[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.] 

Regional and International Relations:

Egypt: Rebranding Sisi
John Bell writes,“al-Sisi has skilfully repositioned himself as a strategic pillar in the Middle East—how long can he keep it up?”

What’s Happening with Suspended Military Aid for Egypt? Part I
Amy Hawthorne argues the United States’ military aid suspension to Egypt did not lead to democratic reforms in the country. 

US Sending Long-Awaited Apaches to Egypt
Mada Masr reports, “Spokesperson for the United States State Department Jen Psaki said on Thursday that the United States is in the process of sending the promised Apache helicopters to Egypt.”

Egypt Warplanes Hit Libya Militias, Officials Say
Maggie Michael and Omar al-Mosmari report that Egyptian warplanes bombed Islamists militias’ positions in Libya, yet officials’ statements deny the country’s involvement in the airstrike campaign in the country.

The Lie Behind the Gaza Reconstruction Conference
Ricard Gonzalez writes on the lack of transparency in the Gaza Reconstruction Conference held in Cairo last Sunday. 

Irrigation Minister: Why We Should Revisit the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
Egypt’s Irrigation Minister Hossam Moghazy highlights the importance of the tripartite committee; including Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia to discuss the Renaissance Dam. 

Student Protests:

New Student Coalition Demands More Freedom and Rights
Adham Youssef writes on Egypt’s Student Coalition (ESC) a new student coalition formed last week following the violent dispersal of the student protests on the first day of the academic year. 

Factbox: Egypt's Student Protests
Shiyun Lu writes a comprehensive piece on the developments of student protests on university campuses.

Egypt: Security Forces Use Excessive Force to Crush Student Protests
Amnesty International releases a statement accusing the security forces of using ‘excessive force’ as a means to disperse student protests.

The Students Are Back Indeed
Zeinobia details the Islamists and non-Islamists student protests on university campuses against the regime and the private security firm ‘Falcon’ with a reference to the late dissident musician Sheikh Emam and poet Ahmed Fouad Nagm’s song “The Students Are Back,”  which praises the student movement in 1970s.

The Falcons on Campus
Reem Khorshid describes the security procedures on Cairo University campus on the first day of the academic year.

Egyptian Students Behind Bars as Classes Resume
Muhamma Ghamrawy sheds light on students who have been imprisoned by the security forces for protesting or supporting the Muslim Brotherhood on university campuses since the 2013 academic year. 

Human Rights and Rule of Law:

Egypt’s NGO Laws Continue to Threaten Civil Society
Ahmed Naje writes on the ramifications of the restrictive NGOs laws on Egypt’s civil society.

In Egypt, An Authoritarian Regime Holds Sway Again
Adhaf Soueif argues, “Egypt is commandeering every resource to establish control over the country–with more to come.”

On Hunger Strikes: A Brief Background
Mada Masr writes briefs on hunger strikers imprisoned in Egypt and elsewhere around the world.

Hunger Striker Soltan Ordered to Return to Prison from Hospital
Ahram Online reports that the trial of hunger striker Mohamed Soltan adjourned to 22 October 2014.

Egypt Arrests Around 200 Illegal Migrants Near Libya
A total of 196 illegal immigrants arrested for being present in an “off-limits military area” at the Egyptian-Libyan borders. 

Parliamentary Elections:

Military Officer Takes Charge as First Secretary-General of Egypt's Parliament
Gamal Essam El-Din writes on the appointment of army major general Khaled Abdelsallam al-Sadr as secretary-general of Egypt’s parliament—making him the first man from the military to hold this post.

Reports and Opinions:

Between the Ranks
Passant Rabie argues, “The recent prosecution of policemen raises questions over the regime’s intentions regarding the police forces’ lower ranks.”

Did Al Jazeera Uphold its Responsibility to its Staff?
Mohannad Sabry writes an investigative report revealing that Al Jazeera failed to protect its employees in Egypt despite warnings from journalists and lawyers to top representatives of the news channel.

UPDATE - Six Security Personnel Killed in Arish Explosion–Armed Forces
Aswat Masriya reports that an explosion went off near a security convoy in Sinai’s al-Arish killing six security officers and injuring five.

Foreign Ministry Accuses Carter Center of Lies, Double Standards
Mada Masr reports on the Egyptian foreign ministry’s reaction to the Carter Center’s decision to permanently close their Cairo office.  

The Left of the Arab World
Jano Charbel writes on the “Contemporary Leftist Politics in the Arab World” Conference held in Tunisia, highlighting a panel discussion on the underlying causes that led leftist-leaning groups to support al-Sisi in the presidential elections.

Street Graffiti from Spain to the Arab World
Muftah writes on the common factors street art has from Spain to various Arab states including Egypt, especially following the January 25 Revolution. The article refers to documentaries produced, videos made, and articles written on the topic of street graffiti in the region and beyond. 

Digital Demands from Children in Egypt & Around the World
Erin Kilbride writes on the paradox of the developing countries’ restrictive and monitoring tactics imposed on digital activities and the diffusion of Internet usage among younger generations in Egypt and elsewhere around the world.  

Egypt Army Arrests Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis Leader: Sources
Ahram Online: “The leader of the military wing of Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis, the Sinai-based militant group, has been arrested according to an official source.”

BOOK: Workers and the Egyptian Revolution
3arabawy links to a co-authorized book by Anne Alexander and Mostafa Bassiouny entitled: “Workers and the Egyptian Revolution,” which focuses on the significant role organized workers played in the Egyptian January 25 Revolution.

UAE Company to Cement Deal for One Million Egyptian Homes
Mada Masr reports that the United Arab Emirates’ Arabtec Company to commence building affordable housing units by the end of this year.

Signs of Rebound in Egypt’s Tourism Sector
Robert Tashima presents quantitative analysis reflecting signs of improvement in the tourism sector and foreign investment.

In Arabic

القوى المدنيّة وجنرالات الجيش المصريّ يمنحان الإسلاميّين الأغلبيّة في البرلمان المقبل
Rami Galal writes, “As Egypt gears up for parliamentary elections, many fear that former generals will be elected to consolidate President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's power.” This article is translated and published in English.

 كيف وصف البنك الدولي أحوال المصريين
Mohamed Gad reviews the World Bank’s report on Egypt’s economy.

معايير مؤسسة التمويل الدولية.. حبر على ورق
The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights releases a study entitled: “International Finance Institution and the Enforcement of Standards for Environmental and Social Sustainability,” revealing that the private financing company International Finance Corporation (IFC) has committed several violations against labor rights and environmental laws despite its obligations to guarantee labor rights and protect the environment. Click here to read a summary of this study in English. 

حرية الفكر والتعبير: القبض على 195 طالب جامعي منذ بدء العام الدراسي
Mada Masr: 195 students arrested since the beginning of the academic year, according to the Association of Freedom of Thought and Expression.  

حكايا الثورة والجامعة
Mai Shams El-Din reflects on student protests’ imitation of revolutionary movements outside university campuses.

خارطة طريق عاجلة لحل أزمة الجامعات
Mohamed Abdelsalam lists six recommendations to solve the student protest crisis on Egypt’s university campuses.

أزمة الجامعات بين الاحتواء والمواجهة
Fahmy Huwaidy suggests several reconciliatory means to contain student protests on university campuses.

مجلس الوزراء يقرر تنفيذ حكم قضائي بحظر أنشطة "تحالف دعم الشرعية"
Cabinet to implement court ruling banning National Alliance to Support Legitimacy--a Muslim Brotherhood-led alliance launched in opposition to the June 2013 anti-Morsi protests. Click here to read the report in English.

ندرة المياه والعائد الاقتصاديّ قد يعيقان خطّة الدولة المصريّة لزراعة 4 ملايين فدّان
Aya Aman writes, “Egypt plans to cultivate four million acres of strategic crops for its large population, but water scarcity and a lack of funds raise doubts about its feasibility.” This article is translated and published in English.

Recently on Jadaliyya Egypt

Hassan Khan in Conversation with Mohamed Abdelkarim
Medrar TV invites Egyptian artists and filmmaker Mohamed Abdelkarim to discuss with Hassan Khan videos, sculpture, sound, photography, and text-based works, as well as Khan’s source of inspiration.   

Egypt’s Conservative Nationalism: Discourse and Praxis of the New Regime
Amr Adly analyzes and dissects Egypt’s conservative nationalist rhetoric politically, economically, and socially. He argues that it may lead to long-lasting socio-political crises. 

Hashem L Kelesh
Medrar TV produces a video on Egyptian visual artist and musician Hashem L Kelesh offering insights on his artistic process and highlighting the musicians and artists’ community’s preference of online platforms compared to physical spaces.

Edmund Burke III, The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2014.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book? 

Edmund Burke III (EB): Ever since my first book, Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Pre-colonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912 (1976), I had wanted to write a book about the role of French ethnography in the establishment of the Moroccan protectorate. Unfortunately my career did not go as planned, and my research interests moved on to a series of other subjects. Nonetheless, I continued to write about the French sociology of Islam over the intervening years.

I have written The Ethnographic State because I am convinced that the debate over orientalism has more to teach us, and that the way forward lies in the analysis of its inscription in the multiple historical contexts in which it flourished. The Moroccan materials are notable not only for the rich documentation they provide of pre-colonial society, but also because they allow us to see the gaps and silences, the wrinkles in the discursive force field, the continual struggles within French society and among French observers over how best to represent Moroccan realities.

My book makes two important claims. On one level, it argues that the creation of the Moroccan colonial archive was a substantial, if little-known, sociological achievement. The most complete inventory of a Muslim society undertaken by a European state, the Moroccan colonial archive provided a comprehensive survey of Moroccan society, group by group, city by city, institution by institution. At its best, the Moroccan colonial archive was notable both for the rapidity with which it had been assembled (1900-1918) as well as for its interpretive understanding of Moroccan society. In this, it challenges current understandings of the relationship of culture and power, even as it ultimately confirms them.

Second, I argue that the Moroccan colonial archive legitimized the French protectorate, while also providing the model for the protectorate government. In the diplomatic struggle known as “the Moroccan Question,” France argued that it alone possessed the expert knowledge of Moroccan society that qualified it to colonize Morocco. In this way, the Moroccan colonial archive provided the symbolic capital that enabled France to assert its intellectual authority over its European rivals. But this was not all. The book goes on to examine the successive instantiations of Moroccan Islam in the conquest and governing of Morocco.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does it address?

EB: Morocco, alone among Muslim countries, is today known for its national form of Islam. My book suggests Moroccan Islam was the collective product of a generation of French scholars and amateur ethnologists, who between 1900 and 1925 invented a new field called “Ethnographic Morocco,” and a new object of study, “Moroccan Islam.”

The Ethnographic State tells three over-lapping stories. First, through a detailed examination of the invention of Moroccan Islam, it seeks to historicize the ways in which French colonial thought asserted its ethnographic authority and political power, the better to exclude competitors and legitimate its rule.

Part One suggests that the invention of Moroccan Islam was not just a manifestation of French discursive power. Rather, it was shaped by overlapping crises at the global, the national, and the bureaucratic levels that created a momentary discursive opening. Only later did the racial stereotypes of the Algerian colonial gospel reassert themselves. A close reading of this history requires a reconsideration of the premises of orientalist theory.

The chapters in Part Two review the institutionalization of French ethnography, as well as the differential fate of French policies toward Moroccan Berbers, cities, and Islam. The situates the creation of the Moroccan colonial archive in the context of fin de siècle European scientific imperialism, notably the application of an ethnographically attuned native policy based upon European best colonial practices, or what I call Native Policy Morocco. One sign of this influence is the failed effort of Resident General Hubert Lyautey to model the Moroccan protectorate on the British colonial administration in India.

The chapters in Part Three trace how the discourse on Moroccan Islam provided the ideological template for the French protectorate over Morocco, a model of indirect rule that claimed to be deeply respectful of Moroccan traditions and culture and pre-existing Moroccan state structures. Meanwhile Morocco’s agricultural, mining, and other resources were gobbled up by the Omnium Nord-Africain, a French business group.

Ultimately, the French colonial project was deeply dependent upon the hegemony of the discourse on Moroccan Islam. It structured, organized, and institutionalized the perceptions of the protectorate for non-Moroccans and Moroccans alike, in the process creating the modern Moroccan polity.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous research?

EB:The Ethnographic State returns to many of the questions that preoccupied me in my first book, Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco, and in my writings on colonial representations. (See also my edited collection (with David Prochaska), Genealogies of Orientalism: History, Theory, Politics (2008).

The book challenges some aspects of the theory of orientalism, even as it validates Edward Said’s larger discursive achievement. By historicizing the unfolding of the discourse on Moroccan Islam and its successive transformations, it seeks to provide a more complexly situated understanding of the role of colonial forms of knowledge in colonial contexts.

“Moroccan Islam” was a discursive innovation (not an empirical reality). The very idea of the existence of a Moroccan Islam violates Islamic claims to universality. The creation of the Moroccan ethnographic state (the protectorate and the post-colonial Moroccan state) was its greatest achievement. Independent Morocco has assumed the discursive apparatus on Moroccan Islam (the better to shore up the legitimacy of the Moroccan King). It too is an ethnographic state. This book is an effort to recount its origins, development, and persistence to the present.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

EB: The Ethnographic State will be of interest to readers interested in orientalism and empire, colonialism and modernity, and the invention of traditions. It should appeal especially to social scientists and historians of the Middle East and North Africa.

In a moment of amnesia about the historical roots of modern states in the Middle East region, it proposes a recommitment to a globally inflected colonial history.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

EB: I am currently at work on two book projects.

The first, tentatively entitled France and the Sociology of Islam, considers the deep history of French ethnographic studies of Islam from the late eighteenth century until the end of French Algeria. It studies the connections between knowledge and power beginning with the Description de l’Egypte, and the distinctive sociological legacies of French involvement in Algeria, French West Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, and the Lebanese and Syrian mandates. It is well advanced and should be completed by the end of 2015.

A second book project, Making the Mediterranean Modern, will draw upon some of the ideas expressed in my essay “Toward a Comparative History of the Modern Mediterranean, 1750-1919” in The Journal of World History (2013), to propose a comparative eco-historical approach to the modernization of the Mediterranean as a global space.

J: How do you see your argument regarding the "invention of Moroccan Islam" by French ethnographers and colonial administrators as potentially affecting both the study of contemporary Morocco and the work of contemporary ethnographers? In what ways was the discourse on colonial forms of knowledge productive of an informed practice of native government?

EB: Contrary to the grim determinisms of some post-colonial critics, for whom orientalism was a totalizing system whose history remains unknowable, my book inserts the development of the ethnography of Morocco into the deeply conflicted French political and intellectual fields of the time. The Moroccan case is key, since Morocco is arguably the leading success story of the application of social science to colonial government.

Upon investigation, while Moroccan Islam was generative of a prose of counter-insurgency, it was with a few exceptions unable to produce a usable native policy. The binaries of the French colonial gospel profoundly shaped French perceptions as well as practice. Despite the earnest belief of many of its proponents, a scientifically based native policy was more of a marketing device than a reality. Pacification was war, not social science. Here my conclusions join those of Martin Thomas, as well as scholars of colonial India.

Scholars of post-colonial Morocco have so far been incapable of transcending the myth of Moroccan Islam that continues to encourage the belief that under French tutelage, colonialism was a victimless crime, or, as one Moroccan scholar has called it “our industrial revolution.” Morocco has yet to awaken from its colonial nightmare. It is not the only MENA state to find itself in this place.

Excerpt from The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam

From Chapter Four: “Political and Discursive Contexts of the Moroccan Question”

Does orientalism have a history, or only an epistemology? Said’s Orientalism doesn’t allow for the possibility of a temporary rupture in the discourse of orientalism since the same essentialist stereotypes about colonial societies endlessly recirculate. Thus it does not in important respects “have a history.” Yet, as we’ve just seen, something very like this occurred with respect to French representations of Morocco during the period 1900-1904. Said derived this aspect of his approach to orientalism from French theorist Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse. He argued that as a discourse (and not just a set of intellectual practices) orientalism provided the lens through which Europeans viewed the Middle East, the set of stereotypes that “stood for” the region. In so doing orientalism the discourse summoned “the Orient” into existence while reducing it to a set of reductive binaries. However, Said’s appropriation of Foucault’s idea of discourse was flawed in important respects.[1] While Said stressed the discursive context, (as James Clifford has pointed out) he also sought to restore the preeminent position of the canonical author. Thus he “fail[ed] sufficiently to historicize the discourse of orientalism,” and “relapse[d] into traditional intellectual history.”[2] In order to account for the struggle over the control of research on Morocco in the period 1900-1904, we must switch theorists.

This is where the work of Pierre Bourdieu becomes relevant to our inquiry. Bourdieu’s sociology of symbolic domination in French life hypothesizes a division between what he refers to as the political field and the scientific field. As opposed to Said’s orientalism in which history does not exist, Bourdieu’s concept of field (champs) opens outward towards history and allows for change. It permits us to consider the relationship of individuals and groups to one another as well as to the fields in which they are inserted. For Bourdieu the political and intellectual fields have specific properties that can be ascertained. It’s also worth stating that his theory works best for France, where the so-called Grandes écoles (among them the Ecole polytechnique, the Ecole normale Superièure, the Ecole des ponts et chaussées, the Ecole des Mines, more recently the Ecole nationale d'administration) are the center of the nested hierarchies at the apex of the intellectual field. But intellectual prestige is only one element of Bourdieu’s schema. A second feature that can be used to locate an individual in a specific field is the rank or job title. Again, in the French field, the place of a given bureaucratic title in a wider field is readily ascertainable. Also, there is Bourdieu's idea of symbolic capital (the symbolic tokens of authority and prestige) the possession of which determines the place of an individual in a status/honor hierarchy. In Bourdieuian terms, the struggle for the control of scientific research on Morocco between 1900-1904 is best understood as a struggle over symbolic capital.[3] It was also a competition in which the position in the French intellectual and political fields of the followers of the Ecole d’Alger and of Le Chatelier shaped what happened later. With this brief excursus, let’s return to the dramatic exclusion of Algerian scholars from research on Morocco by the Quai d’Orsay in October 1903.

The battle over the control of social research on Morocco provides a precious window into the operation of the government and institutions of Third Republic France, and the connections between its political scientific fields. Somehow what had begun as a turf war between a provincial university research group and a politically connected interloper morphed into a pitched battle that split the French government into rival factions. Behind the factions stood major political and economic interests. Although conflicts over research are not unprecedented in academia, few have had such far-reaching consequences. As the crisis unfolded, it activated political faultlines within French state and the world of French orientalism, greatly magnifying the upheaval. The struggle over the Mission scientifique mobilized political forces in the highest reaches of the French government. The affair was only resolved after the intervention of the Foreign Minister, Delcassé and the head of the parti colonial, Eugène Etienne, the heads of key government departments and parliamentary committees, and some of the leading academic figures of the day. Questions of persons, of politics, even of patriotism were raised. Bitterness, skullduggery, and petty-mindedness wore the masks of scientific detachment, personal altruism and French national interest. How can we explain this? What can the struggle to control social research on Morocco tell us about the structure and operation of the intellectual and political fields in France at the turn of the century? Let us return to a consideration of the multiple contexts in which the struggle over the Mission scientifique can be situated.

NOTES

[1] James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).

[2] Edmund Burke III and David Prochaska, Genealogies of Orientalism: History, Theory, Politics (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), Ch. 1.

[3] Pierre Bourdieu, Sociology in Question (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1993 [1984]). See also his Outline of a Theory of Practice (New York: Cambridge University, 1977 [1972]).

[Excerpted from The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam, by Edmund Burke III, by permission of the author. Copyright 2014 by The Regents of the University of California. For more information, or to purchase this book, click here.]

آخر مرة التقيتُ سركون كان في بداية العام 1966، في بغداد. ذهبنا الى مطعم صغير في البتاويين وبعده الى معرضٍ  للرسم في المعهد الثقافي الفرنسي. افترقنا وأنا أعرف بأنه سيغادر العراق، أو يهرب، لينهي عذابه من تجنيده في الجيش وبقائه عاطلاً عن أية وظيفة أو استخدام، في أجهزة الإعلام الرسمية أو الاهلية، وفي غيرهما، سواءً في كركوك أو في بغداد. لم تفده شهرته آنذاك كشاعر طليعي ومختلف، أظهرهما بنشاط في أعمال نشرها، وتراجم أنجزها، سواءً في العراق أو في لبنان من خلال مجلة شعر، بل ربما أثارت بعض المشاعر المعادية والاتهامات ضده، خصوصاً وأن الوسط الاعلامي والثقافي العراقي كانا يعجان آنذاك بالأفكار العروبية واشتراكيتها، وأقصد الفترة الناصرية واتحادها الاشتراكي وشعاراتها الطوباوية في حل المشاكل الاجتماعية والاقتصادية آنذاك لهذه الامة المتخلفة. من مآثر جماعة كركوك حينذاك توجهها المختلف عن هذه الدعوات والشعارات. كنا مع الطليعية في الشعر، القصة القصيرة والرسم وغيرها، وكان سركون في مقدمة هذه الطليعية .لم نكن من المركز، وكنا جميعاً من قوميات غير عربية وبعضنا من دين آخر وجميعنا يساريين. وكان هذا كله أكثر مما يمكن تحمله أو السماح له بالانتشار . كانت " جماعة كركوك " منعطفاً في تطور الكتابة العراقية في فترة ستينات القرن الماضي. انتقاله، وأهله معه، إلى بغداد، كان بداية هذا الهروب. كانت هذه رغبتنا أيضاً، أنا وجان دمو، وعدد آخر من " جماعة كركوك " حققناها بعد سنوات طويلة وبأساليب مختلفة. بعد عودتي إلى كركوك بأشهر تم اعتقالي بعد اقتحام بيتنا من قبل قوة من الامن حيث نهبوا كتبي ودفتري الشعري، ولم يعيدوها رغم محاولاتي في ما بعد. وبذا فقدتُ قصائدي الاولى ومعها مجموعة من قصصي القصيرة. عرفتُ بوصوله إلى بيروت ونشاطه الأدبي هناك، بعد خروجي من السجن.

[سركون بولص مع صلاح فائق في شقة الأخير في لندن]

ثم غادر، من جماعة كركوك، أنور الغساني إلى المانيا، تبعه فاضل العزاوي، والذي استقر في بغداد بعد فترة من السجن، إلى ألمانيا أيضاً، مؤيد الراوي إلى بيروت لسنوات قليلة، بعدها إلى ألمانيا. في هذه الاثناء، نهاية الستينات وبداية السبعينات، كان سركون قد استقر في أميركا وبدأنا نتابع قراءته في مجلة شعر، ثم مواقف. لم نستطع الاتصال به والكتابة إليه بسبب عدم توفر عنوانه. قررنا، أنا وجان دمو، إنهاء خدمتنا العسكرية، لعلنا نستطيع بعدها الحصول على جواز السفر والهجرة. لكننا حتى بعد تلك السنوات المنهكة في الجيش وفي العطالة بعدها، لم نستطع الخروج. أنا بسبب وجود قضايا ضدي لم تحسم بعد، لاعتقالي في الماضي ونشاطي المعارض. كان على الانتظار حتى أواخر العام 1974، حيث قرر الشاعر عبد الوهاب البياتي مساعدتي وحصلت على جواز سفر بواسطته. كنت آنذاك عاملاً في "الشالجية"، أحد مواقع إدامة القطارات وتصليحها من قبل مؤسسة السكك الحديد العراقية، وأنشر قصائدي في مجلة " الكلمة " العراقية.

كنتُ أعطيت البياتي مجموعتي الاولى "رهائن" ليقرأها قبل نشرها من قبل اتحاد الكتاب العرب في دمشق، وبفضله حقاً نشرت، كما ساعدني في نشر قصائد لي في "الموقف الأدبي" وفي "السفير" وغيرهما.

*

بعد بقائي لحوالى سنتين في دمشق وبيروت، استطعت الحصول على ترخيص لزيارة بريطانيا كسائح لمدة شهر، في أواسط العام 1976، وبعد وصولي إلى لندن، بقيت فيها لعشرين سنة. بعد أشغالٍ بائسة، استطعتُ الحصول على وظيفة مصحح في مؤسسة سعودية، ثم في مجلة الدستور. خلال سنتين بدأتُ أكتبُ وأترجم فتغير عملي إلى محرر. في العام 1982 التقيت الشاعرة والباحثة الفلسطينية سلمى الجيوسي وأجريت معها مقابلة، أثناء حديثنا فاجأتني بخبر ترجمة بعض قصائدي إلى الانكليزية في مختاراتها للشعر العربي الحديث، وأخبرتني بان سركون ساهم في الترجمة وكانت تلك فعلاً صدمة لي. رجوتها أن تعطيني عنوانه في أميركا، ففعلت وأعطتني أيضاً رقم هاتفه هناك. لم أستطع السيطرة على حماسي وفرحي بهذه المصادفة المذهلة. في الليل خابرته. وكانت هكذا: 

- مرحباً، هل أنت سركون بولص؟

- نعم. من يسإلني رجاءً؟

- اسمي صلاح فائق. تتذكر هذا الاسم؟

- لايمكن، هذا جنون. أين أنت ؟

- في لندن، أعطتني الشاعرة سلمى الجيوسي اليوم عنوانك ورقم هاتفك.

- أعتذر، لا أستطيع تصديق كل هذا. أرجوك اعطيني رقم هاتفك وسأخابرك فوراً. فقط أريد أن أتاكد. أنا مصدوم حقاً.

 وهذا ما حصل بعد دقائق، ودامت مكالمتنا أكثر من ساعة. سالني كل شيء عن نفسي خلال كل تلك السنوات منذ افتراقنا، وأيضاً عن أصدقائنا في جماعة كركوك، واحداً بعد آخر. أخبرته عن عملي ونشاطي
الثقافي والشعري مع مجموعة من السرياليين البريطانيين، وصدور مجموعات شعرية لي.

[رسالة من سركون بولص إلي صلاح فائق. من أرشيف صلاح فائق]

أخذتُ قبل بدايات التسعينات أتبادل الرسائل مع سركون بولص المقيم في سان فرنسيسكو في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، كنّا نتحدث على الأغلب في رسائلنا عن الماضي الخاص بسركون والذي أعرف بعضه بشكل غامض، وهو يصحح لي هنا وهناك، وبالطبع كان حديثنا الأهم عن نشر قصائده، لكن الأمور سارت بوتيرة غير الوتيرة التي أرادها سركون لمراسلاتنا، وهو معروف عنه البطء، والكسل وتأجيل انجاز المشاريع لآلاف المرات، لكن الأمور، كما قلتُ سارت بوتيرة مغايرة حينما احتل صدام حسين دولة الكويت، وإذا بي وجهاً لوجه مع سركون بولص ببرلين وقد قدمنا من مناطق مختلفة من العالم لكي نلتقي ونتحدث كمثقفين عراقيين، بعد هذا اللقاء ذهب سركون للإقامة قرب مدينة هامبورغ شمال ألمانيا حيث يقيم أقارب صديقته إلكه، وعدت إلى مدينتي كولونيا، وبعدها بأشهر جاءني من سركون مظروف كبير هو ديوانه: الأول والتالي، وقد صدرت طبعته الأولى عام 1992، وبعدها بفترة قصيرة حل سركون نفسه ببيتي، حيث كنت أقيم بشقة كبيرة نوعا ما، وقد أقام عندي لسنوات وعلى فترات متقطعة. هذه الإقامة هي أطول إقاماته خارج الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، وخلالها تم نشر أغلب كتبه وصدرت ترجمات ألمانية لقصائده وقصصه في كتب مستقلة.

وهنا تبيّن لي بأن سركون شخص ليلي، في حين أني شخصي نهاري، أي أني استيقظ بشكل مبكر، في حين كان سركون لا يستيقظ قبل الواحدة بعد الظهر إلا نادرا وفي حالات خاصة جداً، وهو غير منظم بالمرة، فرماد سكائره يملأ الغرفة أو كل زاوية في الشقة يحل بها، وهو لا يرتب فراشه، وقلما يتركه حتى في أوقات يقظته، إلا للذهاب إلى الحمام أو اثناء تناول الطعام أو حين يبدأ رحلته مشياً في المدينة، كما لم أره يغسل الصحون أو حتى يجمعها، أو يصنع القهوة أو الشاي، ولو حدث وقام ببعض الأعمال من هذا النوع لوجدت نفسي أعيد جلي الصحون أو تنشيفها بعده من جديد، بالطبع هناك استثناءات، فلو حدث وزارتنا سيدة شابة أو حتى سيدة فيها بقية من الجمال فهنا تتجلى حيوية سركون ويقوم بنفسه بتحضير القهوة لها، وبالطبع لا يعرف سركون من الطبخ إلا طبخة إيطالية هي طبخة السباغيتي. بجانب هذا سركون مشّاء، حاله حال فاضل العزاوي ومؤيد الراوي وأنور الغساني، فهم شرّابي شاي ومدخني سكائر مدمنين. فشعلة سكائره مستمرة، تلك السكائر التي يلفها بعناية، (اختار سكائر اللف بسبب سعرها الرخيص). وهو حينما يكون في سريره يكون في حالات ثلاث، قارئاً نهماً لأيام متتالية، أو غاطاً في لحظة تأملية طويلة، أو يدوّن في أوراق أو دفاتر صغيرة ملاحظات هي عبارة عن صور شعرية، أو مقاطع من قصائد قادمة، أو يعيد صياغة قصيدة كتب ملاحظاتها الأولى منذ سنوات بعيدة، وسركون يحمل العديد من الدفاتر المليئة حتى آخرها بهذا الخطب من القصائد الخديج، أي القصائد التي لم تلد بشكل نهائي، وهو يشتغل على القصيدة كتابة وترجمة لأيام وليالٍ، بل لسنوات يجلو القصيدة مرة تلو المرة، وهو شديد مع قصيدته لا يطلق سراحها إلا بعد إشباعها تمحيصاً، ودائما حينما كنت أعيد إليه الكتاب مُنضّداً بعد أتمّ صياغته الأخيرة، يعيد سركون جلي الكتاب وكأنه يكتبه للمرة الأولى. 

وسركون بولص متحدّث غير ملول عن الكتب، بل شغوف جداً، بأنواعها المختلفة، وحالم كبير بانجازات ترجمة لهذا الكتاب وذاك، وهو كاتب قصة، تنضج تفاصيل القصة برأسه قبل كتابتها، وكثرما سرد لي قصصاً لم يستطع كتابتها.

وسركون اجتماعي جداً حين يجد نفسه وسط الناس، ولكنه قلما يتلزم بمواعيده بالإتصال أو بالكتابة، إلى الدرجة التي دفعتني إلى أن اقوم بتذكيره بشكل دائم ببعض الأشياء وتسهيل القيام بها، ومنها مثلاً الكتابة إلى صديقته إلكه في أمريكا أو الإتصال تلفونيا بها على الأقل.

ولهذا السبب وغيره شاعت عن سركون صفة الكسل وعدم الإهتمام والخمول، سركون الذي لم يعمل في وظيفة ثابتة إلا لفترة قصيرة في اليونان بفضل يوسف الخال أو انسي الحاج لم أعد أتذكر، حيث كان يذهب أحيانا إلى الدوام لمدة ساعة، لكن سركون مراقب كبير ودقيق، لم يزر مدينة أو مكاناً إلا وتجد أن شاعرنا قد استل تلك الصورة أو الحادثة في إحدى قصائده، وأعماله الشعرية والترجمات والحوارات المنشورة وغير المنشورة تتجاوز الألفين وخمسمائة صفحة وهذا شيء كبير، عاش حياةً جميلةً، لكنها أليمة وغنية بانجازاتها الأدبية، كنا نحتال على الفقر والعوز بطرق عديدة، وهو عاش بعزّ، وقد كنت معه على الأقل في بلدين عربيين دُعي لهما، هما المغرب وعُمان، وهناك كان يمكنني أن ألمس حقيقة حضوره لدى الأجيال الجديدة، وقد حاولت كثيراً لدى العديد من معارفي ترتيب زيارة له لهذا البلد أو ذاك، مصر مثلاً أو لبنان، ولكننا قوبلنا بالتجاهل كالعادة. وهو لم يسعَ وراء الشهرة أو الجاه، كانت قصيدته تربطه، بل قل تشدّه بحبلٍ إليها، وهو بقي مشدوداً بهذا الحبل حتى وهو يحتضر في شقة مؤيد الراوي ببرلين... ففي لحظات هدوء الألم القليلة رتبتُ معه غلاف مجموعته الشعرية الأخيرة: عظمة أخرى لكلب القبيلة، والتي وضع الرسام العراقي ضياء العزاوي رسمة لها وبعد 36 ساعة تقريباً رحل سركون بولص.

”كرسي جدي ما زال يهتزّ على

أسوار أوروك 

تحته يعبر النهر، يتقلّب فيه

الأحياء والموتى“

 سركون بولص، ”عظمة أخرى لكلب القبيلة“

يتجاور الأحياء والموتى بشكل ملفت للنظر في ديوان سركون بولص الأخير ”عظمة أخرى لكلب القبيلة.“فنراهم يتقلبون في النهر الذي يجري على أول صفحة فيه. ويعاودون الظهور، سوية، في عدد من قصائد الديوان الأخرى: 

”الأحياء والأمواتتفاهموا/على الارتماء في حضن السكينة.“. . .”إنه نفس الفراغ الطالع/من حضرة آخر الليل في أية مدينة/متخمةبالأحياء والموتى: باريس، لندن، نيويورك.. . .”فلا أحد وراءه، غير هذا الميت الحي/الموزّع بين بينٍ في أناه، بلا أنا.“وحتّى آخر صفحة في الديوان، حيث نقرأ: ”يا لها من رحلة./الميّت والحيضيوف في حانة سيدوري/من يحتاج إلى الآلهة؟“

ويجب أن نضيف، في هذا السياق، أن الموتى، بالذات، يحتلون حيّزاً مهمّاً في قصائد المجموعة وشخوصها فيلاحقون الشاعر ويعاودونه: “دفتري المفتوح تحت عيني/مصيدةلأرواح موتاي/يمرّون على صفحاته في شبه رفيف/أسمعه مثل لغتي الأولى.”أو: “حيث أستلقي مغمض العينين/وأطفو في سريري قبيل الفجر/قبل أن يشحب الأفق، وتنسحب فلول الأموات/عائدة إلى حجورها الأبدية/ملقية وراءها على عالم الأحياءنظرة أخيرة. و في قصيدة أخرى: “أنا من لا يصلح لترتيب المراثي/رغم أنأمواتيكثيرون، وقبورهم/موزّعة في البراري، تنبشها الذئاب.”وتتبلور جدلية الأحياء والموتى هذه وتتعمّق أهميتها في قصيدتين يهيكلهما حوار بين الشاعر والموتى، كما سنحاول أن نبين في هذه القراءة الموجزة، وهما “جئت إليك من هناك”و “طفلة الحرب.”والأولى حوار متخيّل مع شبح الكاتب العراقي يوسف الحيدري (١٩٣٣-١٩٩٣) والثانية مع طفلة عراقية أهدى الشاعر القصيدة إليها “إلى طفلة عراقية ولدت في الحرب، وفي الحرب ماتت.”

قد لا يكون حضور كل هؤلاء الموتى وأشباحهم في نصوص شاعرنا العراقي مفاجأة، خصوصاً أن تاريخ العراق يحتشد بالموتى حتى ليكاد البلد يكون قبراً جمعياً مفتوحاً على مصراعيه، مازال يلتهم المزيد كل يوم. لكنني أزعم أن طريقة سركون في التخاطب مع الموتى في نصوصه تتجاوز حدود الرثاء، وتغري بمحاولة إنجاز قراءة أعمق لشعره. كما تستحق وقفة تأمّل لخصوصيتها ومن أجل استكشاف تبعاتها إذا ما قرأناها في الإطار الأعم للعلاقة بين الأحياء والموتى في الخطاب الثقافي/السياسي.

يعتمد التعامل مع الماضي والذاكرة وإعادة إنتاجهما في أحد أبعاده على كيفية مخاطبة الموتى، حرفياً ومجازياً. فعلاقة الأحياء بالموتى علاقة سياسية وحيز متنازع عليه بشكل أو بآخر. وذكرى الموتى من ضحايا العنف السياسي هي رأسمال رمزي يتم استثماره واحتكاره لشرعنة رواية تاريخية معينة بدلاً من أخرى ولهيمنة خطاب دون غيره. وبهذا المعنى فالموتى لا يغيبون كلياً عن عالم الأحياء. وهنا تكمن أهميّة الشبح كاستعارة، وكحضور يخلخل ويضبب الحدود بين عالمي الحياة والموت ويحرّض على إعادة طرح أسئلة جوهرية، على أولئك الذين مازالوا في عالم الأحياء، في مواجهة مع ما هو وراء الحاضر الآني. سبق لدريدا أن كتب عن الأشباح و”الشبحية”وعلاقتهما بالعدالة والتفكير بالمستقبل في كتابه “أطياف ماركس.” (الترجمة الإنكليزية، روتليج، ١٩٩٤) مؤكداً أنه ”لا بد من الحديث عن الشبح، إلى الشبح، ومعه، من اللحظة التي لا تبدو فيها أي أخلاق أو سياسة، سواء كانت ثورية أم لا، ممكنة أو معقولة، أو عادلة دون أن تعترف أساساً بمسؤولية نحو أولئك الذين لم يعودوا هنا أو الذين لم يصلوا بعد، الذين يعيشون حالياً، سواء كانوا أحياء أم أموات.” (ص.١٨) ويضيف أن العيش بعدالة سيتحقق “بين الحياة وبين الموت فقط. لا في الحياة لوحدها، ولا في الموت لوحده. وما يحدث بين الإثنين. . . وبين الحياة وبين الموت، لا يمكن أن يبقي علي نفسه إلا ببعض الأشباح.” 

قد تثير هذه القراءة اعتراضات أولئك الذين يحرصون على إبعاد السياسة عن الشعر وعلى صيانة جمالياته من وزرها. لكن اعتراضات كهذه تنطلق من فهم إشكالي وسطحي للسياسة ولعلاقة الشعر بها. نصوص سركون غنية وتغري بمغامرات قراءة متنوعة كما أن الهواجس السياسية، بالمعنى الأعمق للمصطلح، بارزة في ديوانه الأخير وهي لم تكن غائبة أساساً في دواوينه السابقة.

الديوان الأخير مسكون بالأشباح الذين يحومون في هذا الحيّز الذي يتحدّث عنه دريدا، بين الحياة وبين الموت، وبين الحاضر وبين ماضيه أو مستقبله. في قصيدة “طفلة الحرب”يرى الشاعر شبح طفلة مفقودة في الحرب (نعرف أنها ماتت كما يفيد الإهداء):  “في الساعة الأولى من الفجر. إنها تنتظر ارتطامي/بجدار الحقيقة.”الطفلة شبح ذات منسية: “لقد أخذوا أهلي في سفينة/إلي العالم الآخر/كنت أعرف دوماً/أنهم سيتركونني هنا، وحدي على الشاطئ.كنت أعرف. . .”على الرغم من أنها ميتة، إلا أنها لم ولن تصل إلى عالم الأموات. بل تبقى في عالم الأحياء وتعيش في حيز الشاعر الشخصي “واقفة في نهاية الممر”ليلها الأزلي يعاود فجره ووجودها هو الرابط بين عالمين. يطرح عليها الشاعر أسئلة “تعرف هي أجوبة/عليها. . . ”لا تجيب عليها بصورة مباشرة ولا تطالب بشيء. بل تكتفي بسرد حكايتها وتنتهي القصيدة بجملة غير مكتملة.

في  قصيدة “جئتُ إليك من هناك”هناك مواجهة أخرى مع شبح آخر يلاقيه الشاعر قادماً من ”هناك“والـ ”هناك“هذه هي العراق، لكنها أيضاً حيّز الدمار الذي يتحدّث عنه الشبح (تتكرر عبارة ”إنه الدمار“مرتين). و تبرز ثيمة الموتى الأحياء في هذه القصيدة أيضاً إذ يبعث الموتى بسلامهم من المقابر:”اللاجئون على الطرقات/الأطفال في التوابيت/النساء يندبن في الساحات/أهلك بخير/يسلّمون عليك من المقابر/بغداد سنبلة تشبّث بها الجراد/جئت إليك من هناك/إنّه الدمار/قال لي/وسار مبتعداً، واختفى/في كل مكان.“ 

لا يطالب الموتى في هذه القصائد بالانتقام أو بأفعال محدّدة. وكل ما تطالب به أشباحهم هو أن نصغي إليها كي لا ننسى و، ربما، كي لا نصادر ذكراها وذاكرتها ونحولها إلى سلعة في سوق السياسة. كما لا تطالب بأن يتحدّث أحد ما باسمها أو بالنيابة عنها . ويتناقض هذا بشكل صارخ مع الخطابات السائدة عن الموتى في الحيّز السياسي. من اللافت أن الشبح في "جئت إليك من هناك"لا يعود إلى العراق ولا إلى المقبرة. بل يسير مبتعداً ويختفي "في كل مكان". لعلّه سيظل يحوم ويواجه الأحياء في كل مكان. فعليهم، أي الأحياء، أن يتعلموا، كما يقول دريدا، ”التعايش مع الماضي ومع الموت وأن يتعلموا أبجدية الحديث مع أشباح الموتى، لكن ليس بالنيابة عنهم أو باسمهم، هذا إن كانوا يرغبون في الوصول إلى ما يقترب من العدالة في المستقبل المستحيل.“  

[This is a slightly revised version of comments presented as part of the event “Palestine Solidarity: A Faculty Roundtable and Student Q & A,” held at the CUNY Graduate Center on 17 October. The discussion was organized by a group of students involved with a resolution currently before the Doctoral Student Council at the Graduate Center, endorsing the academic and cultural boycott of Israel. I want to dedicate my remarks to these courageous students, who are engaged in organizing work that is at best thankless and at worst dangerous, given the current climate of hostility in the US academy—and, beyond that, to all those who struggle for justice in Palestine.]

I begin with moment from my graduate student days, when I had just started working with Students for Justice in Palestine at New York University. This would have been the autumn of 2002, at a time when I was thinking and talking and reading and working my way towards a position on the struggle for justice in Palestine, a struggle that I supported but that I sometimes felt I was still too ill-informed about. I was passing out fliers at NYU in support of Birzeit University’s Right to Education Campaign. I was still fairly new to Palestine solidarity activism, but I had already gotten used to some of the hostile reactions, from the man who growled at me, “They should close their schools! All they teach them there is to hate Jews!” to those who simply spat on the sidewalk in front of me. Amidst all this (along with, of course, many sympathetic reactions), a somewhat older, well-dressed man approached and began asking a series of sophisticated questions regarding the goals and grounding of the campaign, as well as my own positions. At a certain point, he gestured towards a small lapel pin in the buttonhole of his jacket. “You understand what this says?” he asked me with a smile. I told him that I recognized it as the logo of Peace Now, although I didn’t read Hebrew. “But you are Jewish?” he asked. No, I told him, as it happened, I wasn’t. At this point, he looked at me more closely, with a puzzled expression on his face. “But you’re not an Arab?” No, as it happened, I wasn’t. His expression had by now turned to one of pure incredulity. “But then, why do you…?” In my memory of the exchange, he didn’t even bother to finish the question; instead, he gave an eloquent shrug of the shoulders.

The unfinished question of my interlocutor—“Why do you care?”—is one that I have spent a great deal of time thinking about. It is the guiding question of what we might call international solidarity, not only in the case of Palestine, but in so many other instances as well. What makes it a specific sort of question in this specific case is the circumstance that baffled my interlocutor: I do not have any sort of identitarian claim to make regarding an issue that, for so many, is a deeply personal one. Lacking such an identitarian claim, why should I care?

I have been thinking recently about this exchange, in part because I have found myself, together with other scholars who work in and around the field of Middle East studies and who are supporters of Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS), placed on a blacklist organized by the AMCHA initiative. It is a list that has been widely circulated by AMCHA and other affiliated organizations, with the stated aim of “protecting Jewish students.” To their credit, the list-makers set things out quite clearly: “Students who wish to become better educated on the Middle East without subjecting themselves to anti-Israel bias, or possibly even antisemitic rhetoric, may want to check which faculty members from their university are signatories before registering.”

I want to pause here to address those who like to propagate the argument that the academic and cultural boycott of Israel amounts to a “blacklist” aimed at Israeli academics. Please look at the AMCHA list. This is what an actual blacklist looks like. It names us by name and explains precisely what, in the eyes of the list-makers, we should not be allowed to do—in this case, teach students who are interested in Middle East studies—based solely upon a political position we have espoused. Those of us who support the academic and cultural boycott of Israel, by contrast, have scrupulously and continuously made it clear that it does not, and will not, target individual Israeli academics; indeed, this is a fundamental guideline of the academic boycott call.

I want to say this about finding myself on the AMCHA blacklist: on the intellectual level, I was able to understand that this was simply another intimidation tactic aimed at silencing Palestine solidarity on US campuses. It was also clear to me that as individual academics, we were just small fish for a group like AMCHA; the real goal for pro-Israel political groups is to attack funding for Middle East studies centers. But on a deeper level, none of this helped. What I felt, mostly, was heart-sick.

My response has been to revisit, with renewed zeal, the question with which I began. AMCHA has its answer to the question of why I care about Palestine: anti-Semitism. It is a deeply dishonest and disingenuous accusation, but I will do my best to refashion this into an invitation to renew my critical thinking around the question of solidarity. Why do I care?

I can of course answer—indeed, have sometimes answered—that, as a citizen of the United States, I have a particular responsibility to care, given that the actions of the Israeli state are underwritten and enabled by the unwavering economic, military, and political support of the US government. This is part of the answer, but to me, it is not enough. I am not satisfied to ground my solidarity in my citizenship, and moreover, I think of my solidarity as linked to a global Palestine solidarity movement.

The best answer I have—and I imagine it was part of whatever I said in response to my interlocutor all those years ago—is to say that my solidarity is grounded in a call for justice. I would like to think that the best work I do, as a teacher and scholar and writer and editor, circles around this question of justice. More concretely, though, as I have had the chance to work with others committed to Palestine solidarity work, I have come to see my own commitment as linked inextricably to my larger commitment to anti-racism and anti-colonialism (or, if you prefer, decolonization). I am certainly neither the first nor the last to make this link, although in my own thinking it took some time and effort to put the pieces together. But this notion of Palestine solidarity as a form of anti-racism and anti-colonialism is worth repeating and repeating in the US context (including—especially—the US academic context).

I have a simpler answer to the question of why I support the call for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions. I support it precisely as a call. You can read it here. Simply put, the call is one made in the name of and on behalf of a set of principles and goals that I wholeheartedly support, and so supporting this call was, and is, a very easy decision.

However, there are two things that might be worth saying about my support for BDS, given the responses that the movement has occasioned from its opponents in the US academy. The first is that I see my support for the academic and cultural boycott as being grounded very clearly in a set of positive values. Because the particular tactics of boycott and divestment involve certain kinds of stoppages and refusals—the refusal, for example, to lend one’s support, either as an academic or as a consumer, to certain institutions that benefit from injustices—some opponents have painted the BDS movement as a sort of negative, nihilistic force. But needless to say, struggles for justice have time and again used “negative” actions—strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, occupations of public spaces—precisely in the name of the positive values that they are struggling to bring into existence. In this sense, the academic boycott, like similar campaigns aimed at apartheid South Africa, is a positive action aimed towards the advancement of justice. The goal, if we can put it this way, is to make justice come as quickly as possible—and when one recalls that the first international congress in solidarity with the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa was held in 1959, one gets a sense of how even those struggles that have met with some success have been agonizingly slow.

The second point—and it should be obvious, but I suppose this needs to be said as well—is that my support for BDS does not somehow exhaust my supply of caring, or of solidarity. I care deeply about BDS, and I care very deeply about many other things too. Certainly, deep thinking about the problem of selective solidarity is part of the responsibility of any solidarity movement. But the very fact that, as a supporter of BDS, I find it necessary to state that my commitment to BDS does not exhaust my commitment to other political struggles says something about the staying power of one particular claim made by BDS opponents: that the BDS movement unfairly “singles out” Israel for criticism and sanction.

It needs to be said that the “singling out” argument is, more often than not, an implicit way of making a claim about anti-Semitism without actually saying as much. To ask “Why are you singling out Israel?” is in many ways to put forward what is meant to function as a rhetorical rather than a real question: the very posing of the question contains its implicit answer. But let us take it seriously as a question that can be refashioned into one that is not simply rhetorical—after all, my own academic work has lately focused on questions of singularity and solidarity, which makes me receptive to addressing this “singling out” accusation. So I will say three things about this question of the BDS movement unfairly “singling out” Israel.

The first point is the simplest one: the call to boycott Israeli academic and cultural institutions is precisely a call for solidarity. The proper response to such a call for solidarity is either to pledge one’s support, if one is able to offer this support, or to reject the call, if one is not able to do so. The proper response to a call for solidarity is not to immediately ask it to address all other similar foreseeable situations. To adapt one of the points made on an excellent FAQ sheet produced by anthropologists who support the academic boycott: when Cesar Chavez and the National Farm Workers Association called for a boycott of grapes, the proper political response would not be to immediately ask: what about apples? This is not to say that we would not need to also talk about apples—that is to say, such a call for solidarity in no way excuses us from doing the work of pursuing all of the other related issues, or from offering our solidarity in other instances. This is certainly true of BDS, and supporting the academic boycott in no way exhausts one’s ability to pursue all sorts of other political commitments. But to immediately, as an initial response to a call for solidarity, ask “but what about all those other things?” is to do a sort of violence to the call itself. It is, quite simply, a form of refusal that does not have the courage to present itself as such.

My second point is a related one. The argument about “singling out,” it seems to me, posits a theoretical person who only signs BDS petitions, and only cares about justice when it comes to the question of Palestine. I suppose such a person may exist, but I have certainly never met her or him. When one looks across the broad spectrum of the Palestine solidarity movement, and the networks and associations that have come to support the academic boycott, what one sees are a series of people engaged in a multitude of struggles for social justice.

It is this question of the struggle for justice that leads to my third and final point. Those who ask why the BDS movement is “singling out” Israel are in fact implicitly admitting that the state of Israel has in fact done something worthy of sanction. In other words, this is not an argument based on the claim that Israel has not done bad things (there are those who do say this, but that’s another argument); it is a way of saying: Israel has done things that are worthy of being sanctioned, but what about all these other bad things that other states have done? To which the answer should be: yes, by all means, let’s talk about all those other things. But regarding this particular set of bad things done by the state of Israel: if you are against BDS, then what do you propose as a way to actively address and ameliorate the injustices being perpetuated? And if those who oppose BDS—especially those who claim to also oppose the occupation while vociferously attacking those of us who support the academic and cultural boycott—refuse to provide an alternative beyond merely offering vague variations on “peace” and “dialogue,” then they should be honest enough to admit that they simply do not care enough about these injustices to want to actively intervene to try to bring them to an end. This is, we might say, a vague and wishful sympathy that never even approaches the point of true solidarity.

Again, I am hardly the first to suggest that the repetition of this charge of singling out Israel masks a position that maintains we simply should do nothing at all, and that is overall satisfied with the status quo. But I think this is a point that needs to be clearly articulated in the current climate. The BDS movement in general, and the movement in favor of an academic and cultural boycott in particular, is a response to a call to end certain injustices. It presents itself, quite clearly, as a call motivated by a set of circumstances in which these injustices have been, and continue to be, committed with almost complete impunity. One of the heartbreaking things about revisiting the original Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS, issued in July 2005, is that it repeatedly refers to the ongoing construction of the apartheid wall, and to the 2004 decision of the International Court of Justice declaring the wall illegal. Nearly a decade later, the wall has long been completed; it is now just another fact on the ground. This exemplifies the state of impunity that the movement for BDS is struggling to bring to an end, through an approach that relies on a growing popular movement rather than appeals to states or international organizations. Junot Díaz, who recently declared his support for the academic and cultural boycott, has described the importance of this popular movement to end impunity: 

If there exists a moral arc to the universe, then Palestine will eventually be free. But that promised day will never arrive unless we, the justice-minded peoples of our world, fight to end the cruel blight of the Israeli occupation. Our political, religious, and economic leaders have always been awesome at leading our world into conflict; only we the people alone, with little else but our courage and our solidarities and our invincible hope, can lead our world into peace.

Let me finish where I began. Why do I care? I find in the call for an academic and cultural boycott of Israel a call for justice, as well as a method aimed at achieving this justice.

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Maghreb and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Maghreb Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to maghreb@jadaliyya.com by Thursday night of every week.] 

Algeria

En Algérie, le régime est à bout de souffle Algerian police protested in front of the Presidential Palace for twenty-four hours last week calling for an end to “Hogra,” or humiliation. This unprecedented demonstration comes at a time when many are questioning who is running the country as President Bouteflika has not been seen in public since 21 September.   

Dispatches: Algeria’s ‘Disappeared’ Algerian families suffered many losses during the 1990 civil war. Human Rights Watch documents the continuation of protests organized by the families of the “disappeared,” who have been holding regular demonstration in Algiers for over fifteen years.

Bouteflika’s Possible Successors Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck of the Carnegie Middle East Center posits that all of Bouteflika’s potential successors will be products of the system and the transition in executive authority will leave very little room for reform. 

L’ANP verrouille la frontière algéro-libyenne The Algerian army has deployed all measures available, including some of the most advanced military technology, to secure the border with Libya amidst threats of radical militias attempting to enter Algeria.   

Libya

Benghazi de nouveau en proie à de violents combats General Khalifa Haftar led a military assault on Benghazi to retake control of Libya’s second largest city from Islamist militias.  

Civil society struggles for greater role in Libya's transition While civil society mobilization was nonexistent under Muammar Gaddafi, it has developed and become a force for change since the 2011 revolution in spite of security threats and political instability.

Libya PM says united forces aim to retake capital  Internationally recognized Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani stated that military forces had united and been placed under army command to try and take back Tripoli and Benghazi from Islamist militia groups.  

Libya: The war nobody can win Current developments in Libya can be understood as rival groups attempting to gather as many resources as possible to strengthen their negotiating position in future peace talks.  

Libya: The Lesser of Two Evils Mohamed Eljarh of the Atlantic Council argues that many Libyans have more confidence in Haftar’s military solution than in the United Nations sanctioned peace talks when it comes to defeating radical terrorist groups.

Mauritania

The Global Slavery Index: Mauritania Up to twenty percent of Mauritania’s population is still enslaved despite laws forbidding the practice.

Mauritanian musician Noura Mint Seymali wants to modernise the sounds she grew up with Noura Mint Seymali performed internationally for the first time at the UK Sahara Soul concert, and she intends to keep sharing Moorish music with the world.

Mauritania Uncovers Isis Cell  Security forces arrested four men in the town of Zouerate for alleged jihadist activities and making contact with Islamic State (ISIL).

Morocco

Affaire CDG-CGI, encore une histoire de gouvernance! Imane Azmi argues that the financial problems of Morocco’s public institutions, such as the CDG and CGI, are a product of poor governance practices.  

وكالة المغرب العربي للأنباء تحذف 20% من الترجمة الفرنسية من الخطاب الملكي بما فيها الحديث “النبوي” المزعوم The Maghreb Arab Press Agency deleted twenty percent of King Mohammed’s speech in the French translation, including the alleged fake hadith that the King cited.  

Single Mothers Face Judgment In The Streets Of Morocco AJ+ gives some insight into the marginalization that single mothers face in Morocco through this short documentary.

Moroccan rapper charged over videos and 'distorting' national anthem Another Moroccan rapper finds himself in trouble with the law for challenging dominant narratives of power. The young rapper from Casablanca, Othman A (“Mr. Crazy”), is currently in juvenile court for “distorting the words of the national anthem, immorality and encouraging drug use.”

علي أنوزلا يكتب: دبلوماسية الريع المغربية Ali Anouzla analyzes the system of patronage and rents in Moroccan diplomacy arguing that proximity to the palace is an integral objective in the system.

L’ultralibéralisme économique : cette facette méconnue du PJD Omar El Hyani addresses the ultraliberal economic platform espoused by Morocco’s Islamist party, analyzing their positions and rhetoric on education, health, and infrastructure.

Chabat et Lebbar en arrivent aux mains au Parlement Hamid Chabat of the Istiqlal party and Aziz Lebbar of the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) physically fought each other at the opening session of Morocco’s Parliament.

Tunisia

Législatives 2014 : Ceux qui y vont et ceux qui décrochent  Inkyfada dives into the motivations behind those of the candidates running for seats in Tunisia’s Legislature.

Stories of torture in police stations or inside the walls of jails are abundant In spite of Ben Ali’s infamous 2011 departure, systematic human rights violations continue to stain the image of Tunisia’s prisons and police stations.

Tunisian Confidence in Democracy Wanes  According to Pew Research polling Tunisians have lost confidence in democracy since the 2011 revolution. Support for the Islamist party Ennahda has also significantly declined. 

Tunisians prepare for momentous parliamentary elections Seventy-five percent of Tunisians have registered to vote in the upcoming legislative elections.

Western Sahara

Western Sahara/Algeria: Refugees Face Curbs on Rights Human Rights Watch published its most extensive report on the Polisario run Sahrawi camps in Algeria’s Tindouf province. In general, refugees have the freedom to move in and outside the camps but face restrictions on freedom of expression and some other rights.

Algeria Welcomes With 'Satisfaction' Adoption of UN Resolution On Decolonization in Western Sahara The UN General Assembly's Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) adopted a resolution on the Western Sahara, allegedly showing their commitment to the decolonization process even though a conflict resolution seems nowhere in sight.

Demonstration against Kosmos Energy in occupied Western Sahara Sahrawi women protested against Kosmos Energy oil exploration last week in Laayoune due to its blatant violation of international law.

Most Recent Articles from Jadaliyya’s Maghreb Page

New Texts Out Now: Edmund Burke III, The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam Edmund Burke III speaks to Jadaliyya about his recently released text, which examines the role colonial French ethnography had on shaping knowledge production on Morocco.

« Hamel dégage ! » : Les policiers algériens et les fissures de l'ordre Thomas Serres examines the impending collapse of the Algerian system through the lens of the unprecedented police protests that took place last week in Algiers.

إشكالية المجتمع المدني في المغرب Rachid Yamlouli considers the practical and theoretical causes for Morocco’s civil society problematic.

رحلتي إلى الراب والسياسة والسجن Moroccan rapper and human rights activist El-Haqed, or the “enraged one,” discusses his journey to rap, politics, and prison after his release.  

Civil Society Call for the Protection of Libya's Democratic Transition Various groups from Libyan civil society gathered together to demand a greater commitment to the country’s democratic transition and to emphasize the right of all Libyans to live in freedom and peace.

New Texts Out Now: Andrea Khalil, Crowds and Politics in North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya Andrea Khalil discusses her new book with Jadaliyya, which examines the theoretical conceptions of crowds and politics in Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya during the period between 2011-2012.

Morocco's Mawazine Festival: Exposing Class Tensions and Social Unrest The international music festival in Morocco highlights the problems with the country’s narrative of exceptionalism and the increasing gap between Morocco’s international image and the socioeconomic troubles that its residents face.

Erdoğan, Türk milliyetçiliği kartına oynuyor

Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü Öğretim Üyesi Prof. Abbas Vali, “IŞİD Kobani’ye sadece seküler, sadece Kürt olduğu için değil, direnişin metaforu olduğu için de saldırıyor. Kobani halkların iktidarını temsil ediyor ve bu yüzden herkes için bir tehlike arz ediyor” diyor. Hükümetin çözüm süreciyle ilgili çelişkilerine dikkat çeken Vali, AKP’nin son seçimlerden sonra Kürt sorununu çözen değil, Türk milliyetçisi bir parti olmaya oynadığını belirtiyor.

Ortadoğu ve Kürt siyasetinde uzman isimlerden Prof. Abbas Vali, IŞİD’den Ortadoğu’nun yeni dengelerine; çözüm sürecinden Duhok toplantısına hızlı akan gündeme ilişkin sorularımızı yanıtladı. Prof. Vali, söyleşimizi, IŞİD’e karşı savaşta hayatını kaybeden Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü yüksek lisans öğrencisi Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı’ya ithaf etti.

Çeviri için Fulya Alikoç’a teşekkür ederiz.

Serpil İlgun (Sİ): Sizce IŞİD neden tüm gücüyle Kobanê’ye saldırıyor?

Abbas Vali (AV): Bence IŞİD, Irak ve Suriye’de farklı amaçlar güdüyor.

Sİ: Hangi amaçlar bunlar?

AV: Irak’ta amacı devleti ele geçirmek ve kendi iktidarını kurmak. Ama Suriye’de şiddetli bir taşeron olarak çalışıyor. Türk tankları sınırda duruyor, AKP Ankara’da oturuyor ve Cumhurbaşkanı Tayyip Erdoğan, “Kobani düşmek üzere” diye açıklamalarda bulunuyor, çünkü bunu bekliyor. IŞİD’in evet, Suriye’de iktidarı ele geçirmek gibi bir hedefi de var, kendine has amaçları var, fakat asıl taşeron olarak orada duruyor.

Sİ: Kimin taşeronu?

AV: Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan’ın taşeronu gibi görünüyor şu anda. Ama bu ikisi için de artık tehlikeli bir strateji haline geldi. Suudi Arabistan’da IŞİD’e duyulan sempatinin ne kadar arttığını görüyoruz. Türkiye’nin de durumu yanlış hesapladığını görüyoruz. Çünkü IŞİD, Irak’taki başarısından sonra, Musul’u aldıktan sonra, militarist bir örgüt olmanın ötesine geçip sosyo politik bir hareket haline geldi ve Ankara bunu yanlış hesapladı.

Sİ: Ankara’nın temel yanlışı ne oldu?

AV: Bunun nedeni AKP’nin 80 yıllık Kemalist rejimden devraldığı bakış açısı. Bu da her zaman ana düşman olarak Kürtleri görmektir ve bütün politikayı buna göre belirlemiştir. Türkiye’de IŞİD’in Sünni bir hareket olduğunu düşünenler çok yanılıyor. Evet, AKP İslami bir güçtür ama oldukça etnik bir güçtür. Türk’tür AKP. Çünkü İslam’ın Türk yorumunu yapıyor ve bunu ancak etnik bir ulus devlet içerisinde gerçekleştirebilir. Ama IŞİD, anti etnik bir harekettir. Ümmet anlayışıyla hareket eder. IŞİD’in yorumuna uyan Müslüman’dır, uymayan değildir. Ankara’nın IŞİD’in İslam’ın Türk yorumunu kabul etmeyeceğini gömesi lazım, ama bunu anlamıyor.

Ankara’nın IŞİD hakkında görmesi gereken üç nokta var. Birincisi, Musul’u aldıktan ve Irak’ta diğer yerleri de ele geçirdikten sonra, IŞİD’in sadece bir örgüt değil, artık toplumsal bir hareket haline gelmeye başladığıdır ve toplumsal bir hareketle diplomatik yollarla anlaşma yapmanız çok zordur. İkincisi, eğer Türkiye IŞİD’i kendi amaçlarına evriltebileceğini sanıyorsa çok yanılır, çünkü Irak’ta elde ettiği gücü görmüyor, yanlış hesaplıyor demektir. Üçüncü nokta ise IŞİD’in Sünni kimliği yorumuna dayanıyor. Yani, Müslüman olup olmamak, IŞİD’in belirlediği koşullara uyup uymamakla belirleniyor.

Sİ: IŞİD, “PKK’ye laik, seküler bir yapı olduğu için saldırıyoruz” diyor...

AV: Bundan fazlası var.

Sİ: Nedir?

AV: IŞİD çok değişik bir güç aslında. PKK ile karşılaştırdığımızda 1984’ten beri bir direniş sergiliyor ve gerilla savaşı veriyor, biz buna düşük yoğunluklu savaş diyoruz. Fakat IŞİD, bir devlet gibi savaş yürütüyor. Gerekli tüm silah ve donanımlara sahip, işgal ediyor, direnişi çökertiyor ve şiddet kullanarak bunu yapıyor. Oldukça etkili bir terör yönetimi, barbarca yönetim var. Kobani’nin de Şengal gibi olacağını düşündüler ama Kobani’de insanlar direndi. Kobani direnişin simgesiydi fakat bunun ötesine geçti, direnişin metaforu haline geldi.

Sİ: Bunu biraz daha açar mısınız?

AV: Kobani’ye saldırı sadece seküler olduğu için değil, sadece Kürt olduğu için değil ya da direnişin sembolü olduğu için değil, direnişin metaforu olduğu için. Metafor ne demektir? İnsanların kendi anlamlarını yüklediği, kendilerince okuduğu bir şeydir. Kimileri İspanya iç savaşına benzetiyor mesela. Kimileri Stalingrad’a. Ve anti iktidarcı bir metafor. IŞİD’in temsil ettiği anlayışa ve IŞİD’i destekleyen, onu bir müttefik olarak gören diğer güçlerin temsil ettiği iktidara karşı bir metafor.

Kobani bir sistemi, halkların iktidarını temsil ediyor ve bu yüzden herkes için bir tehlike arz ediyor. Daha birkaç gün öncesine kadar ABD hiçbir şey yapmıyordu. Gelen haberlere bakılırsa, oradaki güçler dengesi değişmiş durumda ve IŞİD geri çekilir duruma gelmiş.

ABD, TÜRKİYE’Yİ TECRİT ETMEK İSTEMİYOR

Sİ: AKP, ABD’ye istediğini yaptırıyormuş algısı yaratmaya uğraşıyor. Buna karşılık ABD’nin de Türkiye’ye sert çıkışlar yapmaması dikkat çekiyor. Suriye özelinde ABD-Türkiye ilişkilerini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

AV: Bence ABD, Türkiye’yi tecrit etmek istemiyor. Bunun bir nedeni evet, orta Asya’da, Azerbaycan’daki petrol yatakları ama asıl önemli olan, Ortadoğu’nun değişen dengeleri ve Türk ordusu bu yüzden gerekli. ABD Türkiye konusunda gayet memnuniyetsiz ama ihtiyaç var ve bu yüzden tecrit etmek istemiyor.

Son 10 yıl içinde aslında Türkiye çok şey kaybetti. Federal Kürdistan yönetiminde ulusal çıkarlar kavramının spesifik bir hesaplamasını yapmaya çalıştı. Irak’ın içine baktı, oradaki Kürt sorunun “çözümüne” baktı ve oradaki bölgesel hükümetle bağımsız bir ilişki kurması on yılını aldı.

Sİ: Bağımsız ilişki derken?

AV: Yani, PKK ile müzakere yolu olmaksızın bir ilişki kurması 10 yılını aldı. Şimdi Kobani için de aynı şeyi yapıyor. Neden yapıyor? Son seçimlerin çok şeyi değiştirdiğini düşünüyorum. Kürtlerin oyu olmaksızın seçimi bu denli yüksek bir oyla kazanması Erdoğan’ı güçlendirdi. Erdoğan artık Kürt kartını oynamaya gerek olmadığını, bunun yerine Türk milliyetçiliği kartını ortaya çıkarmak gerektiğini düşünüyor. 2015 seçimlerine de böyle bakıyor. Artık AKP, Kürt sorununu çözen parti değil, Türk milliyetçisi partisi olmaya oynuyor. Bunun çok büyük bir hata olduğunu düşünüyorum, çünkü iktidar çevreleri yani Ankara, Kürt sorununu çok yanlış yorumluyor. Kürt sorununu bir örgüt ya da parti sorunu olarak görüyor. Ama Kürt sorunu, ulusal bir sorundur. Dolayısıyla bu soruna yanıtların ulusal olması gerekir.

Sİ: O halde, AKP’nin “çözüm süreci bizim için çok önemli, bundan vazgeçmeyeceğiz” açıklamasını, oyalama siyasetinin devamı olarak değerlendirenler haklı mı? Bunlar, 2015 seçimlerini garantiye alma manevrası mı?

AV: Bence son haftalarda olanlar durumu oldukça değiştirdi. Sadece PKK, Kürt siyaseti ve Kürt aydınları, entelijansiyası değil, sıradan insanlar da, Mardin’deki, Batman’daki insanlar da AKP’nin çözüm sürecindeki pozisyonunu samimi bulmuyor. Bu “sözde” barış süreci başladığında, müzakerelerin başarısının Hükümetin Kürt hareketini birleşik tutma ve Öcalan’ın otoritesinin altını oymama iradesine bağlı olduğunu söylemiştim. Ancak Hükümet Öcalan’ın otoritesinin altını oymaya çalışıyor ama bunu paradoksal bir şekilde yapıyor. Bir yandan örgüte “terörist” diyor, “IŞİD’le PKK aynıdır” diyor, öbür yandan Kürtler sokağa çıktığında Davutoğlu, sokakları sakinleştirmesi için Öcalan’a başvuruyor.

Sİ: Bu neyi gösteriyor?

AV: Türkiye Hükümetinin kısmi olarak meşruluğunun Kürt önderliğine bağlı olduğu anlamına geliyor bu. Yani siz bir sıkıyönetim, OHAL ilan ediyorsunuz ve gidip düşmanınızdan durumu sakinleştirmesini talep ediyorsunuz. Politik literatürde bunun adının ne olduğunu bilmiyorum! Hükümet görevlilerinin bu kibirli duruşları, içerde ne kadar güvensiz hissettiklerinin bir göstergesidir.

HERKESE AÇIK BİR ‘BARIŞ AJANDASI’NA İHTİYACIMIZ VAR

Sİ: Kürt hareketi “Kobanê düşerse çözüm süreci biter” diyor fakat hükümet, “Kobani’nin Türkiye ile ne alakası var” diyor. Sizce AKP olumlu adım atmaktan neden imtina ediyor?

AV: Kobani düşsün ya da düşmesin, son birkaç haftada olanlar başlatılan barış sürecinin eski ilkelerinin işlemeyeceğini göstermiştir. Eğer bundan sonra bir barış süreci kurulmak isteniyorsa, yeni ilkeler şunlar olmak zorunda: Birincisi, hükümetin PKK’yi politik olarak tanıması gerekiyor. Birine hem terörist deyip, hem onunla masaya oturamazsınız. Ne Güney Afrika’da böyle bir şey oldu, ne de dünyanın herhangi bir yerinde.

İkincisi ise, Kürt sorunun demilitarize etmek. Yani askerilikten arındırmak ve onu bir politik süreç meselesi haline getirmek. Bunda da ihtiyacınız olan bir yol haritası değildir. Yol haritasında “bir aşamadan bir aşamaya geçtik” dersiniz. Ama bunun işlemeyeceği görülmüştür.

Sİ: Sürecin nasıl işlemesi lazım? Ek olarak akil insanlara yeniden başvurulmasını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

AV: İhtiyacımız olan şey bir barış ajandasıdır. Ve tüm süreç herkese açık olmalıdır.

Bu barış ajandasının işlemesi için açık ve özgür bir basına ihtiyacımız var. Bunun olmadığı yerde süreç herkes tarafından görülebilecek açıklıkta işlemez. Yine, sivil toplum düzeyinde Kürt sorununun herkesçe kamuya açık bir şekilde tartışılıp konuşulabilmesi… İlgili ilgisiz taraflar diye düşünülmemeli; restoranlarda, üniversitelerde, her yerde tartışılabilmeli.  Hükümet akil insanları denedi ve ne işe yaradı, söyleyin bana? Akil insanlar diye bir şeyin yaratılması aslında Türkiye’de demokratik bir durum olmadığının göstergesidir. Eğer demokratik koşullar olsaydı zaten akil insanlara ihtiyacınız olmazdı.

ESAD’IN DÜŞMESİNİ İSRAİL DE İSTEMİYOR

Sİ: Suriye politikası AKP’yi içeride ve dışarıda oldukça sıkıştırıyor. Sizce AKP bu sıkışmışlıktan kurtulmak için Suriye/ Kobanê politikasında bir değişikliğe gider mi?

AV: Bunda üç değişken duruma bakmamız gerekiyor. Birincisi, ABD nereye kadar bu stratejiyle devam edecek? İkincisi, Amerika ve İran müzakereleri nasıl sonuçlanacak? Üçüncü olarak da, Irak’taki Kürt hükümetini, PYD’yi Esad karşıtı bir pozisyona ikna ederse, Türk hükümetinin pozisyonunu değiştirmesi ihtimal dâhilinde. Ama şunu da düşünmemiz lazım; ABD nereye kadar Türkiye’ye ihtiyaç duyuyor? Tampon bölge ve uçuşa yasak bölge, İran tarafından kabul edilmiyor. Ve ABD şunu biliyor ki, İran, Suriye’de önemli bir oyuncu.

Sİ: Amerika bu stratejiyle nereye kadar devam edecek derken, bir kara harekâtını da içine katıyor musunuz? Ek olarak, eğit-donat tartışması için ne düşünüyorsunuz? Eğitilenler kim, kimle savaşacaklar?

AV: ‘Eğit-donat’ın, göz boyamak için yapılan bir şey olduğunu düşünüyorum. Çünkü Almanlar ve İngilizler de Iraklı Kürt peşmergeleri eğitiyor. Amerikan yönetimi bölgedeki stratejiye dair bölünmüş durumda. Beyaz Saray mevcut stratejide ısrar ediyor, fakat Pentagon işgal istiyor. ABD Genelkurmay Başkanı Dempsey, zaten en başında bu stratejinin işe yarayıp yaramayacağı konusunda kuşkulu olduğunu belirtmişti. Amerikan yönetiminin içerisinde işe yaramadığını düşünenler çoğalıyor. Aslında ABD ve İngiltere, Arizona’da gerekirse Irak’a indirmek üzere birlikler eğitiyor. Ama Obama’nın istediği, Esad’a karşı Suriye’nin içinden bir muhalefet yaratmak.

Türkiye’ye gelecek olursak; Türkiye’nin, NATO onayı olmadan hiçbir yere girebileceğini zannetmiyorum.

Sİ:İsrail tüm bu planlarda nerede duruyor?

AV: Esad’ın düşmesini sadece İran değil, İsrail de istemiyor. Çünkü İsrail, Irak’taki gibi bir durumun ortaya çıkmasından korkuyor. On gün önce, “IŞİD, Ürdün’e girerse, IŞİD’e saldırırız” diye açıklama yaptılar. Yani AKP’nin politikaları sadece İran tarafından değil, İsrail tarafından da muhalefet görüyor. Birçok kişinin düşünmediği bir senaryo var. Eğer ABD ve İran arasında nükleer silah meselesinde açık ve net bir çözüm sağlanırsa, İran Esad’ın gönderilmesine ikna olabilir ama rejimin düşmesine değil. Esad gider ama rejim kalır. Oradan bir koalisyon hükümeti elde edebilirsin.

BARZANİ ZOR DURUMDA

Sİ: Barzani’nin çağrısıyla Demokratik Birlik Partisi (PYD) Eşbaşkanı Salih Müslim, Suriye Kürt Ulusal Koalisyonu (ENKS) ve Demokratik Toplum Hareketi (TEV-DEM) temsilcileriyle Duhok kentinde bir araya geldi. Siz bu toplantıdan Kobanê-Rojava için olumlu bir sonuç bekliyor musunuz? İkincisi Barzani’nin, Kobanê’ye destek vermesine Türkiye ne der? Barzani, Türkiye’yi karşısına alır mı?

AV: Barzani zaten zor bir durumda. Şu an Türk tankları namlularını Kobani’ye çevirmiş, Türkiye’nin Kürdistan’a ihracatı yüzde 48 düşmüş durumda. Ayrıca Kobani, bölge halkları açısından bir metafor haline geldiği için Barzani zaten oldukça zor durumda ve yapacak hiçbir şeyi yok durumunu değiştirebilmek için.

Sİ: Bu toplantının, Kürdistan ulusal kongresinin toplanmasına da zemin hazırladığına dair yorumlar var…

AV: Hayır. Önce Barzani, yani KDP ile PKK arasındaki sıkıntı çözülmeli. Bunun için de böyle bir toplantıdan fazlasına ihtiyaç var. Unutmayın ki, Şengal’de hala PKK güçleri var. PKK ile KDP arasındaki mesele Kürt toplumunu kimin yöneteceği. Bu o kadar kolay halledilecek bir mesele değil. Bu olmadan Kürt ulusal kongresi toplanamaz.

TÜRKİYE VE SUUDİ ARABİSTAN’IN HESAPLARI TUTMADI

Sİ: IŞİD’in bu kadar güçlenmesini siz nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Musul ve Şengal saldırılarıyla birlikte adını daha fazla duyuran IŞİD için Musul kilit nokta mıydı?

AV: Hayır, Musul olayı zaten karargahı Rakka’da olan IŞİD’in kendi gücünü konsolide etmesiyle gelişen olayların bir sonucuydu. Bana göre İŞİD’in ortaya çıkışı ve gelişmesi birçok farklı sürecin birleşmesinin bir sonucuydu. Birincisi, ABD’nin Suriye’deki stratejisinin başarısızlığı; ikincisi, Amerika’nın stratejisinin değişmesinin bir sonucu olarak Türkiye’nin Suriye’deki stratejisinin başarısızlığı. ABD’nin stratejisi askeri bir müdahale olmaksızın, Suriye’deki seküler ve dini müttefikleriyle -ki bunlar Suudi Arabistan, Türkiye ve Katar’dır- Esad’ı iktidardan düşürmekti. Fakat Ağustos-Eylül 2013’te bu strateji değişti.

Sİ: Neden?

AV: Bunun birinci sebebi, BM’nin oradaki güçler dengesini okuyuşu, ikincisi -ki en önemlisi olarak bunu görüyorum- ABD ile İran arasında değişen ilişki. ABD, İhvan gibi sözde ılımlı Müslümanların niyetinden ve Esad’ı devirme kapasitesinden kuşku duymaya başladı. Özellikle Mısır’da olanların Suriye’de tekrar olmasından endişelendi. İran’la müzakereye başladı. 2013 yazında Ruhani’nin iktidara gelmesiyle birlikte İran’la daha müzakere güden bir siyaset yürütmeye başladı. İran yönetimi özellikle nükleer silah meselesinin çözülmesi için ABD ile müzakere süreçlerine başladı.

ABD, Suriye’deki duruma baktı ve İran’ın Suriye meselesinde önemli bir oyuncu olduğunu gördü. Çünkü İran, Suriye’de iktidardaki rejimi korumakta çok kararlıydı. İran, Suriye’ye sadece askeri destek sunmakla yetinmedi. Aynı zamanda, muhaliflere karşı Esad’ın güçlerini örgütlemek için de güç gönderdi. Amerika, eğer Suriye’ye askeri bir müdahale yapmayacaksa, Suriye’deki duruma ilişkin İran’la anlaşmaya varması gerektiğinin fakına vardı. Bu konuda artık bir şüphemiz yoktur ki İran, Esad’ı mali olarak da desteklemektedir. Savaş için ona ödemeler yapmaktadır. ABD’nin müttefiklerine gelince; Katar, Suudi Arabistan ve Türkiye’nin aslında tek bir ortak amacı bulunuyor, bu da Esad’ı devirmek ve İran’ın etkisini kırmak. Bu noktada ortaklaşmalarına rağmen bunun nasıl yapılacağı konusunda hepsinin farklı görüşleri var. Bence Türkiye durumu yanlış hesapladı.

Sİ: Nerede yanlış yaptı?

AV: Amerika’nın askeri müdahaleye girişeceğini düşünerek, buna güvenerek hareket etti. Özellikle BM’de böyle bir anlaşmaya varılacağını düşünüyordu. Bunun bir amacı Esad’ı devirmekti. Fakat diğer bir amaç da Kürt sorununa bir son vermekti.

Amerikan’ın İran’la yakınlaşmasından sonra, Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan bu durumdan hiç hoşnut olmadı. Suudi Arabistan, sadece askeri bir müdahale ile Esad’ın devrilmeyişinden değil, aynı zamanda ABD ile İran yakınlaşmasından da memnun değil. Türkiye açısından ise aynı zamanda Kürt sorunuyla alakalı bir boyut var.

Sİ:İran’ın Esad’a desteği bu kadar aleniyken, ABD’nin İran’la yakınlaşmasını nasıl okumak gerek?

VA: Amerika Irak’ı terk ettikten sonra orada bir güç boşluğu doğmuştu. Bu boşluk Maliki’nin yönetime gelmesiyle Şiiler tarafından dolduruldu. ABD, birleştirici güçte bir insan olduğu için Maliki’yi destekledi. İran da destekledi çünkü Şii bir yönetimdi. İran bu sayede Tahran’dan Bağdat’a, Şam’dan Güney Lübnan’a bir erişim zinciri sağlamış oldu ve güçlü bir pozisyona geçti. Maliki’nin başarısızlığından sonra İran bu gücü biraz kaybetmişti. IŞİD kuşatması elini güçlendirdi.

Sİ: Nasıl güçlendirdi?

VA: Amerika’nın stratejisinin değişmesinden sonra, İran’ın avantajı şuydu, Hizbullah gibi bir müttefiki vardı. Ama Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan’ın böyle müttefiki yoktu, savaşan güçleri yoktu ve bunu yaratmak zorundaydılar. Bence her ikisi de İhvan ve El Nusra’yı destekledi, onları müttefik gördüklerinden. Çünkü Amerika’nın stratejisindeki değişiklikten sonra birçok grup ortaya çıktı. IŞİD’i bunların bir sonucu olarak görmek lazım. Esad’a karşı dini muhalefetin içinden çıkan bir sonuç olarak görmek lazım. Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan’ın her ne kadar resmi olarak kanıtlanmamış olsa da, IŞİD’e mali ve silah desteği verdiğinden hiçbir kuşkumuz yok.

PROF. ABBAS VALİ: İran Kürdistanı’nda yer alan Mahabad’da doğdu. Üniversiteden sonra akademik çalışmalar için Britanya’ya giden Vali, doktorasını Londra Üniversitesi’nde yaptı. Kürdistan Bölgesel Yönetimi’nin daveti üzerine 2006 yılında Erbil Üniversitesi’ni kurmak üzere, Irak Kürdistanı’na yerleşti. Ancak yönetimle arasında çıkan problemler nedeniyle buradan ayrıldı. 2008’den bu yana Boğaziçi Üniversitesi’nde öğretim üyeliği yapıyor. “Kürdistan Cumhuriyeti”, “Kürt Tarihi Kimliği ve Siyaseti”, “Kapitalizm Öncesi İran”, “Kürt Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri” kitapları Türkçe’ye çevrildi.

[Bu makalenin orijinali evrensel.net’te yayımlandı.]

Tunisia will go to the polls on 26 October in order to decide the composition of the new parliament and the new political balance that will determine the next phases of political transition. Since the uprising, there have been many and important steps toward real political and institutional change. Indeed, Tunisia has undergone a process of policy change involving the liberalization of political landscape, the subsequent participation of new political forces in the electoral process, the marginalization of the radical fringes, a dramatic rise in the levels of civil and political rights, and the adoption of a new constitution. Moreover, this process has taken place through national dialogue between the most important political actors, with civil society actors, such as the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), at the center of these talks.

All these factors paint a relatively optimistic future for Tunisia, especially on the eve of the next elections. Many analysts and experts have agreed in defining Tunisia as “the only success story” of the Arab Uprisings. Of course, there are still causes for concern, such as the ongoing economic difficulties Tunisia has to manage, the increasing polarization between Islamists and secularists, and the arbitrary arrests of political opponents and activists, which raise serious concerns about the question of human rights in the country. While this could be considered typical of political transitions, it is also indicative of various aspects of the democratization process, which has always entailed different phases leading up to the final stage. However, in addition to elements of optimism, it should be noted that Tunisia has yet to overcome a number of challenges in order to be considered a “successful case study” with regard to its process of democratization. These challenges can be addressed through policies and implemented by the new Tunisian government, but at the same time, their potential to generate new instability should not be discounted. 

Despite the fact that Tunisia is now a relatively more “free” country than it was four years ago, regional inequalities continue to plague the country. These inequalities represent the internal socio-economic concerns of the country and are characterized by marked differences in levels of development between the coastal regions and the internal, southern ones. As the most recent World Bank report underlines, the unemployment rate in the region of Gafsa, for example, exceeds thirty percent, while the national average, still high, is half of that. While access to basic services is fairly widespread in coastal regions, the same cannot be said about the western regions. In Tunis, ninety-seven percent of the population has access to water, whereas this percentage drops to forty percent in the rural areas of the northwest. Even wider is the gap in access to sanitation services. In Tunis, ninety-three percent of homes have access to sanitation services while only twelve percent do in Sidi Bouzid, for example. Seventy-seven percent of public health structures are concentrated in localities that are less than an hour away from a major city, while only one percent is located in villages that are more than two hours from major urban centers, where twenty percent of the Tunisian population lives. The government’s policy of investments in infrastructures during the past few decades has focused almost exclusively on the development of coastal areas. As for foreign investment, only thirteen percent of all companies that are established in Tunisia are located in lesser-developed areas.

Such differences are at the basis of the uprising of 2010-2011 and, until the regional gap is bridged, Tunisia cannot be said to be a country completely democratized. The spatial imbalance brings us to the real challenge for Tunisia today: economy. In part related to the problem of regional disparities, Tunisia's economy has a number of structural weaknesses. The high rate of unemployment is a structural problem in the country, as is evident with the high unemployment rate of graduates. Just before the fall of Ben Ali, what was painted as a model of development has now been characterized by its serious deficiencies, such as the low level of internal competitiveness, a high trade deficit, public debt, high level of corruption, and the absence of targeted investments for the development of the less well-off. The Jomaa government has, in part, been trying to start a process of reforms in the economic sector and, at the same time, Jomaa himself spent much time abroad in search of new investments and loans. However, the new government will have to implement an organic system of reforms that will make the Tunisian economy more competitive and adequate enough to meet the high standards of its workforce and infrastructures. 

While the economy still faces recovery, security issues have gained greater traction Tunisia during the last months. The question of security is closely tied to the political assassinations of two prominent members of the opposition: Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi. These assassinations and other occurrences are symptomatic of the emergence of new forms of radical Islamism and jihadism within the country. These are the result of a double phenomenon, one of which is linked to the expansion of groups linked to al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which is spreading in Tunisia and has become the perpetrator of several attacks against security forces on the border with Algeria, primarily in the area of the Chaambi Mountains. This internal war has already caused dozens of casualties among Tunisian soldiers. The other aspect is that there is a growing trend of radicalization among Tunisians, who are increasingly feeling marginalized by a process of transition that initially characterized them as protagonists. Oftentimes, these groups are comprised of disenfranchised youth, mostly concentrated in the suburbs of large cities, such as Tunis, and in lesser-developed areas, such as Kasserine. The so-called foreign fighters who went to fight in Syria and Iraq stand as a litmus test for the verification of this growing trend of radicalization in Tunisia. According to a study based on official estimates, there are more than three thousand Tunisian foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, the highest number of any foreign national group fighting in the region. From a political point of view, the troika government has focused exclusively on the suppression of the Salafi movement associated with Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST), taking advantage of the internal conflict for political capital. However, there is no evidence directly linking AST and the jihadist groups active in the Chaambi. Moreover, from the legislative point of view, there is the need for a new anti-terrorism law that goes beyond that of 2003, which has been criticized as detrimental to human rights. Most importantly, the Tunisian political class should be more inclusive in its processes, involving segments of the population that have been marginalized over the years.

It is difficult to talk about a successful transition when data about the growing disaffection toward the “new” politics paints an image of a Tunisian population that is increasingly disillusioned. According to a research conducted by the Pew Research Center, the percentage of Tunisians who now believe that democracy is the best kind of government is only forty-eight percent, against sixty-three percent in 2012. Seventy-three percent of Tunisians believe that the most important thing for the country is a strong economy, while only twenty-five percent think it is a democratic government. In comparison with 2012, the percentage of those who think that a stable government without democracy is better than the opposite has doubled from sixty-two percent. Eighty-one percent of respondents are not satisfied with how things are going in Tunisia and the two most popular institutions are the army and the police. From these data we can easily perceive the frustration that is still present among most Tunisians. As previously underlined, the security situation is deteriorating, while the socio-economic conditions have not yet improved. In light of these factors, most Tunisians think that a better economic situation–even without democracy–would be preferable to a democratic system without economic and political stability. On the one hand, this confirms how much economic and security issues are perceived as more important than democratization. On the other hand, this is a worrying signal that highlights the weaknesses of the current political class in failing to convince its constituents regarding its commitment toward democratization. 

Indeed, by contrast, the political parties that have been involved in the transition have been increasingly viewed with disfavor. The three parties making up the so-called troika, Ennahda, the Congress for the Republic (CPR), and Ettakatol, have seen their popularity fall compared to 2012, respectively, from sixty-five percent to thirty-one percent, from forty-eight percent to twenty-six percent, and from forty-four percent to twenty-six percent. This means that Tunisians negatively judge the government that has ruled so far. Therefore, this could turn into a victory for Nidaa Tounes, even if the conservative electoral base will likely support Ennahda again. However, the political actors in which Tunisians have more confidence are the current Prime Minister Jomaa (a technocrat), and the UGTT, a symptom of a disconnection between politics and citizens. Moreover, a generational gap does exist. Despite the post-Ben Ali openness, the most important political positions are still occupied by people belonging to the old guard. For example, RCD-linked figures are making a comeback within the ranks of Nidaa Tounes. Additionally, the average age of the various political parties' leadership is high, as exemplified by Beji Caid Essebsi, leader of Nidaa Tounes and one of the likely winners of the next presidential election, who is eighty-eight. In the light of these numbers, many Tunisians are asking themselves where the supposed new politicians are and whether or not it is worth to vote. In 2011, young people between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five who voted in the elections made up only seventeen percent of the total turnout. In the meantime, many young Tunisians preferred not to directly participate in the political process, but chose rather to be active within non-governmental organizations or within student movements.

The problems highlighted indicate that the Tunisian transition is still rife with obstacles. The parliamentary elections of 26 October represent a turning point in the democratization process of the country. However, in addition to the grounds for optimism there are persistent socio-economic and political problems that threaten a linear path of political transition. In particular, although there have been undeniable progresses in terms of political and civil liberties, there still remain difficulties in the economic field, as well as in the political system, which is still perceived as too distant from the real needs of the population. Post-elections Tunisia will have to be able to offer alternatives for all Tunisians and overcome internal ideological divisions. The need for renewal is as true for Ennahda, as (even to a greater extent) for the secular parties, who are oftentimes more involved in personality campaigns than in programmatic ones. However, what is needed to consolidate the first phase of transition is a structured political program with a long-term vision. If long-term policies are implemented in order to cope with these major challenges, then Tunisia could be said to have inched toward democratization. The conditions are there, but there is still a need for concrete responses to the challenges that, since 2011, have been left unaddressed on the Tunisian government’s table.

On Tuesday 14 October, I received a text from a friend—an activist who lives in the center of Algiers: “Urgent: the police are marching on Algiers. They are protesting next to my apartment, this is the end!” The protests started in the basin of Ghardaïa, eventually reaching the capital. One might have the impression that the structure of power in Algeria is suddenly threatening to collapse. Surely, this social movement in particular raises important questions. In a country where the state struggles to contain a permanent but dispersed unrest, the men in blue play a key role in preserving the prevailing order. Should we thus conclude that this recent wave of protests indicates a major political upheaval in Algeria?

Another Sectoral Movement?

The mobilization of the police adds yet another event to the succession of protests by specific professional sectors in the country. Since the beginning of the year, strikes occurred in the domains of education (teachers in secondary schools and administrative employees), transportation (the National Company for Rail Transport, Algiers's subway, Air Algérie), the post office, and the famous steel factory at El Hadjar. As the policemen began their protests in Ghardaïa last week, doctors working at a hospital in Aïn El Hammam, in the Wilaya of Tizi Ouzou, began their own “unlimited movement” in order to obtain better working conditions. Socio-economic demands emanate from all parts of the society, though they are especially prominent among public employees They express legitimate claims directed at a government that has bragged about the huge quantity of financial reserves hoarded in Algeria during the last decade, reserves which recently reached around two hundred billions dollars, according to the World Bank. 

The anger of the men in blue is intimately linked to this general context of unrest, fed by the gap between governmental boasting and social realities. These contradictions are exacerbated in the heart of the state apparatus, where public servants experience institutionalized predation at the highest echelons of the state as well as dramatic precariousness. The police are hardly an exception to this rule. When instructed to maintain public order in Ghardaïa, a city divided by continual tensions between its Mozabite and Chaamba communities, the cops were forced to feed themselves with cans of tuna and wafers. Without glorifying these baton-wielders, the sentiment that that this diet is unfit for public servants (who had spent ten consecutive months in the field, being exposed to urban clashes and physical danger on a daily basis) is surely understandable. The least their superiors could do is to provide them with adequate nourishment. These difficult conditions were a particularly fertile ground for a new wave of unrest. In fact, the general director of the Sûreté Nationale (national police or DGSN), the retired general-major Abdelghani Hamel, felt the first tremors of this movement a few months ago. At the beginning of June, he admitted that the improvement of his subordinates' social conditions was an “imperative action.”

The moment was ripe for another sectoral movement to gain momentum. After all, during the last few years, social unrest has not spared the Algerian security apparatus. The sector has no special immunity against the widespread discontent, as shown by the communal guards (a paramilitary corps), who were once a valuable support in the regime's crackdown on Islamist guerillas during the civil war.[1] Since 2011, they have been protesting and asking for more respect from the state. Should we thus consider this movement to be a mere continuation of the ongoing routine of strikes and protests that has marked the Algerian landscape? There is one compelling reason to answer in the negative: in this case, the very foundations of the order are at stake. In other words, this movement is surely an indication that a major upheaval in the political order cannot be delayed forever.

A Fractured Police State

To return to our discussion of the communal guards, they totaled around 90,000 members when the body was officially dissolved in 2012. As a rather peripheral tool rendered obsolete by the “residual” dimension of Algerian terrorism, the communal guard does not appear to be central to the regime's ability to control and coerce. Consequently, during the Arab uprisings, the communal guards’ marches faced harsh repression from the hands of police. After they managed to organize a sit-in in the heart of the capital, the Martyrs' Square was closed to the public, allegedly due to the extension of the subway and the subsequent archaeological searches. Yet, even after their dissolution, the National Coordination of the Communal Guards (Coordination Nationale des Gardes Communaux) continued to mobilize. The organization even evolved toward an increasingly frontal opposition vis-à-vis the presidency. Most notably, they denounced Bouteflika’s fourth mandate and questioned the policy of national reconciliation, a key feature of his presidency. When the protests started again during the spring of 2014, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal rapidly gave in to their demands.

The elements of the security apparatus are especially important for the Algerian order, which reconfigured itself during the Bouteflika's first three terms in office. In 2012, General Major Hamel's DGSN had grown to over 188,000 policemen, while the strength of General Major Boustilla's Gendarmerie Nationale stood at 133,000 individuals. The growth of these two bodies shows the transition from a military regime, which existed during the civil war, to a police state that appears to be more compatible with the “upgrading” of the order.[2] Nevertheless, when the discontent reaches the DGSN, and more precisely the Republican Units of Security (the anti-riot police), the entire power structure seems to be shaking. Indeed, except for the highly improbable intervention of the army, there is no real obstacle preventing the demonstrations of the men in blue. A prime example of their capacity to protest unhindered is the ease with which they were able to occupy the space in front of the presidential palace in El Mouradia.[3] 

Moreover, the cracks in the foundation of the Algerian political order explain why Tayeb Belaïz, the Minister of Interior, and Abdelghani Hamel hurried to Ghardaïa in order to show their goodwill and announce that the government would meet the demands of the protesters. Officials in the Ministry of the Interior even suggested that the policemen might form their own independent union. Unsurprisingly, eager to end this critical stand off, Belaïz and Hamel promised that no punishment would be taken against the protesters. The DGSN even supplied its own buses to help bring the protesting police officers back to their barracks rapidly. One should point out that, in addition to the classic demands regarding wages and working conditions, the strikers chanted “Hamel irhal!” (“Hamel, leave!”), which undoubtedly reminded the authorities of the winds of change that came with the spring. 

Internal Contradictions Are Increasingly Intolerable

Before we get too excited: if this slogan initially seems revolutionary, it is because it invokes the recent past of political contestation and upheaval in the region. Yet the same individuals who repeated this slogan were in charge of physically assaulting numerous people: the Coordination nationale pour le changement et la démocratie (CNCD), the students in 2011, the communal guards in 2012, the unemployed from the south in 2013, the Barakat movement, and the Berberists in 2014, not to mention the sporadic riots that have occurred all over the country. These cops are merely angry with their superiors; they are not revolutionaries. In short, they want the replacement of Hamel, not the fall of the regime—and they are certainly not seeking social justice or the end of hogra. 

So what can we conclude from these slogans directed against Abdelghani Hamel? First, the head of the Algerian police is not a mere public servant who the president appoints. Hamel is the former chief of the Republican Guard, a general who holds significant political power in Bouteflika's Algeria. As the head of the DGSN, he has become one of the most powerful praetorians, along with Gaïd Salah (the Chief of Staff), Boustilla (the head of the Gendarmerie), and Toufik (the notorious chief of the secret services, the DRS). Unlike these latter figures who exercised their functions for a longer period of time, Hamel was appointed in 2010, after the assassination of his predecessor under mysterious circumstances. Consequently, he yields less power over the institution. The direction of the police has long been the center of the usual power struggles that reveal the highly fragmented nature of the Algerian regime. Ever since Bouteflika appointed Hamel, he has been presented as a close ally of the presidential clan. He even seemed to be a potential successor to the president at the beginning of this year when there were doubts regarding the possibility of Bouteflika’s fourth mandate. In the present situation, the speculations regarding the conflicts within the DGSN are booming. Some have posited that these tensions are the result of a struggle between the DRS and the presidency in order to establish a plan for the succession. Others echo the well-known chorus that unspecified actors have manipulated the police, a state of affairs that could lead to a dramatic destabilization of the country. As always, there is no certitude regarding the current balance of power or the exact nature of this threat. In other words, there is nothing really new under the Algerian sun. 

Even if there is no indication that a new element will change the status quo of this latent crisis, one can say with no doubt that the existing order is not at its prime. Bouteflika will not reappear as a viable political force, and the echoes of “democratic transition” regarding the dark hole of the presidency seem hackneyed and unconvincing. The regime’s official mouthpiece, the newspaper El Moudjahid might as well continue its chronicles of Bouteflika’s diplomatic visits. But one will need more that a weekly picture with the heir apparent of Abu Dhabi (or the Minister of Sport from Vanuatu, for that matter) to fill the power vacuum at the pinnacle of the state. Meanwhile, the prime minister meets with police protesters and admits that he does not have the power to fire Hamel. Despite his statutory moustache and his technocratic profile, Sellal has neither an electoral mandate nor support from a political apparatus. At the present time, he is no more than a performer of the presidential will, which remains lost in the hallways of the presidential palace. The dynamic of fragmentation in Algeria is even more apparent than in was last June, when a meeting of the Central Committee of the FLN held at the El Aurassi hotel in Algiers turned into an all out brawl (caught on camera) between supporters of Amar Saïdani and Abdelaziz Belkhadem. Internal contradictions continue to paralyze Algerian institutions and ruling parties, exacerbating fears that the order will collapse. This event would tear Algerian society apart that is still traumatized by the civil war. 

Six months after Bouteflika's reelection, it is now clear that the fourth mandate has only delayed the answers to a number of fundamental issues: How can the current state of generalized corruption and stasis be resolved?  How is it possible to end the economic dependence on hydrocarbon rent? What strategies can promote social justice and coexistence in the face of a widely shared feeling of hogra? Is there a way to save the educational system that continues to suffer from the structural adjustment program of the nineties? What is the best way to address the ongoing insecurity that lends itself to the mortiferous ambiance that has reigned since the end of the civil war? The police officers’ protests represent a petty struggle that fragments the regime. Yet, they also confirm that the regime is fundamentally unable to provide answers to these pressing questions. When the police express their discontent with the status quo, it seems evident that the order is being inundated from all sides. The regime’s ship will need more than a few simple repairs to avoid drowning.

[This article was originally published in French and translated to English by Muriam Haleh Davis.]

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.] 

Regional and International Relations:

USAID Tamped Down Internal Criticism over Egypt Work: Report
Reuters reports that the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) inspector general has heavily edited a twenty-one page document criticizing the agency’s work in Egypt, cutting it to just nine pages.  

Carter Center Under Fire in Egypt
Khaled Dawoud argues that the closure of the Carter Center in Cairo will have only a short-term impact on the United States’ relations with Egypt.

We are Fighting Terrorism and We Will not Succumb to the Brotherhood
Hassan Abou Taleb writes on Egypt’s international rhetoric on its “war on terror.”

Egypt Postpones Indirect Palestinian-Israeli Talks: Hamas
Indirect Palestinian-Israeli talks have been postponed due to security concerns, Ahram Online reports.

Egypt Will Not Renew Navigation Agreement with Turkey
Aswat Masriya reports that the 2011 navigation agreement between Turkey and Egypt will not be renewed because it did not achieve “required financial revenues.”

Human Rights and Rule of Law:

Joint Letter to the HRC Re: UPR Review of Egypt - November 5, 2014
Human Rights Watch releases a joint statement with Amnesty International and five other human rights groups containing proposals for the implementation of judicial reforms in Egypt.

Seventeen Sentenced to Five Years in Jail for Rioting during Constitutional Referendum
Mada Masr reports on the verdict against the seventeen pro-Muslim Brotherhood protesters for causing riots during the constitutional referendum in January of this year.

Lawyer: Prison Sentence for Twenty-Three Activists is Political
Mada Masr reports on the verdict against activists who protested near Cairo’s Etihadiyya Palace. Click here to read the article in Arabic.

Egypt’s Detained Minors: A Hardship Untold
Reem Gehad sheds light on the arrest of minors on charges such as illegally protesting, and supporting the Muslim Brotherhood.

Should Egypt be Governed by Majority Rule or by Rule of Law?
Mohammed Nosseir writes on the setbacks of establishing and implementing a majority rule system in Egypt.

NGOs Lose Ground in Sisi's Egypt
Ola Kubbara writes, “NGOs in Egypt did not expect to have fewer freedoms under al-Sisi's presidency. But regressive laws and regulations governing them are now being reinforced.”

Egypt in Classism Row Over Prosecutors Sacked Because Parents Had No Degrees
Patrick Kingsley reacts to officials’ refusal to reinstate 138 prosecutors because their parents do not have degrees.

Prospects for Judicial Reform in Egypt
Yussef Uaf suggests several reform strategies to apply to the judiciary without destroying the original structure of the institution itself.

Endowments Ministry Inspectors Granted Right of Civilian Arrests
Menan Khater writes on the Justice Ministry’s granting of the Endowments Ministry “the right to arrest any civilian who violates religious speech law and regulations inside mosques.”

Did Producer Lead Al Jazeera Coworkers Straight to Jail?
Mohannad Sabry writes, “The judge in the trial of three Al Jazeera journalists in Egypt based his verdict on testimony provided during the interrogation of one of the defendants, Baher Mohamed, but the validity of Mohamed's statements is questionable.”

Better Late than Never: How to Rebound State Fragility in Egypt?
Abdulla M. Erfan responds to the Fund for Peace index on the state of Egypt’s fragility compared to 178 countries.  

University Protests:

Al-Azhar Students, Faculty to be Expelled for Protests: Presidential Decree
Ahram Online reports, “President Abdelfattah al-Sisi issues decree allowing expulsion for anything that harms educational process at Islamic university.”

Egypt’s Crackdown on Student Protests: The Last “Open Space”
Rana Muhammad Taha writes on the emergence of the Students Against the Coup Movement following Morsi’s ouster, and the authorities’ response to their on-campus demonstrations.  

Gender Studies and Sexuality:

How to Raise a Monster
Nada Riyadh writes on society’s definition of gender roles and norms. This article is translated and published in Arabic.

Parliamentary Elections:

Former NDP Figures Prepare for Strong Showing in Egypt's Parliamentary Polls
Gamal Essam al-Din writes on the Egyptian Front Party’s preparations for the parliamentary elections.

Reports and Opinions:

Interview on ABC Radio on Egypt’s latest situation
ABC Radio interviews PhD candidate Amro Ali, who discusses protests, the status of human rights, state violence, and Australian journalist Peter Greste’s case in Egypt. Click here to listen to the audio file.

Egypt’s “Poor Revolution”?
Sarah Moawad writes on a newly founded movement called the “Poor Revolution” that cites a number of economic and social grievances that have magnified under the socioeconomic policies of the current regime.

In Egypt, Media is Made to Serve the Interests of the Regime
William Barnes comments on the censorship measures pursued by the current regime against the media.

Egyptian TV Host Suspended as Network Slams Content 'Demotivating the Army'
Marina Barsoum writes, “TV anchor Mahmoud Saad is prevented from going on-air after a guest on his regular show refers to the 1967 defeat of the army.”

Proposed Community Police Would Do More Harm than Good: Experts
Mada Masr reports on experts’ reactions to the Ministry of Interior’s approved proposal to establish a new division within Egypt’s police force called the “Police Community.”

MB-Affiliated Protesters Clash with Police in Haram during Friday Protests
Pro-Brotherhood protesters and police clash during the weekly Friday Anti-Coup protests, Mada Masr reports.  

In Numbers: A Change in the Nature of Armed Attacks in Sinai
Marium Mohamed writes a detailed account of the number of attacks and civil and military deaths in Sinai since June of this year.   

Curfew and Three-Month State of Emergency in North Sinai Following Attacks
A state of emergency was declared on Saturday following the deadly attack on security forces in Northern Sinai in which at least thirty-one lost their lives. 

Egypt's al-Sisi Says Foreign Hands behind Friday Sinai Attack; Vows Action
President al-Sisi reacts to the Sinai attack that killed thirty-one troops, Ahram Online reports.

MB Condemns Deadly Sinai Checkpoint Attack
In the statement, ousted president Mohamed Morsi’s family condemns Friday’s deadly attack on a security checkpoint in Sinai, and blames the state for its failure to restore security in the Peninsula.

In Arabic

قوى سياسية تشكل جبهة وطنية لمواجهة الإرهاب
Al-Shorouk reports that a number of political leaders and heads of political parties have formed a national coalition to fight terrorism.

أفكار لمواجهة الفساد
Amr Hamzawy lists four suggestions to fight governmental corruption in Egypt.

معركة الهضبة
Isabel Eastrman highlights Sharm el-Shaikh’s community’s collective action tostop the Arab Contractors’ project on the Um el-Sayyed Hill, which may lead to geological and environmental crisis.

الجامعة والمستقبل
Mahmoud Abdelfadeel argues that the situation on university campuses will not be resolved unless the state takes inclusive and comprehensive measures to rid the country from corruption and tyranny.   

تدشين حملة للبحث عن المختفين قسريا
Omar Said writes on the Hisham Mubarak Law Center’s press conference launching a campaign to search for forcibly disappeared detainees.

المبادرة المصرية للحقوق الشخصية تشعر بالصدمة إزاء الحكم على المدافعة عن حقوق الإنسان يارا سلام
The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights releases a statement on the verdict against rights activist Yara Sallam in addition to twenty-two other co-defendants, found guilty of demonstrating against the Protest Law. This statement is translated and published in English.

تأجيل جلسة «غرفة عمليات رابعة» إلى 5 نوفمبر.. وتضارب فى تقارير إضراب «سلطان»
Mada Masr reports that a Cairo criminal court adjourned “The Rab‘a Operation Room” case session to 5 November and that there are contradictory reports on Mohamed Sultan’s hunger strike status. 

سيناء.. بين الحلول الأمنية وتصعيد الخطاب الإعلامي
Mustafa Muhie reports on the media’s rhetoric following the deadly explosion that targeted a security checkpoint in Northern Sinai.

«أجناد مصر»: انفجار الجامعة استهدف الشرطة.. والشرطة: الانفجار استهدف الطلاب
Mada Masr writes on the contradictory statements of the militia group “Ajnad Masr” and the police on the university explosion on Wednesday.

ما وراء تنحية الخلافات
Fahmy Huwaidy analyzes Egyptian-Sudanese relations following al-Sisi’s meeting with President Omar al-Bashir.  

هل تصلح "داعش" العلاقات المصرية الإيرانية
Rami Galal argues that the rise of the Islamic State (IS) may lead both Iran and Egypt to reconsider their countries’ bilateral relations. This article is translated and published in English.

الصراع المصريّ - التركيّ من الأمم المتّحدة إلى ساحة الأزهر الشريف
Walla Hussain writes on the escalation of tensions between Turkey and Egypt following Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly. This article is translated and published in English.

قيادات دينيّة تناقش عودة جلسات النّصح للراغبين في تغيير دينهم
Ahmed Fouad writes on the social ramifications of forced religious conversions in Egypt, and the role that both Muslim and Christian leaders play in holding counseling sessions for those who express their desire to convert religions. This article is translated and published in English. 

Recently on Jadaliyya Egypt

Press Release: Announcing the Website of Watch/Raqeb -- An Arab Regional Project on Information Access
Jadaliyya’s Reports Page announces the launch of a new website called “Raqeb” (Watch), which focuses on the impact of international politics on the Middle East.

Hydrogen Senior Project Exhibition
Medrar TV reports on “‘Hydrogen’ a 2014 senior student exhibition of the American University in Cairo's Visual Cultures Program.”

This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya last week. It also includes a list of the most read articles and roundups. Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our "Last Week on Jadaliyya" series.

• On the BDS Blacklist
• عن سركون بولص في ذكراه
• أشباح سركون بولص
• ذكريات صغيرة عن سركون بولص
• Letter to Amcha Initiative Regarding Its Report on UCLA Center for Near Eastern Studies
• How Not To Understand ISIS
• In Memory of Suphi Nejat Agirnasli
• هل يمكن إنقاذ العراق؟
• New Texts Out Now: Edmund Burke III, The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam
• Beyond Uncritical Optimism: The Challenges for Transitional Tunisia

• Syria Media Roundup (October 20)
• Last Week on Jadaliyya (October 13-19)
• O.I.L. Media Roundup (20 October)
• Turkey Media Roundup (October 21)
• Egypt Media Roundup (October 20)
• Maghreb Media Roundup (October 23)
  
  

• “Hamel, Leave!”: The Men in Blue and the Fracturing of the Order
• Assault on Academic Freedom: Neoliberalism and the Corporatization of Universities, Live Stream Event with Steven Salaita (27 October 2014 at GMU)
• Beyond Uncritical Optimism: The Challenges for Transitional Tunisia
• Letter to the Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights under Law regarding Attack on Title VI-Supported Middle East Studies Centers
• Declaration by Scholars for Peace in Solidarity with the Saturday Mothers of Turkey
• Erdogan, Turk milliyetciligi kartina oynuyor
• Maghreb Media Roundup (October 23)
• On the BDS Blacklist
• أشباح سركون بولص
• ذكريات صغيرة عن سركون بولص
• عن سركون بولص في ذكراه
• New Texts Out Now: Edmund Burke III, The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam
• Egypt Media Roundup (October 20)
• Turkey Media Roundup (October 21)
• ضياء الدين ساردار: مطارحة الإسلام والمستقبل
• هل يمكن إنقاذ العراق؟
• Operation Protective Edge and Legal Remedies
• O.I.L. Media Roundup (20 October)
• Hydrogen Senior Project Exhibition
• Last Week on Jadaliyya (October 13-19)
• Syria Media Roundup (October 20)
• استقصاء السماء
• « Hamel dégage ! » : Les policiers algériens et les fissures de l'ordre

September - October 2014

Nile Sunset Annex, Cairo

Sarah Samy (b. 1992) is an artist from Alexandria, Egypt. She often explores technical glitches, and works with computers, making digital paintings and drawings, GIFs and websites. For her first solo show at Nile Sunset Annex, Samy presents five sculptural and installation works.

[تنشر جدلية بالاشتراك مع مجموعة الـدكتافون ومؤسسة "آرت-ايست" نصوصاً تتناول الحق في الوصول إلى الشاطىء في العالم العربي تحت عنوان "من هنا البحر". نشرت هذه النصوص باللغة الانكليزية على موقع آرت-ايست. تنشر سلسلة "من هنا البحر" تباعاً على موقع جدلية خلال الأسبوع القادم. ]

التقينا أبو حسين عندما كنا مرة جالسين في مقهى "أبو عضل" في الدالية في بيروت. أخبرنا بأنه من الصيادين العشرة الذين طردوا من غرفهم المطلة على البحر التي كانت تقع تحت مقهى "جراند كافيه" على الساحل الجنوبي لبيروت. لقد استخدم الصيادون هذه الغرف على مدى السنوات الأربعين الماضية وهي أيضاً مدة وجود المقهى هناك. لكن المقهى لم يكن يبدو مثل اليوم. منذ أن قرر أصحاب المقهى "ترقيته" عام 2010 رأوا أن وجود الصيادين غير مرغوب فيه بينهم ومصدر إزعاج للصورة الجديدة التي يحاول المقهى تصويرها. هكذا تم إخلاء الصيادين ومنح كل واحد منهم تعويضاً مالي بقدرة 4000 دولاراً أمريكي وتم نقلهم إلى غرف صيادين جديدة في منطقة الدالية.  

اليوم يواجه صيادو الدالية معركة مماثلة إذ استلموا مؤخراً دعوى قضائية لإخلاء المنازل التي كانوا قد بنوها بشكل غير رسمي منذ الخمسينات. إخلاء الصيادين يشير الى مشروع عقاري خاص يخطط له في الدالية. 

كل موقع على ساحل بيروت له قصة مختلفة. عممت تقارير عديدة حول الطرق التي يتم من خلالها إغلاق البحر تدريجياً عن العامة. كما وأفادت دراسات حول استعمال بعض القانونين أو استثناءً على قانون معين أو تعدياً على قانون من قبل النخبة السياسية لتمكين بناء فنادق كبرى ومنتجعات بحرية خاصة تستقبل شريحة محدودة من الناس فقط.

في الواقع منذ نهاية الحرب الأهلية اللبنانية عام 1990 وتشهد بيروت أشكالاً متنوعة من السيطرة على الفضاء العام. تحديداً، لقد رأت المدينة الاختفاء التدريجي لأراضيها الساحلية التي كان بإمكان العامة الوصول إليها. حدث ذلك وما يزال من خلال إباحة خصخصة الخط الساحلي الذي شهدناه خلال سنوات الحرب الأهلية وحتى قبل ذلك أيضاً.

في هذا السياق تم تخيل مشروع "هذا البحر لي". هو عرض حي أدائي مرتكز على بحث حول الموقع نستكشف من خلاله مفاهيم الوصول إلى البحر والفضاء العام في جميع أنحاء المدينة مرتكزين على شاطىء بيروت. لقد دعي الجمهور للمشاركة في رحلة على متن قارب صيد من ميناء الصيادين في عين المريسة وصولاً الى الدالية وشاطئ الرملة البيضاء.

توقفنا أثناء الرحلة عند كل منتجع وكشفنا ملكية عقاره والقوانين التي تحكمه وممارسات مستخدميه. اعتمد المشروع في تطويره على البحث الميداني والتعاون مع العديد من الصيادين وجمع التاريخ الشفوي ودراسة النصوص القانونية. جنباً إلى أدائنا عرضاً حياً خاص في الموقع تم أيضاً طبع ونشر كتيب بحث يتضمن خرائط من نتائج البحث ونصوص وروايات شفوية. وزع الكتيب على الصيادين المحليين وجمهور العرض والعديد من الأماكن العامة في بيروت كما واستخدم كأداة خلال العرض.

في إشارة إلى الخريطة الرئيسية في الكتيب بدأت الرحلة جنب "خليج الزيتونة" وهو قسم من كورنيش البحر حيث يتم مراقبة العامة عن كثب من قبل جيش من الحرس الخاص وكاميرات المراقبة. أنها منطقة مارينا جديدة تم إنشاؤها على أنقاض ميناء تاريخي للصيادين وقد تحول الآن إلى احدى أغلى العقارات السكنية في المنطقة.

توقف القارب عند منتجع "الريفيارا" الذي يقع في المنطقة التاسعة من مخطط بيروت سنة 1954 الذي يمنع أي بناء فيها. مع ذلك تمكن منتجع "الريفيارا" من الاستفادة من مرسوم 4810 الصادر سنة 1966 والذي يسمح باستغلال الملك العام من قبل المنتجعات الخاصة.

رحلتنا تمر بالقرب من "الحمام العسكري" وهو منتجع ضخم على الشاطئ فيه برك سباحة ومطاعم وملاعب وشاليهات. يملك هذا المشروع الجيش اللبناني ويستخدمه كنادي للضباط. أقيمت جميع مباني هذا المنتجع على أراضي عامة حيث يحظر التنظيم المدني أي شكل من أشكال البناء مما يعني أن هذا المشروع غير قانوني بتاتاً.

تستمر الرحلة وتمر عبر عدة حالات مماثلة وقبل الوجهة الأخيرة نعرض على الجمهور حالة فندق "الموفنبيك". هذا العقار يكمن في المنطقة العاشرة من الخطة الرئيسية لبيروت عام 1954 التي تسمح بالبناء على 15٪ فقط من العقار مع أقصى ارتفاع لا يتجاوز التسعة أمتار وعليه أن يكون بالتحديد لممارسة الرياضات والأنشطة البحرية. رغم ذلك تمكن رجل من عائلة ضاهر شراء هذا العقار خلال الحرب الأهلية عام 1986 تحت اسم شركة "ميريلاند". ومن خلال علاقاته مع الطبقة السياسية في ذلك الوقت استطاع أيضاً تحصيل رخصة بناء لتنفيذ فندق من عشر طوابق يستعمل أغلبية مساحة العقار. كما وتمكن ضاهر عام 1988 من الحصول على رخصة بناء من خلال "مرسوم رئاسي" مدعياً أنه لم يكن باستطاعته استشارة الجهات المختصة بالتراخيص!

الفضاءالعامكمايستخدم

على الرغم من الظروف المذكورة أعلاه أو ربما أحياناً بسبب هذه الظروف ما زال سكان بيروت يستخدمون عدداً محدوداً من المناطق المفتوحة في المدينة. تستعمل هذه المساحات باعتبارها "عامة" بمعنى أنه يتم الوصول إليها بحرية والسماح لمجموعة من الأنشطة الاجتماعية الغير محصورة أن تحدث فيها. في هذه الحالات قد يتم تأمين الوصول إلى هذه الأماكن من خلال إتفاقات إجتماعية ومجتمعية يتم من خلالها تنظيم استخدامات هذه الأمكنة.

واحدة من هذه الحالات هو مقصدنا الأخير في رحلة "هذا البحر لي" وهي "دالية" بيروت.

الدالية هو اسم قطعة كبيرة من الأرض البحرية أمام صخرة الروشة وتمتد بين فندق "الموفنبيك" وكورنيش البحر. تتكون الأرض من عدة عقارات خاصة كبيرة. أعلن هذا الموقع منذ الأربعينات كأرض غير مبنى عليها تعود ملكيتها لأسر عديدة. 

لكن دالية بيروت تستخدم اليوم كواحدة من الأماكن العامة الرئيسية في المدينة. تعم بمرفئي صيد والعديد من الأكشاك الغير رسمية على شاطئ البحر وسيل من الزائرين للتمتع بالبحر والتنزه والسباحة. الدالية هي الوجهة الرئيسية للسباحين والغواصين الذين يأتون من مناطق مختلفة من بيروت لممارسة شغفهم في القفز من المنحدرات العالية في مياه البحر الأبيض المتوسط. في الذاكرة الشعبية للبيروتيين لطالما حصلت هذه الممارسة في الدالية. كما وتشمل الدالية مجموعة متنوعة من الفئات الاجتماعية مثل الصيادين البيروتيين وسكان الضواحي واللاجئين العراقيين والعمال واللاجئين السوريين وغيرهم.

رغم أن الدالية متكونة تاريخياً من عقارات مملوكة من قبل العديد من العائلات البيروتية هناك عدد لا يحصى من القصص التي تحكي أنه منذ خمسينات القرن الماضي كان يتم استخدامها كوجهة نزهة معروفة خاصةً في أيام العطل ونهاية الأسبوع. حتى السبعينات كانت تتجمع الاسر فيها في كل نهار جمعة مع مأكولات ومشروبات وأراكيل يستمتعون بالعزف على العود أو البزق أو الطبلة. كان يسمى هذا النشاط بالسيران وهي الممارسة التي يقوم بها البعض في مناطق تنزه محددة. بالإضافة إلى ذلك وحتى الستينات كانت الدالية وشاطئ الرملة البيضاء يستضيفان سنوياً احتفالات النبي أيوب حيث يأتي سكان أحياء مختلفة في بيروت معاً لتنظيم مسيرة إلى شاطئ البحر وتقدم النساء الطبق البيروتي التقليدي الشهي المسمى بالمفتقة ويلعب الأطفال بالطائرات الورقية.

في وصف كيف يمارس الفضاء العام في الدالية من الضروري أن نفهم أنها مساحة تتكون على شكل الفئات الاجتماعية التي تشغلها وكنتيجة لممارسات اجتماعية. ما يثير اهتمامنا بشكل خاص في وضع الدالية انها تضع في موضع تساؤل الفكرة الحديثة الشائعة حول الأماكن العامة التي ترتبطها في الدولة من خلال منح مساحات مخصصة في المدينة بما يسمى "حديقة عامة" أو غيرها.

تفتح لنا الدالية إمكانيات جديدة لفهم الفضاء العام في بيروت كمساحات من التفاوض من خلال التفاعلات اليومية بين روادها وسكانها وبالتالي هي أماكن لا يمكن التنبؤ بها مسبقاً. هذا الشعور بالمفاجأة المستمرة بالمكان كان أيضا سمة من السمات الرئيسية لعرض "هذا البحر لي" نفسه.

الفنالحيكوسيلةاحتجاج

تأسست مجموعة الدكتافون بهدف تزويج البحث المديني بفن العروض الحية. الفكرة وراء هذا التعاون هو تعميم البحوث الأكاديمية من خلال اعطاء الجمهور فرصة لبناء علاقة مع الفضاء المدروس. كما وإنَ اتمام تدخلات مباشرة في الأماكن العامة يمكن اعتبارها بمثابة عمل سياسي يهدف للتغيير. لعل هذا هو السبب في وصف عرض "هذا البحر لي" من قبل بعض وسائل الإعلام على أنه "اعتصام".

الفكرة وراء العرض الحي أن مجموعة من الناس وهم عدد صغير من الجمهور وصياد ومؤدية يدخلون معاً على متن قارب صيد الى المنتجعات الخاصة على شاطئ بيروت آتين من البحر لمحاولة السباحة هناك مجاناً.

متسلحين بقوانين قديمة توضح أن الشاطئ حيث تصل مياه البحر هو مجال عام عبرنا الحدود التي وضعتها بعض المنتجعات الخاصة قي البحر وسبحنا مجاناً حيث كان يسبح أخرون مقابل بطاقات دخول باهظة الثمن تضمن أنَ الأغنياء والنخبة هم فقط القادرين على التمتع بالبحر. في وضع جسد المؤدية وأجساد الجمهور في أماكن غير مرغوب فيها تحول هذا العمل لفعل احتجاجي يهدف الى إعادة البحر والأماكن العامة المسروقة في المدينة.

قدم هذا العرض التفاعلي للجمهور فرصة لإعادة بناء اتصال مفقود مع البحر خارج التجربة المهيمنة للمنتجعات الخاصة والاستماع إلى قصص صياد كبير في السن قضى حياته على البحر وقصص حميمة عن صيادين أخرين منهم من ولد على الشاطئ وعانى من تهديدات مختلفة تجبره وعائلته على إخلاء بيوتهم. كما وشاركنا الجمهور هو أيضاً بقصص جديدة وبات نص العرض ينمو يومياً اذ نضيف اليه قصص الجمهور.

من شارك في العرض تأثر في جوانب مختلفة منه. البعض غضب عندما علم كيف تمكنت الشركات الخاصة والنخبة السياسية من استغلال شاطئ البحر تدريجياً وكيف خدعت بعض الأسر لبيع أراضيها. البعض الآخر أخذ يحلم بتفجير المباني الشاهقة التي تحجب منظر البحر. وأعرب البعض عن فرحتهم برؤية المدينة للمرة الأولى من منظور آخر أي البحر.

فتح مشروع "هذا البحر لي" نقاشا واسعاً حول الحيز العام في المدينة. حدث ذلك في الوقت الذي ظهرت فيه مبادرات أخرى تشاركنا المخاوف عينها على المدينة مثل مبادرة "مشاع" و"شط شطك". منذ ذلك الحين ونحاول في مجموعة الدكتافون المحافظة على هذا النقاش حول حقنا في الوصول الى البحر واستمرار عرض "هذا البحر لي". حولنا مؤخراً نص وتجربة العرض الى قطعة صوتية يمكن للجمهور تحميلها على هواتقهم والاستماع اليها خلال رحلة بحرية على متن قارب صيد أو خلال نزهة على كورنيش بيروت انطلاقاً من مرفأ الصيادين في عين المريسة ووصولاً الى دالية الروشة حيث تتوقف رحلتنا عند كل موقع على شاطئ بيروت عارضةً قصته وملكيته والقوانين التي تحكمه.

حملة"أنقذواالدالية" 

تواجه "الدالية" الروشة في بيروت حيث ينتهي عرض "هذا البحر لي" وهي أيضاً المكان المحوري في مناقشتنا مفهوم الفضاء العام على شاطئ البحر محاولة إغلاقها من الاستعمال العام ومخطط تحويلها إلى فندق فخم. تنضم مجموعة الدكتافون الى ناشطين محليين ومجتمع الصيادين وغيرهم من البيروتيين في حملة ضد إغلاق "الدالية" باعتبارها آخر الفضاءات العامة في المدينة. نشجعكم على توقيع هذه العريضة والانضمام الى الحملة الأهلية للحفاظ على دالية الروشة.

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تم تعديل هذه الترجمة الى العربية عن النص الأساسي باللغة الانكليزية الذي نشر في مجلة "أرت-ايست" ليتضمن المستجدات الأخيرة حول "الدالية".

"لا يقتصر الحقّ في المدينة على حريّة الفرد في الوصول إلى الموارد المدينيّة، بل هو الحقّ في تغيير أنفسنا من خلال تغيير المدينة وفقًا لرغباتنا... فحريّتنا في إنتاج مُدننا وإعادة إنتاجها تُعتبر أحد حقوقنا الإنسانيّة الأهمّ، لا بل أكثرها تعرّضًا للإهمال." (ديفيد هارفي 2008) 

الوصول إلى البحر هو كذلك أكثر من مجرد حق الوصول الى الموارد الطبيعية. هو حق جماعي وغيابه يكوَن ويحدد علاقتنا بالمدينة. للأسف تظهر على ساحل العديد من المدن والبلدات التي نعيش فيها منتجعات خاصة وفنادق ومراسي حصرية تحجبنا عنها جدران وبوابات ضخمة ورسوم دخول. النمو المستمر لمثل هذه المشاريع بالإضافة إلى المناطق العسكرية والمجتمعات المغلقة في العديد من المدن العربية تشير إلى أن هذه الحالة ليست ظاهرة فردية. سواء كانت تابعة لشركات خاصة أو طبقة سياسية حاكمة أو مؤسسات دولة، فقد أدت هذه التدخلات على الساحل الى إعادة تنظيم البيئة المبنية.

ما هي الظروف التي أنتجت خصخصة سواحلنا؟ هل نعرَف الفضاء العام عبر ربطه بمفهوم الملكية؟ ماذا يمكننا أن نتعلم من مراقبة الممارسات المجتمعية البديلة في المساحات المفتوحة في مدننا؟ وكيف يمكننا استعادة حقنا في الوصول إلى هذه الأماكن؟

حاولنا نحن في مجموعة الدكتافون عبر هذه النصوص التي نشرت أولاً في اللغة الانكليزية في مجلة "آرت-ايست" (نعيد نشرها الآن باللغة العربية) جمع أفكار تعالج فهمنا للفضاء العام من منظور الوصول إلى البحر. طلبنا مساهمات من ناشطين وفنانين وباحثين من لبنان والأردن والبحرين والسعودية وسوريا وفلسطين. وذلك بهدف فتح نقاش نقدي ومقارنة إمكانية وصولنا إلى البحر والممارسات الاجتماعية وحقنا في"إنتاج وإعادة إنتاج مدننا" (هارفي 2008). الأسئلة التي نطرحها جماعياً تعالج قضايا سياسة التنمية الليبرالية الجديدة ومفاهيم الفضاء العام والممارسات الاجتماعية البديلة المقاومة. أتت المساهمات على شكل مقالات بحوث مدينية أو توثيق لأعمال فنية مثل الغرافيتي وغيرها أو على شكل حملات محددة الهدف.

النص الأول "هذا البحر لي"لمجموعة الدكتافون يناقش فهم الحيز العام عبر استخدامه فن العروض الحية كوسيلة احتجاجية. يصف المقال العرض الحيَ المرتكز على بحث مديني الذي دعا الجمهور الى رحلة على متن قارب صيد لاكتشاف الظروف التي مكنت خصخصة ساحل بيروت. انتقالاً من بيروت تأتي المساهمة الثانية من البحرين وتتعلق بقضايا حول خصخصة سواحل الجزيرة بأكملها. يشير النص إلى تواطؤ مثير للاهتمام بين 'الحكومة' و'النظام'. تستكشف المساهمة الثالثة المنطقة المواجهة للبحر في اللاذقية في سوريا بالقرب من مخيم اللاجئين الفلسطينيين "الرمل". يحكي الكاتب قصة أرض على شاطئ البحر كانت تستخدم كموقع لمخيم طلائع البعث وهو موقع حافظ على طابعه العام بسبب استخدامه الغير الرسمي. بعد بداية الثورة السورية أصبح هذا الفضاء العام الغير رسمي معسكراً خاصة عندما هاجم جيش النظام مخيم الرمل بالسفن الحربية.

تصف مساهمة من المملكة العربية السعودية استخدام الغرافيتي في حملات ضد إغلاق الأراضي البحرية في الساحل الشمالي من "أبحر". تأتي المساهمة على شكل قصة صورية تشير إلى أهمية التدخلات البصرية في الأماكن العامة في التأثير على الوعي العام. تأخذنا مساهمة فلسطين في رحلة مختلفة تبدأ في حيفا: "في حيفا جلب البحر السلع ولكنه أيضاً جلب العدو." تروي الكاتبة قصصاً عن علاقة قوية تربط الفلسطينيين بالبحر وهي علاقة قد مزقها الاستعمار. 

المساهمة الأخيرة هو نص عن عمل فني لنهى عناب حول قياس المسافات من عمان إلى البحر في فلسطين. بينما كانت تعمل نهى على المشروع واجهها سؤال بديهي من قبل أحد الأطفال في حي اللويبدة في عمان: "أي بحر؟" فأجابت :"بحر آخر". ثم سأل طفل آخر:"وكيف نذهب الى هناك؟" أشارت نهى: "من هنا!"

من هذا العمل الفني كان مصدر إلهامنا لتسمية مجموعة هذه النصوص "البحر من هنا" في محاولة استفزازية منا أن نزحف معاً نحو البحر.

[This is a monthly roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Resistance and Subversion in the Arab world and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the DARS Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each monthly roundup to DARS@jadaliyya.com.]

News & Commentary

Women as Tools: On the Selective Fetishization of Female Resistance Fighters, by Roqayah Chamseddine
The fetishization of women during times of war, especially women in combat, can be argued as being a reification of patriarchal power; the patriarchal view of female violence as being a demonstration of chaos reimagined as tolerable and even acceptable so long as this violence serves patriarchy, militant or otherwise. Despite the female identity being granted space for violent expression, the sexualization of these spaces and the bodies which take up these spaces, has become normalized.

Young People and the Power of Protest, by Nazli Avsaroglu
The power of young people is changing in the new era of social protests. Young people have changing demands from their governments, and an ability to connect with their fellow students–and other citizens–using mainly social media to expose their voices to the world. If the new generation is the one who is at the forefront, then it means that it is dissatisfied with the current order.

In Bahrain, Human Rights Defenders Are Under Attack–But We Will Not Be Deterred, by Maryam al-Khawaja
Last week Zainab al-Khawaja, who is eight months pregnant, was arrested again, after only recently serving one year in prison. She was attending a court hearing on charges of “destroying government property” after tearing a picture of Bahrain’s king during a protest in 2012. Zainab has rejoined a large list of human rights defenders in the country who are languishing in prison in Bahrain for their human rights work and criticism of the regime; namely practicing their right to free expression. Human rights defenders are increasingly targeted by the Bahraini government, and international pressure on the United Kingdom and the United States, the closest allies to Bahrain, is how we can have an influence.

Interview with Imprisoned Bahraini Human Rights Activist Nabeel Rajab, by Malachy Browne
On a European advocacy tour in August and September, Nabeel Rajab was outspoken about governments’ inaction in tackling human rights abuses in Bahrain. Rajab, who has some 240,000 followers on Twitter, posted an online poll asking whether his followers supported or opposed the Bahraini government. Within days, the Ministry of the Interior issued a statement warning of the consequences of “misusing” social media to “disseminate false information and news.” During an interview in Ireland that week, Rajab, who was imprisoned for two years in 2012 for his public criticism of the government, said he interpreted this as a threat to re-arrest him upon his return to Bahrain—which is what happened.

Leading Bahraini Human Rights Defender Re-Arrested, by Tamsin Walker
Leading Bahraini activist Nabeel Rajab had barely arrived home after a two-month human rights advocacy tour in Europe, when he received a call instructing him to immediately appear before the Criminal Investigation Directorate (CID) in Manama. A statement said Rajab had been summoned in connection with "tweets posted on his Twitter account that denigrated government institutions."

Bahrain Opposition Announces Boycott of Parliamentary Elections, by Deutsche Welle
A coalition of Bahrain's four main opposition parties vowed on Saturday 11 October to stage peaceful protests instead of participating in the November parliamentary elections, accusing the Sunni monarchy of failing to heed calls for genuine democratic reform. The Gulf kingdom's largest opposition party by membership, the Shi’i movement known as al Wefaq, accused the royal family of "ignoring the legitimate demands of the people."

On the Possibility of Non-Violent Resistance in Palestine, by Georgia Travers
On the one hand, the adoption of collective civil disobedience strategies could have the ability to restore hope and purpose to the resistance of many Palestinians whose livelihoods are strangled by the occupation, while their leaders equivocate, mired in polarizing external (and internal) disputes.  If successful, mass nonviolent organizing by Palestinians and Israeli allies could transform the face of the conflict and obligate the Israeli government to change course.  However, executing such a strategy is exceedingly complex, and unfortunately, the rhetoric of nonviolence around this particular conflict is, in many cases, simplistic to the point of being counterproductive.

Hebrew University Threatens Palestinian Students With Expulsion Over Political Activities, by Rami Younis
Twelve Palestinian students are facing possible expulsion from Jerusalem’s Hebrew University for participating in an “illegal” political protest. In the past, the university only took steps against particular student groups. Now, it’s switching gears and targeting individual students.

IDF Court Convicts Palestinian Nonviolent Organizer, EU Human Rights Defender, by Haggai Matar
Abdullah Abu Rahmah, one of the central organizers of the popular resistance protests against the separation barrier in the West Bank village of Bil’in, was convicted of obstructing the work of a soldier by an Israeli military court last week. He will likely be sentenced to four months in prison.
Abu Rahmah, who was recognized by the European Union as a “human rights defender” dedicated to nonviolence, previously served over a year in prison for organizing “illegal marches” as well as for “incitement.” All political demonstrations are illegal for Palestinians under Israeli military law.

How Israel Silences Dissent, by Mairav Zonszein
Israeli society has been unable and unwilling to overcome an exclusivist ethno-religious nationalism that privileges Jewish citizens and is represented politically by the religious settler movement and the increasingly conservative secular right. Israel’s liberal, progressive forces remain weak in the face of a robust economy that profits from occupation while international inaction reinforces the status quo. In their attempt to juggle being both Jewish and democratic, most Israelis are choosing the former at the expense of the latter.

Silencing Dissent in Israel–continued, by Mairav Zonszein
Silencing dissent does not only mean directly quashing free speech. Silencing, or a chilling effect, also take place when certain forces in society dominate and monopolize the narrative, deciding what is acceptable, what is fringe and what is mainstream.

Israel’s Left Forgot What Dissent Really Means, by Dahlia Scheindlin
Based on the debate generated by Mairav Zonszein’s article on how Israel silences dissent, the author discusses the failure of Israel’s Left to make its case more convincingly about what is wrong with Israeli policy. In addition, Scheindlin points out to a number of state-sponsored limits of freedom of expression, such as the Nakba law, the boycott law and the NGO law, that target Arabs in Israel.

Iranian Women’s Fight Against the Hijab, by Omid Habibinia
Omid Habibinia talked to Jamileh Nedai, an Iranian writer, producer, and director, about women's historical struggle against mandatory hijab in Iran. Jamileh was among tens of thousands of women who took to the streets during the initial stages of the Islamic Revolution to demand a liberal attitude towards the traditional headscarf.

It Will Take More Than a Quiet Word in Iran’s Ear to Put Human Rights on the Table, by Azadeh Moaveni
First detained in June for trying to attend a volleyball match, Ghoncheh Ghavami remains in prison on charges of spreading propaganda against the regime, though her only real crime is one of civil disobedience. Alongside Ghavami, thousands of other ordinary Iranians are marooned in the Islamic Republic’s prisons for crimes of conscience. Iran’s extremists see themselves as permanent victims, and that view is unlikely to change if their interlocutors stop bringing up cases of genuine victims–Iranians such as Ghavami who are denied basic legal rights.

Istanbul’s Citizens Discover Green Solidarity, by Tessa Love
A year after the Gezi Park uprising–a protest that began as an act to save trees–exploded into anti-government protests around the country, the face of environmental activism in Turkey has changed. The demonstrations were ignited by concerns of rampant urban development, and later became an issue of human rights and democratization. Within twenty minutes of the arrival of bulldozers in Gezi Park in May 2013, throngs of people filled the park to block the construction, and they stayed for twenty days before being forced out by police. One year later, the movement is still alive and grass roots organizations have joined forces to make changes where they can.

Tunisia: Where the Arab Spring Still Shows Promise, by Carol Giacomo
In the chaos of the Middle East, there is still one place that’s not a disaster zone. It is Tunisia, where the Arab Spring was born and where the dream of coexistence between Islam and democracy continues to be championed by people like Rashid Gannouchi, the founder of Ennadha, the country’s main Islamist Party. The years since the 2011 revolution that overthrew Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, the authoritarian president, have hardly been smooth and there is still plenty of uncertainty as Tunisia prepares for legislative elections on 26 October and presidential elections a month later.

Muzzling Dissent: Saudi Arabia’s Efforts to Choke Civil Society, by Amnesty International
Saudi Arabia is persecuting rights activists and silencing government critics, according to a report issued by Amnesty International (AI). AI finds that members of the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA) have been persecuted since the start of the Arab Spring in 2011. The Saudi government has reportedly targeted eleven of the founding members of the ACPRA since 2011, eight of whom are currently detained, with the remaining three awaiting outcome of their trials. Saudi Arabia's justice system has drawn international criticism in recent years, especially with regard to its high number of executions.

Southern Movement Stages Mass Rally in Yemen, by Peter Salisbury
Tens of thousands of people have descended on the southern Yemeni port town of Aden to agitate for secession from a twenty-four-year-old union with the north, hoping that recent turmoil in the capital Sana'a has created an opening for a movement that has struggled in the past. Pro-independence campaigners have been gathering from across the south over the past two days in preparation for what the leaders of al-Hirak al-Janoubi, or the Southern movement, say will be the biggest rally in the group's history. It is timed to coincide with the fifty-first anniversary of an uprising that ultimately led to the withdrawal of British colonial forces from Yemen.

Path to Sanity: Political Humour in Egypt, by Amr Khalifa
The central dynamic of government repression and control has left Egyptians with negligible space for dissent. This is where political satire and humor come to the rescue, as a respite from and deconstruction of Egypt’s daily reality. Hilarity, imbued with a high dosage of cynicism towards any and all subject matter pertaining to the state, is a thin but important strand of hope. Comedy often passes through tweets, garnering hundreds of retweets. This is the danger for a regime struggling with its image as authoritarian: the more a joke spreads, the more it captures the national mood and uncovers an anger roiling beneath the surface.

Crackdown on Student Protesters in Egypt, by David D. Kirkpatrick
Egyptian security forces are tightening their crackdown on student activism by arresting scores of students at the start of the school term in an effort to crush a renewed wave of protests against the military-backed government that took power last year. At least ninety-one students have been arrested in Egypt since 10 October, according to the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression. Universities remain some of the last pockets of visible opposition to the military-backed government and they have previously been seedbeds for the collaboration among Islamist and left-leaning youth groups, who together led the 2011 uprising against former President Hosni Mubarak.

Three Years On and the Copts’ Plight Continues, by Mina Fayek
On 9 October 2011 a group of Egyptians organized a protest from Shubra district to Maspero, the headquarters of the Egyptian Radio and Television Union, to protest an attack that had taken place on a church in the Upper Egyptian city of Aswan. The goal was to also demand the resignation of the Governor, the end of discrimination against Copts and the enactment of a unified law for building houses of worship. Shortly after the march reached its destination, the military forces violently attacked it with live ammunition and by running over protesters, leaving more than twenty-five dead and hundreds injured, most of whom were Copts. This was a state crime, and three years later, justice has still not been served.

The Common Factor: Sexual Violence and the Egyptian State, 2011-2014, by Heather McRobie
The “epidemic” levels of sexual harassment and sexual assault of women in Egypt have been a defining feature of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period, extensively documented by activists and civic initiatives working to mitigate against it, yet a phenomenon that has persisted for the last three years since the revolution. Although the sexual violence of the revolutionary/post-revolutionary period developed from the pre-existing, alarming levels of sexual harassment and sexual assault in the Mubarak era, revolutionary/post-revolutionary sexual violence also had its own causes and dynamics, due to the politicized public space attained during the revolution.

The Obliteration of Civil Society in Egypt, by Amira Mikhail
With over eighty million citizens and around forty thousand registered local NGOs, despite a history of highly restrictive NGO laws, Egypt is described as having “one of the largest and most vibrant civil society sectors in the developing world.” Following the Egyptian revolution and despite a rapid and insistent expansion of civil society, the government’s relationship with NGOs only worsened, due to multiple attempts to pass more restrictive laws and an actual physical crackdown on existing NGOs. A new draft law could further restrict civil society by requiring human rights groups to request permission from the government to collect and document the human rights violations committed by the government.

Salman Rushdie to Share PEN Pinter Prize with Mazen Darwish, by Alison Flood
Salman Rushdie hopes to dramatize the plight of the imprisoned Syrian human rights activist Mazen Darwish by sharing his PEN Pinter prize with the journalist and lawyer. Darwish, founding president of the Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression, a ten-year-old organization that has documented human rights abuses in Syria since 2011, was arrested in February 2012. “Darwish courageously fought for civilized values—free expression, human rights—in one of the most dangerous places in the world,” said Rushdie.

Infographic – Protests: Measuring People Power, by The Economist
How do Hong Kong’s protests stack up against other displays of people power? They are brave and important, posing the biggest challenge from the streets to China’s government since Tiananmen Square in 1989. But in absolute numbers they are small: 100,000 is a fraction of the number of Catalans who marched in Barcelona last month seeking a referendum on independence from Spain; of Brazilians who demonstrated against corruption and poor public services in June 2013; or of Egyptians who took to Cairo’s streets a few days later to demand the resignation of the president, Muhammad Morsi.

Campaign

Saudi Activists Step Up Women’s Right-to-Drive Campaign, by Al Akhbar
Activists in Saudi Arabia are revving up a right-to-drive campaign using social media in the world's only country that bans women from getting behind the wheel. An online petition asking the Saudi government to "lift the ban on women driving" has attracted more than 2,400 signatures ahead of the campaign's culmination on October 26.

Art

Music Plays Crucial Role in Non-Violent Civil Movements, by Viola Gienger
For hundreds of years, music has been integral to rebellion, resistance and revolution. USIP is highlighting the power of a melody to inspire alternatives to violence. “Music and the arts are strategic tools of nonviolent action and need to be financed as such,” says USIP Senior Policy Fellow Maria Stephan, one of the world's leading scholars on strategic nonviolent action, in a new audio podcast.

Through These Mind-Blowing Paintings, Shurooq Amin Fights for the Underdog in Arab Society, by Your Middle East
Interview with Kuwaiti-Syrian artist Shurooq Amin on the responsibility to tackle sensitive issues in society.

Conferences & Events

Nonviolent Movements from Arab Street to Wall Street and Further, 30 October 2014, UCL, London, UK.

Painting Change: Creative Resistance in Egypt and Beyond, 30 October 2014, The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, Washington D.C., USA.

The Arab Uprisings in Comparative Perspective, 7 November 2014, George Mason University, Center for Global Studies, Arlington, USA.

Conference on Impact of Arab Uprisings on Citizenship in Arab World, 12-14 November 2014, University of Balamand, Lebanon. 

The Gulf Monarchies: From Arab Spring to Counter-Revolution, 11 November 2014, University of Bath, Bath, UK.

T.E. Lawrence and the Third Arab Uprising, 17 December 2014, Council for British Research in the Levant, London, UK.

Beyond the Arab Uprisings: Rediscovering the MENA region, Annual Conference of the Italian Society for Middle Eastern Studies, 16-17 January 2015, Ca’ Foscari University, Venice, Italy. 

From Contention to Social Change: Rethinking the Consequences of Social Movements and Cycles of Protests, ESA Research Network on Social Movements , 19-20 February 2015, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain

Call for Contributions: Translation and the Many Languages of Resistance, 6-8 March 2015, Cairo, Egypt.

ICCG2015: Precarious Radicalism on Shifting Grounds: Towards a Politics of Possibility, 26-30 July 2015, Ramallah, Palestine (Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2014). 

[تنشر جدلية بالاشتراك مع مجموعة الـدكتافون ومؤسسة "آرت-ايست" نصوصاً تتناول الحق في الوصول إلى الشاطىء في العالم العربي تحت عنوان "من هنا البحر". نشرت هذه النصوص باللغة الانكليزية على موقع آرت-ايست. تنشر سلسلة "من هنا البحر"تباعاً على موقع جدلية خلال الأسبوع القادم. ]

حيفا
-I-

استعمار يمهد لاستعمار

باشرت حكومة "الانتداب" البريطاني في فلسطين العام 1929 بتوسيع ميناء حيفا الصغير الذي أقامه العثمانيون عام 1908، عبر إقامة المنشآت الضخمة وتجهيزه بكافة الوسائل الحديثة المطلوبة لتشغيله(1).أدى ذلك إلى تغييرات جذرية في بنية المدينة الاجتماعية والسياسية، إذ ما فتئ الكثير من الفلسطينيين عائلات وفرادا الانتقال من قراهم المجاورة للسكن والعمل في حيفا التي كانت تشهد ازدهاراً اقتصادياً، سواء في الميناء نفسه أو في الأحياء التي طفقت تنبثق وتتطور بمحيطه(2).

على الرغم من الازدهار الذي جلبه الميناء إلى حيفا وأهلها، فقد خدم الميناء الجديد مصالح الاستعمار البريطاني ولاحقاً الاستعمار الصهيوني. من هنا فقد صبّ الاستعمار جلّ استثماراته في هذا الميناء تحديداً، مقابل تهميش مدن الموانئ الفلسطينية القديمة والحيوية الأخرى وتحديداً موانئ عكا ويافا، وذلك تمهيداً لتحويل حيفا إلى المدينة اليهودية المركزية حينئذ. وفي غضون عدة سنوات أضحى ميناء حيفا، الميناء التجاري الأكبر في فلسطين والثاني بعد ميناء مرسيليا على مستوى البحر الأبيض المتوسط(3). 

[حيفا: منظر عام من جبل الكرمل، في فترة الحكم العثماني [المصدر موقع كتاب "قبل الشتات"]

-II-

"داره على شط البحر"(4)

أدركت نجاح حينما لامست كفتا رجليها العاريتان الرمل لأول مرة، أنها قد خسرت الكفرينإلى الأبد.. هناك بمحاذاة البحر الشاسع المنسكب أمامها للمرة الأولى، لاطمت أمواج من الكرب والانقباض قلبها الوَجِل. كان قاتماً وبعيداً ولا يشبه البحر الذي أسهب زوجها ناجي في وصفه لأشهر قد طالت، قبل اقتناعها بانتقالهما إلى حيفا للعمل و"شوفة وجه ربنا شوي". "كل الناس بروحوا على حيفا اسا.. كل اشي فيها: قطارومسارح وكاركوز وحكواتيوصندوق الدنيا(5)، هدول كلهم حيفا وأكثر.. بكفيكي البحر!". كانت المرأة تنظر إلى زوجها بعين الشك والحزن كأنه يتحدث عن شيء غير موجود، فيردف "بشتغل بالمينا سنة سنتين منجمع قرشين وبعدين منرجع على الكفرين". تمتمت وعيونها تغرورق بالدموع "أهل الساحل شروشهم رمل(6)،قلبي حاسسني إنه هالقصة مش راح تنتهي على خير...".

تستذكر نجاح كل هذا فيما كانت تقف على الشاطئ ذلك اليوم من تشرين الأول العام 1947. كانت الجمعة الأولى من الشهر، السوق مهجورة وناجي همّ منذ الصباح إلى جامع الاستقلالالمحاذي للميناء، وسيبقى هناك حتى ساعة متأخرة من اليوم، فالقصص عن تقسيم فلسطين وانسحاب الإنجليز من البلد كانت تنتشر كالنار في الهشيم، وغالباً سيتداول الرجال في "الاستقلال" آخر المستجدات ونوايا الدول العربية بالرد على تقسيم فلسطين. انهلّت الأفكار على نجاح وهي تواجه البحر الذي لم يتوقف طيلة الأشهر الماضية بالقدوم بسفن تحمل اليهود الأوروبيين، والتي ازدادت بكثرة في الأسبوعين الأخيرين من ذلك الشهر العويص.

ولم يمض وقت طويل بعد كل هذا ليخرب العالم. في التاسع والعشرين من ذلك العام صوتت الأمم المتحدة على تقسم فلسطين، وباتت حيفا كسائر نواحي فلسطين غير آمنة ومهزوزة في وقت توالت فيه الأخبار عن المجازر التي تملأ البلاد. "من شان الله.. خلينا نرجع على الكفرين.. بدي أشوف أهلي.. هناك أأمن إلنا"، إلا أن ناجي كان يرفض؛ إذ لم يكن ليخبرها أن الكفرين قد سقطت قبل أيام قليلة.. دُمرت وهُجر أهلها وفيهم عائلته وعائلتها دون أن يعرف مصير أو وجهة أحد منهم.

حسمت الأشهر القادمة مصير حيفا المحاصرة بين بحر وجبل استحلهما الأعداء، إذ قصف الصهاينة  المناطق المأهولة بالفلسطينيين الواقعة أسفل جبل الكرمل وعلى سفحه، وسيّلوا باتجاهها أنهاراً من النفط والوقود المشتعل وبراميل مملوءة بالمتفجرات من أعالي الجبل. يوم 21 نيسان 1948 كانت نجاح في شقتهم الصغيرة التي استأجروها في حي "وادي النسناس"، تسمع بمكبرات الصوت دعوات اليهود لهم بالفرار قبل فوات الأوان(7)، عندما جاءها ناجي فزعاً وسحبها من يدها هارباً بهما.  

[لاجئون فلسطينيون يصعدون إلى قوارب صيد للهروب إلى غزة ومصر في الجنوب، وإلى لبنان في الشمال ]
[المصدر من الانترنيت، ظهرت الصورة والوصف في كتاب بابيه "التطهير العرقي في فلسطين"]

ما أن تخطيا عتبة البيت حتى سحبتهم الجموع الفارّة صوب البحر، حيث تجمعت في السوق القديمة التي تبعد أقل من مئة متر عن بوابة الميناء المغلقة يحرسها عدد من رجال الشرطة. خروج الفلسطينيين بحراً، كان كل ما بغاه الصهاينة وهم يقذفون الآن بمدفع الهاون الذي نصبوه على منحدرات الجبل المطلة على السوق والميناء حشود المجتمعين في السوق، فما كان من هؤلاء إلا أن أقتحموا بوابة الميناء يفرون دون هدى باتجاه البحر، وتكدسوا في قوارب حملت بعضهم إلى عكا المجاورة، وبعضهم ابتلعه البحر لفرط طمع بقارب طفحت حمولته وفاضت بآلامها(8).بعضهم كانت وجوههم مألوفة وأخر غرباء.. بيد أن جميعهم تقاسموا ملامح القلق والذعر ذاتها. بكت نجاح وانتحب ناجي وهو يسمع زوجته تردد "البحر ما يقذف إلا الميت(9)".

-III-

البحر أعطى والبحر أخذ

حمل البحر معه البضائع والماشيةإلى حيفا وجلب الحداثة والتطور، إلا أنه حمل الأعداء أيضاً. عبر ميناء حيفا دخل المهاجرون اليهود من أوروبا إلى فلسطين واستوطنوها. وحسبت مصادر صهيونية رسمية أن زيادة السكان اليهود في المدينة في الفترة ما بين سنة 1931 وسنة 1938، بـ239%، الأمر الذ ضخّم عدد سكان المدينة اليهود من 15،923 شخصاً إلى 54،118 (10).

[صورة لاحدى البواخر المحملة باليهود القادمين من أوروبا ترسو في ميناء حيفا في تاريخ 18 تموز 1949]
[المصدر: صحيفة The Daily Mail]

كانت حيفا "المعقل" الأخير في فلسطين الذي تركه الانجليز، تحديداً لكونها الميناء الأساسي في فلسطين، بيد أن بقاءهم تمثّل بحماية الميناء دون أي شيء آخر؛ دون قرابة الـ50 ألف فلسطيني الذين طُردوا من حيفا عبر بوابة الميناء إياه، بعد يومين من ترك الانجليز للمدينة، لتسقط حيفا عشية  يوم 21 نيسان 1948.(11)

يافا

-I-

إسكلة،تعني بالتركية رصيف عليه منارة.

أشار العثمانيون إلى يافا في سجلاتهم بالـ"إسكلة" للتدليل على الأهمية التي كانوا يعيرونها للمدينة، بوابة أوروبا للديار المقدسة(12)

[يافا من البحر [المصدر: Before the Diaspora]

بعد النكبة هُمش تماماً ميناء يافا، وأغلق في شهر تشرين الثاني 1965، وبوشر ببناء ميناء أشدود عام 1961 وانتهى عام 1965، لتصير موانئ الملاحة في فلسطين المحتلة ثلاثة هي: حيفا وأشدود وايلات(13)

-II-

كـ"الذهاب إلى ميناء يافا"

كان ميناء يافا مشاكساً صخرياً ضحل المياه لا يتعدّ عمقها المترين، ما عوّق رسوّ السفن الكبيرة فيه فكانت ترسو على مسافة بعيدة في عمق البحر. الحجيج القادم إلى أرض المقدس من أوروبا والعالم ولغاية مطلع القرن التاسع عشر، والذي كانت يافا عتبته الوحيدة لبيت المقدس، قد عانى من خطورة المرور بين الصخور عند دخول الميناء، فشاعت بين البحارة من هولندا وألمانيا في القرون الوسطى مقولة كـ"الذهاب إلى ميناء يافا" للتدليل على "الذهاب إلى الهلاك، كما لو كان مكاناً خطراً لا مثيله له، إلى درجة يضعف أمل العودة منه بسلام".(14)حتى أن بعض تجار أوروبا كانوا يراهنون الراحلين إلى الأراضي المقدسة على ثرواتهم، أي أن المسافر يقبض ما يعادل ثروته من التاجر الذي راهنه إذا عاد إلى بلاده سالماً، كما أن المسافر يترك كل ثروته لهذا التاجر إذا لم يعد إليها.(15)

وكانت امرأة اسمها فرنسيس املي نيوتن قد قصّت عن أختها التي سكنت يافا، وكانت قد نزلت في ضيافتها ذات يوم خطيبة طبيب المستشفى الاسكتلندي بيافا. فاعتزمت أختها الذهاب إلى القاهرة  لتجلب كعكة عرس صالحة احتفاء بضيفتها. فشاكسها بحر يافا أيّما مشاكسة. فكانت أن سافرت إلى بور سعيد ومنها إلى القاهرة واشترت منها كعكة العرس، وقامت الباخرة من بور سعيد حتى إذا واجهت يافا وقد هاج بحرها مخرت إلى بيروت وثانية واجهت يافا وارتدت تواً إلى بور سعيد. وفي الثالثة استسلمت الأخت فنزلت في حيفا وعادت إلى يافا براً بمركبة مسيرة يومين ... وهاذا أمر كعكة عرس مع بحر يافا.(16)   

-III-

أيوب والبحر

لا تملّ أمي أبداً من سرد قصة لقائها بوالدي على كل جليس، وخصوصاً على مسامعي، أنا ابنتها الوحيدة التي لم تتزوج. وقعت أمي بالحب بُعيد طقس أربعاء أيوب(17)بثلاثة أيام.. كانت قد أتمت عشرينها في الأسبوع ذاته. "وكنت حاطة الحزن بالجرن وقاعدة أتحسر على حظي..  واللهي خفت لأعنس وأقعد بوجه أبوي وامي بلا جوز" تقول أمي. أغلب الظن أن أفكار شبيهة كانت تجول في رأس أمها –جدتي- أيضاً، وهي تدفعها للتسبح في بحر يافا لتغني مع باقي الفتيات العزباوات في أربعاء أيوب "يا بحر جيتك زايرة من كثر ما أنا بايرة... كل البنات اتجوزت وأنا على شطك دايرة"(18).

"كل الناس مسيحية وإسلام كانوا يغنوا مع العزابيات.."، كانت عينا أمي تتسعان وتبرقان كما لو أن الحب أوقعها بأحابيله للتو. "المهم، كنت رايحه عبيت عمتي مريم. كانت بنتها بدها تتجوز وكنا نساعد في التحضيرات. كانت أصغر مني بأربع أشهر. بالطريق لما كنت مارقة جنب المينا اجا شاب تلاي وقال لي إنو شافني بأربعا أيوب قبل كم يوم وإنو حابب يخطبني". وتقسم أمي ألف قسم أنها شعرت بأيوب يغدق        بنعمه عليها في تلك اللحظة، لكن سرعان ما كانت تمتمم مردفة بحسرة وهي تنظر إليّ "لكن أيوب مثل يافا مش راح يرجع".

["نظراً إلى غياب التنظيم العسكري السليم والدفاع المدني المنظم، فقد انهارت معنويات المدنيين الفلسطينيين في إثر الهجمات المشتركة التي شنتها قوات الهاغاناه والإرغون. هنا نرى النساء والأولاد يحاولون إنقاذ بعض ممتلكاتهم وهم يفرون من المدينة." [المصدر: Before the Diaspora]]

["المدنيون الفلسطينيون بعد إلقائهم في البحر: ميناء يافا، أواخر نيسان/ أبريل 1948. هاجر عشرات الآلاف من سكان يافا والقرى المجاورة ـ عن طريق القوارب ـ إلى غزة ومصر، ومات عدد كبير منهم غرقاً"  [المصدر: Before the Diaspora]

كان صيف العام 1946 آخر مرة تشهد فيها يافا طقس أربعاء أيوب، بيْد أن اليافيين حملوا معهم الطقس إلى غزّة التي نزح عدد كبير منهم إليها بعد سقوط يافا يوم 13 أيار العام 1948. لكن سرعان ما أخذت تبدلات الحياة وطائلها على اللاجئين بنثر غبارها على أيوب وأربعائه، وبدأت الناس تتخلف عنه مع اعتلاء جمال عبد الناصر سدّة حكم مصر في الستينيات، ونشره للفكر التقدمي الماركسي الذي صوّر طقس أربعاء أيوب والشعائر الأخرى على كونها بدائية متخلفة ونعتها بكونها "ممارسة عجائز الفلاحين". كما اعتبر الاخوان المسلمون وتلتهم حركة حماس، أربعاء أيوب طقساً وثنياً ومنتهكاً لحرمة الجسد الأنثوي، وتحديداً عندما كانت ترتمي النساء العاقرات على أمواج البحر وهن يرددن استغاثة بالنبي "لقّح لقّح يا أيوب". وفي العام 1982 مع الاجتياح الإسرائيلي للبنان، نجحت حماس والتيار الاسلامي من الاستفادة من الجو النفسي العام لتحريم الطقس نهائياً(19)

غزّة 

-I-

غزاة غزّة

"قطعنا 170 ميلاً في الصحراء. أكلنا في أثناء سيرنا لحوم الكلاب والحمير والجمال وشربنا المياه التي كنا لا نعثر على غيرها في طريقنا. وكثيراً ما كانت تمر علينا أوقات لم يكن لدينا فيها قطرة ماء. ولكن في غزّةاختلف الطقس وتغير كل شيء، وفي الأيام الثلاثة التي قضيناها فيها كانت الرياح عاصفة والأمطار منهمرة والسماء مكفهرة مما ذكرني في طقس باريز". نابوليون بونابرت، Bonaparte’s Adventure in Egypt by P. G. Elgood[20]       

"أُف أيها الصديق الذي أعرفه في غزة. لقد كان من سوء حظ مواطنيك أنهم اختاروا فلسطين محلاً لإقامتهم دون أن يتبرع أحدهم بأن يقرأ الفنجان ويعرف مقدماً أن سيدنا موسى عليه السلام يزمع أن يحرر أبناء الرب من قبضة فرعون ويقودهم عبر الصحراء إلى أول أرض خصبة تصلح لإقامتهم. لقد كان بوسعكم أن تعرفوا مقدماً أن هذه الأرض هي فلسطين لأن بقية المنطقة كلها صحراء، وتعرفوا أيضاً أن سيدنا موسى عليه السلام سيعطيها لأبناء الرب دون إذن منكم، وكان بوسعكم أن تتجنبوا الإبادة على يد الرب نفسه الذي تقدس اسمه في الأعالي".

الصادق النيهوم، "حكاية لطفل أعرفه من غزّة"(21) 

-II-

الطراد فاروق يغرق في بحر غزة

"كان يرسو على مقربة من شاطئ غزة قبيل اعلان الهدنة الثانية طرادان(22)مصريان يحمل احداهما اسم فاروق والثاني فريدة. فاقتربت منهما في 16 تموز (يوليو) سنة 1948، وبعد اعلان نبأ الهدنة بساعة واحدة أربع سفن يهودية حربية. وعندما دخلت المياة الاقليمية أحس قائد الطراد فاروق بالخطر، فاتصل بالقاهرة، وطلب أن يعطى الأمر بضربها ولكن القيادة العليا بالقاهرة رفضت اعطاء مثل هذا الأمر. ثم كرر طلبه مرة ثانية، فثالثة. مؤكداً للمسؤولين في القاهرة أن باستطاعته أن يدرأ عنه الشر بمدافعه. فقيل له:

"لا تضرب، إلا بعد أن يضرب اليهود". وكان أولئك المسؤولون يخشون خرق الهدنة في ساعاتها الأولى."

وفيما كان المصريون في تردد وحيرة من أمرهم: أيضربون، أم لا يضربون، انطلقت ناسفتان يهوديتان احداهما باتجاه الطراد المصري فاروق والأخرى باتجاه فريدة. وأصابت الأولى فاروق في مقدمته، فشطرته شطرين وما هي إلا لحظة حتى غاب عن الأنظار، فاستقر في قعر اليم. وأما الطراد الثاني فلم يصب بأذى.

حدثني مفتش الميناء محمود أحمد دباش الغزي، أنه غرق مع الطراد أحد عشر نفر من بحارته، وأن خمسة وسبعين منهم قد نجوا، وأن الفضل في انقاذهم يعود للبحارة من أبناء غزة واللاجئين الذين هبوا للنجدة من كل صوب." عارف العارف، النكبة الفلسطينية والفردوس المفقود(23)

-III-

صيادون في بحر ضيق

"أُحِلَّ لَكُمْ صَيْدُ الْبَحْرِ وَطَعَامُهُ مَتَاعًا لَّكُمْ وَلِلسَّيَّارَةِ"

 [سورة المائدة، الآية 96]

"مخيم الشاطئ" أو الشاطئ الذي بات مخيماً، بعدما استقبل ألوفاً تشردوا من مدنهم الساحلية ووصلوا غزة عبر البحر. هؤلاء الذين افترشوا الشاطئ بيتاً وعمّروه، بات تعدادهم اليوم قرابة الـ90 ألف لاجئ، يقطنون في مساحة لا تتجاوز 0.52 كيلومتراَ مربعاً(24).عمل عدد كبير منهم بصيد السمك واعتاشوا من البحر، لكنه وهم الذين ائتمنوه وجاوروه رغم غدره بهم مرة، غدرهم ثانية. إذ بات طيّعاً بيد الاستعمار يمطّ الفسحة المتاحة للصيد ويقلصها على هواه، بغية افقار غزة وهي الغنية بالبحر وبغيره؛ وكان ذلك هدفاً تكتيكاً اعتمدته اسرائيل ضد غزة في مجمل ما قامت به على مدى أعوام الحصار السبع العجاف. 

[مخيم الشاطئ في غزة [المصدر: موقع Palestine Remembered] ]

في كل مرة كانت اسرائيل تلسع غزة بكعب أخيلها، البحر.. فمن الـ20 ميل التي تم التوافق عليها ضمن اتفاقية أوسلو، قلصت المسافة أولاً في العام 2002 إلى 12 ميلاً، ثم 6 أميال في العام 2006 بعد خطف الجندي الاسرائيلي جلعاد شاليط، ثم أعقبتها بقرض 3 أميال أخرى من البحر بعد حربها بين كانون الأول 2008 وكانون الثاني 2009 على غزّة. أضافت تفاهمات وقف اطلاق النار بعد حرب العام 2012 ثلاث أميال إلى الثلاث القائمة، ولكن إذ بإسرائيل تعاود في آذار 2013، تقليصها لثلاثة أميال في توقيت هو الأسوأ إذ ينتظر الصيادين هذا الشهر لكونه شهر الذروة لتصيد سمك السردين؛ لتعود بعد شهرين إلى مطّها لستة أميال. قبيل يومين من الحرب الأخيرة على غزّة، قلّصت اسرائيل مساحة الصيد إلى ثلاثة أميال، ثم سدته تماماً طيلة 50 يوماً من الحرب على غزة.  

[حلقة من برنامج غزة تنتصر، بعنوان "الصيد تحت النيران في غزة"، من اعداد قناة الجزيرة وتقديم مراسليها في قطاع غزّة – تامر المسحال ووائل الدحدوح باشتراك عدد من الصياديين الغزاويين (13/8/14)]

اليمّ الذي صار بركة من ثلاثة أميال، ينتقص للثروة السمكية والأسماك الكبيرة الحجم والأكثر قيمة. فيعود منها الصيادون برزق شحيح للغاية لا يسد رمق العائلات وبالكاد يغطي مصاريف الرحلة من أجور عمال ووقود للمركب، أو لسدّ ثمنه في حال اقترض صاحبه المبلغ من البنك لشرائه. الصيادون خسروا البحر، وهو خسرهم بدوره. إذ يقدّر انخفاض عدد الصيادين في غزة في الفترة ما بين 2000 وحتى 2013 من 10 آلاف صياد إلى 3500 صياد فق(25)

لا تنته آلام الصيادين في لعبة المد والجزر هذه التي يلعبها الاستعمار بهم، إذ كثيراً ما يتقصدهم حتى وهم ضمن الحدود  التي أقامها لهم.. فاستشهد الكثيرون منهم أو أصيبوا أو اعتقلوا أو صودرت مراكبهم إلى غير رجعة. لقد خشي الناس البحر في العصور القديمة إعتقاداً منهم أنه يجلب الشر والشياطين والمخلوقات المخيفة(26).من هنا اختلطت علاقة الانسان والبحر بالواقعي والخيالي، ونُسجتْ الأساطير حول البحر الذي يغرر بالناس مكيداً لهم المآكد ليبتلعهم، ولكن واقع غزة اليوم يعيد تعريف الأساطير. بدل أن يصطاد الناس في بحر غزة يصطادهم الاستعمار ويوقعهم فريسة في بحر غريق، كأنه يردد "لا أساطير في غزة.."

أغنية زفّها البحر(27)

[صيادون في غزة عام 1937 [المصدر: موقع Palestine Remembered]

ان طحتوا المراكب خظخظوا الميه

تروّحوا سالمين يا نور عينيه

**

ان طحتوا المراكب خظخظوا المالح

الله يقف معكم والنبي الصالح

**

حسّبت المراكب حاملة تفاح

وتريها المراكب حاملة الملاح

**

حسّبت المراكب حاملة ليمون

وتريها المراكب حاملة الحنون

**

غابت عليك الشمس يا طايح البابور

عينك تلجلج ولا تدري عَ وين تدور

"العودة المحزنة إلى البحر"

جالت هذه المنمنات على طول خط الساحل الواصل ما بين حيفا وغزّة. في حيفا عشتُ وبيافا مررتُ، فيما عصت عليّ غزة فما بلغتها وما كحلت بتربها من شدة الشوق أجفاني كما قال الإمام الشافعي فيها. أزمان المنمنمات لا تتقاطع بالضرورة، فيها كنت الراوية حيناً والقارئة حيناً والباحثة أو العابرة أحياناً. المراجع تعددت ما بين المكتوب والمسموع والمرئي التاريخي والمعاصر؛ كالبحر ذاته.. الحديث المستحدث الغابر الهادر الصامت.  

مياه كثيرة قفزت عنها في تجوالي فهناك طبرية التي علقت بالذهن كفردوس اجتاحه الأشرار، كما وصفها أنيس صايغ. وهناك موائل مياه مدينة عكا، التي كانت أحد المنافذ لاحتلال المدينة حينما لوثها الصهاينة بجرثومة التيفوئيد(28).وهناك قرى حيفا التي صارت زبد ذاكرة، نذكر منها اجزم وعين لام والطنطورة. وهناك جسر الزرقاء، القرية الفلسطينية الوحيدة التي أبقيت على شاطئ البحر، ولكنها محرومة منه والاحتلال يسد طريقها إليه. وهناك أسدود وهناك البحر الميت الذي أخبرني لاجئ سبعيني من القدس، عن الطقس الذي أقاموه لغاية نكسة 1967، حينما كانت تتحلق العائلات على ضفاف البحر عندما يكتمل القمر بدراً، فيتأمل نفسه في وجه البحر حتى لتحسبه ناهضاً من موته. وهناك بحيرة الحولة التي قتلها الاستعمار... وهناك بعدُ الكثير من الماء ليحصى.

عشت ثماني سنوات في حيفا حيث درست في الجامعة وعملت لاحقاً. أغرق في شبر ميّ ولم أحب السمك إلا منذ عدة سنوات فقط. بيد أن السكن في مدينة ساحلية، يعني أن تراوح في مكانك فيما البحر تتلاطم أمواجه بك يومياً. البحر جميل بل ساحر ورائع إذا ما أطللت عليه من كرمل حيفا. بلى، هو كذلك.. لكن بعد هذه البحث، بتّ أدرك أمراً واحداً؛ لقد انكسر شيء بيني وبينه إلى الأبد.

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Mali, South Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania, Djibouti, and Comoros Islands and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the On the Margins Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each month's roundup to info@jadaliyya.com.]  

Mauritania 

Watch the Trailer for Mauritania's First-Ever Oscar Submission 'Timbuktu' Abderrahmane Sissako's drama about Al Qaeda militants taking over a town in 2012 premiered during the Cannes Film Festival.

Question et guerre du Sahara mauritanien The early days of the Polisario Front as viewed through French diplomatic correspondence.

Mauritania uncovers ISIS cell ISIS jihadists come from a variety of different countries, including Mauritania, where four sympathizers were arrested on 12 October.

Mauritania, Morocco bolster security ties Morocco and Mauritania, which share a long mutual border, are vowing to step up security collaboration. 

The Eye of the Sahara Is An Enigmatic Desert Landmark The Richat Structure in Mauritania as seen from the International Space Station. 

Plaidoirie sur l'esclavage déguisé en milieu Soninké de Kaedi et de Djéol A plea against disguised slavery by the Soninké in Kaedi and Djéol.

Noura Mint Seymali wants to modernise the sounds she grew up with Moorish music has not received the love it deserves. Mauritanian musician, Noura Mint Seymali is trying to change that.

Somalia

Somalia's Firsts The last two years have seen big changes in Somalia, BBC Somali's Abdullahi Abdi reflects on what these "firsts" say about a country and people that has experienced years of uncertainty.

A Safe Harbour A short documentary about the Somali sailor's community in Cardiff, Wales.

Excursive Interview with Neil Wigan British Ambassador to Somalia"Our good relationship with Somaliland is not with expense of Somalia."

The imminent prospect of Somalia attracting huge investment Somali government says the country is on the imminent prospect of attracting huge investment after the president's meeting with MEDEF in Paris. 

An inspiring book fair, a raft of challenges In Somaliland, a novelist is berating the audience at the Hargeisa International Book Fair over what he sees as the inherent cruelty of Somali society. 

Djibouti

Sudan, Djibouti and Kenya set to benefit from Ethiopia’s power supply Ethiopia has connected its power grid with Djibouti in order to supply cheaper and cleaner hydropower processed electricity.

Always from Afar: Marginalization, Territory, and Conflict in the Afar Triangle The authors explore two of the ethnic groups involved in some of the most visible conflicts in Djibouti, the Issa-Somali and the Afar. 

Interview with Zakaria Abdillahi, President of the Djibouti League for Human Rights Zakaria Abdillahi speaks with the International Federation for Human Rights on the authorities' repression of protests in Djibouti following elections.

Comoros Islands

Comoros uneasy with France over Mayotte“Everything in Mayotte, the history, culture, religion and even way of life is just simply Comorian, apart now from the illegal French government.” 

France’s Indian Ocean prize“Mayotte is part of Comoros. Decolonization means colonization is supposed to stop. We cannot be four islands, and then become three.” 

‘Huge gaffe’ sparks row between Libya, Iran in Comoros“It is more than an unpleasant situation or a misunderstanding,” a foreign ministry official said, requesting anonymity. “It is a huge gaffe.”

Mali 

The First African Ebola Vaccine Is Being Tested in Mali Three Malian health-care workers have become the first recipients of a new, experimental Ebola vaccine in Africa's first-ever trial of this kind.

Mali : vaste opération de l’armée française à Kidal French reports say arms seizures in northern Niger included an SA-7 system that may have been operational.

Alger: 3e partie des négociations pour le dialogue inter-malien New round of Mali negotiations begins in Algiers, but will the result be any different from the past? 

Largest Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey Ever Conducted in Africa"This report gives us, for the first time, a broad and comprehensive view of the justice needs of the citizens of Mali."

Women Beyond the Veil in Mali A photographer traveled throughout northern Mali speaking with women who with varying experiences during their lives in Mali.

La guerre expéditionnaire française au Mali vu par la Rand Corporation“France's War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army.”

South Sudan

South Sudan nearly shoots itself in the foot An edict the South Sudan ministry of labor issued caused international havoc by telling all foreigners working in the country to leave within a month. 

Four Questions with US Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan US Special Envoy for South Sudan discusses recent political developments, and articulates US policy toward the country.  

The role of social media in the South Sudan crisis A study of social media use during the recent crisis in South Sudan suggests that social media was instrumental in facilitating violence.

When will the Peace Process move beyond delays and deadlocks? The lethargic pace of the peace process is foremost a consequence of the parties’ belief that victory can be obtained on the battlefield. 

Caught in the Crossfire Child soldiers in South Sudan have few alternatives.

China Deploys Troops to Defend Oil Fields This marks a sharp escalation of China’s efforts to ensure the safety of its workers and assets and guarantee a steady flow of energy for domestic consumption.

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Turkey and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Turkey Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to turkey@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.]

English

Kobane, ISIS, Turkey-US Relations in the Wake of Kobane

Kobane Battle: A Summary for Beginners and/or the Confused“Just a small note written by a revolutionary to other revolutionaries, that summarizes the minimum information about the acute situation in Kobane and describes what actions to take.”

Stateless Democracy: The Revolution in Rojava Kurdistan (1)-(2) Livestream recording of the “Stateless Democracy” conference, which discusses the Kurdish resistance in Kobane against ISIS, as well as the politics and culture of Rojava and the formation and growth of ISIS.

Turkey NATO Ambassador in the BBC Hot Seat over Kobane / ISIS In an interview with the BBC, the Turkish Ambassador to NATO, Mehmet Fatih Ceylan, explains why Turkey refuses to join the international coalition to stop ISIS.

Turkey to Let Iraqi Kurds Cross to Syria to Fight ISIS Kareem Fahim and Karam Shoumali relay that Turkey will allow Iraqi Kurdish forces, known as peshmerga, to cross its border with Syria to fight with ISIS.

Ankara Struggles to Maintain Bearings in Kobani Fehim Taştekin argues that the AKP has been compelled to change its approach towards Kobane and ISIS under US pressure.

Kobani and Turkish-American Relations Kılıç Buğra Kanat argues that the conflicting messages and ambivalent signals from Washington are confusing Turkey about the US strategy in Kobane.

What Do Kobani Airdrops Mean for Regional Politics? Analyzing US bombings of ISIS positions around Kobane, Amberin Zaman argues that the US is likely to use its new leverage on the PYD to goad it into opposing Assad.

Tensions Over IS Resurface in Turkish-US Ties Semih İdiz comments that Turkey opposes US-supplied weapons going to Syrian Kurds, but has no power to prevent it and has failed to convince Washington that Kobani is of no strategic value.

Facing the Causes of ISIS Key to Strategy“Considering that the Western campaign against al-Qaida has led to the organization's geographical expansion, rather than curbing its influence—what the world needs to do to reach different results is to adopt structural policies,” writes Taha Özhan.

Turkey Pays Huge Price because of Erdoğan's Obsessions According to Cafer Solgun, “it once again became clear during the Kobani crisis that the government does not have a realistic and operational Syria policy.”

Turkish Foreign Policy Hits Another Cul-de-Sac Suat Kınıklıoğlu suggests that Turkey’s foreign policy in Kobane “was untenable from the beginning,” and has only gone on to alienate virtually all of Turkey’s allies.

Turkey's War of Perception Robert Ellis comments on Turkey’s aims to replace its negative perception in international public opinion in the wake of ISIS crisis with a “healthy perception.”

Erdoğan's Two-Faced Game PlanŞahin Alpay suggests that the inconsistencies of the current government’s approach to Kobane are part of a “two-faced” election strategy, wherein President Erdoğan condemns Kurdish politics in order to win Turkish nationalist votes while PM Davutoğlu continues peace talks with the PKK in order to win Kurdish votes.

Who Is in Charge, and How? According to Yavuz Baydar, the crisis in leadership over Kobane—not only in Turkey and in Syria, but in the international coalition and NATO as well—has distracted us from the escalation of the Assad regime’s brutal campaign.

The US and Turkey: An Alliance of Necessities Gökhan Bacık claims that the growing rift between the US and Turkey over issues like Syria and Turkey’s increasing authoritarianism is only being held together by the pressing crisis of Kobane.

A Loneliness that Isn't Worth Much Examining the discrepancies between Turkish and American intervention (or lack thereof) in Kobane, Cengiz Aktar suggests that the US will step up its support for Kurdish fighters and Erdoğan’s estrangement from the rest of the world will only grow deeper.

Who Prefers ISIL to Kurds? Mustafa Akyol claims that the deep-seated aversion to the PKK (and by extension, the Kurds) has led both secular and Islamic Turkish nationalists to have a rather ambivalent view on ISIL and the siege of Kobane.

Is Kobane a Trojan Horse for Turks? Commenting on Turkey’s ambivalence toward Kurds and the peace process, Güven Sak wonders whether we should see the siege on Kobane as a Trojan horse aimed at Turkey for “when it brings its guard down.”

Peace and Reconciliation Process

Öcalan: There Is a Need for Courageous Political Steps Abdullah Öcalan declared that, far from the resolution process “dying and ending,” it has actually entered a brand new and a more hopeful stage as of 15 October.

Have the Kurds Played Their Cards Wrong on Kobani Protests? According to Tülin Daloğlu, the fragile atmosphere between the Turkish government and the Kurdish movement has fractured again in the wake of Kobane.

The State’s Responsibilities During the Crisis… Ali Bayramoğlu argues that the government’s allowing for the Peshmerga to cross into Kobane will provide an opportunity for the partial easing of the bottleneck of the peace process.

What’s Happening in the Resolution Process and at Kobani? Abdülkadir Selvi suggests that Prime Minister Davutoglu believes that they will reach success in the peace and resolution process.

Something's Wrong with Turkey’s Kurdish Peace Bid Although both the Turkish government and the Kurdish movement reflect an optimism about the future of the peace process, there are too many “ifs” in their statements, writes Murat Yetkin.

Is There Consensus on the Peace Process "Road Map" or Not? Analyzing Öcalan’s and Erdoğan’s recent statements about the peace process, Ismet Berkan argues that peace process has been put back on track.

Erdoğan and the Peace Process Emre Uslu argues that Erdoğan deceived the public about the peace process in order to gain some time for the AKP’s victory before the next elections.

Kobani and the Solution Process Orhan Miroğlu is afraid that the Kurdish movement would tie the future of the peace process to Kobane.

AKP's Shortsighted Approach to Kurdish Question Orhan Kemal Cengiz argues that the AKP does not adopt the peace process to swiftly changing circumstances.

Domestic Politics: Closing the Corruption Files, Erdoğan-Gülen Struggle, Latest Judicial Reform Package

Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Turkey OECD’s report on “Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Turkey” is “seriously concerned” about Turkey’s ability to detect and investigate foreign bribery.

Closing the Corruption Files Günal Kurşun comments on the public prosecutor’s decision to drop all charges of the 17 December corruption and bribery case.

Caricature of Justice and the EU“Exactly when the prosecutors were closing down the corruption file, police officers, some of whom were on the investigation team into the corruption scandal, were being transferred to a maximum-security prison in Silivri,” writes Orhan Kemal Cengiz.

Erdoğan Angles to Tag Gülenists as a National Security Threat Metin Turcan relays that the President Erdoğan wants to include the Gülenist movement as a national security threat to Turkey.

Gülen Community Should Return to Civil Society“The Gülen community today must acknowledge that its strategy has backfired and proved counterproductive, jeopardizing the very civil society realm it intended to ‘safeguard,’” writes Mustafa Akyol.  

Turkish Government Aims to Restructure Military Police Commenting on the AKP’s new bill aiming at putting gendarmerie under civilian control, Tülin Daloğlu argues that it might be linked to the ongoing peace process or to preventing the gendarmerie from helping law enforcement pursue corruption charges against the government.

AKP Proposes "German Model" for Turkish Police According to Pınar Tremblay, Turkey's latest judicial reform package is an open-ended extension of law enforcement powers, indicating further erosion of the rule of law.

Turkish Navy Sails through Rough Seas According to Metin Turcan, after the Sledgehammer trials saw many naval officers detained and forcibly retired, Turkey is now displaying its navy to bolster the “New Turkey” vision in both the domestic and global scene.

Other Pertinent Pieces

Declaration by Scholars for Peace in Solidarity with the Saturday Mothers of Turkey“On 25 October 2014, the Saturday Mothers will remind us for the five hundredth time of the daughters and sons they have lost due to the forced disappearances on the part of the state, mostly in the Kurdish region.”

On the Occasion of the Saturday Mother’s 500th Vigil for the Disappeared Nancy Kricorian relays her firsthand observations from the five hundredth vigil of the Saturday Mothers in Istanbul for their disappeared relatives.

How a Turkish Leftist Gave His Life to Save Kurdish Kobane“All I wanted to do is bring some spark to the lives of unlofty people, to a world without a spark, to a world which has been reified,” writes Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı, who died while defending Kobane against ISIS.

After Gezi: Erdoğan and Political Struggle in Turkey The recent Global Uprisings documentary chronicles a year of resistance and repression that has left Turkey profoundly divided in the wake of the Gezi uprising.

Forbidden Fruit: Censorship at Antalya Golden Orange 2014 Kaya Genç comments on the controversies and censorship aroused around Love Will Change the Earth (Yeryüzü Aşkın Yüzü Oluncaya Dek), a documentary on last year's Gezi Park uprisings.

"When Greeks and Turks Meet: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Relationship Since 1923" William Eichler’s book review for When Greeks and Turks Meet, edited by Vally Lytra, demonstrates the long history of coexistence between Turks and Greeks.

Israel Accuses Turkey of Aiding Hamas Coup Plan Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon accused Turkey of being indifferent to the preparations of Hamas' Istanbul office to attempt a coup against Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, writes Tülin Daloğlu.

Turkish Central Bank Fails to Combat Inflation The governor of Turkey's Central Bank has done well in financial stability, but time is running out for him to control inflation, writes Mehmet Çetingüleç.

Turkish Government Aims to "Save" Marriages Turkey’s government has launched a drive to curb the divorce rate, up thirty-eight percent over the past decade, but the services it has offered have come under criticism as meddling in citizens’ private lives, writes Tülay Çetingüleç.

Judicial Regulation Grip on FoE According to BIA Media Monitoring Report, nineteen journalists were arrested in October, whereas twenty-one journalists were exposed to violence.

Turkish

Kobane, ISIS, Turkey-US Relations in the Wake of Kobane

Kobanê'de Kürtler, sosyalistler, ve emperyalistlerİrfan Aktan analyzes the ambivalent political stance of the Turkish left toward the Kurdish movement, asserting that “the greatest possible resistance against the AKP’s attempts to establish a more authoritarian, fascist system with every passing day might be to strengthen the Kurdish movement at the negotiating table.”

Gelinen nokta… Cengiz Çandar suggests that the emerging relationship of the US with Kurds outside of Iraqi Kurdistan—namely, the PYD—has opened the way for American diplomatic relations with the PKK, indicating a new era of US foreign policy and the “bankruptcy” of the AKP regime’s foreign policy.

Erdoğan'ın Kobani'de anlayamadığı, göremediği According to Cengiz Çandar, Erdoğan fails to see how Kobane is understood by the world, and his approach to the issue—that is, managing the Turkish public opinion—is not productive.

Kobani'den bir mektup! Fahmi Taştekin lists Salih Müslim’s requests from the Turkish government and argues that the demands for “safe borders, peace, and humanity” are not too much.

Yeni bir Maan mı bekliyorsunuz? Hasan Sivri highlights the situation in Hama, a cosmopolitan Syrian village under ISIS attack, warning against a possible massacre against Alevis.

Rojava devrimini içten yıkmak Mahir Sayın deciphers the shift in Turkey’s politics regarding Kobane, in light of the government’s general stance towards Kurdish cantons in Syria.

Erdoğan Kürtlere neden kılıç çekti? Hadi Muhammedi traces Turkey’s political strategy about Syria and speculates about the consequences of the controversial relationship between ISIS and Turkey for the country and the region.

Kobane maskeleri düşürüyor Hüseyin Ali remarks that the Turkish government's stance towards Kobane reflects an inherent animosity to Kurds, and the continuation of this stance would block the peace process.

Erdoğan, Kürt milliyetçiliği kartına oynuyor Abbas Vali expresses his views on the reasons for the attack by ISIS on Kobani, the contradictions in the Turkish government’s policies in the peace process, and the current situation in Syria.

Kobanê ve ABD: “Emperyalist haydutlardan patates ve silah almak" Foti Benlisoy addresses the controversy around the US help to Kobane, arguing for a nuanced political perspective and a balanced stance between ideological determinism and absolute pragmatism.

Beş soruda Kobani’ye askeri yardım Ruşen Çakır’s answers critical questions regarding the military help to Kobane.

PKK ile PYD aynı mı Amberin Zaman argues that the president’s equation of the PKK with the PYD is problematic and limits opportunities to address problems with regards to both domestic and regional politics.

Kötü haber: Kürtler kahraman oluyor! Esra Arsan gives an account of how the Turkish media portrayed the Kobane protests in Turkey, detailing the strategies used to create consent for the government's policies.

İktidarın, ‘’Kobanê Çelişkileri’’ Mehmet Boran addresses the contradictions in the government's statements regarding Kobane and questions the initial reluctance to intervene.

Sınırdaki, hatta içimizdeki tehlike: Peşaver sendromu Mete Çubukçu discusses in detail the potential repercussions of training a “new oppositional force” against ISIS in Turkey.

Devlet olmayan devlet Burhan Ekinci’s impressions on social, political, and cultural life in Erbil.

PYD emperyalizmle işbirliği mi yapıyor? Commenting on the recent debates among the Turkish left about the US bombing of ISID and support for the PYD, Ridvan Turan rhetorically asks “Is the PYD collaborating with imperialism?”

National Security Bill

Güvenlik reformunun mantığı: Almanya’nın polisini alalım, yargısını almayalım According to Berke Özenç, Turkey adopted German security regulations without incorporating the judicial measures to prevent human rights abuses.

Dr. Gülşah Kurt: Bunlar dudak uçuklatan düzenlemeler; güvenlik devletine gidiyoruz Gülşah Kurt points out the problem of impunity in the Turkish judicial system, and warns against the consequences of the security discourse.

Bir savaş hazırlığı olarak "Güvenlik" Paketi Kemal Göktaş details the “real” motivations behind the Security Bill.

Ne mutlu polisim diyene: Artık ‘akla’ değil ‘kafaları’na göre arama yapabilecekler! Ali Topuz scrutinizes the Security Bill proposal, citing possible undemocratic practices that might spring from the regulation.

İç güvenlik paketi ve otoriterleşme Analyzing the content of the Security Bill, Mehmet Karlı argues that the AKP government is moving towards an authoritarian regime.

The Saturday Mothers’ 500th Vigil for the Disappeared

Cumartesi Anneleri/İnsanları 19 yaşında Bianet gives a list of news covering 2009-2014 for the Saturday Mothers’ long struggle in search for their loved ones.

Rosa Arjantin'den Cumartesi'yi selamlıyor Rosa Tarlovsky from Plaza de Mayo talks about her struggle to find her children who were kidnapped by the military regime and recounts her visit to the Saturday Mothers in 1998.

500 haftadır adalet aranıyor A. Hicri İzgören marks the significance of the Saturday Mothers’ struggle in keeping the history of state violence alive in Turkey.

Arjantin’den 500. haftaya kayıplar ve hakikat mücadelesi Hülya Dinçer gives a history of Plaza de Mayo's thirty seven-year old struggle for truth, and draws lessons for the struggle in Turkey.

Video-haber: Dört dakikada 500 hafta A four-minute video depicting the five-hundred-week-old struggle of the Saturday Mothers.

Peace and Reconciliation Process

Öcalan: Süreci sabote etmek isteyenler fırsat kolluyor A summary of Abdullah Öcalan’s most recent comments about the ongoing peace process and the events in Kobane, as related by the HDP delegation.

Öcalan, tavşana kaç tazıya tut mu dedi? Abdülkadir Selvi claims that Abdullah Öcalan and the Kurdish movement have taken advantage of events like the Gezi protests and the 17 December “coup” to avoid keeping their word in the peace process.

Nereye kadar?Çandar continues to criticize Erdoğan’s take on the PYD as an obstacle to the peace process and questions the sustainability of equating ISIS with the PKK.

Dolmabahçe'de konuşulanlar Ali Bayramoğlu analyzes a recent meeting of the “Wise People Committee” (Akil İnsanlar Heyeti) with the Prime Minister and his cabinet, arguing that the meeting proves the dynamism of the Committee as well as the government’s commitment to the peace process.

AKP ve süreç Examining the AKP government’s discourse on the peace process in relation to the new security bill, Beşê Hozat says that “the AKP’s roadmap is not a map for the solution; it is a dead-end.”

"İmralı iyi, Kandil kötü" diye diye… According to Ruşen Çakır, the government has an imbalanced approach to the peace process that privileges negotiations with Öcalan and sees Cemil Bayık as trying to sabotage the process.

Barış süreci, iktidar ve ilahi Sırrı! (1)-(2) Nuray Mert accuses Kurdish politicians, especially Sırrı Sureyya Önder, of omitting the AKP’s ever-increasing authoritarian moves for the sake of the peace process.

Ne iyi bir savaş vardır ne de kötü bir barış Sırrı Süreyya Önder’s answer to Nuray Mert’s controversial article.

‘Çözüm süreci’ anlayışları Ahmet Selim argues that both parties are waiting for a compromise in order to reach the peace in their own imaginations.

Nerdesin ‘kardeş’!Özgür Güven argues that Kobane has become a litmus test for the “brotherhood” rhetoric that has been deployed by the Turkish public for decades.  

Other Pertinent Pieces

Karanlık kuytularda birbirimize fener olalım! Müştereklerimiz (Our Commons) initiative analyzes the parallels between the struggle in Kobane and the Gezi/post-Gezi resistance, describing the geopolitical significance of Kobane and the revolutionary potential of the Rojava governmental structure.

Gezi sanatının direnişi ve Sema Yayla As a result of a public protest at the trial of Ethem Sarısülük’s murderer, in which she threw red paint on the front door of the Ankara courthouse, Sema Yayla was sentenced to six years in prison; this blog post calls on the public to protest at her court hearing, which took place last week.

Görevine son verilen Prof. Ökçesiz: Akademide ağalar ve marabalar var In an interview with Olga Ünaydın Azizoğlu, Hayrettin Ökçesiz discusses his termination from the position of Rector at İstanbul Aydın University and remarks upon the limits on academic freedom and the cronyism of private education.

Şüpheli kaza, kaçırma girişimi, suikast; Türkiye'de neler oluyor?Ümit Kıvanç describes the suspicious accident that killed Press TV reporter Serena Shim in Suruç, the attempted kidnapping of a commander in Urfa by a Syrian opposition group, and the assassination of the former Suruç mayor and his son.

"Ölü Kadınlar Memleketi" çıktı Burçe Bahadır introduces her new book, Ölü Kadınlar Memleketi, about femicide and gender-based murders in Turkey.

İnsanlık suçu işleniyor In an interview, architect Doğan Hasol names ongoing construction/development projects in Istanbul as “crimes against humanity.”

İmre Azem’in kamerasından Validebağ direnişiİmre Azem’s video recording of Validebağ resistance against the government’s attempts to demolish the grove for the construction of a mosque.  

Validebağ’da belediyeden parsel cinliği: Numara değiştirilip yargı baypas ediliyor Nur Banu Kocaaslan condemns Üsküdar Municipality for demolishing Validebağ Grove for making profit.

Published on Jadaliyya

Erdogan, Turk milliyetciligi kartina oynuyor

Declaration by Scholars for Peace in Solidarity with the Saturday Mothers of Turkey

Liberalizmin tasfiyesi ve Ortadogu'da alacakaranlik

In Memory of Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı

Evden Emlağa Fikirtepe: Rant ve Spekülasyon Ekseninde Kentsel Dönüşüm

Turkey’s New Migration Policy: Control Through Bureaucratization

[This is a monthly roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Resistance and Subversion in the Arab world and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the DARS Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each monthly roundup to DARS@jadaliyya.com.]

News & Commentary

Women as Tools: On the Selective Fetishization of Female Resistance Fighters, by Roqayah Chamseddine
The fetishization of women during times of war, especially women in combat, can be argued as being a reification of patriarchal power; the patriarchal view of female violence as being a demonstration of chaos reimagined as tolerable and even acceptable so long as this violence serves patriarchy, militant or otherwise. Despite the female identity being granted space for violent expression, the sexualization of these spaces and the bodies which take up these spaces, has become normalized.

Young People and the Power of Protest, by Nazli Avsaroglu
The power of young people is changing in the new era of social protests. Young people have changing demands from their governments, and an ability to connect with their fellow students–and other citizens–using mainly social media to expose their voices to the world. If the new generation is the one who is at the forefront, then it means that it is dissatisfied with the current order.

In Bahrain, Human Rights Defenders Are Under Attack–But We Will Not Be Deterred, by Maryam al-Khawaja
Last week Zainab al-Khawaja, who is eight months pregnant, was arrested again, after only recently serving one year in prison. She was attending a court hearing on charges of “destroying government property” after tearing a picture of Bahrain’s king during a protest in 2012. Zainab has rejoined a large list of human rights defenders in the country who are languishing in prison in Bahrain for their human rights work and criticism of the regime; namely practicing their right to free expression. Human rights defenders are increasingly targeted by the Bahraini government, and international pressure on the United Kingdom and the United States, the closest allies to Bahrain, is how we can have an influence.

Interview with Imprisoned Bahraini Human Rights Activist Nabeel Rajab, by Malachy Browne
On a European advocacy tour in August and September, Nabeel Rajab was outspoken about governments’ inaction in tackling human rights abuses in Bahrain. Rajab, who has some 240,000 followers on Twitter, posted an online poll asking whether his followers supported or opposed the Bahraini government. Within days, the Ministry of the Interior issued a statement warning of the consequences of “misusing” social media to “disseminate false information and news.” During an interview in Ireland that week, Rajab, who was imprisoned for two years in 2012 for his public criticism of the government, said he interpreted this as a threat to re-arrest him upon his return to Bahrain—which is what happened.

Leading Bahraini Human Rights Defender Re-Arrested, by Tamsin Walker
Leading Bahraini activist Nabeel Rajab had barely arrived home after a two-month human rights advocacy tour in Europe, when he received a call instructing him to immediately appear before the Criminal Investigation Directorate (CID) in Manama. A statement said Rajab had been summoned in connection with "tweets posted on his Twitter account that denigrated government institutions."

Bahrain Opposition Announces Boycott of Parliamentary Elections, by Deutsche Welle
A coalition of Bahrain's four main opposition parties vowed on Saturday 11 October to stage peaceful protests instead of participating in the November parliamentary elections, accusing the Sunni monarchy of failing to heed calls for genuine democratic reform. The Gulf kingdom's largest opposition party by membership, the Shi’i movement known as al Wefaq, accused the royal family of "ignoring the legitimate demands of the people."

On the Possibility of Non-Violent Resistance in Palestine, by Georgia Travers
On the one hand, the adoption of collective civil disobedience strategies could have the ability to restore hope and purpose to the resistance of many Palestinians whose livelihoods are strangled by the occupation, while their leaders equivocate, mired in polarizing external (and internal) disputes.  If successful, mass nonviolent organizing by Palestinians and Israeli allies could transform the face of the conflict and obligate the Israeli government to change course.  However, executing such a strategy is exceedingly complex, and unfortunately, the rhetoric of nonviolence around this particular conflict is, in many cases, simplistic to the point of being counterproductive.

Hebrew University Threatens Palestinian Students With Expulsion Over Political Activities, by Rami Younis
Twelve Palestinian students are facing possible expulsion from Jerusalem’s Hebrew University for participating in an “illegal” political protest. In the past, the university only took steps against particular student groups. Now, it’s switching gears and targeting individual students.

IDF Court Convicts Palestinian Nonviolent Organizer, EU Human Rights Defender, by Haggai Matar
Abdullah Abu Rahmah, one of the central organizers of the popular resistance protests against the separation barrier in the West Bank village of Bil’in, was convicted of obstructing the work of a soldier by an Israeli military court last week. He will likely be sentenced to four months in prison.
Abu Rahmah, who was recognized by the European Union as a “human rights defender” dedicated to nonviolence, previously served over a year in prison for organizing “illegal marches” as well as for “incitement.” All political demonstrations are illegal for Palestinians under Israeli military law.

How Israel Silences Dissent, by Mairav Zonszein
Israeli society has been unable and unwilling to overcome an exclusivist ethno-religious nationalism that privileges Jewish citizens and is represented politically by the religious settler movement and the increasingly conservative secular right. Israel’s liberal, progressive forces remain weak in the face of a robust economy that profits from occupation while international inaction reinforces the status quo. In their attempt to juggle being both Jewish and democratic, most Israelis are choosing the former at the expense of the latter.

Silencing Dissent in Israel–continued, by Mairav Zonszein
Silencing dissent does not only mean directly quashing free speech. Silencing, or a chilling effect, also take place when certain forces in society dominate and monopolize the narrative, deciding what is acceptable, what is fringe and what is mainstream.

Israel’s Left Forgot What Dissent Really Means, by Dahlia Scheindlin
Based on the debate generated by Mairav Zonszein’s article on how Israel silences dissent, the author discusses the failure of Israel’s Left to make its case more convincingly about what is wrong with Israeli policy. In addition, Scheindlin points out to a number of state-sponsored limits of freedom of expression, such as the Nakba law, the boycott law and the NGO law, that target Arabs in Israel.

Iranian Women’s Fight Against the Hijab, by Omid Habibinia
Omid Habibinia talked to Jamileh Nedai, an Iranian writer, producer, and director, about women's historical struggle against mandatory hijab in Iran. Jamileh was among tens of thousands of women who took to the streets during the initial stages of the Islamic Revolution to demand a liberal attitude towards the traditional headscarf.

It Will Take More Than a Quiet Word in Iran’s Ear to Put Human Rights on the Table, by Azadeh Moaveni
First detained in June for trying to attend a volleyball match, Ghoncheh Ghavami remains in prison on charges of spreading propaganda against the regime, though her only real crime is one of civil disobedience. Alongside Ghavami, thousands of other ordinary Iranians are marooned in the Islamic Republic’s prisons for crimes of conscience. Iran’s extremists see themselves as permanent victims, and that view is unlikely to change if their interlocutors stop bringing up cases of genuine victims–Iranians such as Ghavami who are denied basic legal rights.

Istanbul’s Citizens Discover Green Solidarity, by Tessa Love
A year after the Gezi Park uprising–a protest that began as an act to save trees–exploded into anti-government protests around the country, the face of environmental activism in Turkey has changed. The demonstrations were ignited by concerns of rampant urban development, and later became an issue of human rights and democratization. Within twenty minutes of the arrival of bulldozers in Gezi Park in May 2013, throngs of people filled the park to block the construction, and they stayed for twenty days before being forced out by police. One year later, the movement is still alive and grass roots organizations have joined forces to make changes where they can.

Tunisia: Where the Arab Spring Still Shows Promise, by Carol Giacomo
In the chaos of the Middle East, there is still one place that’s not a disaster zone. It is Tunisia, where the Arab Spring was born and where the dream of coexistence between Islam and democracy continues to be championed by people like Rashid Gannouchi, the founder of Ennadha, the country’s main Islamist Party. The years since the 2011 revolution that overthrew Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, the authoritarian president, have hardly been smooth and there is still plenty of uncertainty as Tunisia prepares for legislative elections on 26 October and presidential elections a month later.

Muzzling Dissent: Saudi Arabia’s Efforts to Choke Civil Society, by Amnesty International
Saudi Arabia is persecuting rights activists and silencing government critics, according to a report issued by Amnesty International (AI). AI finds that members of the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA) have been persecuted since the start of the Arab Spring in 2011. The Saudi government has reportedly targeted eleven of the founding members of the ACPRA since 2011, eight of whom are currently detained, with the remaining three awaiting outcome of their trials. Saudi Arabia's justice system has drawn international criticism in recent years, especially with regard to its high number of executions.

Southern Movement Stages Mass Rally in Yemen, by Peter Salisbury
Tens of thousands of people have descended on the southern Yemeni port town of Aden to agitate for secession from a twenty-four-year-old union with the north, hoping that recent turmoil in the capital Sana'a has created an opening for a movement that has struggled in the past. Pro-independence campaigners have been gathering from across the south over the past two days in preparation for what the leaders of al-Hirak al-Janoubi, or the Southern movement, say will be the biggest rally in the group's history. It is timed to coincide with the fifty-first anniversary of an uprising that ultimately led to the withdrawal of British colonial forces from Yemen.

Path to Sanity: Political Humour in Egypt, by Amr Khalifa
The central dynamic of government repression and control has left Egyptians with negligible space for dissent. This is where political satire and humor come to the rescue, as a respite from and deconstruction of Egypt’s daily reality. Hilarity, imbued with a high dosage of cynicism towards any and all subject matter pertaining to the state, is a thin but important strand of hope. Comedy often passes through tweets, garnering hundreds of retweets. This is the danger for a regime struggling with its image as authoritarian: the more a joke spreads, the more it captures the national mood and uncovers an anger roiling beneath the surface.

Crackdown on Student Protesters in Egypt, by David D. Kirkpatrick
Egyptian security forces are tightening their crackdown on student activism by arresting scores of students at the start of the school term in an effort to crush a renewed wave of protests against the military-backed government that took power last year. At least ninety-one students have been arrested in Egypt since 10 October, according to the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression. Universities remain some of the last pockets of visible opposition to the military-backed government and they have previously been seedbeds for the collaboration among Islamist and left-leaning youth groups, who together led the 2011 uprising against former President Hosni Mubarak.

Three Years On and the Copts’ Plight Continues, by Mina Fayek
On 9 October 2011 a group of Egyptians organized a protest from Shubra district to Maspero, the headquarters of the Egyptian Radio and Television Union, to protest an attack that had taken place on a church in the Upper Egyptian city of Aswan. The goal was to also demand the resignation of the Governor, the end of discrimination against Copts and the enactment of a unified law for building houses of worship. Shortly after the march reached its destination, the military forces violently attacked it with live ammunition and by running over protesters, leaving more than twenty-five dead and hundreds injured, most of whom were Copts. This was a state crime, and three years later, justice has still not been served.

The Common Factor: Sexual Violence and the Egyptian State, 2011-2014, by Heather McRobie
The “epidemic” levels of sexual harassment and sexual assault of women in Egypt have been a defining feature of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period, extensively documented by activists and civic initiatives working to mitigate against it, yet a phenomenon that has persisted for the last three years since the revolution. Although the sexual violence of the revolutionary/post-revolutionary period developed from the pre-existing, alarming levels of sexual harassment and sexual assault in the Mubarak era, revolutionary/post-revolutionary sexual violence also had its own causes and dynamics, due to the politicized public space attained during the revolution.

The Obliteration of Civil Society in Egypt, by Amira Mikhail
With over eighty million citizens and around forty thousand registered local NGOs, despite a history of highly restrictive NGO laws, Egypt is described as having “one of the largest and most vibrant civil society sectors in the developing world.” Following the Egyptian revolution and despite a rapid and insistent expansion of civil society, the government’s relationship with NGOs only worsened, due to multiple attempts to pass more restrictive laws and an actual physical crackdown on existing NGOs. A new draft law could further restrict civil society by requiring human rights groups to request permission from the government to collect and document the human rights violations committed by the government.

Salman Rushdie to Share PEN Pinter Prize with Mazen Darwish, by Alison Flood
Salman Rushdie hopes to dramatize the plight of the imprisoned Syrian human rights activist Mazen Darwish by sharing his PEN Pinter prize with the journalist and lawyer. Darwish, founding president of the Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression, a ten-year-old organization that has documented human rights abuses in Syria since 2011, was arrested in February 2012. “Darwish courageously fought for civilized values—free expression, human rights—in one of the most dangerous places in the world,” said Rushdie.

Infographic – Protests: Measuring People Power, by The Economist
How do Hong Kong’s protests stack up against other displays of people power? They are brave and important, posing the biggest challenge from the streets to China’s government since Tiananmen Square in 1989. But in absolute numbers they are small: 100,000 is a fraction of the number of Catalans who marched in Barcelona last month seeking a referendum on independence from Spain; of Brazilians who demonstrated against corruption and poor public services in June 2013; or of Egyptians who took to Cairo’s streets a few days later to demand the resignation of the president, Muhammad Morsi.

Campaign

Saudi Activists Step Up Women’s Right-to-Drive Campaign, by Al Akhbar
Activists in Saudi Arabia are revving up a right-to-drive campaign using social media in the world's only country that bans women from getting behind the wheel. An online petition asking the Saudi government to "lift the ban on women driving" has attracted more than 2,400 signatures ahead of the campaign's culmination on October 26.

Art

Music Plays Crucial Role in Non-Violent Civil Movements, by Viola Gienger
For hundreds of years, music has been integral to rebellion, resistance and revolution. USIP is highlighting the power of a melody to inspire alternatives to violence. “Music and the arts are strategic tools of nonviolent action and need to be financed as such,” says USIP Senior Policy Fellow Maria Stephan, one of the world's leading scholars on strategic nonviolent action, in a new audio podcast.

Through These Mind-Blowing Paintings, Shurooq Amin Fights for the Underdog in Arab Society, by Your Middle East
Interview with Kuwaiti-Syrian artist Shurooq Amin on the responsibility to tackle sensitive issues in society.

Conferences & Events

Nonviolent Movements from Arab Street to Wall Street and Further, 30 October 2014, UCL, London, UK.

Painting Change: Creative Resistance in Egypt and Beyond, 30 October 2014, The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, Washington D.C., USA.

The Arab Uprisings in Comparative Perspective, 7 November 2014, George Mason University, Center for Global Studies, Arlington, USA.

Conference on Impact of Arab Uprisings on Citizenship in Arab World, 12-14 November 2014, University of Balamand, Lebanon. 

The Gulf Monarchies: From Arab Spring to Counter-Revolution, 11 November 2014, University of Bath, Bath, UK.

T.E. Lawrence and the Third Arab Uprising, 17 December 2014, Council for British Research in the Levant, London, UK.

Beyond the Arab Uprisings: Rediscovering the MENA region, Annual Conference of the Italian Society for Middle Eastern Studies, 16-17 January 2015, Ca’ Foscari University, Venice, Italy. 

From Contention to Social Change: Rethinking the Consequences of Social Movements and Cycles of Protests, ESA Research Network on Social Movements , 19-20 February 2015, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain

Call for Contributions: Translation and the Many Languages of Resistance, 6-8 March 2015, Cairo, Egypt.

ICCG2015: Precarious Radicalism on Shifting Grounds: Towards a Politics of Possibility, 26-30 July 2015, Ramallah, Palestine (Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2014).