“

. رجلفلسطينيعمره٢٣عاماًمندمشق،سوريا، الآنفيلبنان

”مشتاق لبيتنا. (أكتر شخص مشتاق له) صديقي أنس تربينا سوى واستشهد السنة الماضية. بفكر بالأيام يلي عشناها سوى والأشياء يلي كنا نعملها وكانت أحلى أيام.“  

. رجلعمره٣٧ عاماًمنمدينةمعضميةالشام،ريفدمشق،سورياالآنفيإربد،الأردن

”أكتر شي بشتاق لأبي وأمي وأخواتي وجيراني يلي ما استطاعو أنو يخرجو واختارو أنو يبقو بسوريا. وبحاول أتصل فيهن كل ما سمحتلي الفرصة عن طرق الهاتف أو عن طرق النت.“ 

. امرأةعمرها٢١ عاماًمنمدينةدمشق،سورياالآنفيإربد،الأردن

”أكتر شي مشتاقتلو هن رفقاتي وأخي يلي ضل بسوريا عمحارب مع الجيش الحر.“ 

 

ومن بين هؤلاء المهجَّرين فلسطينيون هُجِّرت عائلاتهم في عام ١٩٤٨عندما تم ”تأسيس“ دولة إسرائيل، حيث أقاموا في سوريا وقد تجاوز عددهم فيها النصف مليون. ومما يعقِّد وضعهم وقدرتهم على اللجوء خارج سوريا هو أنهم شعب عانى مسبقاً من حالة عدم الأمان والتهجير المتكرر ولطالما تخبطوا مابين وطن يعرفونه (سوريا) ووطن يتوقون إلى العودة إليه. وبينما ترفض الأردن دخولهم، تسمح لهم لبنان بالدخول إلا أن كلفة المعيشة المرتفعة وصعوبة حياتهم هناك كفلسطينيين تشكل عقبة كبيرة أمامهم وقد بلغ عدد اللاجئين هناك سبعين ألفاً.  وقد اتبع كل اللاجئين من سوريا نفس خطوات أولئك الذين سبقوهم من المهاجرين واللاجئين الفلسطينيين والعراقيين والأكراد والسودانيين راجين الأمان والملجأ والعمل والتعليم والمجتمع والاستقرار داخل العالم العربي وخارجه.

. رجلعمره٤٥ عاماًمنمدينةحرستا،سوريا،يسكنحالياًفيإربد،الأردن

”قررت أخد عيلتي ونجي عل الأردن. وأحنا جايين على الطريق وقفنا حاجز أمن وشافو هوياتنا وأخدو ابني الكبير وكلنا صرنا نبكي. ونقلن مشان اللّه اتركوه بس ما كانو يردو علينا وقالو أنو له اسم عندنا من بين الأسماء المطلوبة. اللّه لا يوفئهن! و بعدها مرتي بطلت تترك البلد لأنو كيف بدها تروح و هي ما بتعرف ابنها وينو؟ وإذا طلع بمين بدو يتصل؟ وهلاء إلنا شي ٨ شهور ما منعرف شي عنو. ومرتي ضلت بسوريا عند أقربائها هي و بنتي الصغيرة. وأنا جبت ولادي البقيانين لهون عن طريق اللجوء إلى مخيم الزعتري. وبعد ما أجا أخي عل الأردن واستأجر بيت. طلعت من الزعتري وسكنت معو. واختلفت حياتي هون كتير. تشردت عيلتي وما عندي شغل اشتغلو. وعندي خوف دائم من المستقبل. سجلت بالمفوضية من جديد ولسا دوري ما أجا لهلأ. أنا هون على طول بقلق دائم بتعذب كتير لائدر أطمن على مرتي وبنتي بسبب قطع الاتصال .وعلى طول بضل بسأل حالي يا ترى ابني عايش ولا لا. كيف عم يأكل، كيف عم يشرب، وأكيد عم يعذبوه. 

أنا على طول بحلم أرجع على سوريا وعلى بيتي يللي مشتاقله أكتر شي والزريعة يللي كنت على طول أسقيها. ومشتاق للطيور يللي كنت عم ربيهن عل سطح بيتي وبفقدلن كتير هنن وبيتي يللي قضيت كل عمري فيو ويللي أتهدم. وأملي كبير بالله أنو أرجع و أبنيه وعيش فيه بقية عمري. وإذا ما راح بشار الظالم ما رح نحسن نرجع لأنو مجرد ما نفوت عل البلد. رح يعتقلوني متل ما اعتقلو ابني. 

وأكتر واحد مشتاقله هي بنتي الصغيرة يللي كانت ما تتركني أبدا وتروح معي وين ما روح. وهي حبيبة قلبي. وهون أنا والناس أكتر سيرة منحكي فيها عن أخبار سوريا. وأكتر شي بخاف منو هو أنو موت هون وما أرجع على بلدي وأنو هي الحرب تطول أكتر من هيك.“ 

. رجلفلسطينيعمره٤٦ عاماًمنمخيمجرمانا،الآنفيلبنان

”حياتي هون متل الرجل العوق. ما بعمل شي. بضل بهالبيت وبدور على شغل. بس بسوريا كانت أحوال غير. كنت أشتغل وكان عندي أصدقاء كتير أزورهم. مشتاق لمخيم جرمانا. مشتاق لصوت الأطفال بالشارع وعم يلعبوا. مشتاق لأهلي بالذات أخوي الكبير يلي كان يساعدني ودايما يطل علينا. بفكر أي سفارة فاتحة الهجرة لأنو كرهان العيشة هون.“

 

. رجلعمره٤١ عاماًمنريفحلب،سوريا،الآنفيالأردن

”من أكثر الأشياء المشتاق إليها عملي، كنت أعمل (فني كندشن) وأشتاق لممارسة العمل من جديد. ومن أكثر الأشخاص الذين أشتاق لهم والدي (أمي وأبي) لأنهم سبب تعليمي، و تربيتي، وصنعي رجل.“

. رجلعمره ٢٣عاماًمنحمص،سوريا،الآنفيعمان  الأردن

”مشتاق لحارتي وأكتر شي مشتاق للجامعة وللقاعات وللمحاضرات لأن أحلى أيام حياتي هي بالجامعة. تقريبا كل أقاربي صاروا هون بالأردن وأكتر واحد مشتاق له هو رفيق الجامعة. هو معتقل سجون النظام من سنة وما بعرف عنو شي وأنا خايف عليه.“ 

. رجلفلسطينيعمره٢٣ عاماًمنمخيميرموك،دمشق،سوريا،حالياًيسكنفيلبنان

”مشتاق للفلافل الشامي. اخوي ابراهيم الله يرحمه استشهد ودايما بفكر فيه. بفكر بأخوي والأطفال يلي استشهدو معه.“ 

. شخصعمره٣٥ عاماًمنحماة،سوريا،الآنفيالأردن

”الحياة هون تختلف عن هناك. وهون أعيش بالغربة والحياة صعبة والمعيشة غالية. أحسن شي هون هو الأمان، أحسن من هناك. أكتر شي مشتاق له أن أرجع إلى بلدي وشوف أهلي، أرضي، وبلدتي. أكتر واحد مشتاق له هو والدي لأنني هربت من سوريا ولا أعرف عنه شي.“   

. رجل عمره٢٤ منقريةجاسم،محافظةدرعا،سورياالآنفيإربد،الأردن

”أكتر شي مشتاقلو هو أمي يعني شاء القدر أنو تكون هي ببلد و أنا ببلد. هي موجودة بالسعودية واتصالي فيها أغلبو عن طريق النت. والشخص التاني هو صديقي يلي موجود حاليا مع الجيش الحر بس تواصلي معو قليل جدا بحكم أنو الإتصالات سيئة والنت سيئ وأصلا في حال توفر النت هو ما عندو الوقت ليستخدمو.“ 

. رجل عمره٢٣ عاماًمندمشق،سوريايسكنحالياًفيبيروت،لبنان

مشتاق لغراضي وجامعتي ومرسمي ورفقاتي. مشتاق أرجع أسهر وأطلع وأفوت ع الشام بحرية وبدون حواجز. مشتاق لحبيبتي للي سافرت ع السويد مع عيلتا. هي كانت أملي الكبير بالحياة. بفكر فيها كتير وكيف كان ممكن نتجوز ونعيش مع بعض. كمان هي مسيحية. بتواصل هلاء مع رفقاتي وقرايبيني ع النت أو ع الموبايل. هاد الحل الوحيد بما أنو ما قادر أشوفن.“ 

تُعْتبر مدينة حمص، وهي ثالث أكبر المدن السورية، مركزاً من مراكز سوريا التجارية والزراعية ومسقط رأس لمجموعة متنوعة من السكان المعروفين بكونهم متدينين ومحافظين. وقد كانت حمص مقراً لبعض المظاهرات منذ بدايات الثورة مما جعلها هدفاً لقوات جيش النظام في شهر أيار/مايو عام ٢٠١١. وقد ترك الآلاف من سكان حمص بيوتهم في العديد من أنحاء المدينة نتيجة للقتال المستمر والذي دمر العديد من البيوت والشوارع، حيث بلغت نسبة المهاجرين من حمص وقراها المجاورة حوالي ١٥٪ من إجمالي اللاجئين السوريين في لبنان أي مئة وستة عشر ألف حمصي من الثمانمئة وخمسين ألف سوري في لبنان مشكلين بذلك أكبر مجموعة لاجئين من حيث المصدر الجغرافي. أما في الأردن فيشكل اللاجئون من حمص ثاني أكبر مجموعة بعد اللاجئين من أهالي منطقة درعا جنوب سوريا. في الوقت نفسه أصبح الكثير من أحياء مدينة حمص نفسها ملجأ لأشخاص آخرين ممن هُجِّروا بسبب القتال في مناطق أخرى في البلد. وقد أورد مكتب الأمم المتحدة لتنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية (أوتشا) أنه في شهر آب/أغسطس عام ٢٠١٣ أصبح حي الوعر في حمص مأوى لأربعمئة وخمسين ألف شخصاً ثمانون بالمئة منهم مُهجَّرون داخلياً.

هكذا وصف المهجّرون ما يشتاقون إليه:

. امرأة عمرها٤١ عاماًمنحمص،سوريا  الآنفيالأردن

”مشتاقة لسوريا، للهوا والمي ومشتاقة أتنفس هوا حمص. أكتر شي مشتاقة روح على قبر أمي وأبي وأوعيهم وأطلب منهم يرضوا عني يسامحوني.“   

. رجل عمره٣١ عاماًمنحمص،الآنفيالأردن

”مشتاق لابني الذي ذبح أمام أعيننا و فقدت زوجتي عقلها وهي تنظر إلى ابنها وكيف تأكله الوحوش. وأقف صافنة في وجهي كل يوم كيف أنتقم منالشبيح ورئيسه الذي هو بشار. أعتذر عن الإجابة. وكما أنني مشتاق إلى والدتي. كل يوم يزداد حنيني واشتياقي لكل شيء في بلدي من ماء و ناس و بحره نهره وينابيعه.“  

. امرأة عمرها٤٦ عاماًمنباباعمرو،حمص،سورياتسكنحالياًفيعمان،الأردن

”مشتاقة لهوى حمص، لأهلي و لجيراني. بحكي معهن بس قليل لأن الاتصالات ضعيفة بسوريا. عادة لما نحكي مع بعض بيكون حديثنا عن الوضع في سوريا و إيمتراح نرجع ومن استشهد ومن اعتُقل.“ 

. رجلعمره١٧ عاماًمنحمص،سوريا؛يسكنحالياًفيبيروت،لبنان

”سوريا بدها ناس ترسم ع الحيط قلب حب، و هاد أحلى من السلاح.  وأنا بدي أرسم ع باب غرفتي قلب حب، وع باب جيرانا وردة، وع بيت رفيقي شمس. ما في عنا هون مدرسة زي تبعنا وما في رفقات زي رفقاتي. مشتاق لرفيقي جورج، و ما بعرف عنو شي هلأ. ما بعرف وين سافرو، و راحو. مشتاق أروح معو ع الكنيسة تبعن، ويروح معي ع الجامع. أبوي كل فترة بيحكي مع رفقاتي اللي بحمص وبيطمن ع بيتنا، وبيقلي انو منيح البيت. بس أكون أنا وسامر، منحكي عن جورج، وعن أمو وعن شجرة العيد التبعن. منحكي عن المدرسة وآنسة الرسم والموسيقى. بتمنى ترجع سوريا متل ما كانت حلوة وما فيها دخان أسود. بخاف من بكرا أنو ما أقدر أرجع ع بيتنا.“

. امرأةمنبابدريب،حمص،سوريا  الآنفيالأردن

”هلأ هون مشتاقة لكل شي لأنو ما عندي شي أبداً أبداً غير ثيابي وعندي غطا. أكثر شي مشتاقتله هو بيتي وأكثر واحد مشتاقتله هو ماما لأن البابا توفى وهي بحالها.“

تدور إجابات اللاجئين على سؤال "ما أكثر شيء يشتاقون إليه" حول ذكرياتهم عن أماكن وتجارب متعلقة بهذه الأماكن، وهم مدركون تماماً أن الكثير من تلك الأماكن لم تعد بنفس الهيئة التي يتذكرونها بها ومع ذلك فإنهم يحتفظون بذكرياتهم التي لن يتمكن العنف من طمسها. وتُظهر إجاباتهم على سؤالنا تعلقهم القوي ليس فقط بسوريا والأماكن فيها بل أيضاً بالأشخاص الذين شاركوهم الذكريات من الأصدقاء والأقارب والجيران الذين هم جزء من هذه الذكريات وقد كان البعض منهم قد مات أو راح إلى الأبد.

. امرأةعمرها٢٠ عاماًمنالميدان،دمشق،سوريا،الآنفيالأردن

”مشتاقة لكل سوريا. مشتاقة للشام كثير وأسواق الشام و جبل قاسيون. ومشتاقة أمشي بشارع الحميدية ولكل شارع بالشام. مشتاقة أكتر شي لخالتي الصغيرة لأن هي من نفس عمري وكنا رفقات وأخوة. وطبعاً مشتاقة لكل الناس يلي بيعرفهم. أكتر شي بفكر فيه أرجع على سوريا وشوفها محررة.“ 

رجلعمره٢٥ عاماً مندرعا،سوريا،يسكنالآنفيإربد،الأردن

”أكتر شيء مشتاق له هو جلسات السهر مع أصدقائي وأقاربي على شفى وادي اليرموك. ومشتاق "لطبخات" أمي... أمي هي أكتر شخص مشتاق له... أكتر شيء بفكر فيه هو كيف بدي أرجع عسوريا ؟!.. بفكر كيف بدو يسقط هالنظام.“

. امرأة عمرها ٣٠ عاماً من دمشق، تسكن حالياً في إربد، الأردن

"أكتر شي بشتاقلوا سوف الحميدية. بشتاق أمشي بشوارع دمشق. واكتر شخص بشتاقلوا هو شخص في قلبي وبحبه. بشتاق لاولاد اختي لصغار ورفيقاتي. بشتاق للصغار اكتر من لكبار."

. رجلعمره٢٥ عاماً منالقامشلي،شمالشرقسوريايسكنالآنفيإربد،الأردن

”مشتاق لحارتي ولشجر الجزيرة ولموسم الحصاد بقامشلو. أكتر شخص مشتاقلو هو والدي لأنو هو نمّى فكري وعرفني كيف أمور الحياة وعطول بيدعمني .“

. امرأة  فلسطينية عمرها٤٠ عاماًمنمخيماليرموكوالآنفيلبنان

”مشتاقة اقعد بالمرسم ورفيقتي كانت معي بالجامعة و ضلينا على تواصل سوى بعد ما تجوزنا وما بعرف وين صارت.“ 

. امرأةفلسطينيةمنمخيمحجيرة،دمشق، وتسكنحالياًفيمخيم  برجالبراجنة،بيروت،لبنان 

”مشتاقة...ما بعرف...مشتاقة لأهلي، ولجوزي الأول ( يلي استشهد ببداية الثورة ولجوزي التاني يلي انقتل ما صرلو زمان )، ولجيراني، ولطلابي، ولمدرستي وحارتي و شارعي وبيتي، مشتاقة لكل شي. مشتاقة لحضن أمي، بعدني بحكي معها كل فترة، ع الموبايل أو الأرضي.“ 

وأثناء المقابلات أكد السوريون القاطنون في الأردن إحساسهم بالأمن والأمان في الأردن مقرين وشاكرين للجميل. أما في لبنان فينتشر اللاجئون السوريون في كل أنحاء البلد نازلين إما في بيوت مهجورة أو تحت أسقف أو أبنية خاوية أو مازالت غير مكتملة أو حتى في مخيمات اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في لبنان. كما يتلقون القليل من الخدمات فلا مياه ولا كهرباء ولا مراحيض، وما يبقيهم على قيد الحياة هو عملهم وكرم مضيفيهم اللبنانيين والإعانات الدولية التي يتلقونها. إلا أنه مع مرور الوقت يزداد المهجَّرون فقراً، وتزداد الحساسيات بينهم وبين مضيفيهم، ويزداد تعلقهم بمجموعات اللاجئين الأخرى، أو باللاجئين المحليين، والذين عاش بعضهم حروباً كثيرة وعانوا من الإقصاء والتهجير.

. رجلعمره٢١عاماًمندرعا،يسكنالآنفيإربد،الأردن

”اتعرفت على بعض الأصدقاء يلي ظروفهن بتشبه ظروفي و قويتْ صداقتنا بسرعة. بس رغم هيك بضل في حنين لأصدقائي يلي كانو بسوريا و يلي صار كل واحد منهون ببلد. أكتر شي بشتقلو هو حياتي بسوريا... رفقاتي يلي استشهدو منهون يلي مات بإطلاق النار منهن من استشهد تحت التعذيب بالمعتقلات. حياتي رح تكون صعبة بدونهن لأنهن كانو جزء أساسي من حياتي. كنا أكتر من أخوة. ولما نرجع رح انتقل من فراغ لفراغ آخر. لأنو ما في شي بيقدر يعوضني عنهن.“  

. امرأةفلسطينيةعمرها٢٧ عاماً،منإدلب،سورياتسكنحالياًفيمخيمبرجالبراجنة،بيروت،لبنان

”مشتاقة ل كل شي، انو أرجع عبلدي وثم ريحة الهوا هناك وانو حياتنا المرتاحة هناك عالقليله بتفتحي الحنفية و بتشربي. اخواتي هناك، لأن بخاف اخسرهم.“ 

 

. 

. رجلعمره٣٣ عاماًمنسوريايسكنحالياًفيالهاشميالشمالي،الأردن

”لا يوجد وجه تشابه بين حياتي هوني و حياتي بسوريا، الفرق شاسع. هنيك الواحد لا يمل هون كل شي ملل في البيت والشغل. مشتاق لأهلي وأصحابي إللي تعودت عليهن. كلنا كل أسبوع نجتمع في بيت أخواتي نأكل سوا ونحكي سوا.“  

إن الرغبة في العودة إلى سورية إلى الأمان والاستقرار الذي يسمح لهم بالعودة إلى حياتهم تجلت في إجابات معظم الأشخاص من خلال المقابلات التي أجريناها في حزيران ٢٠١٣ والتي تجاوز عددها المئة. فما الذي يجعل الناس متعطشين للعودة هكذا؟ ما الذي يجعلهم يريدون الرجوع؟ إن إجاباتهم على سؤال "ما أكثر شيء يشتاقون إليه" يعرض لنا لمحة عن العناصر الأساسية التي تُعرِّفهم وتحدد كيانهم وكيف يرون أنفسهم وكيف يرون سوريا، وهذه العناصر هي الحياة الكريمة والعائلة والبيت والعمل والطبيعية من حولهم كالأرض والهواء والنباتات بالإضافة إلى إنجازاتهم وأصدقائهم والجيران والرفاق. لا تكشف إجاباتهم فقط عما يفتقدونه في حياتهم الحالية في الملجأ ولكن أيضاً عن الأشياء التي كان لها معنى عميق في حياتهم في سوريا. فضلاً عن ذلك، تكشف هذه الإجابات أيضاً عن العديد من الصعوبات التي واجهوها قبل بداية النزاع ومن أهمها الفساد والرشوة.

. امرأةفلسطينيةعمرها٤٣ منمخيمحسينية،دمشق،سورياوالآنفيلبنان

”مشتاقة لبيت أهلي بجرمانا. مشتاقة لأبوي منشان أنا يلي كنت أخدمه وأساعده وكنت أقضي وقت كبير معه. بفكر كيف عم يقدر يأمن حاجاته وكيف صحته منشان أنا يلي كنت أساعده.“ 

. امرأةفلسطينيةمنمخيميرموك،دمشق،سوريا،والآنفيلبنان

”أكتر شي مشتاقتلو في سوريا هو المخيم، أخوي، و أصدقائي. أكتر شخص مشتاقتلو هو أخوي و جارتي أم إياد المرأة ابنها استشهد وما إلها حدا تروح عندو. وأخوي ممنوع من السفر. بفكر في الرجعة. بحس هونيك حياتي وبيتي وأمان أكتر.“

 

 شخصعمره٥٧مندرعا. شخصعمره٥٧ مندرعاويسكنالآنفيإربد،الأردن

”ببلدي كنت روح زور أقاربي وأصدقائي وشوف ولادي كلهم مع أحفادي مجتمعين حواليي، كتير بحنّ لجمعة الألفة هي، وبدعي رب العالمين دايماً أنو يلتم شملنا وأني ما موت إلا عأرض بلادي. وبشتاق لبيتي يلي عمرتو وتعبت وشقيت حتى كمّلت بنائو ولأرضي يلي بذرتها وزرعتها بعرق جبيني وكد ذراعي. كل شي ببلدي إلو معنى وذكرى خاصّة بقلبي لهيك بفضل أقول أنو شوقي لبلدي بيختصر كل شي حلو بيخطر ببالي.“ 

[ للنسخة الإنجليزي اضغط/ي هنا ]

O.I.L. Media Roundup (24 January)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Occupation, Intervention and Law and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the O.I.L. Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each biweekly roundup to OIL@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every other week.] 

Palestine-Israel

Israel's African Asylum Seekers Go on Strike, Ruth Margalit
The New Yorker covers the opposition of African migrants in Israel to laws recently passed in Israel carrying harsh punishments for the undocumented.

The End of Palestine? An Interview with Norman G. Finkelstein, Jamie Stern-Weiner
Stern-Weiner interviews noted scholar of the Palestine-Israel conflict Norman Finkelstein on the current negotiations between US Secretary of State John Kerry and Israeli and Palestinian Authority officials.

Palestinian Authority Official Criticizes Peace Talks under Kerry, Maher Abukhater
The Los Angeles Times reports on Palestinian Authority criticisms of peace talks between Isreal and the PA, noting PA concerns that Kerry has slowed the talks to a crawl due to an emphasis on Israeli security concerns. 

Israei Announces New Settlement Construction in Occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem, William Booth
The Washington Post provides a report on Israeli plans to build 1,400 new houses and apartments on Palestinian territory.

The Truth about Israel's Secret Nuclear Arsenal, Julian Borger
Borger criticizes the Israeli practice of demanding Iran halt its nuclear program while refusing to acknowledge its own nuclear stockpile.

Israel's Appalling Crime-Sheet for 2013, Stuart Littlewood
Intifada: Voice of Palestine provides a summary of Israeli violations of international law in 2013.

Palestinian Christians "Not Really Arabs," Says Senior Israeli Lawmaker, Ali Abunimah
Yariv Levin, leader of the government coalition in the Knesset, has proposed laws granting Palestinian Christian citizens of Israel privileges setting them apart from Muslim Palestinians.

Egyptian Judiciary

Egypt's Morsi to Face Trial on New Charges, Al-Jazeera English
The Egyptian government has indicated former President Mohamed Morsi will face trial on charges of "insulting the judiciary," along with twenty-four politicians, lawyers, and media personalities.

Three Al-Jazeera Egypt Journalists 'Facing Charges,' BBC News
Egypt has detained three Al-Jazeera journalists on charges of broadcasting false news and fake footage, charges the Qatar-based network denies.

Why the Muslim Brotherhood (Wrongly) Believes the ICC Can Investigate, Kevin Jon Heller
Heller, writing for Opinio Juris, unpacks and criticizes the view of the Muslim Brotherhood that they may affirm ICC jurisdiction in Egypt on account of their being the legitimate government of Egypt.

Syrian Conflict

Palestinians Die from Hunger, Medical Shortages in Yarmouk, The Daily Star
The Lebanese paper carries a report on documented deaths of Palestinian refugees in the Syrian Yarmouk camp from food and medical shortages.

The Syrian War's Private Donors Lose Faith, Elizabeth Dickinson
Dickinson covers the reluctance of private donors to rebel groups in the Syrian conflict to continue donating given their perception of the conflict as stagnating.

Counting Syria's Dead: Numberless, Alas, The Economist
The Economist reports on the difficulty of obtaining reliable statistics on casualties and deaths in Syria.

While You Were Neutral about Yarmouk, Talal Alyan
Political neutrality is to blame for the horrors faced by Palestinian refugees in the Syrian Yarmouk camp, writes Alyan for Mondoweiss.


Ariel Sharon

Former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon Dies at 85, Dimi Reider
+972 provides reporting on the death of Ariel Sharon and a general overview of his life and tenure as Israeli Prime Minister.

How Ariel Sharon Shaped Israel's Destiny, Max Blumenthal
Blumenthal notes that the late former Israeli Prime Minister brought about a "separation regime" in Israel and Palestine, one not intended not to end occupation but prolong it indefinitely.

Troubled Legacy of a Bulldozer, Vijay Prashad
Writing for The Hindu, Prashad criticizes the settlements furthered under Ariel Sharon.

Top Ten Ways Ariel Sharon Ruined Israel and the Middle East, Juan Cole
Cole critically eulogizes the late former Israeli Prime Minister.

Ariel Sharon's Corrosive Legacy, Raja Shehadeh
Shehadeh, writing for The New Yorker, counts Ariel Sharon among leaders in the Middle East who have done the least to further peace in the region.


Other

Iran and IAEA Postpone Nuclear Talks until February, Reuters
The UN nuclear watchdog has announced it will meet with Iran to discuss concerns with its nuclear program on 8 February of this year, a date later than expected.

On the Fallacy of 'Engaging' with the Israeli Academy, Haim Bresheeth and Sherna Berger Gluck
Writing in Counterpunch, Bresheeth and Gluck push back against the anti-BDS argument that activists against Israeli occupation "need to engage with Israelis" more.

I Helped Destroy Falluja in 2004. I Will Not Be Complicit Again, Ross Caputi
Caputi, a former US Marine during the 2004 fighting in Falluja in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq, criticizes the US media narrative of Falluja as a city being "taken over" by al-Qaeda.


Matter Matters

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Ralf Brand and Sara Fregonese,The Radicals' City: Urban Environment, Polarization, Cohesion.Surrey: Ashgate, 2013.

The Radicals’ City is a rich and illuminating book on the intricate relations between the urban environment as a material setting and socio-spatial conflict-related phenomena, such as radicalization, polarization, and social cohesion. Brand and Fregonese’s message is simple but raises at the same time profound philosophical and existential questions regarding the human and built environment relations; it invites us to take objects seriously.

For Brand and Fregonese, the urban environment is simultaneously mirror and mediator. Social tensions and conflicts project themselves on the objects of the urban environment, affecting their shapes, locations, dispositions, and functions. However, these objects also mediate conflicts by making it easier or harder for specific groups to act. They provide opportunities for meeting or for confrontation. This conceptualization of the urban environment means that, for example, when studying graffiti, one needs to be not only attentive to their symbolic message and their location, but also to the kind of paint on the wall where they are drawn. The graffiti’s message may mirror the tension of the conflict, its location, and the geography of the conflict, while the paint on the wall may mediate the conflict, by rendering the graffiti possible or not (if it is painted in black, for instance), obdurate or easily removable.

Objects are not the “causes” of the conflict and the way it evolves, but neither are they neutral and inconsequential. Understanding this is crucial in an era marked by the rise of the Fortress City with its securitization and anti-terrorism narratives.[1] It allows a critical approach and an alternative to today’s dominant near-ideological conceptualizations of radicalization and polarization, and their consequences in terms of stigmatization of whole communities, militarization of urban space, and control of political space.

In the following, I will address the book as it is structured and presented, before I discuss the input of this approach on thinking and acting on the urban environment in the context of Arab and Middle Eastern cities.

The Book

The Radical’s City is an easy book to read. With its one hundred fifteen figures and illustrations, it makes the message visual and relatively accessible to a lay reader. In fact, it addresses researchers and students interested in urban conflict and professionals and policymakers involved in urban security—but also, as its dedication says, “all who realize that matter matters.” The book is structured in three parts. In the first, the authors present the research project. The second part presents four case studies: Belfast, Beirut, Berlin, and Amsterdam. The third section examines the research findings and presents recommendations for urban planners and urban security practitioners. In the last section, interviews with major scholars in the field (Bollens, Pullan, Gaffikin, and Calame) interestingly materialize the authors’ reflexivity and transparency omnipresent concerns.

The representation of polarization as a multiform process allows the authors to study very different situations with varying polarization “levels”: Belfast and its “Troubles” heritage[2]; Beirut and its civil war history; peaceful Amsterdam and the tensions in some migrants’ neighborhoods; and Berlin and the low-key presence of neo-Nazis in some parts of the city. Through the richly documented case studies, the authors mobilize a diversity of heteroclite “objects” in their analysis of polarization. In Belfast, they identify the urban environment’s elements like “Peace Walls,” curb stones, and murals that mirror the macro and micro geographies of the conflict at the urban level. In Beirut, they decode the subtle ways the latent conflict projects itself through studying banal objects like trash-cans and the color of stripes in the parking lot of a mall, as well as the less subtle ones produced by defensive architecture, communitarian marking of territory, and militarized urban space. In Berlin, they track neo-Nazis’ semiotics geography and modes of operation through café and shop signs’ fonts, coded graffiti, particular cloth stores, snow-drawn swastikas, flags, and the route and schedule of the U5 metro line. In Amsterdam, they examine how objects like the color and kind of paint in tunnels, a mosque project, the location of alcohol shops, and window openings contribute to the calming or exacerbation of potential and actual intercultural tensions in the city. They also examine the different roles these objects play during diverse temporalities of the conflict.

One of the most expressive examples of the complexity of objects’ role in conflict situations is the sudden rise of communitarian incidents in 2007 near the Westlink motorway separating Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods in Belfast, after the construction of a pedestrian bridge over the motorway. This bridge should link a large metropolitan hospital on the Catholic side to Protestant neighborhoods on the other side. However, wheelchair accessibility regulations and requirements, and the need for the building of a ramp, led to moving the bridge forty meters away from the initial position traced by urban planners. Overlooking residential neighborhoods, the bridge thus became an ideal platform for youngsters in their hit-and-run projectiles’ launch on the other side. The unforeseen consequences of simple regulations seem to have had more dramatic effects on the lengthy efforts of reconciliation than any particular event or incendiary speech in this period.

In the four case studies, the authors identify different spatial patterns for different degrees of polarization and radicalization. There are different conceptions of segregation, grievances, ideological propaganda, recruitment, rallying points, and assault strategies, which affect different spaces. Belfast represents the extreme case of polarization and radicalization, where material separation elements reinforce social segregation. The materiality of the conflict—and of the reconciliation effort—concerns first and foremost the areas of the demarcation lines between the Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods. This is comparable to Beirut, which is segregated but not partitioned. The demarcation line and the city center are still the primary areas affected by, and reflecting, communitarian polarizations, but they are not the only ones. Except for certain places, like the seaside Corniche strip, practically every public space reflects or mediates these polarizations at the macro and micro levels. Even private meeting places like malls, wanting to maintain their “neutrality,” are very attentive to the details of their inner built environment (such as the colors of the paint[3]), which should not suggest political affiliation.

The case of Beirut is also interesting, as it allows for a questioning of the role of temporality. The same built environment, like the city center’s streets and public spaces, could encourage occasionally large gatherings, like the demonstrations of 8 and 14 March 2005. It can also restrict access or mobility through defensive space devices, as it has done repeatedly over the last few years. Conversely, in peaceful Amsterdam, polarization is not articulated around identifiable parties and their agendas, but rather around cultural differences, such as the tensions between migrant—mainly Muslim—communities’ culture and mainstream Dutch culture. Some migrants’ difficulties in articulating their original culture and that of the host society are expressed through, and are affected by, built environment elements. Strategies of occupying, organizing, and regulating public and meeting spaces in migrant neighborhoods and material devices that serve as fixes in such strategies express it clearly.

In Berlin, the authors chose to focus on the neo-Nazis radical group, and the way they deploy spatially their social and militant activities. What makes territorialization particular here is that it does not want to be seen. On the contrary, it seeks to avoid social and state surveillance by developing coded modes of operation and space-marking. Consequently, and more than in other cases, the semiotic dimension of material objects this group displays—or diverts—in urban space is of strategic importance: it must allow recognition by the insider but evade the untrained eye.          

In the last part of the book, the authors go through the twenty-one recommendations of their proposed Charter for Spaces of Positive Encounter. The charter is divided into three parts: urban environment as mirror; urban environment as mediator; and facilitating friendly encounters. The authors make very interesting recommendations, such as their call for devolving the responsibility of building environment-related interventions at the local level. Recommendations seven and eight argue: “Knowledge generated at the micro-level must find ways to move upstream to inform some interventions at higher levels.… Anti-polarization organizations should be consulted during seemingly ordinary planning processes—and they should proactively seek engagement in such processes.” They also underscore how segregation causes polarization, and how the way it is experienced in people’s everyday life and concrete practices is crucial. They warn against the obduracy of physical partition elements that can “lag” behind the improvement of socio-political situations, indirectly perpetuating segregation and hostilities. As for spaces of “friendly encounters,” they note how perceived security, equal treatment of communities and groups, and the absence of potentially offending symbols in public spaces, as well as the design process of such spaces, are crucial elements for success.

The findings of the authors seem to be shared by the interviewed scholars. As emphasized by Pullan, who sees polarization as “primarily spatial,” and Bollens, who stresses the “power of urbanism,” materiality is definitely seen in emerging urban conflict scholarship as a central concern. The authors emphasize: “After some time, most [habits and ingrained routines that develop around changes to the physical environment due to conflict tension] are out of reach from cognitive scrutiny and can turn residents into some kind of somnambulists.” Understanding the process of polarization and dealing with it is thus crucial for cities: “Almost all cities are characterized by a certain degree of disputes and controversies, but not all of them end up in inferno.”

An Inspiring Approach for Analysis of and Action on Urban Environments in Middle Eastern Cities

In these years of ubiquitous unrest and turmoil in Arab and Middle Eastern countries, this idea that polarization could be better dealt with by being more attentive to the urban environment’s situation is quite inspiring, but also very challenging. Of course, countries’ strife could hardly be reduced to issues related to the built environment’s organization. However, ignoring this dimension would be eluding a substantive element for understanding the ways polarization and conflict take place and evolve. In fact, in the whole region, the materiality of urban space is an essential element in ongoing social mobilization, in the daily evolution of military operations, as well as in the deployment of anti-terrorism preventive measures.

Today, there is a large controversy regarding the rising importance of virtual space and ICT in opening up new channels for political expression and mobilization and, paradoxically, new technologies of control. However, lesser importance is given to the physical form of the city and its role in encouraging or undermining gatherings, stealth movement, barricading, encampment, and other tactical activities that seem to have strategic value in the current evolution of political polarization and conflicts in the region.

Of course, urban form has been long studied as an essential element in conflict situations, especially in urban geography.[4] In the Arab and Middle Eastern region, war-torn cities like Beirut and—more recently—Baghdad have been the “usual suspects” of those studies.[5] But I believe there is an enormous deficit in our understanding of the role that urban space’s materiality plays in polarization in cities, beyond the particular cases of war conflict. In fact, few works treat polarization and the city beyond conflict situations. Based on the study of the demographic, social, and economic evolution of the region in the last decades, many authors did predict change. However, neither academics nor politicians foresaw the speed and the explosive consequences of such change. Would an analytical approach, like that provided by Brand and Fregonese, permit a better understanding of the phenomenon? Would it serve to grasp its actual evolution in different cities?

Academics, politicians, planning professionals, and social activists are now faced with a situation where our knowledge and understanding of the city is not sufficient—or even useful—to grasp the potentialities and consequences of the city’s form on present socio-political challenges. In fact, the understanding of the built environment and its production as a mirror-projection of structural social relations and inequalities in space long dominated our knowledge of the built environment and its socio-political tensions. It is true that Lefebvre’s conception of the production of space has made room for deciphering the intricate relations of society and built environment on the everyday level, allowing a better understanding of the “city in the making.” But what Brand and Fregonese and other authors propose, inspired by the Actor-Network Theory approach, is definitely a new representation of the built environment as mediator. The urban environment becomes an “actor” not in the sense of an actor with a conscience and will, but in the sense that its very existence and form has consequences.

Methodologically, this means that, in order to understand a certain phenomenon, we should identify the “socio-technical constellation” made of intractably connected human and non-human elements. City places (public spaces, neighborhoods) and city networks (electricity, sewage, roads) are such constellations. Changes in the physical, symbolic, and technical attributes of the non-human elements could have as much, if not more, consequences on the stability, transformation, or even disintegration of these constellations than the desiderata of human actors. This is an excellent framework for mapping and analyzing change, and eventually contributing to it.  

The authors’ recommendations are also relevant in addressing actual socio-political situations. The mobilization of an ever-growing number of new actors in the political—and in some cases, in the security—sphere renders the recommendation defending an enlarged role of the local actors in the transformations of the built environment particularly interesting. In fact, this could contribute to the much-needed pacification of increasingly fragmented and polarized societies. Indeed, pacification goes through answering two pressing and equally important issues: insuring that actors sense a feeling of social and political representation, and that the population at large acquires a feeling of security.

Authoritarian regimes in the region have managed to reach long-term peace through providing security and controlling key players in hierarchal societies. However, today, with the rupture of the political understandings that legitimatized authoritarian regimes and the rise of political mobilization, security starts to crack and can be maintained only through top-down surveillance and military control. In such situations, people and local actors increasingly try to guarantee their security by transforming their immediate built environment, rendering it more controllable, even defensible. But the generalization of such situations can increase fragmentation—sometimes segmentation—of the city, and the fall of public order.

I believe, however, that this should not necessarily be the case. Governments and public authorities can counter these practices by giving, on the one hand, local actors a larger say in the transformations of their local built environment and, on the other hand, providing more creative forms of built environments that a multiplicity of groups and actors can simultaneously use and identify with.[6] Of course, this entails deep changes in political practices, such as more participation, and in urban planning interventions, such as more place-oriented strategies, articulated with Do-It-Yourself spatial practices.[7] Hence, as they contributed to the construction of authoritarian, megalomaniac, oppressive, inequitable, neoliberal, and dull urban environments and landscapes, (creative) architecture, urban design, and urban planning could also help save cities from an “inferno.”      

My main reservations about the book concern the organic interpretation of communities and groups inherent in the authors’ understanding of polarization, as well as the occasional lack of depth in interpreting case studies. Indeed, the authors’ interpretation of polarization misses out on the tensions within communities. The latter are presented as homogeneous units, where individuals are assimilated to the groups they are seen to belong to. As for the case studies, while they surely intrigue the reader, they do not fulfill the promise of reconstituting the socio-technical constellations the authors commit to examining in chapter two. Also, they do not go beyond description, and thus do not link coherently with the different observations. However, I believe the analytical framework provided by Brand and Fregonese is quite inspiring, especially in the actual political context of Arab and Middle Eastern cities. In short, The Radicals’ City is a welcome addition to the literature on polarization, conflict, and urban environment that will certainly have many echoes.

NOTES

[1] See Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (New York: Verso, 1990), and Stephen Graham, Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism (London, Verso, 2010).

[2] “Troubles” is the common name given to the ethno-nationalist conflict that erupted in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s until the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

[3] In Lebanon, certain colors are closely linked with dominant communitarian parties; for instance, yellow is associated with Hizballah, while blue is associated with Hariri’s Future Movement.

[4] These include works that discuss urbicide (for example, Martin Coward, "'Urbicide' Reconsidered,"Theory and Event 10 [2007]) and urban geopolitics (for example, Stephen Graham, Cities, War and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics [Malden: Blackwell, 2004.]).

[5] On Beirut, the works of Fregonese—for example, “The Urbicide of Beirut: Urban Geopolitics and the Built Environment in the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990),” Political Geography 28, no.5 (2009), 309-318—are representative of this approach. On Baghdad and since the construction of security walls, there has been work questioning the relations between urban form and conflict (for example, Mona Damluji, "'Securing Democracy in Iraq': Sectarian Politics and Segregation in Baghdad, 2003-2007,"TDSR 21(2) [2010]).

[6] A very interesting discussion of such architecture and urban spaces is found in Francesco Klauser, “Splintering Spheres of Security: Peter Sloterdijk and the Contemporary Fortress City,Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 28, no. 20 (2010), 326-340. One example is the convention center that allows different shared activities to take place in the same space.

[7] There are different types of Do-it-Yourself approaches; however, they all have in common three basic attributes: they are place-based, participatory, and rely on available, recyclable resources and knowledge. See Tactical Urbanism, Handmade Urbanism, and DIY Urban design.

Egypt News Update (24 January 2014)

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[This is a collection of news updates on Egypt compiled from multiple sources by the editors.]

Cairo Hit By Four Bomb Blasts on Friday, Killing Six

Large blast at central Cairo police headquarters on Friday morning is followed by smaller explosions in Dokki, Talbiya and Haram.

Four separate bomb attacks took place in Greater Cairo on Friday morning, killing at least six people and injuring dozens of others, on the eve of the anniversary of the 2011 uprising that toppled Hosni Mubarak.

The terrorist attack began when a large blast ripped through a police building in central Cairo, killing four and injuring seventy-six others, according to the health ministry.

Hours later in Giza, one person was killed when a primitive bomb exploded after being thrown at a moving police vehicle near a metro station, deputy Giza security chief Mahmoud Farouk told state TV. At least eleven others were reportedly wounded in the attack.

In a third explosion, a small bomb went off later on Friday morning at a police station in Talbiya district, also in Giza, near the pyramids. The attack did not cause any casualties, the interior ministry said.

Later on in the afternoon, Giza’s Haram district witnessed an explosion at Radobis Cinema Theater, leaving at least one dead according to state TV.

"It is a vile, desperate attempt by evil terrorist forces to disrupt the success Egypt and its people have achieved in the [transitional] roadmap and the passing of the new constitution," Prime Minister Hazem El-Beblawi commented, in reference to the Cairo bomb.

The first explosion, which took place at the Cairo Security Directorate in Bab El-Khalk district, blew out the windows of the building and stripped off parts of its façade.

"I was manning the building along with my fellow conscripts shortly after dawn when the explosion took place," police conscript Ahmed Ibrahim who was injured in the blast told Al-Ahram Arabic from his hospital bed.

"I did not believe I had survived until I was pulled out from under the rubble."

According to a statement by the interior ministry, a car exploded at the cement barriers surrounding the main Egyptian police headquarters in central Cairo. Initial investigations showed a remotely-detonated car bomb was behind the blast, a security official told Ahram.

Three attackers parked the explosive-laden vehicle and fled in another before it was let off, South Cairo senior prosecutor Ismail Hafiz said, denying that a charred body found near the exploded vehicle was that of a bomber.

The attack took place at around 6:30 a.m. local time and was heard across several parts of the capital.

TV footage showed wrecked floors of the multi-story building and a damaged facade of the nearby Museum of Islamic Art. The minister of state for antiquities told journalists in a statement after touring the site that some artifacts and items inside the museum had also been damaged. He said the nineteenth-century museum building, which was recently renovated in a multimillion-dollar project, will need to be "rebuilt."

Photos show that the building's roof has caved in, floors are covered with shattered glass and wood debris, and the display cases housing the museum artifacts have been smashed.

An Ahram Online reporter at the scene of the blast said she saw a badly mangled vehicle stained with blood parked in front of the police compound. Some of the building's walls have collapsed and a gaping crater was left in the ground.

The attack has also caused water pipes in the area to explode, and vacuum excavators were sent to remove the water pooling in the street, the reporter added.

The violence came only one day ahead of the third anniversary of the 2011 uprising that toppled president Hosni Mubarak, raising the specter of further violence. Police have been set to deploy around the country to secure key security sites.

In a statement, the president pledged to "severely punish" those involved in "planning, financing, inciting, participating in or executing" such attacks, saying that tampering with state security is a "red line."

He added that Egypt had quashed an Islamist insurgency that raged in the 1990s and "would relentlessly rout [terrorism] and root its culprits out. 

"Such terrorist attacks will only unite the will of Egyptians to move forward towards achieving the goals of the 25 January and the 30 revolution … and to carry out Egyptians' upcoming roadmap." the Egyptian presidency added.

A spate of recent explosions in densely populated areas has raised fears that militant activity in the border Sinai Peninsula, which has spiked since Morsi's removal, would take its toll on other parts of the country.

"They do not want the people to celebrate," Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim told reporters while inspecting the explosion site in Cairo, adding that he was certain that "millions would take to the streets" on Saturday to celebrate the revolution nonetheless. He added that the "despicable attack" would not hamper police "in their fierce war against black terrorism."

After the explosion, large crowds of onlookers gathered at the Cairo site, chanting slogans demanding the "execution" of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and of ousted president Mohamed Morsi.

The group's official English language Twitter account has denied responsibility for the Friday attacks, saying that it "strongly condemn(s) cowardly bombings in Cairo, express(es) condolences to families of those killed, demand(s) swift investigations."

The Brotherhood was designated a terrorist organization by the cabinet in December, although it has persistently denied any links with ongoing terrorist attacks.

In December, a bomb attack at a security headquarters in the Nile Delta city of Mansoura killed sixteen people, mostly policemen.

A bomb also exploded outside a Cairo court just before polls were to set to open in last week's constitutional referendum, leaving no casualties.

An Al-Qaeda-inspired group, Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis, has claimed responsibility for most of the recent attacks in which scores of policemen and soldiers were killed. The group says the violence is in revenge for the killings and arrests of Islamists as part of a broad security crackdown. But there was no immediate claim of responsibility for Friday's attack.

The group also claimed a failed assassination attempt on the interior minister in Cairo in September.

Tensions were simmering in other parts of the country on Friday as violent clashes broke out later in the day between supporters of ousted president Mohamed Morsi, and police and opposing civilians in several governorates. At least one, a school pupil, was killed north of Cairo as pro-Morsi protesters fought with police in Damietta.

Violence also flared during protests in Alexandria, Giza, and Ismailia.

On Thursday, gunmen on motorbikes had killed five policemen at a checkpoint south of Cairo.

[This article originally appeared on Ahram Online.]

 

Condemnation, Blame after Cairo Bombings

Local and international groups and figures condemned the three bombings that shook Cairo early Friday, claiming the lives of five and leaving dozens injured, as the country commemorates the third anniversary of January 25 uprising.

Armed Forces spokesperson Ahmed Ali said in an official statement that the "mean acts of treachery by extremist terrorist groups have underestimated the value of Egyptian souls, and have taken armed violence as a way to achieve their dirty aims to scare the Egyptian people and prevent them from completing the democratic process."

Ali added that the Armed Forces promises Egyptians that it will root out terrorism in Egypt to achieve stability and security. 


Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, usually blamed by authorities for these attacks, was quick to condemn the bombing and offer condolences to the families of those killed. 


"Muslim Brotherhood reaffirms peaceful revolution against fascist military coup is the only path chosen by Egyptians to restore their freedoms. Muslim Brotherhood holds coup authorities responsible for deteriorating security for failure to investigate previous bombings & apprehend perpetrators," the Brotherhood’s official Ikhwanweb site tweeted early Friday.

The spokesperson of the Salafi Nour Party also offered condolences to the "victims of the terrorist attacks. The enemies of the country will not succeed in scaring its people. We shall pass this stage together with the people, army, and police.”

The founder of the Salafi Front, an ultra-conservative Salafi coalition that is part of the National Alliance to Protect Legitimacy and Reject the Coup, held the Ministry of Interior responsible for the bombings in an interview with Sada al-Balad news website on Friday. 



"The aim of such bombings is to further smear the National Alliance and to put the responsibility for the attack on the supporters of former President Mohamed Morsi," said founder Khaled Said, adding that the bombings also target the reputation of Islamists in Egyptians’ eyes. 



Meanwhile, the liberal Dostour Party heavily condemned the bombings, denouncing violence as a method of supporting any political stance, especially as Egyptians are marking the third anniversary of 25 January revolution. 



"The revolution succeeded because it was peaceful. It is important that such attacks will strengthen the will of the Egyptian people to fight terrorism and uniting its efforts to achieve the demands of 25 January revolution," the party said in an official statement on Friday.



The Coptic Orthodox Church also offered condolences to the victims’ families, as spokesperson Bishop Boules Halim said in an official statement: "We know that evil should have an end and we trust that the hands of God can protect the country from such acts, which do not lead to anything but painful memories in the country's mindset."

Halim added that the church is praying to God to protect the country and spread peace among its people. 



The Democratic Front of the April 6 Youth Movement said in a statement that citizens are the primary victims in the current power struggles, adding that "Egyptians know very well that neither terrorism nor unjustified violence against citizens is the solution, as it drags the country to an unknown path, where every step is stained with blood."

The front demanded the resignation of Minister of Interior Mohammed Ibrahim for his "failure to secure the country and failing to be up to his promises to gain control over the security situation."

Arab League head Nabil al-Arabi issued a statement condemning the attacks, adding that the league supports Egypt in its war against terrorism and those who stand behind it, the official Middle East News Agency reported Friday. 


The diplomat called for a swift investigation to bring the perpetrators to justice, adding that such an attack will not affect the will of the Egyptian people in their quest for democracy. 



The American Embassy in Cairo was also very quick to condemn the "heinous terrorist attacks."

"We fully support the Egyptian government's efforts to bring the perpetrators of these crimes to justice. The Embassy extends its deepest condolences to the families and friends of the victims, and we hope for the quick and full recovery of the injured," the statement read. 

[This article originally appeared on Mada Masr.]

 

Ansar Beit al-Maqdes Calls on Soldiers to Defect

In an audio recording released by the Sinai-based militant group Ansar Beit al-Maqdes Thursday, a spokesperson called on Egypt’s security forces to take their government-supplied arms and turn on their superiors, or face the consequences.

“Soldiers, know that you are what gives your leaders strength and a mandate,” said the audio recording.

“Repent and save yourselves. If you can escape with your weapon then do that. Otherwise, you know that soldiers are dealt with as one bloc. We will target you as we target your leaders. And you saw what has been happening in security directorates, buses carrying troops, checkpoints…and what is coming is going to be much worse and bitter.”

A few hours later, a car bomb exploded early Friday morning outside the Cairo Security Directorate, killing four. It was the first car-bomb attack in Cairo since a failed assassination attempt on Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim’s motorcade in early September.

Security forces arrested one ex-naval intelligence officer in connection with that attack. Another message posed by Ansar Beit al-Maqdes claimed the suicide bomber that attacked the motorcade was another former officer, Walid Badr.

Contrary to Egyptian private media reports, the recording was not a claim of responsibility.

David Barnett, a US-based research analyst with eh Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a conservative think-tank that monitors the group, wrote in an email that the recording was “a hundred percent authentic.”

“Recall, that prior to Mansoura attack, ABM had released a statement calling of security personnel to leave their posts or only have themselves to blame,” Barnett wrote.

The person in the recording, Usama Abu al-Masry, has not appeared in previous statements or audio recordings by the group, he added.

“To the soldiers and officers, know that we did not start the fight. Your leaders drove this to you, and you were a willing aid. We didn't start,” Masry says.

[This article originally appeared on Mada Masr.]

 

Islamic Art Museum Severely Damaged by Blast

Damages to Cairo’s Museum of Islamic Art as a result of Friday morning’s blast will cost several times more to fix than the 107 million Egyptian pounds it took to renovate the historic building, according to Mohamed Ibrahim, minister of state for antiquities.

Ibrahim visited the museum to assess the damage hours after an explosion went off in the early hours of Friday outside the Cairo Security Directorate, which is opposite the museum in Bab al-Khalq, according to state news agency MENA. Four were killed and dozens injured in the blast.

Much of the museum’s decorative interior designs were destroyed and the ceilings have collapsed. The glass on the building’s façade was broken, as were glass display cases housing the artifacts.

Many historic pieces were completely ruined, including the rare minbar of Sayeda Roqaya, which dates back to the Fatimid era (909 to 1171).

The neighboring Dar al-Kutub Museum, which has a massive collection of Arabic, Turkish and Persian manuscripts, was also badly damaged.

A group from Egypt’s Heritage Task Force inspected the site on Friday and said that the building’s hanging ceiling had collapsed as a result of the explosion, its façade “seriously affected” while the glass and ceramic objects have been damaged.

“In Dar al-Kutub, behind the museum, eight manuscripts have been destroyed and several others damaged and are currently being transferred to a safe place,” the task force said. 

After criminal investigations are through, the museum will be emptied of its rare artifacts and archeological collections until a committee is formed to assess the total costs to repair the damages, the minister said. In the meantime, a security cordon will be in place around the museum.

A Mada Masr reporter on the scene said that wooden planks were being installed to board up the entrance and broken windows. However, pedestrians were allowed to roam freely around the site of the blast despite it having been sealed off earlier with police tape. Some were able to walk all the way up to the door of the security directorate.

The minister denied that a water pipe had burst inside the museum. The water came from damages to its central air conditioning system, he said, making it impossible to control the interior temperatures and humidity levels, which is vital to the preservation the rare items on display.

Monica Hanna, an Egyptian archeologist and member of the task force, said on Twitter that many of the manuscripts were damaged and water had reached them due to attempts to extinguish the fire. Eight were completely ruined, she said.

Experts are on the scene investigating the possibilities for immediate restoration of the manuscripts and possibly moving the damaged artifacts to a safe storage site, Hanna said.

She added that some of the wooden artifacts were salvageable.

The historic building had closed its doors in 2003 to undergo complete renovation and restoration, at a total cost of ten million US dollars. It opened its doors to the public in September 2010 and was celebrated as the world’s largest, housing around 2,500 artifacts dating from the seventh to the nineteenth centuries.

The museum dates back to 1870 and was originally located at the Fatimid Mosque of al-Hakim. It was moved to its current location in 1903, according to the website of the Supreme Council of Antiquities.

Its wide collection, displayed in twenty-five galleries on one floor, includes rare woodwork and plaster artifacts of different periods from around the Islamic world, along with metal, ceramic, glass, crystal objects and textiles.

Rare Quartic manuscripts are on display along with arms and armory, Persian carpets, coins and medals as well as ancient instruments used in the sciences of astronomy, chemistry and architecture.

Among the treasures, according to AFP, are a gold-inlaid key to the Kaaba in Mecca, and the oldest Islamic dinar ever found, dating back to the year 697.

[This article originally appeared on Mada Masr.] 

Letting Go of Revolutionary Purity

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Three years have passed since the outset of the January 25 Revolution. Egypt remains a nation wrongfully imprisoned. The year 2013 in particular has brought the believers in January 25’s promise even more disappointments than the previous year. An authoritarian military regime reasserted its openly harsh rule first by ousting President Mohamed Morsi on 3 July, and then by publicly massacring the deposed president’s supporters in the aftermath. Sectarian violence against Copts has proliferated and intensified. Prior to and after the coup, state security forces stepped up their use of deadly violence against expressions of political dissent across the political spectrum. Political leaders and activists who oppose the new junta are persecuted, prosecuted, and imprisoned. Xenophobic, pro-military chauvinism is at an all-time high. And finally, a heightened sense of insecurity has pervaded the lives of Egyptians in light of the growing human loss resulting from explosions and attacks on public spaces.

Immediately following Morsi’s ouster, observers and activists debated the question of whether 30 June 2013 signified a second wave of the January 25 Revolution or simply a ruthless coup that killed Egypt’s “young democracy.” Let us set aside the sheer simplicity of this debate. It is clear today that reducing these complex events to “just a coup” will not redeem the Morsi government’s exclusionary policies or negate popular opposition to his rule. In contrast, calling it a “revolution,” as pro-military commentators continue to do, can never magically impart democratic legitimacy to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s military regime. Nor will it mask the fact that the current regime’s abuses have surpassed anything Egypt witnessed during the Morsi administration. In fact, the narrative of a June Revolution serves the current regime’s efforts to negate the memory of the January 25 Revolution, and the basic demands for bread, freedom, and social justice around which Egyptians rallied three years ago. That same narrative also attempts to mask the growing list of crimes that army leaders and their allies in the domestic security apparatus have committed before and after 30 June. In this context, it is an act of resistance just to remember January 25, since to do so forces one to consider the chasm between the ideals of January 25 and the oppressive political order that rules the present.

Yet this recovery of a “revolutionary purity” is for many a near impossible task. It is true that many activists continue to confront the military regime’s abuses. Yet over the course of the past year the mood has clearly shifted in the way observers throughout the world perceive the quest for revolutionary change in Egypt. The faces and voices that international media used to associate with the idealism of this revolution are either in prison, in exile, silent, marginalized, or have tacitly or actively supported the military. To many outside (as well as inside) observers disappointed at the events of the past year terms like “revolutionaries,” “youth activists,” and “January 25 youth” no longer evoke the courage, conviction, and principle they did three years ago. After witnessing many, though certainly not all, of these same actors condone the downfall of a democratically elected president last year and their subsequent silence on the military’s abuses, for some observers these terms have come to denote naiveté, impulsiveness, and hypocrisy.

But even if we are to assume that the so-called revolutionaries who failed to stand up to the military before it was too late are guilty of naiveté, one could argue that those critics who believed that such revolutionary purity actually existed in the first place are no less guilty of the same charge. Perhaps the events of 30 June and the developments that followed it are a wake-up call for those who bought into the fairytale narrative of January 25, namely that it reflected primarily a youth-led, liberal, pro-democracy movement. While this utopic image may have dominated mainstream Western narratives of the revolution since its outset, there is a pressing need to critically reassess the assumptions that such accounts have imposed on January 25, and that have contributed to numerous disappointments. Equally importantly, we may also need to disentangle the realities of these struggles from our own normative commitments as observers. 

The events of the past year only underscore the reality that the popular mobilization that overthrew Hosni Mubarak entailed a complex movement that included multiple long-standing struggles, in which democratization was only one dimension. These struggles also encompassed a host of other ambitions such as demands for social and economic rights, distributive justice, and state institutional reforms that far surpass what liberal democracy alone can offer. These struggles did not articulate in concert. On the contrary, they have often clashed over the course of the past three years, just as they did during the lead up to 30 June 2013. 

Following Mubarak’s downfall in 2011, moreover, many of the January 25 Revolution’s partisans sought to work through the military-sponsored transition and the “democratic” process it generated in an attempt to bring to state institutions the type of far reaching reforms that speak to the ideals of January 25. They engaged in everything from building parties, to writing draft laws, to drafting institutional reform documents. That many of these experiences consistently failed to yield any meaningful results only reinforced the perception that the realm of formal politics, however “democratic,” is not a natural ally to the ambitious agendas that advocates of the revolution have sought to advance. These tensions that have emerged in post-Mubarak Egypt between democratic process and revolutionary movements are not unrelated to the current state of the January 25 Revolution. If there is one clear message one finds in the story of the last three years, it is that democratic outcomes are not always revolutionary, and revolutionary outcomes are not always democratic.

In Egypt, democratically elected leaders have been at odds with revolutionary demands, while revolutionary movements have clashed with democratically elected leaders. This is to say that the fairytale narrative of a pure, democratic revolutionary struggle that can do no harm is no longer viable and has failed to capture the complexities and messiness of the social conflicts in which the January 25 Revolution was anchored. Within the multidimensional struggles that January 25 signifies, not all good things go together, as reflected in the apparent tensions we have observed between what is popularly viewed as revolutionary and what is deemed democratic. In fact, the lead up to the 3 July coup speaks to how Egypt’s rulers have exploited these tensions and the predicaments they impose in order to divide-and-rule their challengers.

Maybe the time has come to ponder these complexities critically, and begin understanding the struggles of January 25 on their own terms, and not our own as observers. Maybe it is time to let go of the mirage of revolutionary purity and the dangerously misleading narratives it all too often propagates.

An Introduction to Kareem Risan's "The Book of Sectarianism"

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The Euphrates

is a long procession

Cities pat its shoulders

as palm trees weep

—Sinan Antoon [1]

In these ashen years following the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, Kareem Risan has produced over two dozen art books. Created as one-of-a-kind artifacts, some are bound and can be unfolded, expanded, and positioned upright to be viewed in the round, while others are comprised of separate panels amassed in a portfolio or box. During this long period of charting Iraq’s most recent phase of destruction, Risan has chosen to focus on two major points of entry: the walls of Baghdad, ancient and newly erected, and a map of the city as though viewed through the distant perspective of aerial reconnaissance. Both vantage points reference the American occupation and the chaos that has ensued. Risan’s views from above are also akin to the abstracted representation of bodies in motion—whether belonging to the natural world or the inventions of mankind—that characterize a Suprematist organization of the world. In these post-invasion compositions, however, streets, alleyways, rivers, and large stretches of land betray the definition of geometric order as the artist surveys fractured cityscapes. Frail arteries are unable to escape spaces that bleed from one fold to the next as they run across several pages.  

Unfurling these fragile works reveals surfaces soaked in broad washes and impressed with small thin line drawings and handwritten texts. At times, the artist’s written narration is stylized to such a degree that letters seem to take on the appearance of ancient pictographs, gathering as a constellation of celestial beings. Life and death often meet on the same plane through an overlay of media and found objects, and scarring many of these textured sheets are areas that have been burnt or cut out, exposing a stratum of the page that is hidden yet vulnerable, charred or stripped bare by the impact of an external force. Fragmentation, realized in form and layered with metaphor, is a concept that Iraqi artists working in a variety of media have turned to since 2003.

                                                                           ["Baghdad Fragmented City" (2007). Image copyright the artist.]

Risan’s palette has remained consistent throughout. There are, for example, the golden earth tones that Iraqi painters have employed for decades when rendering the country’s landscape and people in light or shadow, color fields derived from its vast history. Also visible are deeply saturated reds and charcoaled blacks, bringing to mind the thirteenth-century adage from the Mongol siege of Baghdad, the reddening and blackening of the Tigris river from the blood and ink of the city’s inhabitants.

                                                                           ["Al Mutanabbi Street" (2007). Image copyright the artist.]

Born in Baghdad in 1960, Risan lived and worked in Iraq until the onslaught of the invasion; shortly after, he was forced to flee to Jordan during an especially volatile period of the occupation, and currently resides in Canada. While in Amman, he was active with a small but significant group of artists and cultural practitioners that often convened at Dar Al-Anda Gallery, a hub for Iraqi art in exile. He received his artistic training at the Academy of Fine Arts, Baghdad, which frequently shaped the direction of local aesthetics through its faculty of leading painters and sculptors. The institution’s roster of past instructors includes pioneers such as Faiq Hassan, Ismail Fattah, and Mohammed Ghani Hikmat—modernists who turned to Iraq’s centuries-old visual culture for inspiration.

                                                                                    ["Uranium Civilization" (2007). Image copyright the artist.]

Risan is identified as belonging to the so-called Eighties Generation that emerged against the backdrop of the Iran-Iraq War. Many of these artists also experienced the First Gulf War and the US/UN sanctions on Iraq and are alternatively referred to as the “Uranium Generation.” In the 1990s, although faced with extreme isolation and dwindling resources (creative and otherwise), Risan and his colleagues furthered the experiments of their predecessors while exploring conceptually-driven approaches, notably through mixed-media and assemblage and with a heavy emphasis on abstraction.[2] Farouk Yusif describes this now exiled and scattered set as “painters of critical moments” whose works “neither deceive nor beautify” as they “enter an arena of open warfare, painting public life.”[3] Yusif’s observations evoke the definition of the nineteenth-century Realist movement in Europe as put forth by Linda Nochlin. According to Nochlin, writers and artists of the period were “explorers in the realm of fact and experience, venturing into areas hitherto untouched or only partly investigated.”[4] The Iraqi school of the Eighties Generation indeed affirms that painting is a “concrete art,” as Gustave Courbet declared, one grounded in the physical dimensions of reality. Figuration in the form of found objects signals the material culture of a place now consumed by a catastrophe so immeasurable only abstraction can communicate its seizure of space and time.

                                                                                       ["Fires of Baghdad" (2003). Image copyright the artist.] 

In Kareem Risan’s The Book of Sectarianism (2013), which is reproduced below, Iraq is quickly receding.  

           

               

 

                                     

               

 

               

 

                 

 

                

 

               

 

               

 

                                      

*All images copyright the artist. 

________________________

1. From the poem "Wrinkles; on the wind's forehead" (2003), The Baghdad Blues, Brownsville, Vermont: Harbor Mountain Press, 2007.  

2. For a firsthand account of this period see artist Hanaa Malallah's "Consciousness of Isolation," Strokes of Genius, ed. Maysaloun Faraj, London: Saqi Books, 2001.

3. Faoruk Yusif, "Painters of Critical Moments: Ghassan Ghaib, Kareem Risan, and Nizar Yahya," Art in Iraq Today, ed. Samar Faruqi, Milan: Skira, 2011. 

4. Linda Nochlin, Realism. London: Penguin Books, 1971. 

Egypt News Update (25 January 2014)

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[This is a collection of news updates on Egypt compiled from multiple sources by the editors.]

Three-Way Commemoration of Egypt's Revolution Anniversary; Twenty-Nine Dead in Clashes

Thousands take to streets to celebrate January 25 Revolution despite fears of terrorist attacks; Police disperse Brotherhood protests and Way of Revolution demonstrations; at least twenty-nine dead, 300 arrested; attack on police camp in Suez.

While hundreds of thousands are celebrating the day and cheer for the army around the country, death toll in clashes on the third anniversary of January 25 Revolution has risen to twenty-nine, Egypt's health ministry said. 

Clashes have been ongoing in downtown Cairo several hundred meters away from Tahrir Square, as security dispersed protesters chanting against both military rule and against Brotherhood.

By the late afternoon hours, the Way of the Revolution Front, an anti-military, anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition group that participated in Saturday's demonstrations, has urged its members to end their protests following clashes with security forces.

The 6 April Youth Movement (Democratic Front) has announced that one of its members, Sayed Wizza, died from a bullet wound after police attacked a march from the Journalists' Syndicate in downtown Cairo.

The march of secular and independent groups, opposed to both the Muslim Brotherhood and the military, had left from the press syndicate and began to march to nearby Tahrir Square when they were met by pro-military supporters, resulting in clashes. Police arrived shortly after and dispersed both camps with birdshot and teargas.

Secular demos attacked

Earlier in the afternoon, police fired tear gas and birdshot to disperse two separate marches heading from Mostafa Mahmoud Mosque to Tahrir Square on the third anniversary of the January 25 Revolution, according to an Ahram Online reporter on the scene.

A pro-Muslim Brotherhood march and a distinct Way of the Revolution Front march gathered separately in front of the mosque in preparations for marches to Tahrir Square.

A protest at the Journalists' Syndicate in downtown Cairo has been dispersed by security forces firing birdshot and heavy teargas. Armored vehicles reportedly drove through the demonstration to disperse the crowd.

Demonstrators at the press syndicate had chanted against the military and the Muslim Brotherhood. They had then marched from the building with intentions of reaching Tahrir Square, a few blocks away, but were stopped mid-way at Talaat Harb Square, where they clashed with supporters of General Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi coming up from the pro-military celebrations in Tahrir.

Pro-government forces celebrate in Tahrir

Meanwhile, celebrations of the third anniversary of the revolution by supporters of the interim government started Saturday amid tight security after the day opened with a limited explosion increasing fears of further violence after four bombs exploded Friday.

Tens of thousands have already flocked to Tahrir Square to celebrate the anniversary heeding a call by the interim government and political groups.

The Wafd Party, the Free Egyptians Party, along with Tamarod, the group that spearheaded the protests leading to the ouster of Islamist president Mohamed Morsi, called on Egyptians to join the festivities Saturday in Tahrir Square.

Citizens entering the iconic square are being searched with metal detectors. Military helicopters are also hovering over the area.

Egyptian flags are being waved around Tahrir, with some holding posters of army chief Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi. 

A stage has been set up from the night before.

Many of Egypt's other main squares gradually filled up with celebrating demonstrators. Crowds waving Egyptian flags and carrying pictures of General El-Sisi have already gathered in Alexandria's Sidi Gaber as well as in Sohag, Fayoum and Aswan in Upper Egypt.

In Alexandria, supporters of army chief Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi gathered in Sidi Gaber and Al-Qaed Ibrahim squares demanding the army chief runs for presidency.

Pro-Morsi rallies violently dispersed

Supporters of ousted president Mohamed Morsi organised protests across the nation against what they describe as a 'coup' which removed him from power last July.

Supporters of Morsi have already marched in several parts of Greater Cairo -- the satellite city 6 October, where ten protesters were arrested, Giza and Haram west of Cairo, where they were dispersed by security forces, and in Faisal, where they were dispersed by pro-military citizens.

In Alexandria, Brotherhood supporters also organized rallies demanding the reinstatement of ousted President Morsi. The protesters chanted that "Morsi is a president for millions" and declared that they were "eager for martyrdom."

Police general Nasser El-Abd, a high-level police officer in Alexandria, announced that security forces had arrested tens of pro-Brotherhood protesters wielding Molotov cocktails and birdshot rifles. 

Security forces used tear gas to disperse pro-Morsi rallies in Sidi Bishr, Asafra, and Borg Al-Arab.Two other pro-Morsi marches in western Cairo districts were also dispersed – one in front of Mostafa Mahmoud Mosque in Mohandiseen and another in Giza's Haram, where security officials fired teargas and rubber bullets.

The protests on Saturday had been announced earlier this week by supporters of the ousted Islamist president, including the pro-Morsi National Alliance to Support Legitimacy (NASL), which has deemed the run-up to Egypt's third anniversary of the 25 January 2011 revolution as "The Revolutionary Challenge Week."

The day has witnessed pro-Morsi demonstrations across the capital – in front of Al-Qudsi Mosque in the northern Ain Shams district, as well as in Al-Hay Al-Asher and Mostafa Nahas streets in Nasr City, both of which were halted by security forces.

Several protesters also gathered in the working-class district of Matariya in Cairo, chanting against the military and raising the four-fingered Rabaa sign, a symbol of the pro-Brotherhood Rabaa Al-Adaweya sit-in that was violently dispersed by the military last August.

In Ismailia, dozens of Brotherhood supporters were dispersed by security forces after organising rallies in the city.

In Assuit city not less than fifteen pro-Brotherhood protesters, including several women, were arrested by security forces. Security sources told Al-Ahram Arabic that those arrested were holding banners displaying the yellow four-fingered Rabaa salute associated with supporters of the Brotherhood and ousted president Mohamed Morsi.

Several other protests in support of Morsi took place in other towns in the governorate of Assiut where protesters initiated several marches chanting for “a new revolution” and the fall of the "regime."

In Minya, Upper Egypt, a pro-Morsi march leaving from Omar Ibn Al-Khattab Mosque also chanted against “military rule.”

Security sources told Ahram Online that at least 300 people have been arrested in today's protests across Egypt.

Car bomb detonates at Suez police camp

An explosion at a Suez police camp in the late afternoon hours resulted from a car bomb and not an RPG, said General Abdel-Fattah Osman, Egypt's Deputy Interior Minister for Media Affairs.

General Hani Abdel-Latif, spokesperson for the ministry of interior, had previously reported that anti-government militants fired an RPG at the Central Security Forces (CSF) camp in Suez. 

Four were injured in the attack and transferred to Suez General Hospital, according to a source in Suez's ambulance authority who spoke with Ahram's Arabic news website.

According to eye witnesses, there have been ongoing clashes at the site between the militants and security forces around the camp using live ammunition. 

Tight security in capital

Earlier in the day, unknown militants fired birdshot at Tahrir Square in a drive-by shooting in the early hours of Saturday, injuring one before hurrying away from the area, Al-Ahram Arabic website reported.

Security forces closed off all roads leading to the Ministry of Defense in Abbasiya in anticipation of unrest, forcing vehicles and passersby to take alternate routes to reach their destinations. However, hundreds marched in the middle class district chanting slogans that reflect their support for the army and calling on its head, El-Sisi, to run for the presidency.

Main security directorates and police stations have also been cordoned off, with policemen stationed outside them.

The Rabaa Al-Adawiya crossroad, in Cairo's Nasr City district, where a six-week pro-Morsi vigil was held before the police forcefully dispersed it last August, was also sealed off.

In Ain Shams, where an explosion had taken place early Saturday, defiant demonstrations took the streets with many holding up pictures of El-Sisi.

The minor explosion left no casualties.

An official source told the state owned MENA news agency that an improvised explosive device was set off in front of a police training centre in Cairo's Ain Shams district. According to the source, some damage was done to the centre's perimeter fence.

The explosion came one day after a string of four explosions hit Cairo, killing six and injuring at least eighty.

The four explosions targeted police institutions and checkpoints.

An Al-Qaeda-inspired group, Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis (Partisans of Jerusalem), claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Cairo Security Directorate. The group, which has claimed the deadliest militant attacks since former president Mohamed Morsi's ouster in July, warned Egyptians in an audio statement against taking to the streets Saturday.

The Muslim Brotherhood, labeled a terrorist organization by Egypt's interim government, denied any ties with Friday's explosions.

Morsi supporters also took the streets Friday, clashing with security forces and opponents. Fifteen were reported killed in the violence witnessed in Cairo, Giza, Alexandria and Ismailia.

[This article originally appeared on Ahram Online.]

 

Crowds Celebrate Egypt’s Revolution, Military in Tahrir Square

Huge crowds gather in central Cairo to celebrate third anniversary of 2011 uprising, while a short distance away anti-military protests are dispersed by police.

Tens of thousands converged on Egypt’s iconic Tahrir Square on Saturday, marking three years since the 2011 revolution that ousted autocrat Hosni Mubarak.

Footage aired on state TV showed families and young people in the central square, many waving Egyptian flags, while nationalist songs were played from a temporary stage.

Many of those in the square held banners and posters urging army chief Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi to run for the presidency, or were chanting pro-military slogans.

A number of popular campaigns, including one called "By the Command of the People," have been set up to lobby El-Sisi to run for the presidency in the upcoming elections, expected by mid-2014.

Streets leading into and out of the square were closed off and there was a heavy police presence in the area. Metal detectors were placed at some entrances to the square to assist with the searches of those entering.

Earlier on Saturday, Prime Minister Hazem El-Beblawi paid a visit to the square, saying he is “proud of Egyptians and their victory in both the January 25 Revolution and 30 June revolution.”

Several hundred meters away from Tahrir Square, police dispersed protesters who were chanting against both military rule and against the Muslim Brotherhood.

Police used birdshot and teargas to disperse protesters, many members of the Way of the Revolution Front, barring them from marching to Tahrir Square.

At least nine people were killed on Saturday in a number of different governorates as security forces and local residents clashed with supporters of ousted president Mohamed Morsi.

Security sources told Ahram Online that at least 300 people were arrested on Saturday across Egypt.

[This article originally appeared on Ahram Online.]

 

Sisi For President Slogans Dominate Jan 25 Events

Pictures of Defense Minister General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi donning civilian clothing dominated celebrations at the Ettehadiya Presidential Palace in Heliopolis on Saturday, reported the state-owned Middle East News Agency (MENA).

Calls for the man of the hour to run for president marked the commemoration of the 25 January anniversary in Cairo and elsewhere.

Large banners with Sisi’s picture were set up next to stages blasting popular pro-army song, “Teslam al-Ayadi,” around the presidential palace.

MENA boasted that the main stage was equipped with thirty amplifiers and twenty-eight spotlights and that the festivities were being filmed by two camera cranes.   

Police and Armed Forces cordoned off the area, securing the entrances with checkpoints where they searched those joining the celebrations while marches calling for Sisi’s candidacy arrived at Ettehadiya.

Later in the day singer, Ihab Tawfik, took to the stage giving an impassioned speech about defeating fear and continuing celebrations and pleading with Sisi to become president through song.

In downtown’s Tahrir Square and Abbasseya, the mood was also celebratory, with protesters holding up posters of Sisi and Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim while dancing to the pro-military song.

Other governorates also used the anniversary as an opportunity to reiterate calls for the defense minister to announce his candidacy.

In Alexandria, huge posters showed a picture of Sisi amidst rulers of Arab countries that support the current military-backed government. Slogans surrounding the posters called for Arab unity.  

[This article originally appeared on Mada Masr.]

 

Twenty-Nine Killed in Clashes on January 25 Anniversary

By Saturday evening at least twenty-nine people were reported killed and 176 injured in clashes between protesters and security forces nationwide, according to a Health Ministry statement.

On the third anniversary of the January 25 revolution that ousted former President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, security was heightened around major squares and roads nationwide, but failed to prevent the violent clashes that broke out across the country.

The Interior Ministry had said it was prepared to fully protect citizens and secure 25 January "festivities." In downtown Cairo's Tahrir Square, the situation was calm as crowds rallied to celebrate in a festive atmosphere. Gunshots were heard earlier in the day, but this did not deter people from gathering in the square. 

By evening, Tahrir Square had filled up with tens of thousands who lit fireworks and chanted, “Egypt will always be dear to me,” state-owned Middle East News Agency (MENA) reported. The crowds “affirmed their defiance of the Brotherhood’s armed militias,” maintaining that going to the square today was a clear message to terrorist forces seeking to kidnap Egypt.

Egypt's metro authority stated that it was running thirty metro cars to the keep up with the crowds expected to flood into Tahrir, MENA reported.

But clashes that erupted outside the square left four dead in Cairo, two in Minya and two in Giza, in addition to one fatality in Alexandria, the Ministry of Health stated. Several were also injured in clashes that broke out in Fayoum, Ismailia, Assiut and Beni Suef.

As altercations escalated into the afternoon, the Revolution Path Front called on its members to withdraw from protests in an official statement, denouncing what it described as the excessive use of violence by security forces.

The front is a coalition of several revolutionary forces, including the April 6 Youth Movement and the Revolutionary Socialists. Members of the coalition had been present at the Mostafa Mahmoud protest in Cairo's Mohandiseen neighborhood, which was quickly dispersed around one p.m., and also joined a demonstration on the Journalists’ Syndicate steps at two p.m. in downtown.

Later, the group marched from the syndicate en route to Tahrir Square, but the march was violently dispersed when security forces fired tear gas and shots in the air.

"The conflict with the regime is ongoing, but protecting your souls and freedoms is the most important hope remaining for the revolution," the statement from the Revolution Path Front said.

In Tahrir, the mood was celebratory, with protesters holding up posters of Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim, while dancing to pro-military song "Teslam al-Ayady."

But outside of the square, security forces had moved to quickly disperse protests and marches organized by groups of different political affiliations.

A march of 300 people in front of the High Court building on Ramses Street was dispersed using tear gas, the state-owned newspaper Al-Ahram reported. Protesters were chanting against the military, the police and the interim government's roadmap. 

Meanwhile in Mohandiseen, violence continued following the dispersal of the march that had gathered at Mostafa Mahmoud Square intending to head to Tahrir. Protesters of a variety of political affiliations began gathering after noon prayers. Some were from the umbrella group that calls itself the Anti-Coup Alliance, made up of supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and deposed President Mohamed Morsi.

They raised the yellow and black Rabea sign, which has come to symbolize the movement, as well as the violent 14 August dispersal of the Rabea al-Adaweya and Nahda Square sit-ins that demanded Morsi's reinstatement. 

Some chanted “The people want to overthrow the regime,” and “Down with military rule.”

Other protesters were not affiliated with the Brotherhood and said they were there for the “original demands” of the January 25 Revolution. They attempted to convince those holding the Rabea sign to stop, saying, “We have to stay focused. We are here for the demands of the revolution and we do not want to ruin the day with other demands."

Haytham Mohamedeen, a member of the Revolutionary Socialists, was among those leading the chants, saying: “Not for legitimacy, nor for a mandate, the revolution continues.”

Osama Ashraf, a student and member of the April 6 Youth Movement, stated that while he’s not against Rabea, he refuses to side with the Brotherhood.

Some of the protesters began singing anti-police chants from the Ultras Ahlawy group.

Mada Masr reporters on the scene said protesters quickly scattered and ducked for cover as security forces launched an unprovoked attack, firing in the air what sounded like birdshot, causing several injuries.

After entering the area with APCs and dispersing the protest, military and Central Security Forces personnel roamed the area on foot, checking to see where people were hiding.

Al-Ahram reported that security forces chased protesters in side streets around the neighborhood, located in the Giza governorate.

Tarek Shalaby, a member of the Revolutionary Socialists who was also present at the march, reported that the dispersal started just past one p.m. He said he saw protesters being detained, and all who were left in the square were about 200 to 300 plainclothes and uniformed police.

Al-Ahram reported that fifteen were arrested in the Mohandiseen clashes, and were allegedly in possession of Molotov cocktails. A security source told Al-Ahram that ten members of the 6 April Youth Movement were among those arrested.

The area was then sealed off by security forces.

Sources from the Anti-Coup Alliance said that crowds then regrouped to continue their protest in Mohandiseen’s Sudan Street.

Residents of the area told Mada Masr that gunfire was heard as police and military forces were seen chasing protesters.

One resident overlooking Sudan Street said he saw young protesters arrive there after the main march in Mostafa Mahmoud was dispersed. The protesters reportedly set tires on fire and chanted "Down with military rule" and "Down with the regime."

Other residents in Dokki and Mohandiseen also reported hearing gunfire from the direction of Sudan Street.

Many of those who were scattered from the Mostafa Mahmoud march then headed to the Journalists’ Syndicate, where a protest was scheduled to start at two p.m. on the historic steps of the building.

Shalaby, who headed to the syndicate after the march, stated that “as numbers grew, we were eventually surrounded and at a dead end on both sides. The atmosphere was very hostile and I felt that I had to carry a poster of Sisi in order to have a safe exit."

Shalaby and a few others left the scene unharmed, but fear many may have been detained.

At the syndicate, the protest was mostly made up of revolutionary forces, as passersby honked and saluted them as they drove by, including passengers on buses. They chanted against “all those who betrayed [the revolution],” including the army, Interior Ministry and different political forces.

In response, one passerby, thirty-three-year-old Ahmed Khaled, said, "The people and the army are one. They cannot destroy that."

Chants popular among the Ultras Ahlawy, including “We will not forget Tahrir, you sons of filth,” could also be heard.

Ahmed Aboul Magd from the Revolutionary Path Front said, “We are here today because we want the regime to fall. We said it three years ago and we still say it today."

“We say down to everyone who betrayed us for power: The feloul [remnants of Mubarak’s regime], the Brotherhood and the military. We still want a country without a pharaoh and where we can have dignity, freedom and rights.”

He added that revolutionary forces refuse to accept any kind of violence, whether from the state or from militant groups.

“We are here to show that we are here and always will be. The revolution continues," he said.

Others also called on people to remember those who were killed by security forces over the past three years. “Do not forget who killed Jika: the Brotherhood and the Interior Ministry,” they said, referring to Gaber Saleh, who was killed in 2012 during the second anniversary of the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes.

Meanwhile, security sources said that police quelled an attempt by members of the Muslim Brotherhood to storm the October 6 police station, according to Al-Ahram. Three were arrested, and were allegedly in possession of weapons and live ammunition.

According to activists, tens were arrested early on Saturday during a protest in the Cairo neighborhood of Maadi, including prominent activist Nazly Hussein.

Prime Minister Hazem al-Beblawi had visited Tahrir Square early on Saturday as army helicopters flew overhead, releasing gifts onto the crowds celebrating below in what was once the epicenter of the 2011 revolution.

Beblawi lauded the crowds’ “persistence to mobilize and celebrate the revolution,” and challenged the terrorist acts aimed at breaking the people’s resolve.

On Friday, four blasts rocked the capital, leaving at least six dead and dozens injured. That same day, clashes broke out between supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and security forces, leaving at least fifteen dead.

Beblawi said the large crowds will ensure the success of the celebrations of the third anniversary

[This article originally appeared on Mada Masr.]

 

Fierce Clashes Continue in Cairo’s Alf Maskan Area

Clashes escalated on Saturday evening in eastern Cairo’s Alf Maskan neighborhood, leaving scores injured and an unconfirmed numbers of deaths.

As the third anniversary of the 25 January uprising got underway, there was a stark contrast between festivities in Tahrir Square and clashes elsewhere around the country.

At least nine people were killed in the clashes nationwide according to the Health Ministry, but several more are believed to have been killed as the fiercest clashes continued in Alf Maskan.

The ministry has not yet officially updated the death toll, but a source there said the number of those killed could reach at least twenty. Hundreds have been arrested around the country.

The Alf Maskan neighborhood is a regular site of some of the most violent confrontations between security forces and Muslim Brotherhood supporters during their weekly Friday protests.

Karim Ennarah, researcher at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, told Mada Masr that brutal altercations between Brotherhood supporters and police forces have been ongoing for more than three hours as of Saturday evening.

A large numbers of Brotherhood supporters had marched from the Ain Shams district to Alf Maskan earlier in the day. Ain Shams is known to have a strong Brotherhood presence.

"Continuous live ammunition was heard from different locations, and it is very difficult to locate the source. Other eyewitness say there was an exchange of gunfire," Ennarah said.

Earlier in the day, a homemade bomb went off in Ain Shams outside a police institute, causing limited damage and no injuries.

Clashes also broke out between residents of Matareya district, which is very close to Alf Maskan, and Brotherhood protesters, the state-owned Middle East News Agency reported.

[This article originally appeared on Mada Masr.] 

كتب: الرنين المطوّق: العروض قديماً وحديثاً

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فصل من كتاب: الرنين المطوّق: العروض قديماً وحديثاً 

استقرار التدوين

لا يفصلُ بين العَروضيّ (342/954)  وابن عبد ربّه[1] (328/939) إلا سنوات قليلة، لكنّ المكانَ يفصلُ بينهما: فالأوّل مشرقيّ، والثاني أندلسيّ. زد على ذلك، أنّ نِظرةً إلى مُؤلَفيْهما في العَروض، لن تجدَ إلا الفَصْلَ بينهما ثانيةً: فالـ كِتاب في عِلم العَروض، لا يملكُ شيئاً من منهجيةِ تأليفِ العِقْد الفَريد.وإن كانَ لكِتابِ الأوّل جذورٌ وأصولٌ، احتوى عليها وزادَ فيها وأضافَ إليها، فإنّ كِتابَ الثاني يبدو مُنبتّاً فَريداً كاسمه، إذ لا تكادُ تذكرُ كُتُب الأندلس، شيئاً عن العَروض قبْلَ ابن عبد ربّه[2]. ومع أنّ الأوّل هو الثاني وفاقاً مع النَقْد التأريخي، إلا أنّ صنيعَ ابن عبد ربّه لجهةِ حُسن التأليفِ والتبويبِ، يضعُ كِتابَ العَروضيّ قبْلَه. فاستقرارُ التَدوين هو الفيصلُ بينهما، وهو الذي غيّرَ من ترتيبِ الكِتابين زمنياً؛ فالأوّل هو الثاني، والثاني هو الأوّل. فلا يمكنُ لباحثٍ في العَروض، إلا أن يبدأ من العِقْد الفَريد، فهو أشهرُ المصادر، ويكادُ يرقى إلى المظان[3]. وفضلاً عمّا يؤهله لذلك، فقد اكتسبَ العِقْد الفَريد، مكانتَه هذه لسببٍ موضوعيّ ثانٍ: فهو من أوائلِ الكُتُبِ المحقّقة[4]، ويسبقُ من ناحيةِ التحقيق الكُتُبَ الثَلاثة السابِقةَ عليه زمنياً؛ أي كُتُب الأخْفَش والزّجاج والعَروضيّ، الأمرُ الذي ضاعفَ من قيمتهِ في نظرِ الباحثين، وأرساه كالمصدرِ الأوّل في عِلم العَروض.

يُمثّلُ هذا الكِتاب نقطةَ التقاءٍ فَريدة بين المَشْرق والأندلس، فمصادرُه مشرقيّة[5] وموطنُه أندلسيّ. ومن وجهة نظرِ النَقْد التأريخي، يَظهرُ العِقْد الفَريدكمثالٍ ممتازٍ لتَدوينِ العَروضِ عن بعد، إن صحّ التعبير، واستقراره. وكما رأينا فقد كانَ مسارَ تدوينِ العَروض في المَشْرق، مُرتبطاً على نحوٍ وثيقٍ بتَعليمِه، فكلّما انتشرَ تَعليمُ العَروض، اتضّحتْ الأبوابُ في الكُتُب، وتمّ التأليفُ بصورةٍ تُراعي التدرّج في المعلومات، الأمرُ الذي وجدناه دالاً على انتشارِ التَعليم بين غير المختصّين. فضلاً عن أنّ بعضَ الباحثين يُرجحّ إطلاعَ الأخْفَش على الأقل على كِتاب الخَليل[6] الضائع، وهو ما يقويّ من فرضيّة تقولُ إنّ كِتابَ الخَليل كانَ مُتداولاً في المشْرق، وبما أنّه كانَ صغيرَ الحجم حسْبَ الروايةِ الخاصّة[7] بابن مُناذر[8] (198/813)، فيمكننا القولُ إنّ كُتُبَ العَروض اللاحقة عليه، قامتْ بشرْحِ ما جاء َفيه وقيّدته على نحوٍ معين، وبذلك زادتْ أحجامُ تلك الكُتُب. ولا يمكنُ تصوّر أنّ الأخْفَش مثلاً قامَ وحدَه بابتداعِ طريقةٍ في التأليفِ من دون الإطلاعِ على كِتاب الخَليل، فالمصادرُ كلّها تتفقُ على أنّ الخَليل هو المصدرُ الأوّل للعَروض. أمّا كِتابُ ابن عبد ربّه، فلا يبدو حامِلاً في طِياته لمسارٍ مختلطٍ بين التَعليم والتَدوين، وكأنّه الثمرة من تشابكِهما معاً، فهو مُستقرُّ التَدوين والتَعليم على حدّ سواء.

 من الصحيح أنّ القِسمَ الخاصَ بالعَروض "كِتاب الجوهرة الثانية في أعاريض الشّعر"، يظهرُ من اسمه، أنّه فصلٌ من فصول العِقْد الفَريد، لكنّ هذا الجزء، يحملُ في طِياته قصّةً فَريدةً في عِلم العَروض: فقد ذكرَ ابن عبد ربّه، في مُستهلِّ هذا الجزء ما يُحمّلنا على الظنّ أّنه اسّتقى مادتّه من كِتابِ الخَليل الضائع: "وجعلتُ المقطّعات رقيقةً غَزِلة، ليسهلَ حفظُها على ألسنةِ الرّواة. وضمّنتُ في آخر كُل مقطَّعة منها بيتاً قديماً مُتصلاً بها وداخلاً في معناها، من الأبيات التي استشهدَ بها الخَليل في عَروضه، لتقومَ به الحُجة لمن رَوى هذه المقطّعات واحتجّ بها"[9]. فهو يبيّن صراحةً أنّه احتفظَ بشواهد الخَليل. والسؤال الذي يلحّ هل صحيحٌ أنّ ابن عبد ربّه اسّتقى مادّته من كِتاب الخَليل؟ أم أنّ ثمةَ مصدراً مشْرقيّاً آخر، انتقلَ إلى الأندلس وألهمَ ابن عبد ربّه طريقَته في تَدوين العَروض؟ فنحنُ نعلَمُ أنّ مصدر العَروض مشْرقيّ، لكنّنّا نبحثُ بصورةٍ محدّدة عن كِتابٍ بعينه حَسَنِ التأليفِ والتبويب، وصلَ الأندلس، وحدا بابن عبد ربّه أن يتخذّه مرجِعاً لكِتابة "الجوهرة الثانية في أعاريض الشّعر". 

 أ- انتقالُ العَروض إلى الأندلُس: عَباس بن فِرناس (274/ 887)

 نعلمُ أنّ القَرْن الرابع الهجريّ، شَهِدَ بداياتِ استقرار تَدوينِ العَروض في المشْرق. وأنّ حجمَ كِتاب العَروض، وصلَ إلى ذروتِه على يديّ أبي الحسن العَروضيّ، فاستقرّ كِتاباً كبيراً جامِعاً للعَروض والقَوافي ولمسائل أخرى واهيةِ الصِلة بالعَروض. لكنّ روايةً في كِتابِ الأغاني، تُخبّرنا أنّ كِتابَ الخَليل في أصْله، كانَ صغيرَ الحجم، ويكادُ لا يتجاوز بضع ورقات: "كان محمّد بن عبد الوهاب الثقفي أخو عبد المجيد يعادي محمّد بن مُناذر بسبب ميله إلى أخيه عبد المجيد، وكان ابن مُناذر يهجوه ويسبّه ويقطعه، وكلّ واحد منهما يطلب لصاحبه المكروه ويسعى عليه، فلقي محمّد بن عبد الوهاب ابن مُناذر في مسجدِ البصرة، ومعه دفترٌ فيه كِتاب العَروض بدوائِره، ولم يكن محمّد بن عبد الوهاب يعرف العَروض، فجعل يلحظ الكِتاب ويقرؤه فلا يفهمه، وابن مُناذر متغافلٌ عن فعله، ثم قال له: ما في كِتابك هذا؟ فخبأه في كمّه وقال: وأي شيء عليك ممّا فيه؟ فتعلّق به ولببّه، فقال له ابن مُناذر: يا أبا الصلْت، الله الله في دمي، فطمع فيه وصاح يا زنديق، في كمّك الزندقة، فاجتمع الناس إليه، فأخرج الدفتر من كمّه وأراهم إياه، فعرفوا براءته مما قذفه به، ووثبوا على محمّد بن عبد الوهاب واستخفوا به، وانصرف بخزيٍ" [10].

إنّ تأكيدَ الأصبهاني[11] صاحبِ الأغاني (356/ 967)، على وجودِ الدوائِر في هذه الرواية، يُرجحّ أمراً من اثنين: إمّا أنّ الكِتابَ هو كِتابُ العَروضيّ، لأنّه الأوّل الذي تضمّنَ صوراً للدوائِر، وإمّا أنّه كِتابُ الخَليل نفسِه أو نسخةٌ منه. وفي حالِ عَلمنا أن ابن مُناذر كانَ صديقاً لأبي نواس[12] (198/813) ولأبي العتاهيّة[13] (211/826)[14]، فإنّ الكِتابَ الذي كانَ بين يديّه هو كِتابٌ من القَرْنِ الثاني الهجري، وبالتالي فهو كِتابُ الخَليل أو نسخةٌ منه يقيناً. الأمرُ الذي يتّسقُ مع ما خلصنا إليه سابقاً، من مسارِ التَدوينِ المشْرقيّ، باعتبارِ مدوّناته تزدادُ حجماً، وتتجهُ إلى الشرح، وتتضّح أبوابُها وأقسامُها كلّما انتشرَ التَعليم. والآن هل يمكننا القولُ إنّ كِتابَ الخَليل الصغيرَ الحجم وصلَ إلى الأندلس بطريقةٍ ما، لأنّ كِتابَ ابن عبد ربّه يتضمنُ صوراً للدوائِر؟ أم أنّ كِتابَ العَروضي الكبيرَ الحجم هو الذي وصل؟ فلئن كانَ كِتابُ الخَليل، أمكننا القولُ إنّ طريقةَ التَدوين في العِقْد الفَريدطريقةٌ أندلسيّة، ولئن كانَ كِتاب العَروضي، لأمكننا من خلالِ المقارنةِ بينه وبين جزءِ العَروضِ من العِقْد الفَريدتأكيدَ ذلك.

إنّ الجوابَ العِلميّ عن السؤالِ أعلاه سيؤكدّ بشكلٍ كبيرٍ إطلاعَ ابن عبد ربّه على كِتابِ الخَليل، وصوّغه لجزءِ العَروض بالاستنادِ إليه. ونعلّلُ ذلك بأمور خمسة:

1- تؤكدُ الروايةُ التاريخية وصولَ كِتاب الخَليل الفَرْش والمِثالإلى الأندلس في القَرْنِ الثالثِ الهجري، إذ تُعيّن صراحةً أوّلَ من فكّ العَروض في الأندلس وقتذاك: عباس ابن فرناس (274/ 887). فقد روى الزُّبيدي[15] (379/989) في طبقات النحويين واللغويين: "جلبَ بعضُ التجارِ كِتابَ العَروض للخَليل، فصارَ إلى الأمير عبد الرحمن، فأخبرني أبو الفَرَج الفتى، وكانَ من خيار فتيانهم، قالَ: كانَ ذلك الكِتابُ يتلاهى به في القصر، حتّى إنّ بعضَ الجواري كانَ يقولُ لبعض: صَيّر الله عقلك كعقلِ الذي ملأ كِتابَه من "ممَا مِمَّا" فبلغَ الخبرُ ابن فرناس، فرفعَ إلى الأمير يسألَه إخراجَ الكِتابِ إليه، ففعل فأدركَ منه عِلمَ العَروض، وقالَ: هذا كِتابٌ قبْله ما يفسّره. فوجهَ الأميرُ إلى المشْرق في ذلك، فأُتي بكِتابِ الفَرْشفوصلَه بثلثمائة دينار وكساه"[16].

2- يُشيرُ ابن عبد ربّه في كِتابِه بشكلٍ صريحٍ إلى عنوانِ كِتابِ الخَليل الضائع. ويؤكدُ أنّه مؤلّفٌ من جزأين: الفَرْش والمِثال، فيقولُ: "فأكملتُ جميعَ هذه العُروضِ في هذا الكِتاب الذي هو جزآن، فجزءٌ للفَرْش، وجزءٌ للمثال، مُختصِراً مُبينّا مُفسِراً. فاختصرتُ للفَرْشأرجوزةً، وجمعتُ فيها كلّ ما يدخلُ العَروضَ ويجوزُ في حشوِ الشّعر من الزِّحاف. وبيّنتُ الأسبابَ والأوتاد، والتَعاقبَ والتَراقبَ، والخروم، والزيادةَ على الأجزاء، وفكّ الدوائِر في هذا الجزء. واختصرتُ المِثالفي الجزء الثاني في ثلاثٍ وستين قطعة، على ثلاثةٍ وستين ضرباً من ضروب العَروض. وجعلتُ المقطّعات رقيقةً غَزِلةً، ليسهلَ حفظُها على ألسنةِ الرواة. وضمّنتُ في آخرِ كُل مقطَّعة منها بيتاً قديماً مُتصلاً بها وداخلاً في معناها، من الأبياتِ التي استشهدَ بها الخَليل في عَروضه، لتقومَ به الحُجّةُ لمن رَوى هذه المقطّعات واحتجّ بها"[17].

3- يستعملُ الشّنتريني الأندلسيّ (549/ 1057) في كِتابِه المعيارُ في أوزانِ الأشعار، لفظيّ الفَرْش والمِثال  "وإذ قد ذكرنا من الفَرْشما لا بدّ لطالبِ هذا الشأن منه ولا غناءَ له عنه، فلنقلْ في المِثالبأوجز مقال"[18].

4- يبدو أنّ استعمالَ لفظي الفَرْش والمِثال عند ذِكْرِ كُتُبِ العَروض، كانَ خاصّاً بأهل الأندلس. فقد وجدنا في الذيل والتكملة، عند الكلام على أبي محمّد بن القُرطبي[19] (611/1214) ما يلي: "فكفّ عن الخوضِ في تلك المسألة، وهمّه ذلك وشغلَ باله، واشتدّ عليه، وانصرفَ إلى منْزِله، وعكفَ سائرَ يومه على تصفّحِ عِلم العَروض، حتّى فهمَ أغراضَه، وحصّل قوانينَه، وصنّفَ فيه مُختصراً نبيلاً لخّصَ في صدرِه فرْشه، وأبدعَ فيه بنظمٍ مثله في صدورٍ خمسة، لخمس دوائِر الشّعرِ العَرَبي، ينفكّ من كلّ صدرٍ أشطارُ دائرته وأعاريضها، ونظمَ لكلّ شطرٍ أيضاً عَجَزاً تُعرفُ به أنواعُ ضروبه، وجاءَ به الغد مُعجزاً من رآه أو سمعَ به"[20].

5- إنّ مقارنةَ الدوائِر بين كِتابِ ابن عبد ربّه من جهة، وكِتابِ العَروضيّ من جهةٍ أخرى، تؤكّدُ أنّ مصدرَ ابن عبد ربّه هو كِتابُ الخَليل، لا أي كِتاب مشرقيّ آخر، لأن العَروضيّ وضعَ التَفاعيل على الدوائِر، أمّا ابن عبد ربّه فقد وضعَ رمزيّ المتحرّك (5) والساكِن (1)[21]، وهما صنيعُ الخَليل كما نعلم.

وعليه، لا ريب في أنّ كِتابَ الخَليل ذا الحجم الصغير وصلَ إلى الأندلس، وأنّ ذكاءَ ابن فرناس المتوقّد وعبقريته التي لا تُبارى، قد حملاه على أنّ يُوليه العناية اللازمة؛ فبعد أن فكّ العَروض، واستطاعَ فهمه، قامَ بشرحه "للأميرِ عبد الرحمن ولبعضِ جلسائه من العُلماء والأعيان، وكذلك بدأ يطالعُ به الشّعراء والأدباء، ويتذاكرُ معهم حوله وعن أصولِه ومبادئِه، كما راحَ يذيعه على الناس، فكانَ أوّل من أُخِذَ عنه عِلمُ العَروض في الأندلس"[22]. وفي هذا المسار ما يُخبّرُ قصّةَ العَروض في التَعليمِ ثانيةً، فمن العالِمِ ابن فرناس، إلى العُلماء المختصّين، ومن ثمّ إلى الانتشارِ بين الناس.

الفَرْشُ والمِثالُإذاً، كِتابٌ مؤلّفٌ من جزأين: 1- الفَرْش: وهو القِسمُ الذي يحيلُ إلى مصطلحاتِ العِلم ودوائِر الخَليل، ويمكننا عدّه جُزءاً نظرياً للعَروض. 2- المِثال: وهو القِسمُ الذي يحيلُ إلى البُحورِ الشّعريّة المرتبة تِباعاً حسبَ دوائِر الخَليل، وفي كلّ بحرٍ منها مثال عن أعاريضه وضروبه المختلفة، ويمكننا عدّه جزءاً تطبيقياً للعَروض. وعليه، لا بدّ من تحليلكِتاب الجوهرة الثانية في أعاريض الشّعرلابن عبد ربّه من أجلِ الكشْفِ عن التَدوينِ الأندلسيّ لعِلم العَروض. 

[ضمن سلسلة "كتب“ التي تعنى بالإصدارات الجديدة، تنشر ”جدلية“ فصلاً من كتاب جديد للناقدة ديمة الشكر.”الرنين المطوّق: العروض قديماً وحديثاً“، الشارقة، دائرة الثقافة والإعلام، ٢٠١٣. اضغط/ي هنا لقراءة حوار مع ديمة الشكر حول الكتاب] 

كتب: مقابلة مع ديمة الشكر

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[ضمن سلسلة "كتب“ التي تعنى بالإصدارات الجديدة، تنشر ”جدلية“ حواراً مع الناقدة ديمة الشكر وفصلاً من كتابها الصادر حديثاً ”الرنين المطوّق: العروض قديماً وحديثاً“، الشارقة، دائرة الثقافة والإعلام، ٢٠١٣.]

جدلية: كيف تبلورت فكرة الكتاب وما الذي قادك نحو الموضوع؟

ديمة الشكر:تبلورت فكرة الكتاب خلال سنين  من قراءتي لعلم العَروض، الذي لم يقدني إليه إلا شغفي بالشعر الحديث حصراً، بشقيه الموزون (التفعيلة) وغير الموزون (قصيدة النثر). الشعر الحديث هذا هو أصل القصة كلها، إذ بدأت بقراءته منذ الصغر وكان "حديقتي السرية"، خلافا للقصيد أي الشطرين المقفى الذي كان حصة ما هو رسمي وقتها أقصد المدرسة. أعجبني الشعر الحديث، فبدأت أقرأ عن شعراءه وعنه، فاكتشفت "خلافا" لم يعجبني إن جاز التعبير بين شعراء الحداثة حول أمر محدد هو الوزن، هكذا أردت التعرف عن كثب إلى ما اختلف حوله الشعراء الذين أحبهم، وبدأت بقراءة كل ما يدور حول الأمر إلى أن وصلت عفويا وتلقائيا إلى الكتب التراثية فبدأت أقرا من دون ان أفهم الكثير، ومن دور تصور أو سياق، إذ إن كتب العروض متشابهة كلها حد التطابق، وهي لا تعطي القارئ فرصة للتفكير في سياق العلم أو تاريخه مثلا، ولا تفتح النافذة التي انتظرتها : ما تأثير غياب الوزن أصلا عن القصيدة؟، ما دوره تحديداً حين تكون القصيدة موزونة؟ فاكتشفت أن علي فتح النافذة بنفسي، وأن أوسع منظوري. الأمر بسيط  في رأيي : لم أكن لأكتب عن العروض لو لم أولد الآن، فلو كنت قد ولدت في القرن التاسع عشر مثلا لما خطر الامر في بالي مطلقا، من هنا أنا مدينة لشعراء الحداثة، هم من قادوني إلى علم العروض.

جدلية: ما هي الأفكار والأطروحات الرئيسية التي يتضمنها الكتاب ؟

ديمة الشكر:نظراً إلى عدم وجود أي كتاب يبحث في تاريخ علم العروض ويبسطه كما تم الأمر مثلا مع علم النحو، كان لا بد لي من البدء مما قبل الخليل إلى اليوم. صحيح أن الفترة طويلة جدا، ثلاثة عشر قرناً، لكن لا يمكن البحث في العروض وبالتالي التوصل إلى نتائج علمية وأطروحات يعول عليها أو ذات صدقية من دون البحث في تاريخ العروض كله. الفكرة الرئيسة الأولى هي أن كتب العروض كلها كتب تعليمية، أمليت على طلبة العلم، وهي صورة شبه متطابقة مع كتاب الخليل الضائع. ومنهج الخليل في تأليف الكتاب أثر بشكلٍ طاغ على من جاء بعده. الخليل صاحب العقل الرياضي دوّن إيقاعات الشعر وفقاً للطريقة القياسية : القاعدة ثم مثال عنها. هذه نقطة الانطلاق أردت تصور كيف فكر الخليل؟ ولماذا دوّن الإيقاعات على هذا النحو؟ وما هذه الدوائر التي تزين غالبية كتب العروض؟ ما دورها ما وظيفتها؟ فتنني الخليل بن أحمد، ومن حسن حظي أنني تعلمت العزف على البيانو في صغري وأجيد قراءة النوتة، فطنت فوراً إلى أنه لا يمكن مطلقاً تعلم العزف عن طريق قراءة كتب الصولفيج ولو أمضيت عمراً وأنت تقرأ، يجب أن تقرأ النوتة وأنت تسمع النغمة في آن واحد، العمليتان متلازمتان. والعروض كذلك، إذن هنا فهمت كيف دوّن الخليل علم العروض بالاستناد إلى أمرين يسمحان بالقراءة المنغمة من جهة وبتدوين الإيقاعات بطريقة تجريدية من أجل حفظها من الضياع من جهة أخرى، وبكلام أبسط، النغمات: فعولن مفاعلين الخ تشبه إن جاز التعبير ”دو ري مي“ إلخ أما رسم الساكن والمتحرك على دوائر الخليل فيشبه سلم النوتة الموسيقية مع وجود اختلاف طبعا، فالنوتة الموسيقية التجريدية أعقد بما لا يقاس من رسمي الساكن والمتحرك، أما نغمات الخليل فأعقد من نوتة موسيقبة مثل الـ دو أو الـ ري. ولكل من هذين التدوينين النغمي والتجريدي وظيفة يضطلع بها، تتيح تعلم الإيقاعات العربية ونظم الشعر على منوالها. حين بحثت في تصور الخليل للإيقاع إذن، استطعت العودة إلى ما قبله، والنظر  في ما بعده، فغدا خياري في البحث من ما قبل الخليل إلى الحداثة أمراً مفروغاً منه. وهو ما قادني إلى نتائج مقنعة بالنسبة لي على الأقل، اكتشفت وجود فروق في التدوين بين الاندلسيين والمشرقيين الأوائل، إذ أدت مصادفة جميلة إلى وصول كتاب الخليل "الضائع" إلى الاندلس في القرن الثالث للهجرة واهتمام عبقري آخر هو عباس بن فرناس به، ما أثر بطريقة تدوين الاندلسيين للعلم، كتبهم أكثر منهجية وأفضل ترتيبا من المشرقيين الأوائل، لأنها صورة أصدق عن كتاب الخليل الذي عنوانه على ما أظن "الفرش والمثال".

وتوصلت كذلك إلى تفنيد واحدة من أكثر الأخطاء شيوعاً: استدراك الأخفش على الخليل بحر المتدارك. لم يستدرك أحد شيئا على الخليل، والخليل نفسه نظم على البحر المتدارك. القصة أن ابن خلكان ذكر ذلك ولم تتم اعادة النظر بما قاله ابن خلكان. والاهم أن ظهور البحر المتدارك في كتب العروض الأولى، كان يشي بمكانته لدى الشعراء وقتها: لم ينظر إليه العرب إلا بخفة، كان يبدو مفتقراً إلى مهابة الإيقاعات العربية، لا يمكن مقارنة نغمته المتراقصة مثلاً مع نغمة بحر الطويل الفخمة. وكان لا بد من الانتظار حتى القرن الرابع الهجري حتى يوضع المتدارك بشكل منهجي في كتب العروض، وهو ما قام به الصاحب بن عباد في كتابه "الإقناع في العروض".

وأحب فعلا قصة بحر المتدارك هذه، لأنها وسعت من منظوري تجاه استعمال البحور في الشعر الحديث: الأمر يتعلق بالذائقة، فهذا البحر بدأ بالانتشار وعندها دوّنه العروضيون أصولا في كتبهم، وهو واسع الانتشار اليوم في الحداثة. ويتعلق الأمر أيضا بطبيعة البحر نفسها، ما هي الإمكانيات الإيقاعية التي يمكن للشاعر استغلالها ضمن شكل بعينه: في القصيد، أو في الموشح أو في الشعر الحديث الموزون؟ أي أن الأمر يتعلق بالذائقة وبالخواص "التقنية" إن جاز التعبير للبحور. فعلى سبيل المثال لا يمكن مطلقا استعمال البحر الطويل في الشعر الحديث الموزون لأنه تقنياً لا يقبل الجزء ولا النهك ولا التشطير، أي لا يقبل التخفف من إحدى تفعيلاته أو أكثر، أو بكلام آخر لا يتمتع بالمرونة التي تسمح له بـ "التحرر" من شكل القصيد، ليحط وينزل في قصيدة حديثة موزونة مثل التي يكتبها محمود درويش مثلا.

كانت الأمور تسير فعلا بشكل متطابق مع ما نعرفه من مد للحضارة العربية ثم جمود وتراجع فيها، لم يشذ العروض عن ذلك، ففي زمن الشروح والشروح على الشروح، ظهرت منظومات تعليمية معقدة أقرب إلى المعميات والأحاجي، وكثرت الشروح وتعقد تعليم العروض وغدا مقتصراً تقريباً على حلقات ضيقة أدنى إلى المشيخة والتصوف منها إلى علماء اللغة ومعلميها، إلى أن وصلنا النهضة، هنا ظهر تطور ممتاز في التجديد في طرق تعليم العروض وتنوع لافت في مقاربته وهو ما لبث ان انتكس للمفارقة في فترة الحداثة بتأثير مضلل للمستشرقين الذين اهتموا بعلم العروض العربي.

بحثت بعمق في كتب المستشرقين عن العروض (في فترتي النهضة والحداثة)، ولمست مذاهبهم في تذليل صعوبات تعليمه لغير الناطقين بالعربية، ومحاولاتهم لتقريبه من العروض الإغريقي مثلاً، وبحثهم المحموم عن النبر في العربية والارتكاز في الشعر العربي، وهذا ما فتح أمامي نافذة للمقارنة بين أعاريض مختلفة، وطرق تعليمها وتدوينها وكيف أثر الامر على العرب الذين بحثوا في العروض في فترة الحداثة. بطريقة ما فتح علم العروض أمام عيني خزائن من الكتب، وقصص وحكايات جميلة وطريفة، ودلني إلى واحد من أهم الكتب: كتاب ”دائرة الوحدة“ لعبد الصاحب مختار، هو الكتاب الوحيد الذي نظر إلى علم العروض بعيداً فعلا عن طريقة الخليل، ابتكر طريقة حداثية ممتازة في التعرف إلى الإيقاعات الشعرية، وفتح الباب أمام اختلاط البحور، هذا ما يفعله شعراء الحداثة أحياناً، كتاب ممتاز ممتاز.

جدلية: ماهي التحديات التي جابهتك أثناء البحث والكتابة؟

ديمة الشكر:أهمها دحض الأفكار المسبقة التي تقول بجمود العلم، فالجمود يطول طرق تعليمه ولا شيء آخر. وكذلك أنه علم صعب ومعقد، وهذا صحيح لكن ليس العلم كله صعب، ثمة أجزاء صعبة منه، منها مصطلحاته الكثيرة والصعبة فعلا، بيد أن هذا لا يبرر العزوف عن تعلمه أو تعليمه. هل نتوقف عن تعليم وتعلم ما هو صعب ومعقد في الرياضيات إذن مثلا؟ الصعوبة يجب أن تكون حافزا لاستنباط طرق جديدة وحداثية في التعليم.

لم يكن الحصول على الكتب الخاصة بفترة النهضة يسيراً، لكن تنقلت بين بيروت ودمشق، واستطعت الوصول إلى أغلبها، ولم أعد ذلك صعوبة وقتها، فقد كان الشغف يقودني. ولكن في أحايين كثيرة كنت أقول لنفسي: لمَ أفعل هذا؟ لمَ أبحث في أمر يتطير الناس منه ويسخرون أيضاً؟ فأحبط بسبب صعوبة البحث، ثم أتابع مجددا وأنا أقول لنفسي طيب بما أنه متروك وهامشي فسأحتفي به، هو حصتي ولا أحد يريده.

وربما كانت الصعوبة الأكبر أن لا كتب بحثت في الامر أستطيع الاعتماد عليها لأطور بحثي، كان علي أن أبدأ تقريبا من لا شيء، وأن أكتشف بنفسي مسار العلم وتاريخه. صحيح ثمة كتب ولو قليلة جدا بحثت في نشأة إيقاعات الشعر العربي لكنها لم تتابع الأمر، بمعنى أنها خطت نصف خطوة ولم تربط النشأة بما صنعه الخليل بعد ذلك، ولم تتوسع كثيرا في ما يخص الأشكال السابقة على القصيد (الشطرين المقفى) لأسباب كثيرة منها مثلا قلة ما وصلنا من ذلك الشعر، وضعف المقارنات مع الشعر في اللغات السامية الأخرى. بالإضافة إلى الأخطاء الكثيرة المنتشرة في كتب الحداثة سواء أكانت بحثية أم تعليمية، أدت كلها إلى زيادة "الأفكار المسبقة" وابتكار صعوبات جديدة، شيء يشبه الفوضى، وفي ظني أن سبب ذلك هو الانقطاع المخل بين النهضة والحداثة، نادرا ما تجد حداثيا يشير إلى نهضوي، كما لو أن الحداثة طردت النهضة ورمتها. غياب التراكم، وعدم الاستفادة من النتائج التي توصل إليها النهضويون مشكلة كبرى في رأيي. ونادرا أصلا ما التفت الحداثيون إلى الشعر الحديث في كتبهم، لا يوجد ولا طريقة واحدة تدل الطالب اليوم كيف يفرق بين الشعر الحديث الموزون وغير الموزون. لهذا يستغرب الناس حين أقول لهم السياب ودرويش مثلا كتبا شعرا موزونا. النكسة فعلا في غالبية كتب الحداثة التي رمت النهضة وأدارت وجهها للشعر الحديث، وغرقت في جدالات غير ذات صلة متأثرة بأطروحات المستشرقين الذين لا يمكن أن يعرفوا العروض العربي كأهله، وهم أنفسهم وضعوا كتباً ممتلئة الأخطاء المعرفية.

جدلية: كيف يتموضع هذا الكتاب في الحقل الفكري/الجنس الكتابي الخاص به وكيف سيتفاعل معه؟

ديمة الشكر:هو كتاب في تأريخ علم العروض، كتاب بحثي، ينظر في أحد علوم اللغة العربية، لكنه بسبب منهجه يظهر في عيني أحيانا كصورة مصغرة عن علاقتنا بتراثنا ولغتنا اليوم، كيف نهتم بعلوم اللغة؟ اهتمامنا قليل، ومع ذلك لا نكف عن الشكوى من تراجع اللغة العربية مندهشين من الامر رغم إهمالنا لعلوم اللغة العربية وطرق تعليمها. مفارقة غريبة عجيبة، نحن كمن رسب في الصفوف الأولى في المدرسة ومع ذلك يتذمر ويصرخ لماذا لم يتم قبولي في الجامعة؟!! ويعد نفسه مظلوما كذلك.

أظن أن موضع الكتاب مع إخوته من كتب العروض هو مكانه الطبيعي، مع ذلك يمكن أن يغيّر مكانه فيذهب إلى كتب التاريخ بسبب "قصص" العروض فيه، ويمكن أن يذهب أيضاً إلى رف الشعر، ففيه شواهد الخليل ومنظومات تعليمية كثيرة، صحيح هي ليست شعرا لكن لها شكله، هي نظم أعرف هذا لكن أحب لو وضع الكتاب مع الشعر لأنه عنه.

 اعتنيت بتبويبه ليكون سهل المأخذ، أنت غير مضطر لقراءته كله، تستطيع أن تقرأ الجزء الذي يهمك فقط، من هنا من الممكن أن يكون التفاعل معه أكثر حرية، هو ينظر أيضا في طرق التعليم، وقد يكون مفيدا لمن يحب تعدد الأبواب المفضية إلى أمر بعينه. والكتاب يعتني بفكرة تدوين النغمات، وحفظ الإيقاعات أو ما سمي قديما "أبنية العرب"، تعجبني التسمية وأراها معبرة جدا.

جدلية: ما هو موقع هذا الكتاب في مسيرتك الفكرية والإبداعية؟

ديمة الشكر:هو كتابي الأول رسمياً  لذا فإن موقعه هو موقع القلب بالطبع، البحث في العروض قربني إلى التراث، وجعلني أحب الشعر الحديث أكثر وأفهم كيف أن تلك الإيقاعات الراسخة للشعر العربي التي فتنتنا على مر العصور وقليلا ما خرجنا عنها (خلا النزهة الأندلسية للموشح والأزجال)، جاء شعراء الحداثة وخاصة السياب ودرويش فاقترحوا لها بديلاً جميلاً استطاع الصمود لأزيد من نصف قرن، الكتاب يقول أيضاً ثمة إمكانيات هائلة  في الإيقاع لا مبرر للتفريط بها. كنت أكتب ونصب عيني الشعراء والنقاد الأقرب إلى قلبي، كنت أريد شيئا يليق بما كتبوه. وكان البحث العلمي الغربي نصب عيني كذلك، كنت أريد كتابة شيء محكم، عربي ومحكم، كنت لا واعية أتصرف وعنوان أحد كتب عبد الفتاح كيليطو يرن في رأسي: "لن تتكلم لغتي"، لهذا أفردت مساحة واسعة لما كتبه المستشرقون عن الأمر.

 جدلية: من هو الجمهور المفترض للكتاب وما الذي تأملين أن يصل إليه القراء؟

ديمة الشكر:أظن وأتمنى أن يكونوا ممن يحبون الشعر ويقدرونه مثلي، ولا يجدون أن عليهم الاختيار بين التراث والحداثة أو بين الوزن وغيابه أو بين الأشكال الشعرية. لكن فلأكن واقعية، هذا كتاب للمختصين والذين يعشقون اللغة العربية، والاهم أنهم يعشقون البحث والتعمق فيها. 

جدلية:ماهي مشاريعك الأخرى/المستقبلية؟ 

ديمة الشكر:أتمنى أن يصيبني شغف مماثل لأكتب عن الشعر الحديث، عن شعراء أحبهم، سيكون كتابي نقدياً بالطبع. 

[اضغط/ ي هنالقراءة فصل من الكتاب] 


الرأسمالية الفلسطينية المتمادية

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لمحة عامة

تكافح غالبية الفلسطينيين الرازحين تحت الاحتلال الإسرائيلي من أجل البقاء على قيد الحياة، وفي الوقت نفسه تشهد فئةٌ متنفذةٌ من الرأسماليين الفلسطينيين ازدهارًا وتناميًا في نفوذها السياسي والاقتصادي والاجتماعي. وغالبًا ما يكون ثمن ذلك الازدهار مشاركتهم في مشاريع التطبيع الاقتصادي. أي أن هؤلاء الرأسماليين الفلسطينيين يتعاملون مع الإسرائيليين كما لو كانوا شريكًا تجاريًا "طبيعيًا" وليس قوةً محتلة ما انفكت تنتهك حقوق الشعب الفلسطيني بلا رحمة منذ ما يزيد على 65 عامًا.

يُسلِّط عضو الشبكة طارق دعنا، في هذه الورقة السياساتية، الضوءَ على أساليب هؤلاء الرأسماليين الفلسطينيين في ممارسة نفوذهم السياسي وفرض سيطرتهم الاجتماعية، ويسُوق أمثلةً لمشاريع التطبيع الاقتصادي التي يشاركون فيها.

لمحة موجزة عن رأس المال الفلسطيني

ظل رجال الأعمال الفلسطينيون حاضرين في المجال السياسي منذ ما قبل إنشاء منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية. وبعد تأسيسها، لعب الرأسماليون الفلسطينيون أدوارًا متنوعة في حركة التحرر الوطني. ونظرت بعض فصائل منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية، ولا سيما حركة فتح، إلى الطبقة الرأسمالية الفلسطينية باعتبارها "برجوازيةً وطنية،" وبالتالي كجزءٍ لا غنى عنه في النضال ضد الاستعمار، وتعاملت معها وفقًا لذلك.

وفي ذلك الوقت، انطوت مشاركة الرأسماليين الفلسطينيين مع منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية على تقديم التمويل، وشغل المناصب القيادية في المنظمة، والوساطة السياسية. ومن أمثلتها وساطة رجال أعمال فلسطينيين بين قيادة منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية والنظام الأردني في أحداث أيلول الأسود، وبين قيادة منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية والإدارة الأمريكية إبان ثمانينيات القرن الماضي. وكان للعديد منهم مساهمات خيرية و دعموا العديد من  المشاريع التعليمية والاجتماعية والاقتصادية. ومن الأمثلة الرئيسية في هذا الصدد إنشاءُ مؤسسة التعاون سنة 1983 التي شكَّلت دفعةً كان المشروع الوطني الفلسطيني بأمس الحاجة لها في القطاعين التعليمي والاجتماعي و الاقتصادي في أعقاب طرد جُل الفدائيين  الفلسطينيين من قاعدتهم في لبنان إبان الاجتياح الإسرائيلي عام 1982 بقيادة رئيس الوزراء السابق آرييل شارون.

ومنذ أوسلو، ما فتئ نفوذ الرأسماليين الفلسطينيين يتنامى على نحو غير مسبوق في الأراضي المحتلة، ولا سيما في السنوات الأخيرة. ويمكن تصنيف الرأسماليين الفلسطينيين في ثلاث فئات رئيسية:

  • الرأسماليون "العائدون" المنتمون إلى الطبقة البرجوازية الفلسطينية التي برزت في البلدان العربية، وبخاصة دول الخليج، وفي أمريكا الشمالية وأوروبا. وقد ارتبط العديد من رجال الأعمال هؤلاء بعلاقات وطيدة مع السلطة الفلسطينية الوليدة.
  •  الرأسماليون المحليون، وينقسمون إلى فئتين فرعيتين: كبار مُلاّك الأراضي المتمتعون بنفوذ سياسي واجتماعي كبير في الهياكل الاجتماعية التقليدية؛ والوسطاء المحليون الذين جمعوا ثروتهم بالعمل كمتعاقدين من الباطن لحساب شركات إسرائيلية في أعقاب احتلال أراضي 1967.
  •  حديثو الثراء، الذين اكتسبوا ثروتهم في الآونة الأخيرة مستفيدين بوجه خاص من عملية أوسلو بطرقٍ مختلفة كما سنأتي على ذكره لاحقًا.

التأثير في عملية صنع السياسات

عانى رجال الأعمال الفلسطينيون، كغيرهم من الفلسطينيين، من انعدام الجنسية (statelessness)، وبحثوا عن الأمن الذي من شأن الدولة أن توفره لكي تحظى شركاتهم وأرباحهم بحماية وحصانة أفضل في مواجهة عدم الاستقرار والتهديدات الإقليمية. وهكذا، أيَّد الكثيرون منهم اتفاقات أوسلو كخطوةٍ رئيسية نحو إقامة الدولة الفلسطينية، حتى إن بعضهم توهَّم بأن "عوائد السلام" المنبثقة من اتفاقات أوسلو سوف تُحوِّل الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة إلى سنغافورة الشرق الأوسط.

تبرز العلامات المبكرة للنفوذ الرأسمالي في السلطة الفلسطينية الوليدة في المادة 21 من القانون الأساسي الفلسطيني التي تنص على أن "يقوم النظام الاقتصادي في فلسطين على أساس مبادئ الاقتصاد الحر" (التوكيد من الكاتب). غير أن دستور الولايات المتحدة، على سبيل المفارقة، يتسم بمرونة كافية تسمح بتبني استجابات مختلفة لظروف اقتصادية محددة رغم أن الولايات المتحدة هي القوة الدافعة عالميًا للرأسمالية القائمة على السوق الحرة. لقد ساهم تبني النهج النيوليبرالي داخل السلطة الفلسطينية في استحداث إطار مؤسسي يُمكِّن جماعات المصالح الاقتصادية من التلاعب في السياسات لخدمة مآربهم الخاصة.

لقد عزَّزت النيوليبرالية الممزوجة بالاستبداد السياسي والفساد ما يمكن وصفه بأنه رأسمالية قائمة على المحسوبية والشِللية (crony capitalism) في إطار السلطة الفلسطينية. وتجلت المحسوبية ضمن السلطة الفلسطينية منذ تأسيسها في نشوء علاقات خاصة بين رجال الأعمال ذوي النفوذ والنخبة السياسية والأمنية في السلطة الفلسطينية. وكان لهذا الوضع بطبيعة الحال آثارٌ سلبية على الاقتصاد، إذ أعاقت السلطة الفلسطينية بمحاباتها جماعات سياسية واقتصادية معينة تنافسيةَ السوق واستبعدت غالبية الناس من الحصول على فرص اقتصادية مجدية.1وتنامت قدرة الرأسماليين على التأثير في سياسات الحكومة وازداد السياسيون ثراءً.

وإبان عقد التسعينيات، أدت العلاقة الخاصة بين بعض الرأسماليين الفلسطينيين والدوائر السياسية الحاكمة في السلطة الفلسطينية إلى تركُّز السلطة السياسية والاقتصادية في يد أفراد قليلين تمكنوا بسرعة من تحويل المشروع الوطني إلى لعبة سياسية قائمة على المصالح. وكانت الحال كذلك ولا سيما فيما يتعلق بتواطؤ النخبة السياسية والأمنية في السلطة الفلسطينية مع تكتلات رجال الأعمال في الشتات لإدارة احتكارات القطاعين العام والخاص واسعة النطاق. فقد شملت تلك الاحتكارات المحمية من السلطة الفلسطينية ما يزيد على 25 سلعة رئيسية مستوردة بما فيها الدقيق والسكر والزيت واللحوم المجمدة والسجائر والحيوانات الحية والإسمنت والبحص والفولاذ والخشب والتبغ والبترول.

لم تكن هذه الاحتكارات مؤشرًا مبكرًا على فساد السلطة الفلسطينية وحسب، بل كانت أيضًا التجسد الأوضح للتحالف السياسي-الاقتصادي الناشئ الذي أوجدَ ضمن السلطة الفلسطينية آليةً سياسيةً فعالة لتحقيق المصالح الاقتصادية الخاصة. وعلاوة على ذلك، مُنِحت الاحتكارات على نحو انتقائي للفاعلين السياسيين والاقتصاديين الفلسطينيين المقرَّبين من الشركات الإسرائيلية. وفي المحصلة، نجم عن الاحتكارات أثرٌ مدمر على الاقتصاد الفلسطيني والشركات الفلسطينية الصغيرة، وفائدةٌ للاقتصاد الإسرائيلي. وأصبح عددٌ من المسؤولين السياسيين والعسكريين الإسرائيليين السابقين، بعد تقاعدهم، شركاءَ تجاريين لبعض الرأسماليين الفلسطينيين والنخب السياسية في السلطة الفلسطينية. وفي المقابل، منحت إسرائيل رجال الأعمال والسياسيين الفلسطينيين امتيازات خاصة كالحصول على التصاريح، وقدرٍ أكبر من حرية التنقل والتجارة، وحرية المرور المخصصة لكبار الشخصيات.

ومع تعيين رئيس الوزراء السابق سلام فياض وتنفيذ البرامج الحكومية التي استحدثها منذ 2008، زاد نفوذ الرأسماليين في المؤسسة السياسية. وفي معظم الأحيان، تبوأ رجال الأعمال والتكنوقراطيون المؤيدون للرأسمالية مناصبَ وزاريةً رئيسية في حكومات فياض.

شكَّلت عملية "إصلاح" القطاع المصرفي التي جرت في عهد فياض جانبًا مهمًا من جوانب زيادة النفوذ السياسي الرأسمالي. فتلك الإصلاحات مكَّنت الحكومةَ من توقيع عقودٍ طويلة الأجل بلغت نحو 4.2 مليار دولار في العام 2013 وفقًا لتقديرات مؤخرة، أي ما يصل إلى 50% من الناتج المحلي الإجمالي، بفائدة سنوية تبلغ 200 مليون دولار. وبالنسبة لاقتصادٍ يعتمد إلى حدٍ كبير على المساعدات الدولية، تُشكِّل هذه المديونية العامة المرتفعة قلقًا حقيقيًا. ولا يتضح إلى الآن كيف أُنفقت تلك الأموال وكيف ستسدد السلطة الفلسطينية ديونها.

وبفعل ارتفاع مستوى الدين العام، يستطيع الرأسماليون أن يضغطوا على السلطة الفلسطينية لكي تغير سياساتها بما يتفق ومصالح الشركات الخاصة الكبرى، حيث يهددون بسحب بعض الاستثمارات أو الامتناع عن الدخول في استثمارات أخرى، كما يبين علاء الترتير في دراسة صدرت مؤخرًا. وغني عن القول إن الشعب هو من يدفع الثمن، كما حصل حين رفعت السلطة الفلسطينية ضريبةَ الدخل وخفَّضت الإنفاق في مطلع 2012

ازداد دور هؤلاء الرأسماليين الفلسطينيين بروزًا حتى على الصعيد السياسي الدولي. فهم يُلقون بثقلهم خلف جهود وزير الخارجية الأمريكي جون كيري لوضع تسوية سلمية من خلال خطتهم الفلسطينية-الإسرائيلية المشتركة المسماة "كسر الجمود" بالرغم من الأثر الوخيم الذي سيلحق بالحقوق الفلسطينية جراء ذلك. وعلاوة على ذلك، تفيد التقارير بأن الخطة أُعدَّت دون مشاركة المجتمع المدني الفلسطيني ولا حتى السلطة الفلسطينية نفسها.

يشير هذا إلى أن الرأسماليين الفلسطينيين المحليين الشِلليين أصبحوا المستقبِل الأول لمبادرات "السلام" الدولية. ومن الصعب أن يصدق المرء بأن خطة السلام التي يديرها هؤلاء سوف تساهم في الدفع نحو تقرير المصير وتحقيق الحرية والعدالة للقضية الفلسطينية. بل من المرجح أن تشكل فرصةً ربحية أخرى لهؤلاء المنتفعين من استمرار الوضع القائم.

 

السيطرة الاجتماعية من خلال الديون ووسائل أخرى

كما في بقاع أخرى من العالم، يقوم النظام النيوليبرالي على آليات مختلفة للسيطرة الاجتماعية من أجل اخضاع الأفراد و المجتمع ككل بشكل يضمن استمرارية النظام القائم مهما كان جائرا وتعسفيا. وفي الحالة الفلسطينية تهدف ادوات السيطرة الاجتماعية بشكل أساسي الى تطبيع الاحتلال، واختراق الجماعات التي تسعى لمقاومته باستخدام وسائل مختلفة من اجل احتوائها و اخضاعها.2ولممارسات السيطرة الاجتماعية في فلسطين أثرٌ مدمر بوجه خاص لأنها ترتبط بمجموعة الضوابط الاستعمارية التي يصممها الاحتلال.

لقد سعى الرأسماليون الشِلليون لممارسة السيطرة الاجتماعية بواسطة تسخير المجتمع المدني لخدمة أهدافهم، والعمل جنبًا إلى جنب مع الجهات المانحة الدولية الكبرى. ومن الطرق التي يتبعونها في ذلك إنشاءُ منظمات غير حكومية كبيرة تنزع إلى اختراق النسيج الاجتماعي بواسطة تشجيع قيم معينة تصممها المؤسسات المالية والوكالات الإنمائية الدولية لاستدامة النظام النيوليبرالي. ومن المتوقع أن تنتقل قيم تلك المنظمات غير الحكومية لتصل إلى منظمات المجتمع المدني الأصيلة عبر مشاريع بناء القدرات ومشاريع أخرى.

وثمة جانب آخر للسيطرة الاجتماعية يتمثل في تسهيل الإقراض الخاص، والذي يشجّع ثقافة الاستهلاك ويوقع الكثيرين في فخ الديون. فوفقًا لسلطة النقد الفلسطينية، قفزت القروض الفردية إلى حوالي مليار دولار أمريكي في 2013 مقارنةً بنحو 494 مليون في 2009. ويقدَّر أن 75% من موظفي القطاع العام (94000 من أصل 153000) مدِينون. تُستخدم الديون الشخصية في المقام الأول في تمويل الاستهلاك (بما في ذلك الرهن العقاري، وشراء السيارات، ودفع تكاليف الزواج، وشراء الأجهزة الكهربائية) وقلما تُستَثمر في أنشطة إنتاجية. إن لهذه الحالة من المديونية الشخصية تداعيات اجتماعية كبيرة لأنها تشجع مذهب الفردية وتوجِّه الاهتمام بالشواغل الشخصية الخاصة، مما يدفع الناس على نحو منهجي للتخلي عن القضايا الوطنية الحاسمة. وهي تعزز اللامبالاة السياسية وتُضعِف التفكير الناقد والجهود المناهضة لطبيعة النظام القمعية.

ومن الأساليب الأخرى للسيطرة الاجتماعية استغلال العمال في المصانع المملوكة لبعض الرأسماليين المحليين حيث يتقاضى العمال أجرًا أقل بكثير من الحد الأدنى للأجور الذي حددته الحكومة مؤخرًا للقطاع الخاص والبالغ 1450 شيكل (377 دولار أمريكي). "رغم أن العمال احتجوا على الحد الأدنى للأجور الذي أعلنته السلطة الفلسطينية، لأنه لا يكفل الحد الأدنى لمستوى المعيشة، لا يزال الكثيرون منا يعملون في ظروف مهينة، حيث تقل رواتبنا حتى عن 1000 شيكل. ومع ذلك، علينا أن نقبَل، وإلا فإننا سنُرمى في الشارع" (مقابلة مع الكاتب). ويتفاقم ما تتعرض له العمالة الفلسطينية من استغلال وسيطرة جراء غياب الاتحادات العمالية الفعالة، حيث عملت السلطة الفلسطينية والرأسماليون على حدٍ سواء على اختراق و إضعاف تلك الاتحادات إلى حدٍ كبير.

هناك مخاوف من أن نظام استغلال العمال والسيطرة عليهم سوف يتسع ويتمأسس من خلال المناطق الصناعية المصممة لدمج رأس المال الفلسطيني والإسرائيلي والإقليمي من أجل استغلال وفرة العمالة الفلسطينية الرخيصة. ووفقا لآدم هنية، لن تطبق المناطق الصناعية قوانين العمل الفلسطينية أو الإسرائيلية، أو مستويات الأجور وشروط العمل الأخرى المتبعة لدى الجانبين، وسوف يكون الحق في تكوين الاتحادات العمالية محظورًا.

تطبيع الاحتلال على الطريقة الاقتصادية

بات التطبيع الاقتصادي مُمأسسًا في مجموعة واسعة من الأنشطة المشتركة مثل المناطق الصناعية المشتركة ومنتديات الأعمال الإسرائيلية الفلسطينية المشتركة، والاستثمارات الفلسطينية في إسرائيل ومستوطناتها، والإدارة المشتركة للموارد المائية. ويُمثِّل هذا أعلى مستويات النشاط التطبيعي في تاريخ النضال الفلسطيني من أجل التحرر الوطني (انظر الصفحات الأكاديمية والثقافية الخاصة بحركة مقاطعة إسرائيل وسحب الاستثمارات منها وفرض العقوبات عليها للاطلاع على تعريف التطبيع).3

ندَّدت بعض الجماعات العاملة في مجال حقوق الإنسان الفلسطيني وتقرير المصير علنًا ببعض الرأسماليين الفلسطينيين الشِلليين. وردّ الرأسماليون مدَّعين ببساطة بأنهم يسعون لخدمة الاقتصاد الفلسطيني وصمود الشعب، في حين أن المشاريع المشتركة بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين تمثل في الحقيقة أقبح وجه للتطبيع بسبب حجمها واتساع نطاقها، وبخاصةٍ لأنها تُعين القوة المحتلة على التربح وعلى التغلغل أكثر فأكثر بهياكلها في الأرض المحتلة. وفيما يلي بضعة أمثلة لمشاريع تطبيعية كبرى.4

مدينة روابي وهي مدينة منظمة تمثل أحد أكبر الاستثمارات الخاصة في الضفة الغربية وأحد أكثر المشاريع الكبرى إثارةً للجدل، إذ تضرب مدينة روابي، سواء بقبول وزراعة نحو 3000 شجرة تبرع بها الصندوق القومي اليهودي عام 2009 (اقتُلعت لاحقًا بسبب الانتقادات) أو بالتعاقد مع ما يزيد على 10 شركات إسرائيلية لتوريد المستلزمات، مثالًا للترويج لتربح الشركات الخاصة والتطبيع الاقتصادي على أنه "مشروع وطني".

المناطق الصناعية

تطبق المناطق الصناعية في الأراضي المحتلة المنطق نفسه المتبع في
المناطق الصناعية المؤهلة في الأردن ومصر. وهي تجسد طموح شمعون بيريز في "شرق أوسط جديد" يُنظر فيه إلى إسرائيل باعتبارها المركز الاقتصادي المهيمن في المنطقة. وتُمثل المناطق الصناعية إشكاليةً كبيرة أيضًا لأنها تدمج رأس المال الفلسطيني والإسرائيلي والإقليمي في آليةٍ عديمة الشفقة لاستغلال العمالة الرخيصة الفلسطينية والأجنبية الوافدة على السواء. ورغم أن تلك المناطق تعود بالنفع على نخبة قليلة من رجال الأعمال المحليين، فإنها تساهم في تقدم منظومة السيطرة الإسرائيلية وتكرِّس الاحتلال.

الاستثمارات الفلسطينية في إسرائيل والمستوطنات

تفيد
إحدى الدراسات بأن رأس المال الفلسطيني المستَثمر في إسرائيل ومستوطناتها غير القانونية يفوق بكثير رأس المال الفلسطيني المستَثمر في الضفة الغربية - ما بين 2.5 و5.8 مليار دولار مقابل 1.5 مليار دولار فقط في الضفة الغربية. وقد اتهمت وزارة الاقتصاد الفلسطينية الدراسة بأنها تفتقر إلى الدقة والموضوعية، في حين وصفها بعض الاقتصاديين بأنها تعاني من مشكلات منهجية بالغة. ومع ذلك يبقى فحواها جديرًا بالذكر. وقد قال مصدرٌ في وزارة الاقتصاد للكاتب إن "الكثير من رجال الأعمال الفلسطينيين يستثمرون في المستوطنات الصناعية مثل بركان ومعاليه أدوميم وغيرها من المجمعات الصناعية الزراعية في غور الأردن."

وخلصت دراسةٌ استقصائيةٌ أخرى إلى أن العديد من الشركات الفلسطينية تشارك في تبييض منتجات غور الأردن، إذ غالبًا ما تحتال بوضع علامة "منتج فلسطيني" على منتجات المستوطنين الزراعية، ومن ثم تصدرها إلى الأسواق الدولية وبالتالي تتفادى حملات المقاطعة في بعض البلدان الأوروبية.

التعاقد مع شركات الأمن الإسرائيلية

كشف
تقريرٌ صدر مؤخرًا أن بعض الشركات الفلسطينية (فندق موفنبيك رام الله، وبنك الأردن، والبنك الأهلي الأردني، وبنك القاهرة عمان، وبال سيف (Pal-Safe) ترد أسماؤها في قائمة العملاء المستفيدين من خدمات شركة نيتاكس (Netacs)، وهي شركة أمنية إسرائيلية يملكها اللواء في جيش الاحتياط داني روتشيلد الذي قاد قوات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي في الضفة الغربية وجنوب لبنان وعمِلَ في المخابرات العسكرية.

الشراكة بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين في المشاريع التكنولوجية

يعكف العديد من رجال الأعمال الفلسطينيين على التعاون والتشارك مع
شركات إسرائيلية في مجال التكنولوجيا المتطورة. ومن أمثلة ذلك مشروع صدارة الذي يتخذ من رام الله مقرًا له. أسَّس هذا المشروع سعيد ناشف ويادين كوفمان ويديره فريقٌ من الخبراء الإسرائيليين والفلسطينيين في مجال الابتكار التكنولوجي وخدمات الإنترنت. وقد نشرت مجلة فوربس تقريرًا مطولًا يُسلِّط الضوء على دور شركة سيسكو سيستمز الإسرائيلية في الجمع بين خبراء التكنولوجيا المتطورة الإسرائيليين ورجال الأعمال الفلسطينيين للمساعدة في النهوض بالاقتصاد الفلسطيني على غرار النموذج الإسرائيلي الناجح المتمثل في "أمة الشركات الصاعدة." ويكشف التقرير أيضًا بأن العديد من الشباب الفلسطيني في مجال التكنولوجيا المتطورة يتلقون دعوات للالتقاء بنظرائهم الإسرائيليين والعمل معهم في الكواليس وهي "مجرد واحدة من عشرات الحوارات المركزةَّ على الأعمال والأخذة في الانتشار بهدوء - وفي حالات كثيرة بالسر - في جميع أنحاء الأرض المقدسة."

ما الذي يجب عمله؟

إن النفوذ السياسي والاجتماعي الذي يمارسه الرأسماليون الفلسطينيون الشِلليون واستمرارهم في التطبيع الاقتصادي مع الاحتلال الإسرائيلي ينبغي أن يثير قلق الحريصين على مستقبل القضية الفلسطينية. فبسعيهم الحثيث وراء الربح دون اعتبار الحقوق الأساسية والتطلعات الوطنية الفلسطينية، تمادى هؤلاء الرأسماليون كثيرًا. إن أساليبهم في فرض السيطرة الاجتماعية والسياسية وتواطأهم المفضوح في مشاريع التطبيع يمثِّل عقبةً بنيوية في سبيل النضال ضد الاستعمار ويقوِّض المسعى الفلسطيني لإقامة العدالة. وفي هذا الصدد، ثمة خطوات عدة يجب اتخاذها، ومنها:

  • يجب أن يقاوم رجال الأعمال والمستثمرون المحليون المحاولات الإسرائيلية الساعية لإشراك رأس المال الفلسطيني في مشاريع التطبيع. فما من تشاركٍ بين رأس المال الفلسطيني والشركات الإسرائيلية يمكنه أبدًا أن يخدم التنمية الوطنية الفلسطينية وصمود الفلسطينيين.
  •  يجب على السلطة الفلسطينية، لكي لا يُنظَر إليها على أنها متواطئة، أن تصمِّم وتنفِّذ لوائح تنفيذية توجه طُرق استثمار رأس المال الفلسطيني، ولا بد لها أن تراقب هذه العملية عن كثب وبدقة لكي تحرصَ على أنها تخدم الأهداف الوطنية الفلسطينية. وينبغي وضع آليات فعالة لفرض المساءلة العامة بحيث تشمل القطاعات الاجتماعية المتنوعة والجهات الفاعلة الأصيلة في المجتمع المدني.
  • تضطلع منظمات المجتمع المدني والمؤسسات الأكاديمية بدورٍ مهم من خلال الدراسات التي تجريها ولفت الأنظار إلى هذه المسألة. ومع ذلك، لا بد من فعل المزيد لمحاسبة الرأسماليين الفلسطينيين الذين ضلّوا السبيل، كما تفعل حركة المقاطعة بين حين وآخر. وينبغي إطلاق حملات مستمرة لإضعاف موقفهم ونبذ تبريراته.
  • يجب أن تأخذ عمليةُ تنمية الاستثمارات والأعمال حقوقَ الإنسان الفلسطيني وكرامته في عين الاعتبار، وأن تُخفِّضَ تدريجيًا مستويات الاعتماد على المساعدات الدولية وعلى الاقتصاد الإسرائيلي، لتهيئة الظروف الأساسية لأشكال النضال والصمود المختلفة. وعلى وجه التحديد، ينبغي تطوير نموذج للتنمية على أساس مفهوم الاقتصاد المقاوم القائم على الاعتماد على الذات والاكتفاء الذاتي، وإعادة توزيع الثروة الوطنية توزيعًا عادلًا، ووجود بيروقراطية تخدم أجندة سياسية واقتصادية واجتماعية وإنمائية ديمقراطية تتمحور حول العنصر البشري.

يقتضي التغيير المطلوب إعادة هيكلةٍ كبرى للإطار السياسي العام. وأكثر من أي شيء آخر، يحتاج الفلسطينيون إلى قيادةٍ مكرسةٍ لمقاومة الاحتلال والسعي لإحراز حقوق الفلسطينيين في تقرير المصير والتحرر والعدالة والمساواة.

[نشر للمرة الأولى على "الشبكة" وتعيد "جدلية" نشره ضمن اتفاقية شراكة وتعاون مع المجلة. للنسخة الإنجليزيةاضغط/ي هنا.]

Maghreb Media Roundup (January 27)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Maghreb and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Maghreb Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to maghreb@jadaliyya.com by Thursday night of every week.]

Algeria

Présidentielle #dz2014: les jeux sont (déjà) faits. Baki 7our Mansour predicts a fourth term for the ailing incumbent Bouteflika.

Algérie: Un géant vert en devenir? Amir Lebdi highlights Algeria’s plans for solar energy.

Benflis le saint, Bouteflika le diable Ghani Gedoui makes a case for why Bouteflika will see another term.

Libya

Clashes strain health services in Libya’s south IRIN reports on deteriorating security’s impact on health services in Libya’s Fezzan region, where doctors stay home for fear of safety rather than going to work.

Des professionnels des médias continuellement en proie à de graves exactions Reporters Without Borders expresses grave concern over the treatment of media in Libya at the hands of non-state militias.

Libya: End Impunity, Reform Repressive Laws Human Rights Watch characterizes Libya as sliding into lawlessness in its World Report 2014.

Sebha death toll put at 99 as town still waits for military reinforcements After weeks of clashes leave dozens dead, Jamal Adel reports that calm has set in in Sebha.

كلاش الراب الليبي Choukri Midi describes different tensions in Libyan rap.

Mauritania

#موريتانيا - اعتصام عمال تازيازت امام القصر الرئاسي Mauritanian workers continue to demonstrate unjust working conditions at the Tasiast mines.

نظام العسكر... ديون تتحملها الأجيال القادمة ! Hussein Mohamed Omar decries economic policies that allow large resource extraction corporations to enter into Mauritania without state protections for labor.

Morocco

The Invisible Moroccan: Reading Hassan Najmi’s ‘Gertrude,’ Reading Tangiers Hassan Najmi’s new work Gertrude, reflects on Moroccan presence and absence in literature. 

Morocco/Western Sahara: Rights Promises Outpace Progress Human Rights Watch urges the Moroccan government to put its words to action in delivering protections for human rights.

L’AMDH demande l’ouverture d’une enquête sur le #DassaultGate The Moroccan Association for Human Rights issues a demand for inquiry into the detainment of two French-Moroccan citizens arrested as part of a political understanding of the Moroccan embassy in France.

Tunisia  

Tunisia's Draft Constitution: an English TranslationTunisiaLive provides an English translation of Tunisia’s brand new constitution.

تونس تقدِّم نموذجاً ثورياً مغايراً: المنجَز والمنتَظر Rather than measuring the Tunisian experience as a “democratic model” against regional neighbors, Chokri Hamid measures Tunisia’s constitution against its revolutionary ideals.

Nouvelles Exigences du FMI : Augmentation des prix du carburant, du gaz, de l’électricité et du pain … et d’autres réformes Med Dhia Hamammi outlines a new plan for price hikes at the behest of the IMF.

Tunisie : 168 ans après l'abolition de l'esclavage, le racisme est plus que jamais présent (VIDÉO) This Tunisian public service announcement (produced by the Institut Français) highlights the continuing problem of racism.

Opposition "laïque"? Hajar Zarrouk laments the absence of a true secular opposition in Tunisia.

Western Sahara

[13]25: In the Beginning Was the Word (PHOTOS) Through profiles of thirteen Sahrawi women activists, Daniel Lagartofernández offers a view into the gender dimensions of the Western Sahara conflict.

Camp in Minefield to Protest a Wall Mohamedsalem Werad describes his experiences as part of a delegation of Sahrawi activists who protested at the Moroccan-constructed sand wall in the Western Sahara.

Recent Jadaliyya Articles on the Maghreb

Tunisia’s Judges: The Intra-State Struggle for IndependenceMohamed Afif Jaidi highlights institutional attempts and obstacles to creating an independent judiciary in Tunisia.

Crise politique et question territoriale en Tunisie Sami Yassine Turki explores the “territorial question” at its intersection with Tunisian socio-politics, interrogating public space and a tension between centralization and decentralization.        

الأدب والثّورة: حوار مع حسين الواد بمناسبة الذّكرى الثّالثة للثورة التونسيّة Nour Gana interviews Tunisian litterateur Houceine el Oued on his life and work on the third anniversary of the Tunisian 2011 uprisings.

The Tindouf Refugee Camps: A Moroccan's Reflections  Nadir Bouhmouch describes his recent visit to the Tindouf refugee camps and measures his experience to the representations presented in his home country.

ليبيا: دولة الميليشيات  Wissam Mata describes the deteriorating state of security in Libya and portends a bleak outcome given increased decentralization of power to local armed militias.

Tunisia: A New Prime Minister for Old Politics?  Stefano Maria Torelli profiles Tunisia’s new Prime Minister, Mehdi Jomaa.

New Texts Out Now: Samia Errazzouki, Working-Class Women Revolt: Gendered Political Economy in Morocco  Jadaliyya interviews Maghreb Page editor Samia Errazzouki on her recent article in the Journal of North African Studies.

After Mauritania’s Elections: Toward Reform or a Political Charade?  Hassan Ould Moctar analyzes the latest round of elections in Mauritania.

Emel Mathlouthi at Cairo's Qasr El Nil Theatre Jadaliyya culture and Madrar TV cover Tunisian singer Emel Mathlouthi at Cairo’s Downtown Contemporary Arts Festival.

Drug Trafficking in Northwest Africa: The Moroccan Gateway Abdelkader Abderrahmane examines the history of Morocco’s cannabis cultivation and its drug trade with Europe.

On the Margins Roundup (January)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Mali, South Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania, Djibouti, and Comoros Islands and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the On the Margins Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each month's roundup to info@jadaliyya.com.] 

Mauritania

Biram : les raisons du succès The author examines the reasons for Biram Ould Abeid’s success in fighting for human rights in Mauritania.

Mauritania to set up slavery tribunal A judicial committee chaired by President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz to create a court to try crimes of slavery.

Quand les Nations-unies nous font honte!“When the United Nations make us ashamed!”

Mauritanie : bientôt une Bourse à Nouakchott ? The Central Bank of Mauritania expecting a growth of over six percent in 2014, plans to launch the first stock market in the country.

La Mauritanie "s'enfonce dans la crise", selon l'opposition Mauritania "sinks into crisis," according to the opposition.

Le Sahel face au salafisme conquérant The author describes how the rapid spread of salafism threatens the Sahel.

موريتانيا : الشركاتالأجنبيةتتسابقفيفصلالموريتانيين Ahmed Jedou discusses how foreign mining companies in Mauritania have been laying off workers.

Somalia

U.S. Advisers Sent to Help Somalia Fight the Shabab The United States sent a team of uniformed military advisers to Somalia, the first American troops assigned there since the failed “Black Hawk Down” mission in 1993.

Constitutional crisis, another PM ousted, what's next? A discussion of Somalia’s constitutional crisis resulting in the ouster of Prime Minister Shirdon after only a few months in office.

Political infighting threatens Somalia’s government According to the Mogadishu-based Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS), “another phase of infighting could lead to a collapse of this government.”

Banking on Somalia Somalia’s informal banking system is one of the only coherent institutions in the country—so why is United States policy undermining it?

Dealing with Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf Of Guinea Brookings senior fellow, Vanda Felbab-Brown, reviews the latest trends in maritime piracy off the coasts of Somalia and Nigeria.

This guy discovered that dry cleaning could prevent terrorism in Somalia Mohamed Ali is a young Somali-American with a mission to help youth in Somalia steer clear of extremist groups.

Sentencing in New Rape-Journalist Case Raises Legal, Political Questions in Somalia. A female journalist convicted of defamation for false rape allegations may be telling the truth. 

A series of photographs from Hobyo, Harardhere, and Eyl coastal areas in Central Somalia from Discover Somalia portray life in a tense period. 

Renowned Somali historian dies in Djibouti at the age of 91. Aw Jamac Omar Isse was a prominent historian of modern Somalia living in Djibouti since 1991.

Mine, not thine: Somalia's Al Shabaab bans the Internet Al Shabaab has reportedly gives telecommunications companies fifteen days to comply with the order. 

Kenya air strike in Somalia 'kills al-Shabaab militants' Kenyan military says dozens of terrorists were killed in its attack on a rebel meeting at a camp in southern Somalia. 

South Sudan

This map drives home how bad things are getting in South Sudan South Sudan's crisis is only three weeks old, but it has already displaced 189,000 people, according to the United Nations refugees agency.

South Sudan: internally displaced people flee Bor region – in pictures 80,000 people are seeking refuge from fierce clashes between army units loyal to the president and those loyal to the former vice president.

Donor-Driven Technical Fixes Failed South Sudan While pundits argue about who or what is most at fault for South Sudan's return to conflict, one thing is clear: the international community is not free from blame.

Self-destruct mode A violent internal conflict sparked by a power struggle between two of South Sudan's leaders threatens to destroy the young country's hopes of peaceful independence.

African leaders broker South Sudan government ceasefire - video

Juba reprend aux rebelles Bentiu, la capitale pétrolière Bentiu, the town which concentrates most of the oil wells in South Sudan was taken back by the army from the rebels.

Soudan du Sud : qui sont les mystérieux combattants de l’Armée blanche ? The author reports on the “White Army,” a mysterious militia taking part in the violent clashes in South Sudan.

"La partition du Soudan, voulue par Washington, est une catastrophe" Michel Raimbaud, former ambassador of France in Sudan on the reasons why the United States pushed for the split of Sudan.

How Hollywood cloaked South Sudan in celebrity and fell for the "big lie" Film stars have been speaking from a flawed script about the newest nation.

The Crisis in South Sudan: Swapping Partners. Magdi El-Gizali argues that Kiir and Bashir are allying in this bloody conflict to attack their respective domestic enemies.

Understanding the Suicidal War in South Sudan. Gerald Prunier gives a sobering assessment of both the prospects for peace in South Sudan and the motives of the actors in the civil war.

United States Mission in South Sudan Shows Limits of Military Weak leadership and rivalry between states have hampered African efforts to bring security to the conflict-hit continent.

Was South Sudan a mistake? With the world's newest country on the brink of collapse, the wisdom of separating north and south Sudan is in question.

South Sudan Finance Minister: Will Borrow to Cover Lost Oil Revenue"I will be searching the whole world for loans and I will take the loans that are good for South Sudan from any source."

Mali

Mali: ex-Libyens et pro-Bamako... ces Touaregs qui en 2011 ne voulaient que la paix“All Tuareg fighters that returned from Libya do not opt ​​for the insurgency.”

Nord-Mali: éradiquer Aqmi, la nouvelle priorité de l'opération Serval Eradicating Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is the new priority of the operation Serval.

Mali - Serval: la France a-t-elle piégé les jihadistes en janvier 2013?“Has France trapped the jihadists in January 2013?”

Mali : ATT seul à porter le chapeau ? Bamako wants to try the former president, Amadou Toumani Toure, for high treason.

François Hollande précise le calendrier de désengagement français du Mali French president, Francois Hollande announces the timetable for French withdrawal from Mali.

African Union missing in action in conflicts from Mali to South Sudan Weak leadership and rivalry between states have hampered African efforts to bring security to the conflict-hit continent.

A year of hunting jihadists in West AfricaFrance 24 takes a look back at the key moments of France’s intervention in Mali.

Innovation: A Solar Powered PC in Mali. Two groups of Malians have developed a type of PC highly useful in countries like Mali because it requires only a limited amount of solar power. 

2014 année du changement? Askia Mohamed discusses the prospects for change in Malian society this year and the enduring challenge of corruption. 

Comoros

US Consortium to Exploit Oil in Comoros. The United States-based private equity firm Carlyle group announced that it will be investing two hundred million dollars in oil exploration efforts in the Comoros. 

Fighting Corruption in Comoros, Cameroon and Madagascar The Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index shows that faith in the honesty and integrity of the public sector is low. 

Three Prisoners Deny Molesting Fellow Inmate in Dubai Centrail Jail Three inmates were accused of assaulting a Comorian held in the same prison, who had an arson complaint against one of them.

Djibouti

Reporters Without Borders Concerned Over Arrests of Journalists in Djibouti. Reporters Without Borders accuses the regime of targeting journalists covering street vendor evictions. 

Violation sans précédent du domicile du président du MRD et porte-parole de l'USN, Daher Ahmed Farah Police raided the home of prominent opposition leader, Daher Ahmed Farah, arresting twenty-nine people.

Searching for Signals Impoverished African migrants crowd the night shore of Djibouti city, trying to capture inexpensive cell signals from neighboring Somalia—a tenuous link to relatives abroad.

Base restriction lifted in Djibouti A four-month order that restricted Djibouti-based troops to Camp Lemonnier for protection was lifted.

Djibouti to Send More Troops to Somalia Djibouti's President Ismail Omar Guelleh says his country will send more troops to violence-ridden Somalia.

Djibouti Gives Landlocked Ethiopia Cargo Ultimatum Land-locked Ethiopia is now forced to pay tiny Djibouti with two billion birr annually for port services.

Ammar Abo Bakr: Committing Murder, then Marching in the Funeral Procession

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Street art has played an important role throughout the Egyptian revolution. As many observers have pointed out, such art is more than mere representation that inspires mobilization. It is that, certainly, but it is also an act of protest in and of itself. It is not only artists who make this claim. With each of their whitewashing campaigns over the last three years, state authorities have also routinely recognized this fact. In anticipation of biennial commemorations of the November 2011 massacres on Mohamed Mahmoud Street, the government of Prime Minister Hazem El-Beblawy passed a law raising punishment for graffiti to four years in prison and an 18,000 USD fine.

Even before the 2011 massacres, Mohamed Mahmoud Street was synonymous with revolutionary street art. Since then, of course, the street has become an open-air gallery of elaborate murals, painted and layered atop of one another. Of the many protest-artists working on Mohamed Mahmoud Street, few are better known than Ammar Abo Bakr. His mural series are unquestionably provocative and level the charge of murder at a number of State powers, including the military and the Ministry of Interior as well as religious institutions, the media and the Muslim Brotherhood.

With the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, many street artists retreated from Mohamed Mahmoud Street. But last November, as the military inaugurated a memorial for the Mohamed Mahmoud martyrs in Tahrir Square, protesters and artists returned to mark their dissent. Many of these activists were appalled by the fact that the military was attempting to honor the very people it killed. For Ammar and many others, the botched attempt at official commemorations of state murder evoked the Arabic proverb, “Committing murder, then marching in the funeral procession.”

I spoke with Abo Bakr in late November.

[Abo Bakr Mural, Mohamed Mahmoud Street, image from artist]

 

SM: Can you tell me about your work on Mohamed Mahmoud Street?

AA: I am currently working on a mural of a military camouflage with a pink tint. I am working on it with a group of course, a large group. Before beginning, we sat together in the street and decided on a few things. First of all, that we do not support Rabaa, pro-Morsi protests, and that we were relieved to have gotten rid of Morsi. We also agreed that we are against the military. I know that the military put Morsi in his position as president in order to use the Brotherhood as an excuse and to scare people, in the same way that Mubarak used the Brotherhood.

So our latest work on Mohamed Mahmoud Street came out of a particular context. There was a major propaganda campaign suggesting that anyone who protested in Downtown Cairo was a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood. The media was pushing this message all over, trying to scare people and prevent them from protesting.

But we insisted that we would protest, and that our message would have nothing to do with the Brotherhood. The most appropriate form of address in this moment is a vulgar one. There is no other way to speak to the military. Look how crude they were. You build a memorial in Tahrir Square for all the people you killed. Then you gather their families together to commemorate the event. Is there anything more crude and vulgar than that? So on top of the camouflage layer, we wrote the dirtiest phrase we could. It is vulgar, sure. But it is you, not us, who killed people, who imprisoned them, and who committed these crimes. For example yesterday they stooped to condemn people for burning the flag on the memorial. They were appalled that someone set a flag on fire? Who cares about burning a flag when they burn human beings?

I am sorry that we had to write that. But nothing is more vulgar than playing with the memory of the martyrs. The martyr is dead, and should be untouchable—so why do I paint him? Because I am searching for the killer, that’s why. It is not the martyr himself I am concerned with—I put the image of the martyr in the street to disturb the people who murdered him. I want to identify the people who murdered our martyrs, I want to stop them, I want to stop the killing.

SM: You stopped working on Mohamed Mahmoud Street from June 30 until very recently. You were working elsewhere, over on Qasr al-Nil Street. Why did you leave Mohamed Mahmoud and why did you return?

AA:  Of course I had to return to Mohamed Mahmoud—it is my job to remind people of the anniversary of the massacres that took place there. I have commemorated both anniversaries here on Mohamed Mahmoud Street. When I returned here in 2012, I drew the gruesome post-mortem images of martyrs, like the photograph of Khaled Said after he was so savagely beaten.

The idea of the anniversary and our very presence on it on 14 November is very crucial. But it is separate from my project on Qasr al-Nil Street. That series is less aggressive than the work on Mohamed Mahmoud. The idea of Qasr al-Nil Street is to develop graffiti and street art as an expressive tool. We are working on more than one level. Besides our political art, I am interested in a local, popular kind—connected to how I know Egypt, which is from below. I lived in a mud house in a rural village for several years and feel a connection to ordinary Egyptians and what they think is beautiful and how they see the world, how they see humanity. And so while we strongly oppose the military and want to mark that stance, we love the people and would also like to present art to the people.

The two causes are tied to one another. We cannot always paint in an aggressive or violent way, and expect to maintain popular support. As an artist, I also want to present something of beauty to people who can see it, see that their streets have beautiful murals and feel joy. Today, in the midst of our revolution, I would not be content to offer something in a gallery.  Who goes to a gallery to see art? Maybe you or me, or people willing to pay for it, but nobody else. What about the people for whom we came out to protest? The people we have belonged to since before the revolution?  I must take those people into account and to the extent that I can, present something to them as well.

SM: You have painted under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, President Morsi and now. How have these different periods of rule been different for you as an artist? For example, have the change in laws affected you?

AA: I do not see them as different. I cannot say, for example, that I painted under “the rule of Morsi” because I did not think of it as “the rule of Morsi.” There is only one enemy, one killer. He has been there all along and he is still there now. They change faces, and people get distracted. And the law? The law does not concern me. There is no law in a fascist state, there is nothing called the judicial process. People expect the judicial process to bring justice for the sake of the martyrs. But who must the Judiciary rely on for bringing cases forward? The Public Prosecutor. And who does the Public Prosecutor’s office depend on? The Interior Ministry. To expect the judicial process to work means hoping murderers will gather evidence against themselves.

SM: What do you see your current role to be as a protest-artist?

AA: I am with the people and I am with the movement in the street as ever.  I have no special role, but play a role just like everyone else. As an individual, as Ammar, I can do nothing on my own. I cannot paint a mural in one night. I cannot go at midnight and end up with an entire wall painted by six in the morning.  And then there is the energy created by working collectively. Over three years, we have built real trust and developed real expertise together.

As artists, we have strengthened ourselves and developed a strong collective voice. We have the power to shape the picture, but they do not. They have their money to host elections. They can work their media, and they can spend their money on commercials, and all to try to put the revolution in a ballot box. But the revolution will come back every winter. And it will destroy everything they have done, all of it. They return and try to install a constitution, and it falls. And they will try to install a constitution again, and still the revolution will destroy it. Why? The revolution is not a ballot box. The revolution is not politics. The revolution is not a constitution. The revolution is not laws.  The revolution must first take back what was taken by those who robbed the country in the first place. And this cannot happen through legal means, since the law was created by a ruling clique of criminals.

 SM: Then, what do you mean by ‘the revolution’?

AA: The revolution is people knowing their rights. The revolution is about exposing the thieves and the criminals and the killers, and all that has been hidden since Nasser’s day. It is bringing groups and people closer together. Not in the form of a party—because parties can be easily infiltrated. The revolution is about creating something new. The revolution is this—what is new and innovative. We will decide what the revolution looks like. It will be outside of the old logic, outside of the old boundaries.

Revolution, not institutions, will clean up things. Revolution is everywhere, in every sector of society.

SM: Can you give me an example of this?

AA: The revolution is the students at the Fine Arts College, for instance. The students had been petitioning the Dean for reforms within the College, but were ignored. Recently, the Dean tried to host an exhibition of art works by teaching faculty and he invited the governor and president of the university—he was just putting something on for appearance, whereas in reality the students were neglected. As a sign of opposition, the students demonstrated and blocked the president and governor from going in. They stopped the exhibition. That is the revolution. This form of defiance or even voicing opposition, trying to change things, was unthinkable before the revolution – a student could not even look a professor or the Dean in the eye.

I am just talking to you about the small part of the revolution that I know from my field of work, so imagine similar situations taking place in every sector of society. That is the revolution.

SM: What about the political efforts to bring change?

AA: The revolution has nothing to do with political parties, it has nothing to do with ballot boxes, it has nothing to do with a Committee of Fifty or a Committee of Sixty. It has nothing to do with any of these political things. The revolution is something else entirely.

We are still dealing with the same regime. Mubarak stepped down. The Sharaf government stepped down. Shafiq is gone, and Morsi is gone. And Sisi will be gone too.  And the streets will continue.  

98Weeks Research/Project Space

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98Weeks Research/Project Space

Beirut, Lebanon 

November 2013

 

On a side street overlooking the central area of Mar Mikhael in Beirut, Lebanese artist Marwa Arsanios and curator Mirene Arsanios founded 98Weeks in 2009. The initiative, which started as an artistic research project that focuses on a different topic every 98 weeks, has developed into a full-fledged space with a regular program of exhibitions, performances, and thematic discussions running in parallel to the ongoing research.

This video presents a portrait of 98Weeks, with Marwa highlighting its development over the years and the main programs it has offered the public, including in-depth research on such topics as the changing urban space of the city, modern Arab cultural magazines, and feminist discourse in the Arab world. Marwa also talks about an art book fair and bazaar they organized, as well as the space's recent online radio program exploring exercises in collective reading. 

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