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The Chronicle of Higher Education Interviews Jadaliyya Co-Founder Bassam Haddad

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The following interview was conducted by Ursula Lindsey with Jadaliyya Co-Editor Bassam Haddad in preparation for a feature about Jadaliyya for The Chronicle of Higher Education. The feature was published on 29 September 2014 and can be accessed by clicking here.

Ursula Lindsey (UL): Could you send me any statistics on the readership of Jadaliyya? I would like to get a sense of the overall size of the readership, and how it is geographically distributed.

Bassam Haddad (BH): We have become much less interested in numbers after having passed an important threshold in 2013, but we do not totally ignore them! Unfortunately (because one would like to see an alternative), the best indicator of the growth and expansion of readership has been “Facebook Reach,” which increased from around fifty thousand per week during the first six months in 2010–2011, to one million in 2012–2013, and surpassed 2.3 million in 2014. We actually stopped monitoring such numbers as closely, but know that our social media and classroom presence continues to increase steadily as our Facebook followers have surpassed 130,000. These followers are pretty active in circulating our content, and constitute a large part of how Jadaliyya content is disseminated. Twitter is another indicator. However, we refrain from tweeting too much, as shown by our tweets-to-followers ratio—which is perhaps among the highest (9900 tweets and twenty-seven thousand followers), at about thirty percent. The closest we have seen in our field is about forty-five to fifty percent. This reflects the extent to which each post/article, and/or tweet, is generating interest. It is important to note that our Arabic reading audience, world-wide but mainly in the region itself, has quadrupled since 2011, and now constitutes almost thirty to thirty-five percent of our readership, a testimony to how local informed readers elect to turn to Jadaliyya frequently—largely because our writers on local matters are either writing from the region or are intimately connected with the region.

As to other forms of tracing numbers, such as unique visitors, they seem quite inconsistent because the extent to which Jadaliyya is read not only via Android, iPhone, and iPad apps, but also because of the unusually large level of circulation of PDF’s via huge email lists (which we are on and we see!) and, most importantly, its ubiquitous presence on syllabi (for instance, our unique visitors to the site hover around 500,000 a month, while most read Jadaliyya off line via email, PDF, or apps). Our Middle East scholars/educators/researchers list, now combined with that of Tadween Publishing, our sister organization, tops eight thousand engaged Jadaliyya readers who are increasingly assigning material from Jadaliyya.

The reason this happens is not only because we have good content. There is plenty good content if one searches the net carefully. Rather, it because of four very specific reasons: first, our good content has a long shelf-life, an outcome that is built into the editorial process; second, Jadaliyya content serves as an explicit resource or reference, through twelve topical and country/region-specific Media Roundups, profiles and archival posts for reference use, as well as weekly pedagogical reviews of new books, films, documentaries, art exhibits, and relevant social media items; third, Jadaliyya, in conjunction with Tadween’s blog, has become the space that most educators/researchers constantly visit for matters related to academic freedom, publishing, and higher education in the region as well as the United States and Europe; finally, our Jadaliyya content is selectively tapped to produce books and pedagogical publications that are published by Tadween Publishing and other publishers like Palgrave and Pluto Press, giving more gravity, and more longevity, to Jadaliyya content. One important source of such readers is JADMAG, of which we have so far produced five issues geared to educators, and chock-full of resources that are compiled and categorized at the end of each issue. (see www.JadMag.org or www.TadweenPublishing.com for more information). 

This source of readership is constantly expanding as Jadaliyya seems to be the only available site for such content (now quadro-lingual), and is our litmus test and what keeps us on our toes from day to day. The reason we emphasize this source in relation to numbers and quality is because the population of students reading Jadaliyya material based on educators’ choices is increasing exponentially at times, and serves as our most consistent source of readership with time especially that newcomers from that sphere become loyal readers. 

It is no surprise that the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) consistently sends us their critical public letters to publish when they want to reach the broader academic and research/journalist communities, including beyond the United States. It is not something you see consistently on any other website. And this applies to various other organizations that would like to reach the same expansive cohort (based in the United States, Europe, or the Middle East), including the new Arab Council for the Social Sciences (ACSS).

Our colleague and professor of Arabic literature at Brown University, Elias Muhanna, who also runs his own popular blog, Qifa Nabki, commented openly at a conference that he does not know a professor teaching the modern Middle East who does not have a variety of Jadaliyya articles on their syllabi—an honor that ranges from rare to unique when it comes to similar online publications. 

UL: We discussed stories that caused particularly strong debates, and you mentioned the critique of DAM's video. Are there any other pieces that sparked debates?   

BH: Just to clarify, this last piece sparked more than a debate, as some folks where actually unhappy with the approach—though we are still in good communication with the concerned parties (e.g., DAM) given our approach to the matter. The pieces that sparked debate, discussion, and the like are actually many, and I am not sure it would be fair to single out a handful. However, the notable pieces that drew heated debates and attention revolve around the July coup in Egypt, or around the nature of the Syrian uprising. But this is almost a continuous variable, and still sparks heated discussions that reflect the polarization on these matters among concerned publics. Nonetheless, we continue to get serious engagement—even if sometimes a bit over the top—from detractors on various topics, from Palestine and Syria, to articles on sexuality, Islam, and even literature and film. The fact that detractors of the entire publication continue to engage and critique reveals a sense of legitimacy that even this cohort associate with Jadaliyya. For a critical publication, this is priceless, and we think we will fail if we do not maintain that level of quality and legitimacy.

UL: What are the most common criticisms or suggestions for improvement your get? Do you think they are valid? Where do you see room for improvement? When I last saw Jadaliyya Co-Editor Sinan Antoon in Cairo, he said, for example, he thought the site might publish less so as to focus more on the quality of the writing. 

BH: Oh, dear, there are all kinds, and so many of which come from us, the editors, given that various page teams are relatively autonomous. Our position on critique is simple: we ignore any critique at our own peril. This does not mean that all criticisms are equally valid. They are not. It does, however, mean that we take them seriously and assume their validity until we can illustrate otherwise to ourselves and to others. In most instances, critiques do include a modicum of validity, and our responsiveness to nearly every single significant line of critiques (based on a compilation) is the reason we keep growing in quality and numbers. We surely miss some, and we surely make mistakes even in assessing critiques—but these represent a minority of cases within our practice. Based on what we have heard, we see room for improvement in soliciting even more writing from the region; in working harder to get more pieces from the scene, on intractably controversial matters, like Syria; and we agree that we, like any successful publication, can get too comfortable with its status quo of readership and contributors. But questions like yours, and internal discussions based on similar observations, push us on a quarterly basis to make a deliberate and explicit effort to reach out. This is in fact why we dramatically expanded the Arabic section (in terms of readership and contributors) during the past two years. 

All in all we operate on a five-year plan of sorts (despite the problematic association with five-year plans). At this point, as we are still in our fourth year, we are establishing ourselves as a serious and perhaps the go-to publication for informed readership. But you will soon see some changes that will expand our scope and spice things up a bit in a productive direction, at a time when we need not worry as much about the basics and daily operations. Our challenge, actually, is to maintain the essentially voluntary-based nature of Jadaliyya. Therefore, much of what we have focused on during the first years of establishment involves building the best team there is, or what we think is such, under these circumstances. It is a continuing challenge, but it has been working since 1992 when the parent organization, the Arab Studies Journal, started.

As to the question of quantity verses quality, we exercise a mean purge every quarter, precisely to avoid the false impression that quantity is synonymous with quality. Surely, we fail here and there. However, the one development since 2013 has been the reduction of the output rate—which we view as having been somewhat unavoidable as this is how you connect with new readership and contributors in the early stages—from about 175 pieces per month to about 110-120 (though this includes all posts and reports, etc.). But this challenge continues, and—frankly—we hold ourselves to standards that are not observed in comparable publications that either focus on one country, or one approach (e.g., Foreign Policy), or one audience, or one language, or one discipline, etc. So we have to make up our own standards for a new kind of publication. All this takes time, and we welcome any criticism that allows us to meat our challenge. We are not sensitive to productive critique at all! We will fail without it. 

UL: You mention detractors of the site—any examples?

BH: Every new initiative gives rise to critics, and that is a good thing. What is interesting about Jadaliyya’s critics, most of them at least, is that they critique and stick around for the most part—largely because of what they tell us verbatim at times: “We expect more from Jadaliyya,” or something of the sort. Now the question of who these critics are depends on the issue, and often our biggest critics on one topic are our biggest fans on another. Syria is a good example where we get flack from both pro-opposition corners and anti-opposition corners, but you would find avid readers of other Jadaliyya pages among both varieties. Do we have critics that do not think Jadaliyya is worth reading at all? You bet! There is very little we can do to convince those voices otherwise. Having said all of that, the fact is that Jadaliyya has filled a gap and presented a centrifugal force around which critics of mainstream discourse on the region in the United State and beyond hover. That in and of itself has generated detractors. 

UL: It seems to me that Jadaliyya has a pretty clear, consistent identity, both in its politics and its theoretical orientations. The people who edit and write it are generally the same age and peer group, and many have known each other for a long time. Do you think you have a wide enough variety of views? Do you feel like Jadaliyya has been able to spark debates outside of a community of like-minded contributors and readers? 

BH: [One factual note: the editors and contributors are by no means of similar age or belong to similar social circles—not after 2011, regarding the latter comment, and have never been, regarding the former comment. We have had more than a one thousand contributors and the Jadaliyya team surpasses eighty people living in different countries now. Any cursory view of any fifty consecutive posts reveals a variety that easily surpasses most comparable publications. As for views, it is a political challenge, not always a question of diversity. See below.]

This is the one-million dollar question. Yes, any good publication must struggle with this dialectic of building a readership based on a particular kind/nature of knowledge production, but then expanding it to attract new readership and contributors while retaining the reason for its success. Are we guilty of not doing this perfectly? Absolutely. Have we gone far beyond most other publications to allow for serious internal differences and reach out to new and alternative views? Absolutely. But that does not exhaust the question. As mentioned above, we are in the building stage, and we view a good part of the shortcomings as related byproducts. However, this is one of our fundamental goals as we enter and complete our fifth year, and it will not come without its risks, risks we are very happy to take. Most importantly in reference to sparking discussion or debates, Jadaliyya articles have been written about and discussed in conferences and in social media in ways that have actually jump-started broader research questions and helped set research agendas—not to mention the impact of Jadaliyya on the carriers of junior writers who make their debut there and then get picked up by other institutions who are hiring, paying, and producing knowledge. The list is pretty long.

Having said that, two comments are relevant here. First, we are not and do not pretend to be an open forum for all views. Though I suspect you recognize that and you are not asking about why we do not highlight and invite problematic (racist, sexist, classist, etc. writers), but rather, from within the perspective we support, we may still afford more variety—and that is totally fair, and the above addresses our need to meet this challenge in increasingly better ways.

The second comment is political, and refers to the context within which Jadaliyya and other publications emerged in recent years. We see ourselves as a counter-discourse in relation to the dominant and quite entrenched discourse on the Middle East in the United States primarily, but also beyond. We also see ourselves in the same manner in relation to the petro-media empire of some Arab states. In this context, we are trying to provide an alternative reference point for sound daily analysis on the region. To establish that difficult reality and standard, we have had to be more focused on consistency and quality, sometimes at the expense of maximum diversity. So, we are not, per se, seeking diversity of “views” in the absolute sense, which is a matter/goal that speaks more to liberal concerns that are often divorced from realities of power and its direct relation to dominant discourses. However, where we have room to improve on this particular point, which is how we understand your question, is to establish even more diversity “within” the “general” perspective we endorse. And, yes, we do have some work to do in that respect, but not always for lack of trying. We are fighting an uphill battle and we also have to pay attention to the challenge of dragging everyone along while expanding this spectrum (i.e., the million-dollar challenge/question above). The years ahead will speak louder than any words regarding our genuine interest in making this happen within the context of a counter-discourse movement.

Also, we do not pay our writers, and this restricts us by excluding many careerist writers who might have provided a diversity of sorts despite differing views.

Finally, it is important to note that beyond the essentials, we have ongoing viewpoint disagreements within Jadaliyya regarding content and particular pieces. We think it is a testament to the absence of a rigid conception regarding which particular views are welcome.

UL: Finally, there is an argument that young academics should focus on scholarly work and publication and not "waste" their ideas and time on writing for web sites and other venues. How do you respond to that? 

BH: We totally agree in principle, considering the kind of online publications and quality that proliferates. And whereas we would give the same advice, we cannot ignore the fact that the strategic position of Jadaliyya within the academic community can be a plus for rising academics who would like to be read and heard. Last year alone, several folks within and outside Jadaliyya remarked to us how valuable their Jadaliyya contributions were in capturing the attention of employers/academics in the hiring process. This semi-exception is borne out of the fact that Jadaliyya has indeed become the go-to place for academics generally, despite what this or that observer can say, sometimes legitimately, about the quality of this or that post. We just have to make sure that this continues to be kept to a minimum in the coming five, or ten, years!

So, in short, it depends. In the case of Jadaliyya, publishing there can be used strategically to enhance one’s chances of getting an academic job. We used to think that this was not the case before we were told otherwise by employers and during academic interviews. Used properly, it can be a plus, and this is not confined to Jadaliyya, as there are a number of quality publications out there. The world is changing, and the academic community is following suit, even if at a few steps behind.

UL: Are you planning on publishing anything soon on Obama's war on ISIS?

BH: Yes, we have published a number of pieces addressing the rise and nature of ISIS, in both Arabic and English, and, beginning the week of 22 September, our fourth anniversary incidentally, we are publishing a regular media roundup specifically on ISIS-related articles. Stay tuned!


Alaa Abd El Hamid: Visual Lab Rats

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June - July 2014

Medrar for Contemporary Art, Cairo

Cairo-based sculptor Alaa Abd El Hamid attempts to incorporate viewers into his latest exhibition. Through a series of mirrored objects, placed around the gallery space, a photograph and a laser show, he hopes they would reflect on their relation to their surrounding and one another. The shape of the pyramid is a recurring motif in the exhibition as Abd El Hamid notes in this video interview. The artist wished to explore how the ancient Egyptian civilization might have developed this shape had it persisted.

Jadaliyya's Top 50 of All Time

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  1. Waiting for Alia
  2. Why Mubarak is Out
  3. No, Israel Does Not Have the Right to Self-Defense In International Law Against Occupied Palestinian Territory
  4. The Right to the City Movement and the Turkish Summer
  5. Egyptian Elections: Preliminary Results [UPDATED]
  6. Why the Western Media are Getting Egypt Wrong
  7. "من المآسي المضاعفة للنزوح: فتيات سوريات للزواج "بثمن بخس
  8. Let's Talk About Sex
  9. How Not to Study Gender in the Middle East
  10. New Texts Out Now: Chouki El Hamel, Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam
  11. Tragic Day for Norway; Shameful Day for Journalism
  12. الجيش والاقتصاد في بر مصر
  13. What is a Virgin?
  14. The Naked Bodies of Alia
  15. Can Palestinian Men be Victims? Gendering Israel's War on Gaza
  16. The Empire of Sexuality: An Interview with Joseph Massad
  17. What is Settler Colonialism?
  18. Egypt's Revolution 2.0: The Facebook Factor
  19. Is Gaza Still Occupied and Why Does It Matter?
  20. Unpacking Anti-Muslim Brotherhood Discourse
  21. Sexual Harassment Video that Led to Removal of Rula Quawas as Dean at the University of Jordan
  22. US on UN Veto: "Disgusting", "Shameful", "Deplorable", "a Travesty" . . . Really?
  23. The Army and the Economy in Egypt
  24. The Poetry of Revolt
  25. Gay Rights as Human Rights: Pinkwashing Homonationalism
  26. The Idiot's Guide to Fighting Dictatorship in Syria While Opposing Military Intervention
  27. ما الذي يحدث في مصر الآن؟
  28. Letter to a Syrian Friend Who Said: ‘Your Opposition to the US Attack on Syria Means You Support the Asad Regime’
  29. Jon Stewart's Theater of the Absurd
  30. Neither Heroes, Nor Villains: A Conversation with Talal Asad on Egypt After Morsi
  31. Chemical Attacks and Military Interventions
  32. The Marriage of Sexism and Islamophobia; Re-Making the News on Egypt
  33. Egypt's Three Revolutions: The Force of History behind this Popular Uprising
  34. جنرالات مصر ورأس المال العابر للحدود
  35. My 50 Minutes with Manaf
  36. Ghosts of Yogas Past and Present
  37. كامل نص الدستور السوري الجديد الذي تسلمه بشار الأسد
  38. "Was the Arab Spring Really Worth It?": The Fascinating Arrogance of Power
  39. On Why Struggles over Urban Space Matter: An Interview with David Harvey
  40. Orientalist Feminism Rears its Head in India
  41. On Sheep and Infidels
  42. The Effects of The Economic Sanctions Against Iran
  43. Jadaliyya Co-Editor Noura Erakat Debates the Tactics and Ethics of Warfare on PBS Newshour
  44. "V for Vendetta": The Other Face of Egypt's Youth Movement
  45. Stuff White People Like n.135 Humanitarian Intervention
  46. Saeeds of Revolution: De-Mythologizing Khaled Saeed
  47. Algeria's Impact on French Philosophy: Between Poststructuralist Theory and Colonial Practice
  48. Why Egypt's Progressives Win
  49. How America Goes to War
  50. Open Letter to Trinity College President and Dean

Remembering Those Who Were Slain

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Thousands of Coptic Christians marched down the streets of Cairo demanding equal citizenship. The chants were loud, the slogans rhymed, and the resolve was unwavering.

The date: first week of October 2011; the cause: a series of incidents of sectarian violence against the Christians of Egypt. As a sign of rejection of the status quo, a number of symbolic and peaceful demonstrations were scheduled in different parts of Egypt during that time. In Cairo, the plan was to camp in front of a landmark of Egypt’s main propaganda outlet: the National Media Broadcasting Center (Maspero). The burning and orchestrated destruction of the Marinab Coptic Church in the southern city of Aswan accompanied by the government’s passive response in containing the violence, specifically by the Governor of Aswan, triggered a flood of emotions among the Copts as well as many of Egypt’s Muslims.

During that period, the streets of Cairo were already relentless in demanding social change. The Copts, being a part of the national fabric of Egyptian society, and after years of passiveness, rose to the challenge and demanded change: equal citizenship and justice. The marches were peaceful but the chanting was sharp and critical. Apparently, the words struck a nerve among some members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the interim ruling military entity governing Egypt after the January 25 revolution in 2011, and a decision was made to contain the Copts’ demonstrations and prevent them from camping down in front of Maspero.

Just as much as the Copts’ slogans were loud and penetrating, so was the military’s reaction, except the loudness of the Armed Forces was manifested in their AK47 guns and the bullets pierced the bodies of the marching civilians. The crowds were stunned that the military was using live ammunition. To add insult to injury, an order was given to disperse the crowd using armed personnel vehicles and many died crushed under its wheels. At the end of the massacre, some two dozen Copts were slaughtered in front of Maspero. The Maspero massacre of 9 October 2011, is Egypt’s small scale version of China’s 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre of hundreds of Chinese student protestors in Beijing: both committed by the military against civilians in cold blood.

In a televised broadcast, two days afterward, the generals appeared on national TV claiming that the soldiers acted in self-defense and used pictures of two soldiers with bandaged wrists to justify the use of force. The generals denied the use of live ammunition and announced that the military prosecutor would conduct a thorough investigation. Ironic as it is, the principles of military justice adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Commissions clearly states:

In all circumstances, the jurisdiction of military courts should be set aside in favor of the jurisdiction of the ordinary civilian courts to conduct inquiries into serious human rights violations such as extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances and torture, and to prosecute and try persons accused of such crimes.

But again, who are we to question the integrity of the military prosecutors? Indeed, few months after the Maspero incident, and in a reverse tide, the military prosecutor produced a report containing a list of a dozen Copt activists charging them with old-school and vague accusations: “disturbing public peace” and “seeking to harm public order.”

Facts remain, during that period, the military was running the country and being a rigid hierarchical entity, orders strictly flow from top to bottom. Some brass must have ordered the soldiers to use live ammunition to disperse the crowd, some brass must have provided the written report to broadcast live on public national television lies that the Christians are attacking the peaceful soldiers, some brass must have ordered the soldiers to disperse the crowd using armed personnel carriers. The man who has to know the inside story and details of the tragic events of 9 October 2011, has to be the head of the military intelligence: then General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Perhaps, in some fifteen years, al-Sisi in his retirement years will narrate to us such details in his best-selling biography.

In remembrance of the free-spirited Mina Daniel who was shot dead on that night along with the other slain Copts.


[Photo courtesy of the Popular Current Party's official Facebook page.]

[This article originally appeared on Mada Masr.]

Jadaliyya Turns Four (or something like that)

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Jadaliyya turns four this September (totally behind on the announcement). As we promised this time last year, we were going to have a busy year, but we were somewhat wrong. It was actually pretty insane. 

Internally, we were consumed by building new pages and teams, finalizing an institutionalization process that is now firmly in place, and expanding our networks considerably in the Middle East and beyond. We are happy to report that not only has our readership expanded dramatically, mostly in the region—the principal object of our analysis and reporting—but it has also become one of our main avenues for sharing Jadaliyya content. Our readers and our team are literally our biggest assets. Equally important in terms of impact, beyond growth and numbers, is the near-unique achievement of seeing Jadaliyya materials adorn an inumerable number of classroom syllabi, virtually on any topic. Very little is more satisfying for a publication like ours. 

The truth is, we are just getting warmed up. 

Perhaps even more consequential in terms of the urgency of our work is the escalation of violence in the region, with further twists and turns in the context of ongoing or rekindled uprisings, and, markedly, the war on Gaza that galvanized the world’s attention. More recently, it was ISIS mania, or hysteria, that has received more than its worth of media attention. Among other “spikes” in both violence, intrigue, and incalculable media interpretations that we sift through to produce some sense, we, and we imagine similar publications, had more than enough on our plate with which to contend. Such busy years may be "good" for publications, but we need to be continuously reminded of the human toll that has been incurred. If we, or publications like ours, do not rise up to contribute to some form of progress by, among other things, confronting power and/or debunking narratives that legitimize various forms of exploitation, we probably should fold. 

But there is also another dimension to our work that merits attention, or more attention. Some of the critiques of our work that focus exclusively on our handling our current events end up bypassing one of the more important raison d'etre of this publication.

Despite the increasingly urgent current events that require our critical attention, we continue to publish exciting work about various topics and time periods across our more than eighteen county/thems pages, which distinguishes Jadaliyya among its peers. Our NEWTON and interviews sections, reflective and historical pieces, and the robust cultural and literary content we publish in English, Arabic, and other languages makes Jadaliyya relevant irrespective of changes in the current political realities. In fact, as per above, this has always been the intent of the co-founders of this publication. But, alas, or not (?), the Arab uprisings whisked so much of our immediate energy away. We will therefore renew our efforts to return to a more balanced coverage that affords even more space for matters that do not involve the current moment. 

In the past, we went to great lengths to discuss Jadaliyya’s history and trajectory. Somehow, this is no longer necessary or desirable. See our third-year milestone announcement below,** which we can safely say was a transformational moment. Henceforth, we have been harnessing, nurturing, and protecting our trajectory, as discussed below. It is a mixed blessing because the magic of the early days must go away, and must be survived by any successful project for it to soar beyond that initial euphoria. We have done this before with the Arab Studies Journal which launched in 1992. Thrilled to do it again.

Jad Turns One: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2701/jadaliyya-turns-one
Jad Turns Two: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/7473/jadaliyya-celebrates-its-two-year-anniversary
** Jad Turns Threehttp://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/14374/jadaliyya-turns-three_a-journeys-recap

In fact, the entire passing of the fourth year constituted a benchmark that elucidated mixed emotions: the feeling of being established, stable, and growing is both good news and bad news. It is good news because this is the goal of any comparable organization that seeks to remain relevant and effective. It is bad news because with the passing of the most basic building stages comes the loss of some of the magic of “struggle,” the feeling of starting something new, however non-dramatic all this is to outsiders.

But herein lies the difference between one-hit-wonders and long-term projects: surviving the euphoria and sheer excitement of newness, both of which apply to any new venture, including personal ones. We certainly hope to keep going with evermore vigor and originality. Not only do we, at the Arab Studies Institute (ASI), have twenty-two years of experience with building organizations that both survive and thrive, but also the very institutional structure, networks, and solidarity behind Jadaliyya’s early journey have become more dynamic and supple. We are here for the long haul, despite empire, dictators, drones, and douchebags. (اجل. كتبناها)

Where To?

In the past year, we promised we will develop our content and pages, institutionalize our relations with our sister organizations at ASI (Arab Studies Journal, Tadween, Quilting Point, FAMA), venture further into producing pedagogical publications, and work with our colleagues at ASI to develop the mammoth Knowledge Production Project. We are pleased to announce that we accomplished all these goals and more. A cursory review of the material we have published/produced or the websites in which they live tells a more complete story. We have published several JadMag issues, ranging from Gezi to Gaza, and from Theorizing the Arabian Peninsula to addressing the Algerian revolution.

As you can see below, we tried as much as possible to price our publications at near-cost. One way our readers can support Jadaliyya and its sister organization Tadween Publishing is by picking up a copy. Better yet, if you are an educator, we have been issuing serious discounts for entire classes. Pedagogically, these publications have proved exremely student-friendly and teacher-friendly.

We have also ventured into marginalized issues, including the Western Sahara. All JadMag issues come with both a set of detailed and somewhat exhaustive scholarly resources, as well as a list of important social media links. Educators get their copies for free if they sign up to our Tadween Educators Network, and receive a “Teaching Guide" to accompany each JadMagTo take a peek at the guide, click here. All the above can be found on http://www.JadMag.org

Reflections-in-Progress on the Salaita Case: Contradiction, Overdetermination, Mobilization

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Much has already been said in the weeks since University of Illinois Chancellor Phyllis Wise informed Steven Salaita that she was not forwarding his appointment to the Board of Trustees and was thus effectively revoking a tenured job offer in American Indian Studies that Salaita had already accepted in October 2013. When a local faculty group I am involved with organized an off-campus forum on “Academic Freedom and Political Dissent,” I decided to step back and try to theorize the nature of the event we have been living through and the political response that has arisen out of it. Despite the context, there has been pleasure in writing this piece because it represented an opportunity to think again after six weeks of a distracting (and ongoing) crisis. The questions I have sought to address are these: what has made this case so powerful for so many people and what are the implications of that fact for political mobilization?

My first hypothesis is that the Steven Salaita case has become a national and even international affair because of the way it condenses multiple, ongoing crises. Other cases share many features with this one, but the Salaita affair has hit a particular nerve—and may well be remembered as a landmark case—by virtue of the extraordinary number of very current flashpoints it brings together. To enumerate what is a long, but no doubt incomplete list, I have in mind the following critical features: the type of job Salaita was offered (comparative indigenous studies); the particular global political conjuncture in which that job was offered (the Israel/Palestine issue in its local and global manifestations); the kind of intellectual work Salaita does (bringing together indigenous and Palestinian issues); the administrative logics that attended his hiring and firing (especially the erosion of faculty autonomy and meaningful shared governance in the face of the corporatization of the university); long term trends—call them neoliberal—in the economics of public higher education, including questions of funding and de-funding and struggles over labor conditions for tenure-track and non-tenure track employees; the organization and prestige of academic disciplines (including splits between the humanities and social sciences, on the one side, and STEM fields, on the other); the politics of race and culture on campus (including discourses and practices of “diversity”); developments in technology and media and tensions around their relation to education and scholarship; and the changing parameters of free speech (including the monitoring of political speech, especially by Zionist-affiliated organizations, and the seemingly sudden turn toward “civility” on campus).

In enumerating this incomplete list of contexts and crises that create the salience of the Salaita case, I want to make a second, relatively simple point—one that I think has significant consequences for political mobilization in the wake of Salaita’s firing. The Salaita case is overdetermined. Overdetermination was a concept coined by Sigmund Freud and developed several decades later by the Marxist philosopherLouis Althusser, who used it to describe the complex causes of social phenomena. Like dreams according to Freud, society according to Althusser is composed of multiple, interlocking systems that ensure that politics plays out on a field where singular, clear-cut meanings are unlikely to be found:  overdetermined and sometimes incompatible contradictions characterize all social formations. 

It may well be true—as Katherine Franke has convincingly argued—that the clear trigger of the Salaita crisis was the organized movement to limit dissent about Israel and Palestine on the part of Zionist groups. This movement, which has targeted numerous other scholars in recent years, brought Salaita to visibility during the Gaza war and shaped the administrative response to the revelations about his tweets through its discourse of civility. Nevertheless, understanding why those groups have been as successful as they have been and why a lively opposition has thus far failed to secure reinstatement for Salaita involves making sense of the complex conditions in which the case has unfolded, conditions that include the defunding of public education and the importation of business models of management into the university. Even when there is a clear catalyst for an event, the contradictions that arise from it are never simple: events always play out on uneven terrain. 

As the Salaita “event” demonstrates, the multiplication of overdetermined contradictions can lead in two different directions: to rupture with the status quo or to the blockage of social change. This may sound a bit grandiose, but I think the insight speaks to our situation. First, the concept of overdetermination helps explain why the Salaita case has been so mobilizing for so many people. Following an initial vote of no confidence in the leadership of the university by the American Indian Studies program, a chain reaction took place: more than a dozen other departments rapidly followed suit, even though none of them was involved in Salaita’s hire. The coalitions of faculty and students that have been involved include many people I’ve never seen politically active or so deeply upset by campus politics before. Beyond the Illinois campus a similar chain reaction took place with thousands of people signing on to boycotts and other statements of opposition after Bruce Robbins and Corey Robin made initial pro-boycott statements. The dynamics of social media played their part in the swift unfolding of the event (as they did in its initial moment), but I think we also have to imagine that people came to this cause for many different, perhaps contradictory reasons: some that might have to do with the politics of Israel/Palestine, some that have to do with the governance of universities, some with the politics of free speech—and of course some for several of the above reasons. 

Such multiplicity has been a positive factor in mobilization, but the fact of overdetermination in politics means, second, that we also have to think seriously about the limits of coalition building and about the problem of how to hold together different interests and expand our base. We don’t need to convince everyone—and there always has to be an oppositional, antagonistic moment in mobilization in order to create solidarity within a coalition—but we do need, for instance, to cross the divide between the “two cultures” of the university and reach the STEM fields if we want to exert real power on campus. So far, no departments representing the natural sciences or engineering (not to mention business or even law) have joined their colleagues in the humanities and social sciences in voting no confidence—and a small number of departments and a large number of individuals have taken the opportunity to register support for the chancellor. 

I would also argue that we can—and in fact need to—reach more people who are genuinely concerned about the content and mode of expression of some of Steven Salaita’s tweets and who might have less radical positions on the Israel/Palestine question than many of us do. Some of these people are already with us—see the boycott statements of Jonathan Judaken and David Blacker, for instance—but we could reach even more if we address people’s concerns about antisemitism head on. The attempt to tar all opposition to Israeli occupation, blockade, and bombing as antisemitic has been a tactic of those who seek to prevent dissent on the question of Palestine, but that does not mean that antisemitism is never present in such opposition—something that was visible, for instance, in some of the recent demonstrations in Berlin, where demonstrators called Jews “coward pigs.” 

I find Steven Salaita sincere in his statements of opposition to antisemitism—and have argued that most of the tweets that have been labeled as antisemitic are, in fact, commentaries on the exploitation of antisemitism to silence dissent. But I think it is also true that some of the rhetoric Salaita deploys against Zionists occasionally comes close to tropes that have a long history of anti-Jewish use. (I’m thinking here of the references to “scabies” and to sexual perversion in two of the tweets I’ve seen.) To be sure, the context of those tweets includes asymmetrical violence against Palestinians and vile, racist statements made by Israeli politicians, among others; there were even suggestions by some commentators that genocide in Gaza would be an acceptable outcome of the bombing and invasion. Despite this dispiriting context, however, principled opposition to antisemitism—beyond lip service—should be a component of our program along with opposition to all forms of racism. One crucial effect of such principled opposition could be the expansion of solidarity with Palestinians among those uneasy about the expressions of antisemitism that arise intermittently in otherwise legitimate criticism of Israel.

The fact of overdetermination—the uneven, contradictory nature of social phenomena—entails that coalitions require work to bridge divides that sometimes seem (and sometimes actually are) unbridgeable because people’s multiple interests don’t always line up. A further example from organizing work around the Salaita case on the Illinois campus involves the relation between those who have been working hard to create a faculty union—the Campus Faculty Association—and those mobilized specifically by the rescinding of Salaita’s job offer. The overlap between these groups is enormous in terms of personnel and political commitment, but the interests of the two movements do not correspond perfectly. Commitments to workplace justice and academic freedom unite both groups, but the Israel/Palestine question is naturally not at the center of union organizing and not all who are upset about the Salaita situation are necessarily union supporters. The movement for faculty unionization has been a long-term, relatively slow-moving process. The mobilization for academic freedom in the wake of Salaita’s termination, in contrast, has been rapid and characterized by a high level of energy among faculty and students—although it remains unclear how long such intensity can be maintained. 

My argument would be—once again—that the speed and energy of the Salaita mobilization result from the multiplicity of the contradictions it makes visible. The release of such energies might have the unintended effect of furthering the unionization struggle. At the same time, the union offers a potential structure that could provide longer-term stability and an institutional form for those energies. 

The blockages and inhibitions that follow from overdetermination are also relevant here, however. Although divergent in various ways, the two struggles—for unionization and for reinstatement of Salaita—have hit similar roadblocks: in particular, both movements have failed to activate a large number of faculty outside the humanities and social sciences. While this failure might—in the Salaita case—have to do with divergent views across the disciplines about such issues as international politics, my sense is that the underlying issue for both struggles involves both local and structural issues. The uneven terrain of the modern research university and the unequal division of resources and power between the disciplines—both generally and at the University of Illinois in particular—ensure that some faculty will feel more “confident” in the university’s leadership in moments of crisis, while others will find the basic conditions of their intellectual work imperiled by top-down management decisions. It is, in any case, impossible for me to imagine that were Salaita a chemist rather than a cultural critic the chancellor would have made her decision without consulting with the department head and college. This case exposes contradictions in the university that ramify across contexts. 

Reflecting back on the long list of crises and contexts I mentioned at the beginning of these reflections, the ultimate points I want to insist on are these: 

At stake here is first of all the question of justice for Steven Salaita and for theAmerican Indian Studies program that selected him in their search. But the overdetermined contradictions that this case illuminates indicate to me that we are also close to the core of today’s political conjuncture: the Salaita event reveals how interwoven the politics of higher education has become—or perhaps always was—with the most pressing political, economic, and cultural contradictions of our times. Organizing around the case puts us in touch with those contradictions.


[An earlier and shorter version of these remarks was first presented at the forum “Academic Freedom and Political Dissent,” which was sponsored by Illinois Faculty for Academic Freedom and Justice and took place on 18 September 2014 in Urbana’s Independent Media Center. The forum featured a lecture by Katherine Franke from Columbia Law School about the legal and political ramifications of the Steven Salaita case followed by short responses by several Illinois faculty members and graduate students. This version current version of the article was originally published on 
michaelrothberg.weebly.com]

Can Arabs Be Human Rights Defenders?

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In September the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), a caucus of fifty-two members of the European parliament from nineteen political delegations and fourteen countries, nominated Mouad Belghouate, Ala Yaacoubi, and Alaa Abdel Fattah to receive the Sakharov Prize.  The award, named after the late Soviet physicist and human rights activist Andrei Sakharov, was established by the European Parliament in 1988 to honor individuals and groups who strive to defend human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

Belghouate, who raps as “El Haked” or “The Angry,” is an activist in the Moroccan 20 February pro-democracy movement.  He has been arrested three times and has spent at least sixteen months in jail since 2011 on dubious charges of insulting the police and assaulting a police officer.  Yaacoubi, who raps as Weld El 15, is a Tunisian democracy activist.  He was jailed for two years for having posted an online music video entitled “The Police Are Dogs.” He was released after the Ennahda-led interim government was removed from power in January 2014, giving Tunisia a better chance to establish a democratic regime than its neighbors. Abdel Fattah is an Egyptian blogger, software developer, and revolutionary. 

Abdel Fattah has the distinction of having been arrested by the Mubarak regime, the post-Mubarak interim regime of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and the regime installed by the military coup of 3 July 2013 led by current Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. He was also under investigation during Mohamed Morsi’s presidency on several trumped up charges. Most recently, he was arrested on 28 November 2013 for inciting a demonstration against the proposed constitution, which was adopted in January 2014.  Policemen broke into Abdel Fattah’s home and confiscated his family’s electronic equipment.  When he asked to see the warrant, they beat Abdel Fattah and his wife.

Only days earlier, the military-installed regime had issued a draconian law criminalizing public gatherings without obtaining prior government approval and giving security authorities the right to ban any public event deemed a threat to public order.  On that basis, Abdel Fattah was sentenced to fifteen years of hard labor, the harshest sentence given to any secular political activist since the crackdown on the Muslim Brothers following the military coup.  After nearly ten months behind bars and a month-long hunger strike, he was released on bail on 15 September of this year pending a retrial.

The three Arabs nominated for the Sakharov Prize by the GUE/NGL were worthy nominees.  They are youth with strong records advocating democracy, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly, all of whom have been jailed for their convictions.  They are emblematic representatives of the 2011 Arab popular uprisings and their repression in Egypt and Morocco.

Not so, wrote the online Wall Street Journal–a newspaper whose editorial qualifications to pass judgments on human rights include having vigorously advocated a criminal and costly war of aggression against Iraq in 2003, relying on repeated falsehoods and anti-Muslim incitement.  This September, the diligent researchers of the WSJ discovered that Abdel Fattah had engaged in “tweets offensive to Israel”–a new variety of speech crime that has apparently been established in the wake of the Steven Salaita affair at the University of Illinois–Urbana Champaign.

According to the Online WSJ, in 2009, Abdel Fattah tweeted, “One should only debate human beings.  Zionists and other imperialists are not human beings.”  In 2010 he tweeted “Dear zionists please do not ever talk to me, I am a violent person who advocated the killing of all zionists including civilians,” and, “My heroes have always killed colonialists."  In 2012, he tweeted, “Assassinating Sadat is not something that should shame a man, but instead honor him.”

Responding precipitously to the decontextualized publication of these tweets, the GUE/NGL promptly withdrew its nomination of Abdel Fattah and his two colleagues, who have not been accused of “tweets offensive to Israel” or any similar transgression.  Abdel Fattah responded to the news on his Facebook page:

… I *was* surprised when the president of the GUE/NGL decided to withdraw my nomination based on a mention in a two-year-old tweet taken out of context. And I *was* surprised that this was done without an attempt to contact me for clarification, and without any regard for how such public condemnation affects my safety and liberty. The president of the GUE/NGL has now sent a clear message to the Egyptian authorities that whatever international solidarity and support I have is fragile-easily destroyed with a tweet. 

The GUE/NGL are of course free to form their opinion based on whatever sources of information they choose-including well-known neocons writing for the WSJ about an-out of-context tweet. However, since they made the nomination … publicly, it was their responsibility to ascertain how the manner of retreating from it would affect my safety. Other options were available to them; they could have asked me to withdraw, or they could have quietly dropped my name from the short-list.

Abdel Fattah offers a detailed contextualization of the offending tweets.  He believed he was communicating privately with a friend.  We now know, thanks to Edward Snowden, that there is no privacy on the Internet.  We also now know, thanks to the cases of Alaa Abdel Fattah and Steven Salaita, that communicating in 140 character snippets, especially if they include disparaging comments on Israel, can have serious unintended consequences.

If not Alaa Abdel Fattah, who is a worthy nominee for the Sakharov prize?  Ayaan Hirsi Ali, of course.  In April of this year, students at Brandeis University forced their president to withdraw her proposed honorary degree because of her hate speech against Islam.  Yet five months later, she was nominated for the Sakharov Prize by the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) parliamentary group–a collection of libertarian and conservative Euroskeptic parties whose constituent members embrace such democratic principles as limiting immigration, opposing multiculturalism, questioning the science of climate change, and opposing same-sex marriage.

Ali did not make the list of finalists for the Sakharov Prize, although she was not subjected to the public denunciation that Alaa Abdel Fattah experienced. The finalists are the Ukrainian Euromaidan movement, the Congolese gynecologist Denis Mukwege and Azerbaijani human rights activist Leyla Yunus.  European parliamentarians are apparently not discomfited by Euromaidan, even though ultra-nationalists, white supremacists, and neo-fascists participated in it.

The reason that EFDD is not embarrassed to nominate Ali, while the GUE/NGL is embarrassed to nominate Abdel Fattah, is that most European discussions of the Middle East–left, right, and center–take place under the shadow of the Holocaust.  Of course, Europeans should remember that dark era and its murderous anti-Semitism.  But the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has only indirect links to Europe of the 1930s and 1940s.  The most important connection, as Edward Said repeatedly wrote, is that the Palestinians are “the victims of the victims, the refugees of the refugees.”  It is long past time that European political parties, especially those of the left, understand that this is the most fundamental context of much of what Arabs have said about Jews in the last sixty-six years.

Maghreb Media Roundup (October 11)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Maghreb and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Maghreb Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to maghreb@jadaliyya.com by Thursday night of every week.] 

Algeria

Algeria: North Africa’s Reluctant Policeman Maghreb and West Africa specialist Imad Mesdoua discusses the debate over Algeria’s increasingly important role in mitigating the security threat in North Africa and the Sahel regions.

Iran backs Algeria's plan for national reconciliation in Libya Iran expresses its support for Algeria’s plan to hold Libya peace talks and invite “all major parties involved in the ongoing conflict.”

IS in Algeria: serious threat or publicity stunt? Jund El Khalifa, the violent jihadist group responsible for the beheading of French national Hervé Gourdel, and their alleged connection with Islamic State represents more of a strategic partnership for publicity rather than a regional security threat to North Africa.

L’absence de Bouteflika alimente la rumeur : Où est passé le Président ? Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has not been seen in public since 21 September and many are concerned about his health and who is currently running the country.

Où va l'Algérie après l'assassinat d'Hervé Gourdel ? Historian Malika Rahal writes for Le Monde on the assassination of Frenchman Hervé Gourdel within the context of Algeria's recent past entangled with violence.

Libya

A new walled border for Algeria and Libya? Algeria and Libyan news sources have claimed that a 120 kilometer fence is being built along the border between the two countries after reports of after allegations that armed fighters from Libya were set to breach the south-east Algerian border.  

In Tripoli, ordinary life must go on Christine Petré describes the difficulties and moments of respite for residents of the country’s capital city in the face of armed militias, rising food prices, power outages, and political instability.

Libyan political factions due to open talks Libya’s two rival governing assemblies, Toburk and Tripoli, are set to meet with the aim of resolving the country’s political crisis over representation.

Is It Too Late For Libya? Council on Foreign Relations interviews Tripoli-based journalist about the various cleavages that mark the current political crisis in Libya.

NGO: Dozens of Palestinians, Syrians found dead off Libya Dozens of refugees fleeing war and occupation in Syria and Palestine were found dead off the coast of Libya. Over three thousand migrants died in the first nine months of 2014 attempting to cross the Mediterranean by boat.

Mauritania

Les islamistes de Tawassoul réclament l'application du statut de l'opposition Mauritania’s Islamist opposition, the National Movement for Reform and Development (RNRD) are applying for official recognition as an opposition party.

Arrests & Violations against Protesters in Tifrit village by Security Forces Demonstrators took to the streets in Tifrit to protest the state dumping garbage in their village. Police aggressively stopped the peaceful protest and arrested four of the organizers, including a journalist at Radio Mauritania.

Travel Warning For U.S. Citizens In Mauritania The US Embassy in Nouakchott issued a warning to Americans to avoid Mauritania’s border areas because of an increased threat of kidnapping.

Morocco

Le Britannique gay libéré, le Marocain toujours en prison The British national found guilty of homosexual acts and sentenced to four months of prison has been released while Jamal, the Moroccan who faced the same charges, remains behind bars.

Benkirane: «les Occidentaux ne savent que donner des leçons» King Mohammed VI’s speech was given by Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane at the United Nations General Assembly session. It has been noted for its criticism of western financial institutions and unilateral notions of economic and social development, representing a change from country’s traditionally pro-western discourse.  

My journey to rap, politics and prison El Haqed, “the enraged one,” is a Moroccan rapper, human rights activist, and government critic. In this op-ed written for Aljazeera English he describes his recent release from prison and the role of rap in political resistance.

La vérité sur la CDG, par Taoufiq BouachrineAkhbar Alyoum’s editor-in-chief dissects the various corruption scandals that Morocco’s key financial institution is currently facing. The Deposit and Management Fund (CDG) is considered by some as a tool for corrupt Makhzen economic policy.  

Murder of Senegalese migrant overshadows “radically new” politics of migration in Morocco Sebastien Bachelet analyzes the source of racist violence in Tangier and the struggle between civil society and state authorities about the nature of Morocco’s migration reform. 

Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network condemns the harassment of human rights organizations and the repeated violations of the right to freedom of assembly  EMHRN criticizes Morocco for its recent crackdown on the activities of some of its most independent human rights groups, including the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) and Amnesty International.

Nouveau financement de la Banque mondiale sur l’énergie solaire The World Bank has agreed to help finance the Noor solar energy complex, near the southern city of Ouarzazate. The sum is around 519 million dollars, or 4.5 billion dirhams.

برلمانيون بريطانيون "يقاطعون" المغرب بسبب اعتقال سائح "مثلي A British member of Parliament calls for a boycott of Morocco after arrest of British national on charges of homosexual acts. 

Tunisia

Mohamed Ali, Amina et Hichem : 1023 dinars par mois  Inkyfada shows the effect of Tunisia’s transition on everyday families and their budgets.

Tunisian youths at forefront of Syria militant fighters Tunisia’s young people are feeling more marginalized than ever. Around 3,000 Tunisians have gone to Syria to join militants since the civil war began in 2011.

Unpleasantly Familiar Faces in Tunisia Former members of the Ben Ali regime have announced their candidacy for Tunisia’s upcoming presidential elections in November.

Tunisia Prepares For Its Ultimate Democratic Ordeal Tunisia’s parliamentary and presidential elections are focused on ensuring high turnout and mitigating the threat of militant groups looking to jeopardize the process.

12 millions de dinars pour le financement public des campagnes législatives 2014 Public financing for the parliamentary elections are at an all-time high in Tunisia, with the highest percentage going to the Sousse district.

Western Sahara

US oil company set to violate international law in Western Sahara Kosmos Energy and Cairn Energy, American and British oil and gas firms respectively, are ready to begin oil exploration off the coast of the Western Sahara without the permission of its residents, which violates international law according to Sahrawi representatives. 

A permanent crisis in the desert The Sahrawi refugees face unique and difficult challenges compared to other groups, especially in their relationship with aid organizations.

Torture and death: a political prisoner's story in Western Sahara Hassana al-Wali, a Sahrawi political prison and human rights activist in the Western Sahara, died in a military hospital in Dakhla on 27 September after a hunger strike. Moroccan authorities then arrested six other activists who protested his arrest and mistreatment.

Most Recent Articles from Jadaliyya’s Maghreb Page  

New Texts Out Now: Andrea Khalil, Crowds and Politics in North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya Andrea Khalil discusses her new book with Jadaliyya, which examines the theoretical conceptions of crowds and politics in Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya during the period between 2011-2012. 

Morocco's Mawazine Festival: Exposing Class Tensions and Social Unrest  The international music festival in Morocco highlights the problems with the country’s narrative of exceptionalism and the increasing gap between Morocco’s international image and the socioeconomic troubles that its residents face.

A Voyage to Toledo: Twenty-Five Years After the 'Jews of the Orient and Palestinians' Meeting The 1989 Toledo conference marked a courageous attempt at Arab-Israel peace pre-Oslo, which was largely ignored in popular media. This was one of the earliest attempts to challenge Israel’s rejection of Palestinian identity and demonstrated the important role of Jewish communities in Middle Eastern countries like Morocco in the early years of the peace process.  

Algeria’s Jewish Past-Present Sarah Abrevaya Stein examines the North African Jewish past and how it is used in Algerian politics today.

حوار مع القيادية اليسارية المغربية نعيمة الكلاف Brahim El Guabli interviews Morocco’s leading leftist activist Naima Al Guallaf.

Djerba, Tunisia: Garbage Disposal, the Environmental Crisis, and the Awakening of Ecoconsciousness Rania Said explains the importance of Djerba’s campaign and strike against the government’s disregard for the problem of garbage disposal on the Tunisian Island. 


Photography Media Roundup (October 13)

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[This is a monthly roundup of articles on photography in the Middle East and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Photography Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in roundups to photos@jadaliyya.com.]

Announcements:

Exhibition and talks: “Stories of Change,” 

15 October - 15 December 2014 at Contemporary Image Collective, Cairo
Opening: 15 October 2014, 11 am

The exhibition runs Sundays to Thursdays (11 am - 5 pm).
The project shows the work of North African photographers and multimedia journalists, who took part over two years in the Reporting Change project, organized by World Press Photo and Human Rights Watch.
Talks by four of the photographers are as follows:

Ahmed Hayman: 22 October 2014, 7 pm
Muhannad Lamin: 16 November 2014, 7 pm
Mohamed Ali Eddin: 4 December 2014, 7 pm
Mosa’ab Elshamy: 14 December 2014, 7 pm



Exhibition: “Next To Here: Young Photographers from North Africa and the Middle East,” 28 September - 5 November 2014 at Contemporary Image Collective, Cairo
The exhibition runs Saturdays - Wednesdays (12 - 9 pm).
The exhibition “Next to Here” presents eighteen photographic works by young documentary photographers from North Africa and the Middle East. The works originated in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and in the United Arab Emirates. The works were produced in the context of ten photography workshops in MENA organized by the Goethe-Institut and its local partners in 2013 and 2014.

On Gaza:

Gallery: Loss is Loss, Pain Has No Nation, Ideas.Ted.Com
A selection of photojournalist Eman Mohammed’s powerful portraits of people who lost loved ones in Israeli attacks on Gaza.

Eman Mohammed: The Courage to Tell a Hidden Story, TED
Gaza photographer Eman Mohammed’s TED talk.

On Egypt:

Urban History and the Authority of Images, Cairo Observer
An article about the circulation of historical photos of Cairo in social media and how nostalgia for an imagined past can affect the way viewers read them.

Through the lens: a dreamlike-Egypt, New Internationalist
An interview with photographer Laura el-Tantawy about photographing in Cairo.

Young Photojournalist Amanda Mustard on Life in Cairo, Feature Shoot
Photos and interview with Mustard about living and working in Cairo.

Hunger Strike, Mada Masr,Panorama
Photo essay and text about the young hunger strikers in Egypt who are protesting for the release of political detainees.

On Syria:

Photographer Captures Tens of Thousands Fleeing ISIS, Entering Turkey, National Geographic
Photos and interview with John Stanmeyer about the mass exodus of Syrians into Turkey.

Whoever Saves a Life, Medium
A story with words, videos, and photos about the Civil Defense team, Syria’s first responders.

Syrian Eyes of the World: Portraits of Syrians made by Syrian photographers around the world
Exactly what it sounds like.

On Iran:

Keeping True to an Iranian Vision, Minus Big Money, New York Times, Lens Blog
Photos and article about Newsha Tavakolian’s dedication to truthful storytelling in Iran.

Newsha Tavakolian versus Carmignac, L’Oeil de la Photographie
A statement from Newsha Tavakolian about why she initially stepped down as the winner of the Carmignac Gestion Award.

In Iran, Mothers Dream of Missing Sons, New York Times, Lens Blog
Photos and article about Fatemeh Behboudi’s project “Mothers of Patience” in which she photographed twenty Iranian mothers who have lost sons in the Iran-Iraq War.

Iranian Fathers and Daughters, LensCulture
Photographs and text by Nafise Motlaq.

Iranian Coal Miners, AP Images
Photos by Ebrahim Noroozi.

Other:

Photo Exhibit Restores Dignity to Victims of U.S. Torture, The Intercept
A description and photos from Chris Bartlett’s exhibit “Iraqi Detainees: Ordinary People, Extraordinary Goals” now on display in New York.

Four Questions About Contemporary Arab Art, Hyperallergic
Hrag Vartanian reviews the exhibition “Here and Elsewhere” at the New Museum in New York City.

Mirror Worlds: Here and Elsewhere at the New Museum, Ibraaz
Stephanie Bailey reviews the exhibition “Here and Elsewhere” at the New Museum in New York City.

Sahara Rocks, Mashallah News
French reporter Arnaud Contreras photographed the Saharan people over the past 15 years.

Seized Land in Palestine, Al Jazeera In Pictures
Photos of the village of Wadi Fukin and the land seized by Israel, which resulted in the eviction of the residents.

Covering the Islamic State, AFP
Thoughts on how to balance the dignity of victims, reporters’ safety, the duty to inform the public, and avoid spreading propaganda when reporting on the Islamic State.

Abstraction of the real: Oliver Hartung’s photographs of Middle Eastern landscapes offer a different take on a troubled region, British Journal of Photography
Photos and interview with Hartung about his mostly people-less photos of urban and rural landscapes around the region.

Majid Saeedi: Life in War, L’Oeil de la Photographie
Interview with Saeedi about his photographs of daily life in Afghanistan.

The Arab Image Foundation, 2014, Nafas Art Magazine
An overview of the recent work of artist members of the Arab Image Foundation.

 

Short Skirts and Niqab Bans: On Sexuality and the Secular Body

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Introduced in Québec in March 2010, Bill 94 proposed requiring women to unveil their faces if they wanted to work in the public sector or access public services, including hospitals, universities, and public transportation. The bill was eventually tabled and was followed in November 2013 with Bill 60, which demanded in more generalist language the removal of conspicuous religious signs in order to dispense or use public services in the province. These Québécois bills—which have not passed—echo the logic of the April 2011 French law targeting the niqab (face veil) and banning the “dissimulation of the face” in public spaces. Both French and Québécois proponents of these laws cited gender equality and women’s emancipation—which they deemed foundational to French and Québécois values—as their primary goal. Despite Québec’s long insistence that it espouses a third path between Canadian multiculturalism and the French Jacobin model, Québec and France have increasingly converged to promote a model of secularism in which liberty and equality are articulated as sexual liberty and sexual equality. In fact, these niqab restrictions represent a broader secular-liberal discourse—what Joan W. Scott calls “sexularism”—that posits secularism as the best guarantor of women’s sexual freedom and sexual equality and, therefore, as that which distinguishes the West from the woman-oppressing rest, especially from Islam.

Much has been written on secularist reactions to veiling, some of it on this blog. Most of that scholarship focuses on the problems that the veil, and Islamic piety more generally, pose for political secularism. Here, we try to provide a somewhat different reading that follows recent work arguing that, like forms of religiosity, secularity too includes a range of ethical, social, and physical dispositions, hence the need to apprehend the secular via its sensorial and affective dimensions and not only its political ones. In a 2010 post, Charles Hirschkind asked: “Is there a secular body? Or, in somewhat different terms, is there a particular configuration of the human sensorium—of sensibilities, affects, embodied dispositions—specific to secular subjects, and thus constitutive of what we mean by ‘secular society’?” Michael Warner posed a similar set of questions: “What is the lived and embodied dimension of the secular?” he asked, and “how is this bodily secularity related to thin accounts of ‘secular rationality? ’” Using the niqab bans as a starting point, we try to map some of the coordinates of what might be called the secular body, being especially attentive to its sex and gender norms. Rather than ask if there is a secular body, we inquire into the secular investment in the body, or more precisely, in female bodies. We therefore ask how the secular body might be fundamentally sexed and gendered. We argue that the French and Québécois cases reveal a particular set of sexual protocols regarding what constitutes the proper female subject and proper femininity— and attendant notions of maleness and masculinity—that intimately link secularity to the embodiment of very specific sex and gender norms.

Bill 94 was introduced to the National Assembly of Québec in response to what was deemed an unreasonable request for special accommodation made by a niqab-wearing Egyptian woman in a French language class for new immigrants. The bill laid out guidelines governing individuals’ requests for accommodation, requiring that individuals must “show their face during the delivery of services [as] a general practice.” During a news conference, Premier Jean Charest, flanked by three female ministers, avowed that “An accommodation cannot be granted unless it respects the principle of equality between men and women, and the religious neutrality of the state.” The convergence of women’s rights and secular neutrality was made more explicit by a 161-page February 2011 report entitled “Affirming secularism, a step toward real equality between men and women,” released by the Conseil du Statut de la Femme (Council on the Status of Women, CSF), a government-funded body created in 1973 to defend women’s rights in the province. The Québécois document approvingly cites the French Stasi commission’s report, which preceded France’s 2004 ban on headscarves in public schools, noting that secularism can no longer be conceived without a direct link to the “equality principle between the sexes.” The CSF report also criticizes Canadian multiculturalism and Québec’s current model of laïcité ouverte (open secularism) for threatening the secular commitment to gender equality. Although the report uses generalist language about politico-religious extremism, most of its examples concern Islam and Muslims. Thus the fight against radical Islam is hitched to the protection of women’s rights, with both accomplished via a renewed commitment to secularism.

Particularly interesting is the CSF report’s investment in the unveiled female face. Essentially, it argues that women’s faces must be bare and their bodies “areligious” in order to be “neutral.” According to the report, a neutral dress code and bare face protect women against patriarchal religious traditions and give them access to social and civic rights, including the rights to vote, to divorce, and to abortion. And, just as secularism once protected women against Catholicism, now it must do so against Islam by promoting an areligious female body. Yet even as the report attempts to fit niqab bans into this broad narrative, its repeated invocations of and attachment to the bare face—where bare means unveiled, rather than without adornments like make-up or piercings—index a particular problem with Islam and a grounding in specific sex/gender norms and gender performativity integral to Québécois secularity (a point further addressed here).

Even as Bill 94 and the CSF report display a clear attachment to women’s bare faces, however, they leave that attachment unexplored, and the sex/gender norms integral to that attachment implicit. It is instructive, therefore, to turn to French opponents of veiling, who are equally invested in the bare female face, but much more explicit about why.

In July 2008 National Assembly deputy André Gerin began to speak out against what he perceived as the increasing number of women wearing face veils in his district. Like much of the French discourse about veiling, Gerin presented no sociological evidence, relying purely on emotional rhetoric. He and fifty-seven other deputies co-signed a resolution (No. 1725) demanding a commission to study the problem of the face veil. President Nicolas Sarkozy soon obliged, appointing Gerin to lead a commission that, after interviewing 211 individuals (none of the them niqab-wearing women), presented a 658-page report to the National Assembly in January 2010.

The report argues that women who wear face veils lose their dignity, their femininity, and their very identity as persons, echoing the initial resolution, which decried the niqab as “an attack on a woman’s dignity and on the assertion of her femininity” so that “her very existence is denied.” In justifying the creation of the commission, Sarkozy had noted, “we cannot accept in our country women who are imprisoned behind a grid, cut off from society and deprived of any identity.” What Sarkozy and the deputies suggest is that the niqab denies its wearers the possibility of full personhood.

But how and why? Here, the mention of femininity is key, as is the Gerin Commission Report’s surprising attention to the 2009 film La journée de la jupe (“Skirt Day”). The film chronicles the experiences of a female high school teacher working in a socio-economically marginalized banlieue (outer-city suburb), where the male students have no respect for women. One day, having come to school in a short skirt—something she has been expressly asked not to do by the principal—the teacher-protagonist “loses it,” holding her students hostage with one of their own guns. She has one demand of the authorities called in to negotiate this hostage crisis: “that the government establishes a national skirt day in all schools. A day when the government states you can wear a skirt and not be a whore!” The Gerin Commission devoted a section of its report to a discussion of the film by commission members and invited interlocutors. One interlocutor, republican feminist philosopher Elizabeth Badinter, described how she had attended a screening of the filmat a public middle school in the immigrant-populated 18th arrondissement of Paris, and how she had been struck by the paucity of girls wearing short skirts. Like the film, she attributed this reluctance to Maghrebi Muslim cultural mores and the concomitant pressure on girls to dress modestly. Similarly, Olivia Cattan, president of the association Parole de Femmes (Women’s Words), noted before the commission that at the poor, largely non-white middle school where she teaches, there might be “one girl” in a class of twenty who wears a skirt, and she voiced her concern for the related rise in garçons manqués (tomboys). Another interlocutor before the commission, National Assembly deputy Danièle Hoffman-Rispal, succinctly summed up Badinter’s and Cattan’s fears: “Skirt Day is not just a film, it’s every day.”

The lengthy discussion of the film by the commission begs the question: how is the anecdotal rarity of short skirts among young women of immigrant origin relevant to hearings about the acceptability of face veils in the public sphere? Cattan makes the connection most explicitly: the decline of skirt-wearers and the appearance of tomboys signal an environment in which young women deny their femininity; this in turn reflects a broader degeneration of gender equality. And all are the result of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, of which the niqab is the most visible representation. As is evident from the consternation about the lack of short skirts, femininity takes a very particular form in this narrative, and the Franco-Maghrebi feminist organization Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores Nor Doormats, NPNS), a vociferous proponent of both the 2004 ban on headscarves and the 2010 ban on niqabs, best exemplifies its contours. In her autobiography, NPNS co-founder Fadela Amara contends that during her adolescence three decades ago, “it was considered natural for us to wear short skirts, tight-fitting jeans, low-cut blouses, and short T-shirts,” all modes of dress she defines as “showing off our femininity.” Like the Gerin Commission, Amara decries the pressure supposedly exerted on young Muslim women by patriarchal Islam and lauds those who rebel “by continuing to wear revealing clothing, by dressing in fashion, [and] by using makeup” in order “to exist as individuals, by dressing in fashion, by using makeup.” Another leader of NPNS, Sihem Habchi, testified before the Gerin Commission that the face veil entails the loss of a woman’s self. Notably, when Habchi declared that she—unlike her veiled counterparts—was not ashamed of her body, she removed her jacket to reveal bare shoulders. The commission members applauded, presumably appreciative of the embrace of secularity that her bare shoulders represent. Indeed, Habchi, Amara, and the Gerin Commission voice their criticism of veiling as a defense of secularism, linking secular values like individual autonomy and sexual equality to a particular mode of hetero-femininity and to particular sexual protocols (a link explored elsewhere). What is striking is how certain aesthetic practices—wearing makeup and short skirts—and certain forms of bodily display—bare legs, bare shoulders, uncovered hair, and bare faces—have become essential to that femininity. Also striking is how much this model of femininity is naturalized, such that wearing makeup and revealing clothes corresponds to taking up one’s natural qualities and desires as a woman and an individual.

Equally integral to femininity is the capacity to seduce, which the niqab is thought to impede, thus obstructing, once again, the ability of a woman to take up her natural femininity. André Rossinot, mayor of the city of Nancy, put forth this idea in his testimony before the Gerin Commission. According to Rossinot, the niqab is part of a gender system in which “women do not have control of their image, they are not free to show themselves, to exist on the outside, even less to seduce.” Rossinot’s reference to seduction brings to mind Joan W. Scott’s compelling analysis of French debates about veiling.

Within French secular-republican ideology, Scott argues, subjectivation is not simply dialogic but also fundamentally gendered. Man hails woman into being: “Feminine identity depend[s] on male desire; male desire depend[s] on visual stimulation.” Seduction and the male gaze are therefore key to subjectivation: the visual appreciation of women’s faces and bodies brings women into being as women, just as the ability to see women’s faces and bodies brings men into being as men. Within this framework, the niqab is not only an assault on women’s femininity and men’s masculinity, but also, more broadly, on women’s and men’s very existence as subjects.

This framework collapses sex and gender, positing an integral relationship between the female-sexed body and the feminine gender (and the male-sexed body and masculine gender). Thus to express one’s self, and in so doing to enact one’s autonomy, is to express one’s feminine sexuality and vice versa. It is precisely this logic that allows Fadela Amara to call the headscarf “an instrument of power over women used by men” by noting that “men do not wear the headscarf”—a sign of gender inequality—while at the same time describing suburban Muslim women’s wearing of short skirts and makeup (obviously also not worn by men) as a way of “affirming their femininity” and “being themselves.” This secular re-investment in a natural or biological sexual difference means that opponents of the niqab can champion simultaneously hyper-normative femininity and—indeed, as—sexual equality.

Proposals to ban the niqab in Québec and France consistently posit a link between secularity and gender equality; we have sought to analyze that link by exploring Québécois and French investments in the visibility of the female body and face, and by attending to the concomitant sexual protocols that underpin Québécois and French secularity. A few concluding points are in order. First, we are struck by the remarkable commitment to sexual difference as an organizing principle. What is ironic about this commitment is that it has become the basis for a secular discourse of gender equality. Even more ironic is that this commitment to gender equality has then been mobilized to critique the niqab as perpetuating a system of innate sexual difference that leads to gender inequality.

Second, to return to our initial analytical framework of the secular body, we are struck by how foundational the sexed and gendered body has become to discourses and practices of secularity. Warner, Hirschkind, and others are surely correct that the secular is not a space-clearing arrangement of political and affective neutrality, but rather a site of robust norms, affects, emotions, embodied dispositions, and ethical sensibilities. Like religious bodies, the secular body therefore needs to be examined as a site of marked fullness rather than of unmarked absence. We suggest that this kind of analysis cannot be done without attending to sex/gender, and to the sexed/gendered configuration of the sensibilities, bodily dispositions, affects, and norms that underpin what might be called the secular body.

[This article was originally published on The Immanent Frame]

Last Week on Jadaliyya (October 6-12)

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This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya last week. It also includes a list of the most read articles and roundups. Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our "Last Week on Jadaliyya" series.
 

Hashem L Kelesh

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 Egyptian visual artist and musician, Hashem L Kelesh's online presence is even stronger than in the real world. He studied art history and musical composition online, on his own. And he continues to do so, substituting for Egypt's archaic formal art education programs. 

From his flat in suburban Cairo, Kelesh has also been drawing, painting, making music and posting it all online. When it came to his street art, he handed out his stencil designs for others to spray on the city walls. 

His inspirations come from online interactions, and he posts the work on his Facebook page, Tumblr blog and SoundCloud. The feedback he gets from his growing fan base and many more who stumble upon his work inspires new work, keeping things rolling.

This video portrait of Kelesh offers insights into his process and psyche, as well as the community of artists and musicians who have preferred online platforms to physical spaces and real-life encounters.

This video was produced by Medrar.TV in collaboration with ibraaz as part of ibraaz platform 007 on the future of arts infrastructures and audiences across North Africa and the Middle East.

Egypt Media Roundup (October 13)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.] 

Regional and International Relations:

Egypt and Libya: A Fatal Embrace?
Karim Mezran analyzes the political biases undermining Egyptian-Libyan efforts to help deescalate the conflict in Libya. 

Resolution of Israel-Palestine Conflict 'Duty to Next Generation', Says al-Sisi at Gaza Aid Conference
Ahram Online reports on Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s speeches during the Gaza aid conference held in Cairo.

Egypt Will Not Let Go of Gaza, At Least for Strategic Reasons
Dina Ezzat argues that behind official statements on Egyptian-Gazan relations lies deep-seated tensions and conflicting interests between Palestinians and Egyptians.

Talk of an Egyptian Boycott of Turkish Goods Will Not Do Anyone Any Good
Dominic Dudley argues that if the Turkish-Egyptian feud escalates, it may lead to adverse effects on both countries’ economies. 

Religious Minorities:

Maspero: An Eyewitness Account of the Memorial Protest
Mina Fayek reports on the protest commemorating the October 2011 Maspero massacre. 

Three Years on and the Copts' Plight Continues
Mina Fayek writes, “Three years after the Maspero massacre, no justice has been served. This was a state crime, and more worryingly, the Egyptian state seems to be increasingly engaging in hostile acts towards Copts.”

Maspero: A Massacre Revisited
Amr Khalifa examines the state’s role in increasing sectarian tensions between Muslims and Copts in Egypt.

Three Years After the Maspero Massacre: Where is the Justice?
Ishak Ibrahim writes on the judicial process in the investigation of the Maspero massacre.  

Sexual Harassment:

The Common Factor: Sexual Violence and the Egyptian State, 2011-2014
Heather McRobie argues, “We must conceptualize the epidemic levels of sexual violence in post-revolutionary Egypt at least partly as ‘state violence’, and resist the state’s attempt to selectively appropriate women’s rights. Every post-revolutionary Egyptian regime has the blood of women on its hands.”

Human Rights and Rule of Law:

Egypt Forms Committee to Draft Law for Nubian Resettlement
Ahram Online reports on the new committee’s plans for a “future development project to focus on the Nubian community near Lake Nasser in south Egypt.”

Egypt between Two Billboards
Mina Fayek criticizes the Sisi administration, arguing that “Egypt is living a moment of cognitive dissonance clearly demonstrated in the contradiction between reality and false depiction.”

Cairo Court to Consider Facebook, Twitter Ban in Egypt
Nancy Messieh writes on a lawsuit seeking to ban Facebook and Twitter in Egypt, which is expected to be heard on 18 November of this year.    

The Obliteration of Civil Society in Egypt
Amira Mikhail analyzes the illegality of restricting non-governmental organizations in Egypt.

Parliamentary Elections:

Contradicting Statements Fuel Speculation over Egypt's Parliamentary Polls
Gamal Essam El-Din discusses conflicting statements over the new electoral districts law, which have “fueled speculation whether Egypt’s parliamentary elections will be held later this year or postponed to the end of 2015.”

Reports and Opinions:

Egypt in Focus: President Sisi in Power
EgyptSource offers brief overview of al-Sisi’s domestic and foreign policies to date.

Why Sisi’s New Egypt is No Laughing Matter for a Cartoonist
Patrick Kingsleyreacts to the status of political satirists and cartoonists in Egypt.

Egyptian Universities Start New Year with More Protests
Ahram Online reports: “Limited protests at six public universities to denounce private security firms on campus, latest round-up of alleged anti-government students.”

Police Fire Tear Gas at Azhar University; Students Break New Gates
Hana Afifi reports on protests and clashes between Azhar University students and Egyptian police at the beginning of the academic year.

Students Call for Protests amid Tense Atmosphere on Egypt's Campuses
Ahram Online reports on Cairo University student protests and arrests as the new semester starts under recently passed university regulations restricting political activities on campuses nationwide.

Asleep at the Wheel
Iman Hamam explores the state’s rhetoric on the forty-first anniversary of the 6 October 1973 war. 

Social Media as Archive
Laura Gribbon writes on social media groups that post photos of historically significant Egyptian personalities or sites creating the freedom for public commentary as a form of collecting specific narratives.

Egyptian Activist, Alaa Abdel Fattah, Penalized by Sakharov Prize Nominating Committee for Speaking Out Against Israel
Muftah reports on the Sakharov Prize Committee’s withdrawal of Alaa Abdel Fattah’s nomination over tweets made against Zionists during the 2012 Israeli offensive on Gaza.  

In Arabic

ماذا قدم المشاركون في مؤتمر إعادة إعمار قطاع غزة؟
Reuters reports on various states’ pledges of aid for the rebuilding of Gaza at the closing sessions of the International Cairo Conference on Palestine: Reconstructing Gaza.  

إسرائيل ترفع السرية عن وثائق جديدة تخص حرب 1973
Mada Masr writes on newly declassified Israeli intelligence reports on the October 1973 war.  

قبل يوم من محاكمته: إجبار سلطان على تناول محلول مغذي
Mada Masr reports that hospital medical staff  have force fed political prisoner Mohamed Sultan, who has been on hunger strike for 259 days.

معاقون: همّشتنا الأنظمة كافّة، وآخرون: التحسّن بسيط
Ahmed Fouad argues, “The situation of disabled Egyptians is not improving and may further deteriorate with the prime minister’s decision to affiliate the National Council for Disability Affairs with the Ministry of Social Solidarity.” This article is translated and published in English.

توازن الضعف فى مجلس النواب القادم
Waheed Abd El-Majeed explores the possible outcomes of the upcoming House of Representatives elections under the current political circumstances in the country.  

آن الأوان ترجعي يا دولة الجواسيس!
In a two-part piece, Bilal Fadl examines intelligence reports written in the 1960s to showcase the similarities between Gamal Abdel Nasser’s police state and that of current Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. 

تعديلات المادّة 78 من قانون العقوبات المصريّ تثير قلق المجتمع المدنيّ
Enas Hamid reports on al-Sisi’s approval of new amendments “increasing punishment for groups receiving foreign funding in the context of counterterrorism.” This article is translated and published in English.

«سين وجيم» عن قانونية الإجراءات الحكومية في الجامعات
Omar Said interviews rights lawyer Ahmed Ezzat on the legality of regulating universities in Egypt.

تحت قبة الجامعة .. قلقٌ مشروعٌ على «المستقبل»٠
Ayman al-Sayyad reacts to reports on a university’s refusal to grant a PhD student his degree due to fundamental differences between the university’s mission and the student’s opinions as presented in his dissertation.

عن حسين صدقي وسينما التيار الرئيسي في مصر
Ashraf El-Sharif analyzes the sociopolitical impact of Egypt’s cinema in the decades leading up to the inauguration of Gamal Abdel Nasser as president of Egypt.

إجراءات ومحاولات مصريّة طموحة للخروج من أزمة الطاقة بالاعتماد على الطاقة الشمسيّة
Aya Aman reports on new government projects aiming to produce twenty percent of power from renewable resources by 2020. This article is translated and published in English.

صخب السلطوية الجديدة
Amr Hamzawy writes on the state’s restriction of human rights under the banner of the “war on terror.”

بيت المقدس يعود إلى الواجهة في سيناء والقبيلة على وشك السقوط
Al-Monitor’scorrespondent in Sinai reports that the jihadist group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis is regaining strength in the Sinai Peninsula. This article is translated and published in English.

اشكالية حول المشروع المصري لربط البحر المتوسط ببحيرة فيكتوريا بخط ملاحي بالنيل
Walaa Hussain writes on the obstacles facing the project aiming to “add a navigation lane to the Nile River, linking Lake Victoria and the Mediterranean Sea” which was approved by several heads of state at the January 2013 African Summit.

Recently on Jadaliyya Egypt

Can Arabs Be Human Rights Defenders?
Joel Beininreacts to the Sakharov Prize Committee’s withdrawal of Alaa Abdel Fattah’s nomination.  

Remembering Those Who Were Slain
Hani Atalla remembers the October 2011 Maspero massacre.  

Alaa Abdel Hamid: Visual Lab Rats
Medrar TVreports on sculptor Alaa Abdel Hamid’s exhibition entitled: “Visual Lab Rats.”  

On the Sakharov Prize
Alaa Abdel Fattah responds to the Sakharov Prize Committee’s withdrawal of his nomination due to a conversation he had on twitter reacting to Israel’s offensive on Gaza in 2012.

Samir Nabil (Object Obscure)
Medrar TV interviews Alexandrian musician and sound engineer Samir Nabil, head of music project and band “Object Obscure.”

Syria Media Roundup (October 13)

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This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Syria Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to syria@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]


Inside Syria

Suweida to Assad: The Chair For You and Coffins For Our Sons“Since the regime declared its war and turned the soldiers and officers into murderers and criminals, many young men from Suweida refused to serve in the army.” 

As ISIL advances on Syrian town, UN envoy urges international action to avoid ‘massacre’ The UN looks to adopt a realistic approach to assisting the millions of Syrian civilians suffering, and looks to facilitate a reduction in the current belligerent manner of the conflict. 

Why ISIS Is Gaining Ground – and So Hard to Beat Noah Bonsey, senior analyst with the ICG, gives insight on ISIS and its advancement in Syria and how to prevent further ISIS progression in the Syria.

Why some Syrians are against strikes on ISIS Syrians have been led to believe that efforts to attack ISIS are futile, and more violence will only provoke them and boost their popularity. 

Civilians "will most likely be massacred" if Kobane falls: UN Syria envoyKurdish fighters halted a thrust by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) jihadists towards the heart of the Syrian border town of Kobane.” 

Kurds Try to Capitalize on US Airstrikes Against Islamic State Fighters in Kobane The clash for the Syrian/Kurdish border town Kobane has sparked questions about a more robust response to the expansion of IS.

Can PKK transform military might into political power? Fehim Taştekin analyzes the complexity of the situation in Northern Iraq and Syria with the advance of ISIS towards Erbil and Kobani. ”As regional developments open new military and political arenas to the PKK, it is unlikely that the Turkish peace process will end with the Kurds disarming." 

Kobani becomes battle for Kurds' future Onur Burcak Belli writes about the frustration of Kurds because of the Turkish policy towards the offensive against Kobani. “With the Islamic State siege of Kobani endangering the peace process and the cease-fire between the PKK and the Turkish state, Kurds could soon be facing a host of new challenges.”

Salman Rushdie to share PEN Pinter prize with Mazen DarwisSalman Rushdie publicizes plight of the imprisoned Syrian human rights activist Mazen Darwish by sharing his PEN Pinter prize with the journalist and lawyer.

The National Ideological Resistance in Syria: A ‘Syrian Hezbollah’ BranAymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi writes about the emergence of native brands of Hezbollah in Syria, which are identical in ideology and messaging to that of Hezbollah.

Looting Spreads in Damascus Suburb Damascus Bureau reporter reports about the systematic looting of furniture in Damascus Suburb by "armed groups supported by the regime." 

What is sectarianism in the Middle East? “The term of "sectarianism" is heard whenever the Middle East or Syria is discussed; yet a talking head would be pressed to define what they mean by sectarianism. Mohammad Dibo speaks to two prominent Arab thinkers Salameh Kaileh and Victorios Shams, who provide their perspectives by going back to the basics.” 

ISIS’ Ammunition Is Shown to Have Origins in U.S. and China C. J. Chivers writes about the sources of ISIS’ ammunition, "more than 80 percent of the ammunition was manufactured in China, the former Soviet Union, the United States, post-Soviet Russia or Serbia."

Sources: U.S. air strikes in Syria targeted French agent who defected to al Qaida “A former French intelligence officer who defected to al Qaida was among the targets of the first wave of U.S. air strikes in Syria last month, according to people familiar with the defector’s movements and identity.”

Diplomat: Syria has four chemical weapons facilities it didn't disclose “Syria has four chemical weapons facilities that it did not previously disclose to the United Nations, a Western diplomat told CNN on Tuesday.”

Turkey Arrests 274 Kobane Refugees Fleeing Islamic State Attack John Beck writes about the Kurdish refugees who fled Kobane. "Turkish security forces have arrested and detained more than 200 Syrians refugees — including young children — fleeing the besieged border town of Kobane, according to their family members, lawyers, and local politicians." 

Syrian regime ignores supporters' rising anger Edward Dark reports "anger among pro-government supporters spilled into protests in Homs last week after two deadly suicide bombings, but the Syrian government remains indifferent to their complaints." 


Regional and International Perspectives
 

A Kurdish Alamo: Five Reasons the Battle for Kobane Matters Katherine Wilkens discusses the impact of the battle for Kobane on IS progression in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.

A Time Bomb in Lebanon: The Syrian Refugee Crisis The influx of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has created economic, social, and political pressures. Lebanon makes an effort to limit the flow of refugees into the country.

No Syrians Are Allowed Into Jordan, Agencies Say International refugee agencies claim that Jordan refuses to allow Syrian refugees to cross the border. 

Biden's apology hides the truthTulin Daloglu analyzes US Vice President Joe Biden’s instant apology to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which may be considered a technical obligation, but not a denial of the merits of what has been said. 

Rojava, ISIS and Turkey Kurtuluş Tayiz analyzes the implications of the ISIS attack on Kobani and how that affects the policy of both Turkey and the Kurdish parties, namely, the PKK and its Syrian branch, known as the Democratic Union Party (PYD). 

Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen: Support for the Islamic State Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  analyzes the attitude of The Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen, a Gaza-Sinai jihadi group and opponent of the Hamas government in Gaza, and wider trend of sympathy for ISIS in the Gaza-Sinai area.

What’s at Stake in Kobani: Islamic State and Kobani Calculations Carl Drott analyzes the current situation and the strategic importance of Kobani and the reasons behind ISIS offensive. 

Is Islamic State symptom of the Assad problem? According to Mustafa Akyol "Turkey's policymakers need to take seriously the Islamic State's growing power, instead of dismissing the group as a "symptom" of Bashar al-Assad's regime." 

Despite demands, Syria no-fly zone a no-go for US The imposition of no-fly zone in Syria "would set the stage for a direct confrontation with one of the Mideast's most formidable air defenses, a system bolstered in recent years by top-of-the-line Russian hardware".

Why the US will be forced to join the fight against Assad Hussein Ibish writes about the American policy towards Syria, "growing tensions between the United States and Turkey regarding the campaign against ISIL in Syria and Iraq reveal significant weaknesses in the current American approach, and where it will have to change course if it is to succeed." 

Turkish PM Davutoğlu: Only people can defeat ISIL, not air strikes “Turkey’s prime minister has warned against the supposed risk of popularizing the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) among the people of Syria, by having the Syrian regime involved in a planned military battle against the jihadists.” 


Policy and Reports

الجندر والتجنيد والحماية والحرب في سوريا Rochelle Davis, Abbie Taylor and Emma Murphy provide a comprehensive report about gender in the context of the Syrian war and the need "to redefine classic conceptions of vulnerability and to consider civilian men and their needs as part of a solution rather than a problem." 

The English report:
Gender, conscription and protection, and the war in Syria
 

Economy and Agriculture 

Syrian price spikes: Aleppo gas increases by 140% Gas prices skyrocket in Aleppo as coalition’s strikes place more costs and problems on the citizens of Syria.
 

Arabic:  

مع ضربات التحالف... الأوضاع المعيشيّة للسكّان في تدهور
Mohammed al-Khatieb reports about the severe daily life in Aleppo which have been worsen following the airstrikes of the US-led coalition against the Islamic State, which have "targeted oil wells and refineries, causing prices of basic commodities in Syria to skyrocket."

To Our Countries لبلادي        
“To Our Countries” is a project produced by a group of youths who live in Sweden and are originally from Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. 

أسامة محمد: في سوريا نافورة صور لن تتوقف والثورة لحظة لا تنتهي
Hauvick Habechian interviews the Syrian director Ossama Mohammed after the success of his last documentary "Silvered Water, Syria Self-Portrait" 

غُل لـ «الحياة»: نصحنا صدّام والأسد... ونخشى تقسيم سورية
Ghassan Charbel interviews the Former Turkish President Abdullah Gül who revealed that the Turkish government had advised both the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and the Syrian President Bashar al Assad to initiate political reforms and avoid the war but they chose to ignore the Turkish advices.

The complete interview with Gül 

النازحون السوريون… بين الفقر والحصار الاجتماعي 
Nofa Ali reports from opinions of internally displaced persons in Syria following the reconciliations and agreements between the Syrian government and different fractions of the armed opposition in many areas. 

موقع لوزارة «الشؤون الإسلامية» يروّج لـ«الجهاد» ودعم المقاتلين .. ويصف المبتعثين بـ«الانحلال» 
A Saudi ministry of “Islamic Affairs” calls via a website for reviving the spirit of jihad and urges for supporting fighters with money to buy weapons! 

إنشقاق جندي لبناني رابع وإنضمامه إلى "داعش"
 A fourth Lebanese soldier defected from the Lebanese army and joined ISIS. 

جهود مساعدة جيل سوريا “المفقود” مازالت مخيبة للآمال
Benjamin Plackett writes about the disappointing efforts to help Syrian students who lost their schools and their rights to access of education because of the ongoing war.

45 ألف مواطن يشربون مياه معقمة من محطة الشميطية في ريف ديرالزور
Mohammad Hassan reports from Deir Ezzor about the successful efforts of the local council of the town of Al-Shumaytiyah that provided access to fresh water for more than 45,000 citizens.

«صرخة إنسان» تجربة موسيقية تحاكي آلام السوريين
Omar al-As'ad writes about "scream of human being", a new musical experience of the Syrian poet Ola Hosamow, which reflects the Syrian tragedy through songs. 

أنصار النظام السوري يترقبون بقلق تطور العلاقة بين الأسد والتحالف الغربي
An Al-Monitor Correspondent in Syria reports from the coastal city of Tartous that "the Syrian government’s supporters are divided in their views on the US-led strikes against the Islamic State in Syria, with many believing it violates Syria’s national sovereignty and humiliates the country."

The English translation of this article:
Supporters accuse Syrian regime of cooperating on airstrikes 

خسارة عدرا تعيد خلط أوراق المعركة في الغوطة الشرقيّة         
"
Mustafa al-Haj writes about the sudden withdrawal of Jaish al-Islam from the strategic town of Adra in the Damascus countryside, which means that the "Syrian regime forces have scored an important victory, increasing pressure on rebel strongholds in eastern Ghouta."

The English translation of this article:
Syrian army closes in on Douma after Adra victory 

جدران مقبرة مدينة النبك... من الموت إلى الحياة
Mustafa al-Haj reports "the Syrian Women’s Forum for Peace has launched a new project to paint murals across Syrian cities, in an attempt to spread peace and life in the hearts of Syrians who are suffering from the effects of the war."

The English translation of this article:
Syrian women's group paints for peace                                                                             

جوع ودروس دين في "كامبات" السويد!              
Raheem Haidar writes about the life of Syrians within the Swedish camps for immigrants.  

خطة إعادة الإعمار: قرار سياسي أم؟
Abed Al-haj writes about the plans for reconstruction in Syria and the conditions for planning and conducting effective plan. 

عالم سويسري: "أعيش الأحداث الجارية في سوريا بألم وحسرة كبيرين"        
Mohamed Cherif of Swissinfo interviews the prominent Swiss archaeologist Jean-Marie Le Tensorer who spent more than 30 years conduction excavations in Palmyra until 2011.

«دروب دمشق»: «الإليزيه» تلاعب بتقارير الكيــميائي

Sabah Ayoub retrieves controversial information, such as the chemical attack on Ghouta of Damascus, from the new book, Le chemin de Damas: 40 ans de relations franco-syriennes.

الجيش في وادي عين ترما... ويتقدّم في جوبر
Marah Mashi and Ahmad Hassan report about the recent advances of the Syrian regular army towards Wadi 'Ayn Tarma and al-Dokhaniya.

Soma ve Kobane’yi birlikte dusunmek

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Soma ve Kobane’yi birlikte düşünmek

Rafine ve eşitleyici bir katil olarak para

Kapitalizm maddi refah kadar uhrevi bir vaatle de kendini pazarladı, pazarlıyor. Sol ve sağ liberallere göre para evrensel bir çözücü. Girdiği her yerde modernlik öncesi hiyerarşileri yerle bir ediyor, geleneksel ayrımları anlamsızlaştırıyor. Marksizmde dahi bu inancın yer yer yeniden üretildiğini görüyoruz. Ne diyordu Marx ve Engels? “Metaların ucuz fiyatları, tüm Çin Sedlerini temelden yıkacak, barbarların en inatçı yabancı düşmanlıklarını alt edecek ağır toplarıdır burjuvazinin.”

İşte artık tam da bu vaadin iflas ettiği bir döneme girmiş durumdayız. Modernliğin tarihindeki gerçekliği ne olursa olsun, paranın ilkel vahşeti alt edip (en kötü ihtimalle) yerine incelikli bir şiddeti ikame edeceği beklentisi artık gerçek dışı.

Soma katliamı beş sene önce yaşansaydı, birçoklarının çıkıp şu tür cümleler kurmaya yüzü olacaktı: “Evet, doğru, kapitalizm işçilere karşı görünmez bir şiddet uyguluyor olabilir. Ama bakın, aynı kapitalizm insanların önyargılarını yıkıyor. Memlekette her şeyin ölçüsü para haline geldikçe, modernlik öncesi ayrımlar sönümleniyor. 301 canla bedel ödüyor Türkiye ama, kalkınmanın da ötesinde, bütün ülke modernleşiyor. Dini ve laik katılıklardan vazgeçip ılımlı Müslümanlar haline geliyoruz hepimiz. Bu özgürleşme bölgeye de yayılıyor.” Beş sene önce “ortak aklı”, sağduyuyu oluşturan bu kalıp cümleler, artık kurulamaz. Zira sermaye birikiminin doruğa ulaştığı bu on üç yıl, aynı zamanda IŞİD’in zeminini de hazırlamış meğer. Türkiye en yoksul, sermayeden en uzak olduğu dönemde değil, paranın tuvalet taşlarının altından fışkırdığı bir dönemde IŞİD’e kucak açtı.

Üstelik Türkiye bu cürmünde yalnız değil. İddialara göre, Ortadoğu’nun finans devleri Suudi Arabistan ve Katar, “para getiren para” çarkından dolarlarını çekip, IŞİD’e akıttılar. Paranın uçsuz bucaksız görünen cennetine dalmış bu ülkeler, neden hızla bu noktaya savruldu?

Belki bu kadar paranın etrafta dolaşması “katı olan her şeyi buharlaştırdı.” Ancak buharlaşan geleneksel ve modern değerlerin yerini dünya tarihinde az görülen bir katılık doldurdu. Manevi dünya boşluk kabul etmiyor.

Ucuz mallar millet-mezhep seddini yıkamadı

Türkiye’de yaşanan süreci kabaca özetleyelim. Ülkemizde (paranın hakimiyetine rızayı sağlayan) “ılımlı İslam”ın tutmamasının arkasında (birbirinin içine geçmiş) ideolojik, ekonomik ve siyasi dinamikler var. Gidişat, (şu aralar moda olduğu üzere) ne Erdoğan’ın kişiliğine, ne de yönetenlerin on sene dikkatle sakladıkları “gerçek niyetleri”ne indirgenebilir. Nedir bu dinamikler?

Birincisi, liberal İslami tezler belki bazı dindar entellektüelleri ikna etti ama, kitlelerde heyecan uyandırmadı. Bu görüşler solun, ulusalcılığın ve radikal İslam’ın panzehiri olarak tüm anaakım güçler tarafından pompalanıyordu. “AB süreci” denilen masalın dinamosu, “ılımlı İslam”ın kök salacağı beklentisiydi. Fakat liberal İslam, tüm küresel ve yerel yatırımlara rağmen, kitlesel bir inanç haline gelemedi. O halde halkı ne bağlayacaktı AB sürecine, liberalleşmeye ve devlete? Metalaşmanın kendisi bir süre kitlesel coşku yarattı ancak, (kısmen büyümenin de yavaşlamasından) bunun da sınırlarına gelindi. Yönetenler de, manevi alanda doğan boşluğu kontrol edemeyecekleri bir ideolojiyle (selefilik sosuna bulanmış bir mezhepçilikle) tahkim etmeye giriştiler.

İkinci etmen, neo-Osmanlı projenin önce kendine gereğinden fazla güven kazanıp, sonra da çok çabuk duvara çarpması. Arap ayaklanmaları abartılı beklentilere yol açtı. 2011 dönemecinde yönetenler, zaten ihraç etmekte oldukları “Türk model”ini daha hızlı yayabileceklerini düşündüler. 2011’in hayali, ayaklanmaların Ak Parti benzeri yapıları her yerde iktidara getireceği; böylece Türkiye’nin “yumuşak gücü”nün patlama yaşayacağıydı. Muhafazakar burjuvazinin iş alanlarının katlanarak artacak olması da bu hesabın parçasıydı. Bu olmayınca beklentilerini mütevazi bir çerçeveye geri çekmek yerine, oyunu sürdürmeye çalıştılar. İmparatorluk hayallerinin zeminsiz kaldığını kabul etmek kolay değil. Fakat (bölgede müdahil olmakta ısrar ettikçe) Suudi Arabistan ve (Şiisiyle, Sünnisiyle) körfez ülkelerinin yerleştirmekte olduğu (mezhepçi) parametrelere yenik düştüler.

Sorun şu ki, Ak Parti ne içeride ne dışarıda selefi, cihadi, mezhepçi güçlerin hamisi olamaz. Olsa olsa takipçisi olur. Türkiye’nin bölgeye vaadi, liberalizm ile İslami muhafazakarlığın harmanlayabileceği idi. Ak Parti bunu kendi yapmayı bırakınca, özgüllüğünü kaybetti. Sünni cephenin sıradan bir neferi haline geldi.

Üçüncü olarak, bu bölgesel gelişmelere Türkiye’nin özel şartları eklenince, geri dönülemez bir yola girildi. “Nedir o özel şartlar” diye soracak olursanız, izninizle cevabı Türk-İslamcı basın versin: “Türkiye ‘Yurtta sulh cihanda sulh’ pısırıklığından uzak çıkarları doğrultusunda ne yapması gerekiyorsa onu yapmak zorundadır. Düşmanının düşmanı şimdilik dostundur. IŞİD, Türkiye’ye yönelik Kürt Devleti kurma heveslilerine karşı savaşıyorsa Türkiye ‘hayır bu örgütler dursun da ileride canımıza okusunlar’ diyemez.” (Nusret Çiçek, “Terörle İslam’ı bir arada ifade etme yanılgısı,” Akit, 8 Ekim 2014). “Kobani, yöre açısından oldukça stratejik öneme haiz bir yer, İslam’ın küfür dediği Kürtçülüğün merkezi burasıdır. IŞİD bu ilçeyi tamamen kontrolü altına alamadığı taktirde bilesiniz ki Türkiye’nin başı daha da derde girecek.” (Nusret Çiçek, “Güneydoğu kana bulanırken,” Akit, 9 Ekim 2014).

Sonuçta, nehirlerimizi zehirleyen, tarihimizi yıkan, işçilerimizi öldüren “ucuz meta” üreticileri, başımıza IŞİD çuvalını da geçirdi. Hülasa, paranın ütopyası fos çıktı. Her köşesinden ucuz meta akan bir memleketin medeniyete iki büyük katkısı oldu: dini imanı para olan rejimin meşru çocuğu Soma Holding ve gayri meşru çocuğu IŞİD.

[Bu makalenin orijinali BirGün’de yayımlandı.]


Roj Roja Rojava

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Kobanê’nin böylesi eşitsiz bir savaşta böylesi destansı bir direniş göstereceğini çok az kişi hesaplamıştı. Bugün daha da iyi anlaşıldığı üzere ittifakların ve hesapların yeniden düzenlendiği Ortadoğu’da halkların demokrasisi seçeneğini yükselten tek güç olan Kürt Özgürlük Hareketi’nin yenilgiye uğraması tüm hegemonik güçlerin işine gelecekti. IŞİD’in Kobanê’yi alması, Şengal ve Mahmur denklemini bozan HPG ve YPG güçlerinin kazandığı meşruiyetin aşınmasını sağlayacak ve bir kez daha Ortadoğu, batı kafasının Sünni, Şii, Kürt kategorilerine ve sınırlarına göre şekillenecekti.

Ama Kobanê direniyor. Kobanê tüm halklar adına, özgürlük adına, ev, yurt adına, irade adına, dünyadaki güzel her şey adına direniyor. Gün Kobanê’nin günüdür. Ve IŞİD şehre ulaşsa dahi Serêkaniyê’de El Nusra nasıl yenildiyse, Kobanê’de IŞİD de o şekilde yenilecektir. Gün halkların günüdür.

Kobanê’de savaş başladığında SAMER araştırma ekibi olarak Cizirê Kantonu’ndaydık. Amacımız inşa sürecini anlamaktı. Konuyla ilgili raporumuz bir ay içinde çıkacak.

Cizirê’de demokratik özerkliğin yarattığı mucizeyle karşılaştık. Eğitim, adalet, öz savunma, ekonomi ve cinsiyet ilişkilerinin kısacık bir zamanda halk gücüyle nasıl gerçek anlamlarına kavuştuğuna tanıklık ettik.

Rimelan’da görüşmeler yaptığımız kadın akademisinde ahlak, devlet, demokratik ulus, kadın özgürlüğü üzerine verilen derslerle halk bilgisinin buluşmasına dair hikayeler dinledik. ‘Devlet nedir?’ sorusuna, ‘Her gece koynuma aldığımdır’ diye cevap veren kadınları duyduk. Çocuklarını yanlarına alıp akademide onlarla kalan, ders gören ve halk meclislerinde göreve hazırlanan kadınlarla tanıştık.

Yine Rimelan’da asayiş okulunda verilen derslerin tamamının belkemiğini oluşturan şiddetsizlikle karşılaştık. Okulda en kıymet verilen bilgi devrimin intikam ve öfke duygularının yenilmemesi gerekecek kadat kıymetli olduğuydu. Türkiye’de uğruna yıllarca mücadele edilmiş sanık hakları ve sağlığı meseleleri, psikolojik baskının engellenmesi için gerekli düzenlemeler çoktan hayat bulmuştu. Üstelik hayal; bir gün halk özsavunmasının asayişi gereksiz kılacağı bir dünyaya kavuşmaktı.

Kamışlı’da kadın evinde (male jin) kadınlarla ilgili tüm sorunların, birkaç kadın tarafından üstelik tehditlere, şantajlara rağmen nasıl çözüldüğünü gördük. Cinayet, taciz, tecavüz, erken evlendirilme, çok eşlilik dahil olmak üzere kadınlara yönelen tüm şiddet biçimlerini kadınları esas alarak yaklaşan çok güçlü bir kadın dayanışmasına tanık olduk. Rojava’da komünlerden, meclislere her birliktelik içinde oluşturulmuş olan sulh komiteleri davaların neredeyse tamamını çözerek, devlet mahkemesini işlevsiz kılıyor. Adalet alanında da hayalleri savcı ve avukatların, hakim ve yargıçların fazlalık haline geldiği bir dünya.

Herkesin her şey olma potansiyelinin ortaya çıkarıldığı Rojava’da bu iki senelik süreçte deneye yanıla, değirmenler, yollar, hatta rafineri bile yapılmış. Devletten el konulan topraklar kooperatif şeklinde örgütlenmiş halka dağıtılıyor.

Kamışlı’da Mezopotamya Akademisi’nin üç bölümünü ziyaret ettik: Tarih ve sosyoloji, hukuk, dil. 9’ar aylık periyodlarla male jin ve mala gel’lere destek olabilecek, dil dersleri verebilecek ve halkın toplumsal sorunlarını çözebilecek gençlerin yetiştirildiği akademiler bunlar. Kaynak çok az. 80 yaşındaki bir ninenin halk destanlarını ve efsanelerini gençlere anlatarak “eğittiği” ve bilginin demokratikleştiği, hayatın inceliklerinin bilgi niteliğini koruduğu, okullar bunlar.

Asayişin, YPG, YPJ’nin, kadının, erkeğin, çocuğun her gün tekrar el sıkışarak selamlaştığı bir dünyada bir hafta yaşadık. Kobanê düşmez. Üstelik bütün bunlar şehitler toprağa verilirken yaşanıyor, yaşatılıyor. Devletin bir check point cürümüne indiği Cizirê Kantonu’nda Araplar, Süryaniler ve Kürtler kendilerini yeniden keşfediyor. Daha söyleyecek çok şey var. Şamir aşireti reisi kanton eşbaşkanının Öcalan’a selamı var. Zamanında dünyanın her yanındaki Kızılderililer, Aborjinler, aşiretler ve kabileleri bir araya getirerek uluslararası bir örgütlenmeye gitmeye çalışmış. Şimdi adına o da demokratik özerklik ve demokratik ulus diyor.

[Bu makalenin orijinali Özgür Gündem’de yayımlandı.]

Egypt’s Conservative Nationalism: Discourse and Praxis of the New Regime

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Egypt has been witnessing a tidal wave of conservative nationalism since June 30 and particularly as the new regime of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi takes hold. Conservative nationalism cuts across regime discourse on local politics, the economy, and foreign relations. The usage of the term discourse here goes beyond mere rhetoric that may refer to the employment of empty words and slogans in a way divorced from actual political practice. Conversely, discourse is an analytical tool that intimately links rhetoric with practice. It depicts how the new military-backed regime constitutes itself vis-à-vis its supporters as well as its rivals and how it perceives itself, both internally and externally.  As the term “regime” refers to power relationships between the state and society, self-identification and self-constitution are inherently communicative actions. The regime is defined and redefined continuously through actions and practices that reach out to the general populace and especially to its actual and potential constituencies.

Conservative nationalism is a complex and multifaceted discourse that is being produced by the Egyptian state and its allies. It is an interpretation of the long tradition of Egyptian nationalism that stretches back to the early twentieth century. This discourse is nationalist in being centered on saving and restoring the Egyptian state authority and sovereignty from chaos and external conspiracies. Meanwhile, it is conservative in being supportive of the reestablishment of the old paternalistic authoritarian state, the adoption of conservative fiscal and economic policies, and the absence of any substantial anti-colonial or anti-imperialist elements often associated with more traditional iterations of Egyptian nationalism.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Egyptian nationalism has been historically anti-colonial. It is hardly possible to understand the intellectual and political formation of contemporary Egyptian national identity pre- and post-1952 without close consideration of the struggle against British colonialism. This element continued through the 1950s and 1960s with more stress on anti-imperialism, Arab unity, and non-alignment in the context of the Cold War. Egyptian nationalism gave way for a more pronounced Pan-Arabism, which was no less anti-imperialist or anti-colonial and was more radical on socio-economic questions. Interestingly enough, Egyptian nationalism was brought back in the 1970s by Anwar Sadat as a means to justify the breakup with the Arab world in the wake of the broad opposition to the Camp David Accords with Israel. That was the first instance when Egyptian nationalism abandoned its anti-imperialist dimension. This was exacerbated by the peace treaty, which was coupled with significant foreign policy realignment in favor of Egypt’s admission into the Western bloc. Egyptian nationalism even began to garner anti-Arab sentiments. 

The recent wave of Egyptian nationalism seems very much in line with Sadat-era redefinition of nationalism, albeit with some differences. Current nationalism in Egypt combines Nasserist anti-Western undertones with explicitly anti-Islamist overtones. Here the local fight against the Brotherhood and Jihadi militant groups in Sinai is portrayed in terms of fighting and aborting a Western scheme aimed at dividing Egypt and embroiling it civil strife. This position gained credence by Western reticence to openly support the ouster of the Brotherhood-backed president in July 2013.

Both crisis and conspiracy have been integral components of conservative nationalism. On the one hand, the regime has developed a discourse centered on a sense of deep, prolonged, and multifaceted crisis on the national as well as regional levels. Long before his presidential candidacy, al-Sisi was open about how bad things are and how the Egyptian state has “nothing” (mafeesh in Egyptian dialect)financially speaking, to offer. He even referred to living under his rule in March 2014, in a talk before some military commanders as naar we aa’dhab (“fire and torture”) while tackling the necessity to remove subsidies. Many pro-regime talk-show presenters echoed this discourse by stressing the need to give to Egypt rather than to take from it.

Nationally, the crisis has been evident in the shortage of economic resources, marked by daily electricity outages, high unemployment, and depleted foreign reserves. Regionally, the broader context is marked by civil strife and sectarian war, namely in the conflicts in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq. Crisis-based discourse provides the government with a good justification to lower expectations in general and to project an image of stability against the backdrop of regional tumult. Al-Sisi’s continuous invocation of the slogan Misr lan tasqut (“Egypt will not fall”)often comes in juxtaposition with the situation in surrounding Arab countries where the state fell victim to various forms of civil strife.

The crisis discourse also conveniently lends itself well to conspiracy. The state’s official discourse—which is also expressed by its allies in the local media—often portrays Egypt as a “Noah’s arc” that is navigating through the dark and perilous waters of chaos induced by international conspiracies. For instance, in an August meeting with journalists, al-Sisi expressed his belief that Egypt and the region as a whole are a target of the “fourth generation wars” (H’urub al gil al rabe’). “Fourth generation wars” is the a term popularized by some counterrevolutionary writers and public figures in the aftermath of the 2011 revolt. It refers to wars that are no longer based on external aggression but rather on the instigation of internal conflict using international and social media, rumors, and other means. Of course, the Arab revolts of 2011 can be framed as falling under this category of wars.

Civil strife and sectarian wars in the region are seen as the result of some Western (predominantly American)–Zionist conspiracy aiming to destroy the social fabric of Arab societies and leading to the breakdown of Arab states. Local Islamists, ranging from the Brotherhood all the way to Jihadists passing through militant Shiite groups backed by Iran, are seen as mere instruments in instigating and perpetrating internal conflicts. 

The conspiracy discourse generally lacks coherence and often ends up with very unlikely allies as parties to the same conspiracy—such as Iran and Israel as collaborators, or the United States working alongside Hamas and Hezbollah. It also contradicts the facts on the ground where Hezbollah and Hamas are sworn enemies of Israel and the United States, while Egypt is actually the only party with official ties with the Hebrew state and the second largest recipient of United States military aid in the world. The same incoherence appears in the claim of fighting Islamist extremism while being closely allied to Saudi Arabia, the historic beacon of Wahhabism.

However, and despite its inconsistency and incoherence, the conspiracy discourse is generally helpful in making some sense of the social anomie and overwhelming chaos across the region. It is also instrumental in justifying the suppressive measures that the state (particularly its coercive apparatuses) has taken against the Muslim Brotherhood as well as other opponents and the effective preclusion of the political opening that initially started with the January 25 Revolution in 2011.

Economically, conservative nationalism invokes a nationalist rhetoric based on the need to sacrifice one’s economic gains for the sake of the nation. The state uses this rhetoric to justify fiscal restructuring in the form of subsidy cuts and more taxes, and hence imposing more pressure on the broad base of middle and poor social strata. The sacrifice-based and crisis-ridden discourses are mutually reinforcing. They enable al-Sisi to paradoxically combine a populist seemingly-Nasserist rhetoric with fiscal austerity, creating an odd mix of what can be labeled right-wing populism. Right-wing populism is a practice where the leadership bases its discourse on the glorification of the ordinary citizen and stresses national uniqueness and unity together with a strong sense of belonging while downplaying income redistribution and economic needs. 

Politically, this stripe of nationalism is equally conservative as it largely serves the counterrevolutionary stance aimed at containing the January revolution and the reestablishment of the authoritarian paternalistic state. It is basically antagonistic to political and social change at large. Instead, it practically yearns for the reproduction of some viable version of authoritarianism be it that of Mubarak for some or ideally that of Nasser for others.

Yet, conservative nationalism has its own limitations. Whereas it may prove to be a valuable tool for the newly-established regime in the short-term, it is not likely to furnish a strong ideological platform adequate enough for the longer-term process of reestablishing political authority and regaining legitimacy. Yet, that does not imply that the new military-backed regime is going to be short-lived or that it will lose its relevance to internal and external sponsors. To the contrary, it may well persist into the future. However, that would happen without overcoming the legitimacy crisis from which the Egyptian state has been suffering for decades and that culminated in the January 25 revolution and the political turmoil that followed it. 

On the one hand, conservative Egyptian nationalism cannot feed for too long on solely anti-Islamist overtones or anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian undertones. It will prove more and more difficult to claim its descent from earlier, more established and more legitimate historical versions of Egyptian nationalism that have been essentially anti-imperialist. Any future regional role for Egypt in fighting terrorism or Islamist militancy will assume some partnership if not a full-fledged alliance with the NATO as is the case with the alliance fighting ISIS and the Egyptian attempts to extend the global war on terror to Libya.

On the other hand, conservative nationalism has hardly any social progressive content. Unlike Nasserism of the 1950s and 1960s for instance, the current version of conservative nationalism is at its heart pro-capitalist and in harmony with neo-liberalism. This limits any serious restructuring of the socio-economic model and thus precludes social mobility or income redistribution as a means to cultivate support bases. It can at best serve the immediate needs for economic recovery and political stabilization. Politically, conservative nationalism can justify more draconian measures and continuous repression against opponents. Economically, and in parallel, it may justify the need for economic austerity by framing such reforms as national sacrifice. However, it can barely constitute a set of sustained policies, practices, and meanings on which to rebuild state authority in post-revolutionary Egypt. Again, the current political setting may prove resilient and may linger for years against many odds. However, that may be a recipe for a prolonged and protracted socio-political crisis at the same time. What is important here is whether or not the new military-backed regime would be successful in cultivating a broad social alliance that may overcome the legitimacy crisis that once led to the recent political turmoil. Conservative nationalism does not seem to serve that end.  

[The author would like to express his gratitude to Yasser El-Shimy and Dina El-Khawaga for their invaluable ideas and suggestions.]

Suphi Nejat Agirnasli’nin Anisina

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Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı’nın Anısına

Dostumuz, yoldaşımız, meslekdaşımız sosyolog, çevirmen, yazar, devrimci Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı’yı 5 Ekim 2014 günü Kobane’de Marksist Leninist Komünist Parti Türkiye/ Kuzey Kürdistan (MLKP) saflarında kaybettik. Hepimizin başı sağolsun, ışıklar içinde uyusun.

Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı, 22 Eylül 1984 doğumlu. Siyasi mülteci olan ailesinin durumu dolayısıyla Nejat, çok küçük yaştan itibaren uzun yıllar Almanya’da yaşadı. Almanya’da girdiği üniversite sınavında çok yüksek derece almasına rağmen üniversiteyi Türkiye’de okumak istedi. Marmara Üniversitesi’nin Göztepe Kampüsü’ndeki Sosyoloji bölümüne yerleşti, ancak benzeri bu sene de tekrarlanan faşist baskı ve saldırılar dolayısıyla Marmara’dan ayrıldı; bölümünde derece yaparak Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü’ne geçiş yapma hakkı kazandı. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü’nde lisans ve yüksek lisans derecelerini tamamlayan Nejat, tezini Tuzla tersanelerindeki işçi cinayetleri üzerine yazdı. Aynı zamanda iyi bir grafiker olan ve bir kaç web tasarım dili bilen Nejat, üniversite yılları boyunca Boğaziçi öğrencilerinin düzenlediği bir çok eylem için afişler hazırladı.

2011’de Nejat’ın KCK operasyonu kapsamında gözaltına alınması, ders programı ve notları dahil çalışmalarının “örgütsel doküman” olarak delil gösterilmesi üzerine Boğaziçi Üniversitesi öğrencileri, “Foucault da Yargılansın!” başlıklı bir bildiri yayımlamışlardı. Takibinde Bianet’e konuşan Nejat: “Ben sosyalistim. Bu kimliğimle de tanınırım. Ben Kürt meselesinde duyarlı bir insanım ama esas mesele bu değil. "Türkiye'de bazı toplumsal meselelere ister entelektüel anlamda olsun ister siyasi anlamda olsun, yakınlık duyuyorsanız size böyle davranılır"ın mesajıdır benim yaşadıklarım.Türkiye'de sosyalist, özgürlükçü insanlarla Kürtlerin ilişkilenmesi, entelektüel düzeyde de olsa siyasi düzeyde de olsa, bir cadı avıyla karşılanıyor” demişti. Nejat’a bu kapsamda açılan dava halen devam ediyor.

Nuran Ağırnaslı’nın oğlu Nejat’ın dedesi Niyazi Ağırnaslı, Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP) üyesi olarak 1961-1966 yılları arasında Cumhuriyet Senatosu’nda görev yaptı. Niyazi Ağırnaslı 12 Mart 1971 darbesinde yargılanarak 6 Mayıs 1972’de idam edilen devrimci öğrenciler Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan ve Hüseyin İnan’ın avukatları arasında yer alıyordu. Nejat’ın babası Hikmet Acun, Boğaziçili arkadaşlarının Hikmet Abi’si, Nejat’ın ölümü üzerine, “Oğlumu, yoldaşımı, kardeşimi, Nejat’ı Kobane’de kaybettim. Önünde çok parlak başka hayatlar varken o, devrimci dayanışmayı seçti. Sözünde durdu. Beni yanıltmadı. Bir parçam olduğunu bana hediye etti. Her acı büyüktür, tekrar yoktur. Onun önünde saygı ile eğiliyorum" dedi.

Nejat’ın taşıdığı bütün isimler Türkiye’nin ezilen halklarının mücadelesine işaret ediyor. Kendisine seçtiği kod adı “Paramaz Kızılbaş,” 1915 yılında İttihat ve Terakki yönetimi tarafından idam edilen Ermeni sosyalist Madteos Sarkisyan ile Türkiye Alevileri’ne bir ithaf. “Suphi Nejat” ismi ise 1920 yılında kurulan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’nin ilk merkez komite başkanı olan Mustafa Suphi ve parti sekreteri Ethem Nejat’tan geliyor. 

Emek mücadelesinin içinde yer alan ve hayatını çeviri yaparak kazanan Nejat, 2012’de Bianet için “Freelance Çalışanlar Örgütlenebilir Mi?” başlığı altında bir yazı yazmıştı. Yazıda giderek yaygınlaşan esnek ve güvencesiz çalışma koşullarına dikkat çekiyor, "Bir sendika hayal edelim, sendika olmasın; bir kooperatif/kollektif hayal edelim sadece ekonomik bir paylaşım olmasın; dışı şirket ama içi ortak zenginliğimiz olan alanlar düşünelim ama şirket olmasın" diyerek farklı örgütlenme biçimlerinin önemine işaret ediyordu. Nejat’ın 2013 yılında yazdığı “Menkıbe” adlı “mevcut, menkul, ve müşterek komünizmde ısrar beyanı”na burdan ulaşılabiliyor. Nejat’ın Osmanlı ve Türkiye solu tarihine dair bilgisi, dünyadaki sol literatüre hakimiyeti, ve bu çerçeveden günümüz soluna getirdiği eleştirilerin derinliği yazarı olduğu Fraksiyon.org’da yayımlanan Cadı Kazanı’nda Kaynayan Günahlar adlı yazısında izlenebilir. Pazar gününden beri sosyal medyada beliren ve #SuphiNejatAğırnaslı hashtag’iyle takip edilebilen taziye ve anma mesajlarında, yine bu yazının son cümlelerinde geçen “müşterek olana iştirak edenlerin de cemali değil ceme kattıkları can önemli olur” sözüyle anılıyor Nejat.

Nejat’ın çevirdiği kitapların listesini Bianetşöyle sıralıyor: Biz Anonymous'uz (Paloma Yayınevi), Tarihin Yapıları Tarihsel Materyalizme Giriş (Yordam Kitap), Para-Şüt (Optimis Yayın Dağıtım), Ters Yüz Et (Optimis Yayın Dağıtım), Düşük Bütçeli Filmler (Kalkedon Yayıncılık), L. Auguste Blanqui'nin Devrimci Teorileri (Otonom Yayıncılık). Beraber çalıştığı yayınevlerinin bir kısmı da Pazar günü Twitter hesaplarından taziye mesajları yayımladı.

Bugün ailesi, dostları, yoldaşları, meslekdaşları Nejat’ı anıyor. Halkların Demokratik Partisi’nin çağrısı ile Nejat için Kadıköy’de taziye çadırı açıldı. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi’nde de taziye çadırı kuruldu, Kuzey Meydan’a Nejat’ın ismi verildi.

YPG Basın Merkezi Nejat’ın ölümüne dair yaptığı 13 Ekim 2014 tarihli yazılı açıklamada, “Halklarımızın özgür geleceğini inşa etmek için Kobanê'de yürütülen görkemli direnişe omuz veren Paramaz Kızılbaş yoldaş, halklarımızın düşmanı vahşi DAIŞ çetelerine karşı yürüttüğü onurlu mücadelede ölümsüzleşmiştir” derken, MLKP de “Ömrünü, 30. yılında, faşist DAİŞ'e karşı savaşmak, sömürgeci bölge devletlerinin ve emperyalistlerin özgürlük iradesini kırma planlarına barikat olmak için Paramaz Kızılbaş adıyla yer aldığı Kobanê devrimci mevzilerinde bayraklaştırdı. YPG'li yurtsever yoldaşlarımızın kurduğu savaş siperlerine adım atarken seçtiği isim, Suphi Nejat yoldaşın düşünce ve duygu dünyası için yeterince fikir vericidir. Kobanê gönüllüsü olma kararı ve ölümü yenme pratiği bunun en berrak ifadesi oldu” şeklinde açıklamada bulundu.

Nejat’ın ölüm haberinin ardından, 2011’deki KCK davası sırasında ekşi sözlük’te “nejat ağırnaslı” adı altında açılan başlıkta sevdikleri anılarını paylaşıyorlar. Bu paylaşımlardan biri, yaşarken kendisini yakından veya uzaktan tanıyan bir çoğumuzun duygularına ve düşüncelerine tercüman oluyor: “nejat hiç birimizden daha az kıymetli değildi. fersah fersah ilerimizdeydi hatta. hayatını ortaya koydu tüm bilgeliği ve sadeliğiyle. bizim yapamadığımızı yaptı. nejat kobani'den başıyla selamladı bizi, gülümsedi, r'leri söyleyemeyen çocuk sesiyle bir slogan çaktı uzaktan... nejat bizi ağlattı. iyi ki de ağlattı, insan olduğumuzu hatırlattı.”

Nejat bizim için değerli olduğu kadar, bu savaşta Rojava’da, Kürdistan’da, Türkiye’de kaybettiklerimizden sadece bir tanesi. Nejat gibi ismini, tarihini, hikayesini bilmediğimiz, hayatlarına değemediğiz bir çokları var. Nejat’ın kaybı, onun değdiği, uğruna savaştığı, beraber çarpıştığı hayatları anmamıza da, bilmediğimiz hikayelerin anlatılamamasının temelinde yatan adaletsizliği hatırlamamıza da bir kapı açıyor.

Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı ölümsüzdür! Nurlar içinde yatsın.

Diğer kaynaklarda Nejat’a dair yazılanlar:

Etkin Haber Ajansı: Paramaz’dan Suphi Nejat’a

Bianet: Sosyolog Nejat Ağırnaslı Kobanê'de Hayatını Kaybetti

Ekşi Sözlük: Nejat Ağırnaslı

Jiyan: Nejat Ağırnaslı’nın Ardından…

MLKP: Kobane Savaşçısı Suphi Nejat Yoldaş Ölümsüzdür!

BirGün: Boğaziçi Öğrencisi Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı Kobane’de Yaşamını Yitirdi

YPG: Paramaz yoldaş Kobanê direnişine güç kattı (ANF)

2011 Özgür Gündem eylemi (Video)

Siyasihaber.org: MLKP savaşçısı Nejat Ağırnaslı Kobane’de yaşamını yitirdi

Fraksiyon.org: Kobane’den Cem’e Can Katan Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı

A Politics of Hope: A Tribute to Brief Lives at a Time of Perpetual Death

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Sara Khatib died on 5 September. The last time I saw Sara, she was lying in a hospital bed, surrounded by a worried and loving grandmother, a selfless mother camouflaging her sense of helplessness with a comforting smile, and an older sister who was silently battling a feeling of impending tragedy. Sara had undergone surgery to remove a recurrent tumor in her arm. A post-operation infection had brought her back to the hospital where doctors were unable to diagnose the cause of infection.  Less than a year later, Sara died of cancer. She was twenty-two. Approximately two weeks before her passing, she gave a speech at a Tedx event at the Lebanese American University where she shared four lessons she learnt from living with a painful disease. She ended her talk with a call, and a promise, to create a support group for amputees in Lebanon. Sara’s right arm had been amputated shortly after her diagnosis. Hers was a sober, humorous, and excruciatingly hopeful account of living with disease. It was about everyday resistance to pain–both physical and psychic–as well as the tactics of living with disability. It was also a future-oriented account of what needs to be done to make such a life less exceptional and more livable.

Bassem Chit died of a heart attack on 1 October. On that day, Bassem was supposed to deliver a lecture on the Marxist analysis of social classes in Lebanon to a group of students at the American University of Beirut. He did not show up to class and his body was later found on the floor of his Furn al-Shubbak apartment. Bassem was a revolutionary Marxist and co-founder of the Socialist Forum in Lebanon. His published articles and essays, in English and Arabic, reveal a complex and grounded theoretical grasp of power and the mechanics of domination. Though only thirty-four, Bassem was a fine thinker and a prolific writer whose future theoretical and political contributions were highly anticipated by those who knew him. This was a common belief that was expressed in the many eulogies published since his passing. Bassem’s friends and comrades are mourning the past, but also a future that they now know will never be. And perhaps this is the most tragic element of Bassem’s death: the realization that there is, indeed, no future. In the words of his close friend and comrade, “There is no other life, no encounter, no goodbye, no greeting, and no extensive discussion between us. Nothing but this futility that we have tried to change, and that we always will.” 

Senseless Loss

How do we deal with senseless loss? Indeed, are there losses that make sense? How do we deal with loss at a time where everything seems to have been lost already: nations, revolutions, hope. At a time of perpetual war, of spectacular mass death, how do we mourn those who die because their hearts simply stop?

The unspectacular, private deaths of Sara and Bassem have decidedly different publics. But both are stamped by the optimism that characterized their brief lives. Faced with knowledge of her imminent passing, Sara decided to make the imminence of her death public. She wanted to share the meaning of her experience with others, to leave a trace that would outlive her material body. Her talk, now available in an online video, preserves her memory and gives meaning to her death. It therefore also renders our loss less senseless. Sara passionately wanted the ones who loved her, and the millions of strangers she would never meet, to learn something about living with, despite, pain. With the little time she knew she had, she wanted to make disability an issue of public concern.    

But Sara knew what Bassem did not. His was an unexpected and sudden death. As a public intellectual, however, his trace could be found in his many published fragments and essays, and perhaps most notably in the monthly magazine he helped launch, Permanent Revolution. Bassem's passing, the way he is being mourned and remembered by those who loved, thought, worked, and protested with him, captures a glimpse—and promise—of alternative lifeworlds at a time of counter-revolution. The local and global network of leftist individuals and collectives that has materialized online since the news of his death gives hope. And perhaps this is why his untimely death is itself an act of optimism, as it reveals, through his disappearance, all those who are still here.

How do we deal with senseless loss? We start by giving it meaning, understanding the sense that has been inscribed onto those brief lives at the moment of death. Loss is productive when it creates publics. But this is as far as Sara and Bassem can take us. Now, we are on our own. Now, it is up to us to take the meaning and allow it to move us, change us. Allow ourselves to be transformed by it. To recognize that we are not the same, and that we will never be.

A Public of Death

What has prompted this joint tribute to two very different individuals is a realization that we have become a public of death. The “we” here is highly specific yet heterogeneous and differentiated. It is highly specific to a time and place: An imagined contemporary Arab geography that is being transformed by state-managed, militant-perpetrated, disease-caused, and naturally-occurring deaths. The feelings of helplessness and hopelessness in the face of such a colossal force of destruction transforming our region are compounded by the individual, unspectacular losses of those we love. Are we doomed to be the witnesses as everything falls apart?

I look for a politics of hope that emanates from loss, both individual and collective.

Hope, to be sure, is not something to be found. Rather, it is something that emerges through the very act of searching. Hope resides in the search for alternatives, and is not in itself the alternative. We must look for alternative forms of embodiment, alternative intimacies, alternative collectivities, and alternative lifeworlds because what we have now is not enough. In Bassem’s words, “It is a comprehensive and ongoing struggle for a better world to live in . . . and we will live in it!” I like to think that this is the common legacy of Sara and Bassem: a tireless will to change their respective realities. Is this not a politics of hope?      

رحلتي إلى الراب والسياسة والسجن

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 لماذا "الراب المحابسي"؟ لماذا لا أترك الموسيقى بعد أن تم حبسي ثلث مرات؟ أي دور يلعب الراب فيالدفاع عن المجتمع ضد من يحكمونه بالفساد والاستغلال؟

سأخبركم قصة قصيرة. في صيف ٢٠٠٧ حينما كنت في العشرين من عمري، بدأت في أخذ الراب على محمل الجد وذلك بتأسيس فرقة أسميناها “عكاشة فاميلي." اخترنا حينها المقاومة والراب، مقررين نشر أغنية لنا على اليوتيوب نتداولها بين أصدقائنا. أغنية "عطيني حقي" نجحت وقدمنا عرضنا الأول. لم يعرف منظمو الحفل محتوى الأغاني قبل الحفل. صدم الجمهور بكلمات - الكلمات التي تعبر عن همومهم- أول أغنية راب في المغرب تتحدث عن حقوقهم ومقاومة السلطات وتجاوز الخطوط الحمراء. 

بعد بدء الحفل، جاء أحد المنظمين إلى الخشبة وطلب منا إنهاء الحفل ثم بدأ في مجادلتنا. 

“من أنتم؟ من أنتم؟" سألنا عدة مرات. بعد التحقيق معنا تركنا نتساءل فيما بيننا "هل نمثل خطراً كبيراً على السلطات فقط لأننا نقول الحقيقة؟"

طبعاً. 

كان هنالك سؤال واحد علينا الاجابة عليه في تلك اللحظة: هل سنقف مع الناس أم مع الدولة؟ لكننا احتجنا لأن نفهم أيضاً: لماذا اخترنا الراب لهذه القضية؟ وأي أسلوب من الراب؟

الراب والسياسة

بينما كنت أتعلم عن الراب والسياسة – والسجن خير مكان للتعلم – فهمت أربع نقاط يجب علي التركيز عليها كمغني راب وناشط. 

مع مرور الوقت وإصدار الأغاني بشكل منفرد أو بالتعاون مع آخرين، استطعت أن أرى بنفسي قدرة الراب على الوصول للشباب والتأثير فيهم، وقوة هذا الفن على الانتشار بين هذه الشريحة. رغم التعتيم الإعلامي والإقصاء والرقابة الممارسة ضدنا، شعرنا بقوة الراب وكلمات الحرية وقدرتها على التصدي للأنظمة القمعية.

أصبحت خطراً على النظام، على حماة السلطة. هذا الطريق، بالطبع، قادني إلى السجن، وفي كل مرة يطلق سراحي، يسألني الناس ذات السؤال: “هل ستكمل مسيرتك؟ هل ستتغير كلمات أغانيك؟"

أعترف أنني سألت نفسي: هل هذا الطريق الأفضل؟ هل أستمر في هذا الطريق أم أبيع مبادئي وكرامتي، وأسير خلف القطيع مطأطئاً رأسي للسلطان لأحصل على رضاه مثل مغنيي راب آخرين؟ قد أصل بذلك إلى الجوائز والشهرة إلا أنني لا أرى نفسي عبداً يطبل للحاكم، باحثاً عن رضاه بابتسامة. اخترت الموسيقى كسلاح لقول الحقيقة لأكبر قدر من الناس، ولن أتخلي عن ذلك من أجل أي شخص أو شيء.

الراب والدولة

الدولة المغربية لم تأبه لالراب كثيراً حين انطلق في ١٩٩٤، معتبرة إياه مجرد موجة عابرة. منذ البداية وحتى ٢٠٠١، لم يكن هناك الكثير من الفاعلين في هذا الفن إلا أن الأغاني تحدثت عن قضايا ومواضيع تهم الشباب مثل البطالة وإدمان المخدرات وأشكال التهميش.

مع نمو المشهد، فهمت الدولة أن الراب خطير مما جعل مؤسساتها تبدأ بخلق ودعم مهرجانات للسيطرة على هذا الفن. بما أن أغلب الفنانين غير مهتمين بمواجهة السلطة أو الحفاظ على الشخصية الثورية للراب المتمرد فقد كانت مهمة الدولة سهلة. 

بالتالي فإن المسؤولية ملقاة على القليل منا ممن اختاروا قول الحقيقة في فنهم بشجاعة مثل تلك التي أشعلت الثورات العربية قبل سنوات. 

في ٢٠٠٧، بدأ نوع جديد من الراب بالانتشار، بجهود بعض الفرق تحدثت عن قضايا اجتماعية أكثر منها سياسية. كان هذا النوع أصيلاً لا يقلد غيره. تلك الأفكار الخطيرة التي جعلت السلطات ترغب بإسكاتنا ووضعنا في سجن كبير للأفكار والحريات. 

ولادة راب السجن

أسمينا فننا "الراب المحابسي" أي (راب السجن) – نعبر فيه عن الواقع ونغني عن الحرية وتحطيم القيود وتجاوز الحدود. علينا أن نعي قوة راب السجن في مشهد فني يغلب عليه المتلونون وطبالو السلطة. بإمكاننا عد مغني الراب المسّيسين في المغرب على اليد الواحدة. إلا أن العدد الصغير يجعل موسيقانا أقوى بكثير. لقد منح السجن الفكري والثقافي المزيد من القوة لموسيقانا، لكن الدولة لا تعي هذا. 

من خلال تصوير واقع المجتمع بصراحة كاملة، يلعب الراب المقاوم دوراً مهماً في خلق مساحة للنقد وتقديم رؤية مغايرة. من دون قوة النقد، لا يمكن للناس أن يتقدموا. كلنا نعلم أن الحقوق لا تمنح بل تؤخذ. 

لذا أقول بأنه من واجبنا كحركة مقاومة جدية، والفنانين العاملين فيها، أن نحاول تعليم وتنوير الناس. بينما نشهد انتشار الراب السياسي بعد الثورات العربية، نجد أن مستوى الحريات تراجع حيث تستمر الدولة في قمعها لنقادها بقسوة متزايدة. 

لذلك تريد الدولة اليوم أن تحبسني مرة أخرى لأنني أعبر عن الغضب الذي نحس به تجاه قمعها ولأنني أتحدث عن قضايا حساسة جداً في موسيقاي. هذا يجعل مني شخصاً خطيراً، ففي هذه الدولة النامية مثل بلادنا، أي شخص يتجاوز الخطوط الحمراء يعتبر خطيراً. 

لم يغيرني السجن أبداً. بل على العكس، منحني المزيد من الوقت في عزلة لأتأمل وأطور أفكاري، أقرأ المزيد من الكتب وألتقي بمحبي في السجن الذين يمنحوني الكثير من الأمل. في ذات الوقت، علمتني تجربة السجن أن الكلمات التي أغنيها يجب أن تكون مفهومة، خاصة في وجود هيمنة الدولة على الإعلام. 

في النهاية، مازلت مؤمناً بأن "الراب المحابسي" سيساعد جيلي وكل المغاربة على الاقتراب من الحرية. ومن أجل ذلك، سأدفع أي ثمن تفرضه علي السلطة.

 

[نشر هذا المقال سابقا على موقع "الجزيرة" باللغة الإنجليزية.]

 

[الحاقد ـ والوووا]

 

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